WI Germany wins 1st battle of Marne?

The two corps sent east aren't nessesarry!
Just take 1 Army from the useless battle of Lorraine and you have more troups than you need.

IIRC Van Creveld calculated that the transportation wasn't sufficient to move a left wing army to the front in time for the Marne; they could take trains to the Belgian border but I think would have to foot-march the rest of the way.
 

BooNZ

Banned
On the 20th of August there was an opportunity for 1st, 2nd and 3rd German armies to encircle both the BEF and 5th French Army, but there was nobody in command to see and seize this opportunity.

I believe also on the 23/24 August there was an opportunity to drive into a gap between the French 4th and 5th Armies but again no commander to see it and make it happen.

As far as commanders, are we referring to Moltke J at his mediocre best, the exceeding competent Schlieffen in his prime, or the sublime Moltke the Elder? Or alternatively, an accomplished gamer with fog-of-war switched off and a pause button handy...

Are you refering to Motke J's mental health issues, or the overall German command structure - I understood the Germans command structure was comparatively decentralised, so where is the failure; was this gap not identified, was the nature of this gap not correctly assessed, or did the German command ignore excellent/ actionable intelligence?

IIRC Van Creveld calculated that the transportation wasn't sufficient to move a left wing army to the front in time for the Marne; they could take trains to the Belgian border but I think would have to foot-march the rest of the way.

Van Creveld also suggested the outcome of Marne was academic, because the Germans were on thier last legs.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Was the destruction of an allied army remotely possible at the Marne?


They killed a field army's worth of men at Verdun.

Destroy as in encirclment and capture, or kill every last man in a unit so that it simply ceases to exist? No.

Reduce one to a division's worth of men? Probably.
 
As far as commanders, are we referring to Moltke J at his mediocre best, the exceeding competent Schlieffen in his prime, or the sublime Moltke the Elder? Or alternatively, an accomplished gamer with fog-of-war switched off and a pause button handy...

Are you refering to Motke J's mental health issues, or the overall German command structure - I understood the Germans command structure was comparatively decentralised, so where is the failure; was this gap not identified, was the nature of this gap not correctly assessed, or did the German command ignore excellent intelligence.

I'm talking about the OTL German command structure, which was not suited to the task. Motlke was in overall command, but he had woeful communications so couldn't follow the course of the battle let alone impose his will on it. 1st Army was put under 2nd Army on and off during the campaign, but it wasn't a formal Heeresgruppe with an Armee-Abteilung to make Bulow's task of commanding his own 2nd Army manageable which commanding 1st Army as well.

Ideally Moltke would have had world-class communications, equivalent to the best of the other armies had, in order to keep abreast of the course of the battles so that he could balance the needs of the right wing, the left wing and the Eastern front. The right wing ideally needed a proper Heeresgruppe (commanded by the agressive Kluck?) whose own army would have an Armee-Abeiling of 5 or so divisions with a specific task (maybe finding the flank no matter what, or keeping contact with the other Army no matter what) so he wouldn't have to worry about that task within his own army. A heeresgruppe should be have a large scope and span of control and be close enough to the fighting to see and seize opportunities exceeding the scope of a single Army fighting one on one. If Moltke had a good communications suite he could order 3rd Army to go to support the Heeresgruppe or not as needed because he'd have access to accurate and timely information, while still having a decentralised command system. That should transform the opportunities 20-25 August to encircle and destroy a French Army and maybe the BEF.

Van Creveld also suggested the outcome of Marne was accademic, because the Germans were on thier last legs

But the Germans would win the Race to the Sea.

They killed a field army's worth of men at Verdun.

Destroy as in encirclment and capture, or kill every last man in a unit so that it simply ceases to exist? No.

Reduce one to a division's worth of men? Probably.

The difference is time; at Verdun an Army worth of men was destroyed over a period of months as divisions were rotated through the front line and back for rest and refitting and reinforcement. At Tannenberg the Russians lost 70,000 casualties and 92,000 men and 350 guns were captured, this is a totally different thing!
 

