Unlike the Western allies, Japan, and probably the Soviet Union, Germany never embarked upon a substantial research program for offensive biological warfare. In 1939, Hitler barred all offensive work. and his prohibition, despite the chafing of some German biologists, was periodically reaffirmed during the war. By 1941, German intelligence agents were reporting on British research and even warned that England would initiate biological warfare toward the end of the war after the Luftwaffe had been weakened and German 'reprisals will be at a minimum'. Among the alleged British research projects were those for anthrax, plague, glanders, and dysentry.
Intelligence from 'a very reliable agent' also reported that the United States was working on anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and glanders.40 Even in early 1942, when German intelligence warned that the western allies might soon drop potato beetles and Texas fever ticks on Germany, Hitler refused to budge. He 'ordered', in the words of the then-secret minutes, 'that no preparations for [offensive] BW are to be made by us', but stres. the need for preparations against possible enemy attacks. The German arnit: bluntly informed scientists, 'the use of BW against England is out of question'.41 'Up to this time the fear of reprisals has prevented mass use [of biologi1 warfare but] the unambiguous fact [is] that our enemies have worked diligent on BW', a German scientist warned in early 1943 in pleading for offensive research.
Yet, Hitler again decreed, in the words of the minutes, 'Bacteria are not to be used as weapons'. According to these minutes, 'It was emphasized that if we did not begin immediately with preparations of our own, countermeasures [German retaliation] could not be applied. Even bacterial activity through [sabotage] is out of the question.' Hitler would still only allow defensive work.42 Some German scientists, perhaps eager to do offensive work, argued, plausibly, that defensive preparations could not be effective unless they also investigated offensive uses and pathogens. Scientists thus received permission for some limited work, mostly on potato beetles and on foot and mouth disease. 'The experiments planned [on offensive bacterial warfare] are not at variance with the Fuhrer's order', a 30 March 1943 military conference concluded.
Actually, the scientists may have cheated a little to edge into offensive work. In July i943, violating Hitler's ban, German scientists recommended some biological weapons in sabotage: injecting botulin toxin or typhoid in toothpaste and in such foods as sausage, sugar, and pudding. Despite military complaints about Polish and Soviet biological-warfare sabotage against German soldiers, nothing came of these scientists' proposals.44 By early 1944, German intelligence told Berlin that the British feared that Hitler might soon start biological warfare. A month before D-Day, German intelligence reported, 'England is expecting more extensive preparations on the part of Germany and assumes that reprisals. will consist of the use of bacteria and their poisons. Therefore England is anxious to obtain information about the type and extent of German preparations. '45
Despite occasional German reports of allied work on anthrax, German defensive precautions in mid-1944 concentrated on protecting livestock in France from foot and mouth disease by inoculating 450,000 animals against it. Curiously, there are neither reports or even hints - at least in the captured German files at the National Archives - of the allies' 1944 botulin threats reaching Germany. The allied strategy of deterrence, with its calculated leak about mass inoculations against botulin, was apparently both ineffective and unnecessary. 46 In late 1943 or 1944, Heinrich Himmler, apparently circumventing Hitler's orders, authorized a laboratory for offensive bacterial research. 'Little progress was made by this group', the post-war American investigation concluded, because the work started so late, the working conditions were unfavorable, and the selection of researchers was poor.'
Hitler's own motives for prohibiting such offensive research remain unclear. Of the top German leaders, only Heinrich Himmler, according to a post-war American report, expressed any desire to use offensive biological warfare.