FBKampfer

Banned
The difference is time; at Verdun an Army worth of men was destroyed over a period of months as divisions were rotated through the front line and back for rest and refitting and reinforcement. At Tannenberg the Russians lost 70,000 casualties and 92,000 men and 350 guns were captured, this is a totally different thing!

Consider though, assuming a POD that allows the Germans to win at the Marne, we need to do away with the Allied numerical superiority in one manner or another. I doubt the French will have the ability to just pull an entire corps out of the line for rest and refit during the height of the German offensive, nor will they be able to reinforce at a sufficient rate.

And given that the British lost 20,000 or so at Somme on the first day alone, there clearly exists the capability to put out enough bullets to shatter an army in a few days.


Its not an easy task, but there are the prerequisite conditions to let WWI armies simply be destroyed in place.
 
Reading this thread. It seems the Germans should have just rushed the line from Metz to the Somme to Amiens to the sea in August 1914 and gone on the defensive. A short defensible line. The most valuable French industry area is secured. Decent bases for prosecuting the war against either Britain or France later. Negotiations proceed from a position of strength.

(No turn east or west of Paris)
 
Was there a war, where taking important industrial / natural resources got the taker out of a dificult / disadvantageus position? Because otherwise you would need a certain case of briliant / understanding that I find sadly lacked in all sides.
Otherwise that could have been a very interesting move with the French trieng to secure Paris and the Germans plunge the knife into the economical spine of their enemy. And should Germany have a good shot in closing the Channel it stands to reason that the British will have many more problems.

And while I do not find the requiered POD too hard to engineer, IMO in OTL the understanding was not there, at least at the start of the war.
 
Was there a war, where taking important industrial / natural resources got the taker out of a dificult / disadvantageus position?

I can't think of any. Oddly its the fails that come to mind. Japanese attacking to secure oil resources in 1941. Germany attacking east in 1941, choosing to prioritize economic objectives in the Donetz basin and the Caucasus.
 
Consider though, assuming a POD that allows the Germans to win at the Marne, we need to do away with the Allied numerical superiority in one manner or another. I doubt the French will have the ability to just pull an entire corps out of the line for rest and refit during the height of the German offensive, nor will they be able to reinforce at a sufficient rate.

And given that the British lost 20,000 or so at Somme on the first day alone, there clearly exists the capability to put out enough bullets to shatter an army in a few days.


Its not an easy task, but there are the prerequisite conditions to let WWI armies simply be destroyed in place.

The British Army wasn't shattered on the first day of the Somme, they fought for 3 1/2 months after that first day, indeed that first day pushed the German 2nd Army out of its positions.

IOTL it is seen as a big thing that the Germans used their Reserve divisions in the first line of their offensive while the French didn't, however some 6 weeks later the French had well and truly turned so the 6th Army was half Reserve divisions. Using Reserve and Territorial divisions that were in existence the French will be able to bring up new divisions to replace those which have taken casualties in frontal battles on the Marne ITTL.
 
IIRC, the reason as to why the Germans lost the battle was because they panicked at the prospect of Russian successes in the eastern front at the same moment and sent two divisions there for relief, leaving the left flank of the German army's western front weakened, an issue that was exploited by the French army.
Have the Germans be willing to stomach losses in the eastern front in exchange for full commitment to defeating France first and the Schlieffen Plan most likely succeeds.
 
IIRC, the reason as to why the Germans lost the battle was because they panicked at the prospect of Russian successes in the eastern front at the same moment and sent two divisions there for relief, leaving the left flank of the German army's western front weakened, an issue that was exploited by the French army.
Have the Germans be willing to stomach losses in the eastern front in exchange for full commitment to defeating France first and the Schlieffen Plan most likely succeeds.

It was 2 infantry corps and a cavalry division, 5 divisions in total. It is one of the examples of how a reasonable plan was poorly execututed, indeed it shows how poor the German communication systems were.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
The British Army wasn't shattered on the first day of the Somme, they fought for 3 1/2 months after that first day, indeed that first day pushed the German 2nd Army out of its positions.

IOTL it is seen as a big thing that the Germans used their Reserve divisions in the first line of their offensive while the French didn't, however some 6 weeks later the French had well and truly turned so the 6th Army was half Reserve divisions. Using Reserve and Territorial divisions that were in existence the French will be able to bring up new divisions to replace those which have taken casualties in frontal battles on the Marne ITTL.


There was also weeks if not months of preparation for Somme, and high casualties had been anticipated.

And remember, I think a prerequisite for winning at Marne is dealing with some of the French numerical superiority. Say even a corps gets encircled, and the French need to start bringing their reserves up to the line.

And again, I'm not saying you need to completely wipe out the army, or even that it's very likely. It's certainly a hot streak of 6's scenario. But even inflict 60% casualties over a period of a few days before the French can shift reserves from other sections of the front, and I think you could reasonably claim that the Germans destroyed a French field army.


And again, I only claim it's possible in theory, not that it's the crushing blow that would lead to French surrender.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I'm talking about the OTL German command structure, which was not suited to the task. Motlke was in overall command, but he had woeful communications so couldn't follow the course of the battle let alone impose his will on it. 1st Army was put under 2nd Army on and off during the campaign, but it wasn't a formal Heeresgruppe with an Armee-Abteilung to make Bulow's task of commanding his own 2nd Army manageable which commanding 1st Army as well.

So we have an experienced gamer with fog-of-war switched off...

Ideally Moltke would have had world-class communications, equivalent to the best of the other armies had, in order to keep abreast of the course of the battles so that he could balance the needs of the right wing, the left wing and the Eastern front. The right wing ideally needed a proper Heeresgruppe (commanded by the agressive Kluck?) whose own army would have an Armee-Abeiling of 5 or so divisions with a specific task (maybe finding the flank no matter what, or keeping contact with the other Army no matter what) so he wouldn't have to worry about that task within his own army. A heeresgruppe should be have a large scope and span of control and be close enough to the fighting to see and seize opportunities exceeding the scope of a single Army fighting one on one. If Moltke had a good communications suite he could order 3rd Army to go to support the Heeresgruppe or not as needed because he'd have access to accurate and timely information, while still having a decentralised command system. That should transform the opportunities 20-25 August to encircle and destroy a French Army and maybe the BEF.

Your scenario requires a number of very significant PODs. In 1914 radio communication was in its infancy, with 'mobile' radio sets requiring their own baggage train. On a recent thread it was mooted the Entente without the radio infrastructure of Eiffel tower might of lost the Battle Marne - and the Entente would have had far superior landline communications than the Germans hundreds of miles from home. As far as communications, your scenario requires significant technological advances in addition to military resources and doctrine. Easy?

In 1914 army aviation was also in its infancy. Despite its recognized leadership in army aviation in 1914, the French failures in reconnaissance to locate German armies were systemic. German army aviation hundreds of miles from home, operating on foreign fields and unfamiliar terrain are also likely to need significant technological advances in addition to military resources and doctrine - to initially surpass French expertise in aviation and go further to make it genuinely useful in the opening weeks of the war. Easy?

There is an easier and more effective German POD, but it would eliminate the Battle of Marne altogether...

But the Germans would win the Race to the Sea.
With the benefit of hindsight a very useful outcome in a long war, but probably not recognized as significant at the time.
 
So we have an experienced gamer with fog-of-war switched off...

I don't understand what you are saying? That only a gamer would create a Heeresgruppe and Armergruppe and ensure that OHL had adequate communication?

Your scenario requires a number of very significant PODs. In 1914 radio communication was in its infancy, with 'mobile' radio sets requiring their own baggage train. On a recent thread it was mooted the Entente without the radio infrastructure of Eiffel tower might of lost the Battle Marne - and the Entente would have had far superior landline communications than the Germans hundreds of miles from home. As far as communications, your scenario requires significant technological advances in addition to military resources and doctrine. Easy?

Why would Moltke need radios? Surely they ate more suitable for Army and Corps commanders and OHL could make extensive use of the national phone network like the French did. However his phone calls with Prittwitz were atrocious and were in a large part responsible for the problems there. It doesn't take a genius to provide a few more field telephone lines, a few more repair techs, some more dispatch riders and some improvements on what radios were available. The British did it, so why not the Germans.
 
On the 20th of August there was an opportunity for 1st, 2nd and 3rd German armies to encircle both the BEF and 5th French Army, but there was nobody in command to see and seize this opportunity.

I believe also on the 23/24 August there was an opportunity to drive into a gap between the French 4th and 5th Armies but again no commander to see it and make it happen.

These are the war-winners that Germany undertook the offensive through Belgium for. If they had been successful the right wing armies would have had a free pass for maybe a week until France scraped together an Army to replace the the 5th and even then they would only match the Germans rather than being able to outnumber them as they did at OTL Marne.


these would have been the best chances th Germans had. Another would be if the BEF sought shelter at Maubeuge. French considered it but didn't in the end

One last chance would have been if the French abandoned Nancy. Castelnau wanted to and asked Joffre for permission. Joffre pointed out that if he did so, the entire French line would collapse and the entire French army face the prospect of double envelopment.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I don't understand what you are saying? That only a gamer would create a Heeresgruppe and Armergruppe and ensure that OHL had adequate communication?
Computer simulations chose to ignore the frailties of communications before the satellite age (a precaution to stop gamers throwing their computers out the window in frustration) and frequently the fog of war can be rather transparent (or scripted). Having reliable actionable intelligence and reliable effective communication are swell ideas, but very sweeping hand waves for 1914.

Why would Moltke need radios? Surely they ate more suitable for Army and Corps commanders and OHL could make extensive use of the national phone network like the French did. However his phone calls with Prittwitz were atrocious and were in a large part responsible for the problems there. It doesn't take a genius to provide a few more field telephone lines, a few more repair techs, some more dispatch riders and some improvements on what radios were available. The British did it, so why not the Germans.

As stated in my previously post, it was recently mooted on these boards without the Eiffel tower (and its radio infrastructure), the Entente might have lost the battle of Marne. Again, the Entente (including the British) should also have had access to existing landline communication infrastructure far superior to that available to the Germans after advancing hundreds of miles over enemy territory.

There is no reason to think there was an underlying shortfall in German communication equipment or standards, given they are ordinarily recognized as the most organized and best equipped military in 1914. It was just limitations of technology of the age, coupled with advancing hundreds of miles over enemy territory places strains on both logistics and communications. It should be noted outside the Schlieffen Plan, German military doctrine for decades had emphasized fighting decisive battles as close as possible to their own territory - the antithesis of the OTL Battle of Marne.

Further, I understand OTL many of the French intelligence successes in the opening weeks of the war were based on intercepting OTL German wireless communications (again via a certain structure in Paris), enabling them to identify each German formation and guestimate their position. Your cunning plan of increased co-ordination and communication is likely to be a boon for the French battle planning.
 
Computer simulations chose to ignore the frailties of communications before the satellite age (a precaution to stop gamers throwing their computers out the window in frustration) and frequently the fog of war can be rather transparent (or scripted). Having reliable actionable intelligence and reliable effective communication are swell ideas, but very sweeping hand waves for 1914.

Oh, OK; but I'm not talking about having reliable actionable intelligence, I'm talking about having a level of command much closer to the battlefield that OHL but with a broader scope and view than a single Army.

As stated in my previously post, it was recently mooted on these boards without the Eiffel tower (and its radio infrastructure), the Entente might have lost the battle of Marne. Again, the Entente (including the British) should also have had access to existing landline communication infrastructure far superior to that available to the Germans after advancing hundreds of miles over enemy territory.

There is no reason to think there was an underlying shortfall in German communication equipment or standards, given they are ordinarily recognized as the most organized and best equipped military in 1914. It was just limitations of technology of the age, coupled with advancing hundreds of miles over enemy territory places strains on both logistics and communications. It should be noted outside the Schlieffen Plan, German military doctrine for decades had emphasized fighting decisive battles as close as possible to their own territory - the antithesis of the OTL Battle of Marne.

Further, I understand OTL many of the French intelligence successes in the opening weeks of the war were based on intercepting OTL German wireless communications (again via a certain structure in Paris), enabling them to identify each German formation and guestimate their position. Your cunning plan of increased co-ordination and communication is likely to be a boon for the French battle planning.

I saw it proposed too, but not backed up by robust argument supported by evidence, and personally I haven't seen enough evidence of panaceas like this working to readily believe the claims made for them.

Correlli Barnett in the Swordbearers goes on and on about OHL being out of touch by poor communications with the right wing, which is understandable if not forgivable, and I've seen this backed by other sources. What is not as understandable is how difficult it was to communicate with the 8th Army operating on home soil or the left wing which was virtually static and on home soil. He points out in contrast that the French and British had better communications, with the French using the ET as a radio relay as well as the civilian phone network. I can't imagine the technology of 1914 can fully solve OHL's comms problems, but they could certainly have been foreseen and addressed to an extent, both with technical means as well as organisational changes.

A Heeresgruppe, a proper one with a proper staff rather than the half-arse subordination of Kluck to Bulow, would not have the communications problems OHL had because it would be commanded from 1st or 2nd Army HQ with direct and constant contact with the other Army much like the direct and constant contact it had with its own Corps and ArmeeGruppe. This level of command appeared very early on and by mid 1915 became standard for the Germans.

There's no
 

BooNZ

Banned
Oh, OK; but I'm not talking about having reliable actionable intelligence, I'm talking about having a level of command much closer to the battlefield that OHL but with a broader scope and view than a single Army.

Thank you for the clarification

I saw it proposed too, but not backed up by robust argument supported by evidence, and personally I haven't seen enough evidence of panaceas like this working to readily believe the claims made for them.

Correlli Barnett in the Swordbearers goes on and on about OHL being out of touch by poor communications with the right wing, which is understandable if not forgivable, and I've seen this backed by other sources. What is not as understandable is how difficult it was to communicate with the 8th Army operating on home soil or the left wing which was virtually static and on home soil. He points out in contrast that the French and British had better communications, with the French using the ET as a radio relay as well as the civilian phone network. I can't imagine the technology of 1914 can fully solve OHL's comms problems, but they could certainly have been foreseen and addressed to an extent, both with technical means as well as organisational changes.

A Heeresgruppe, a proper one with a proper staff rather than the half-arse subordination of Kluck to Bulow, would not have the communications problems OHL had because it would be commanded from 1st or 2nd Army HQ with direct and constant contact with the other Army much like the direct and constant contact it had with its own Corps and ArmeeGruppe. This level of command appeared very early on and by mid 1915 became standard for the Germans.

There's no

A few random observations:

Pimping the 1914 German military capabilities is like giving Viagra to a teenager...

Improved communications between armies would need to be immaculately conceived, since there is unlikely to be a perceived need before 1914 without the OTL invasion of Belgium/ France. The same could be said for winning of the race-for-the-sea as a goal in itself.

Being able to implement improved communications with absolutely static defensive battle lines in 1915 is very different to maintaining such communication standards under extreme duress such as the OTL invasion of Belgium/ France.

I am very skeptical the Germans could execute anything resembling the Battle of Tannenberg on the French, because the underlying quality of the French force was superior to the Russians, the French were on the defensive on top of their logistical lines, while the German logistics were being stretched. I assume the Germans could have rolled a few more sixes than OTL, but my imagination only extends to this resulting in the Germans winning pyrrhic victory at Marne and/or the race to the sea. small beer

Can you recommend any credible threads/reading on the 1914 Germans doing significantly better in German v Anglo-French forces between the battle of the Frontiers and Race to the Sea? I could probably revisit my reading on that area. Thanks in anticipation.
 
Well...

...Probably nowhere in the same league as the TL suggested by Riain, but my 'The Great Raid' does have an Anglo-French defeat at the Marne due to 'Seebataillon England' disrupting the BEF by its reduction to a few divisions (one being the 'Long Division') and the infamous Colonel Schenke causing disruption and casualties throughout Northern France. Sabotaging/attacking the Eiffel Tower radio communications sounds a good idea...
 
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