WI Germany renewed the Reinsurance Treaty and word got out?

Instead of necro bumping one of the older threads on this topic, I thought it'd be better to start a a new one. In 1887, Bismarck arranged the Reinsurance Treaty to deal with the collapse of the League of the Three Emperors. It was to prevent a Russian convergence toward France, securing Germany against the possibility of a two-front war. The TL;DR version of this treaty is as follows: 1) Germany and Russia would remain neutral in the event of a war with a third party, excluding France and Austria-Hungary, 2) Germany would not intervene in the event of a Russian move on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

In 1890 Russia asked for a renewal of this treaty, but the Reinsurance Treaty in large part rested on Bismarck's prestige. His successor Caprivi felt unable to keep this in place, but the Foreign Office prepared a denunciation of the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary. Wilhelm II refused this, believing his familial ties with Tsar Alexander III would be sufficient to ensure cordial relations with Russia and also didn't want to renew because it could endanger ties with Britain. He didn't realize the Tsar, like many of his relatives, found him to be obnoxious and Germany's refusal to renew this treaty contributed to the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

So my question is as follows:

I. What would happen if Wilhelm II had a change of heart (he changed his mind all the time, so it's in the realm of possibility) and renewed the Reinsurance Treaty? Would the rapprochement between Russia and France be avoided?

II. What would happen if the treaty, and particularly the secret protocol on the Bosporus/Dardanelles, became public knowledge? More precisely: How pissed off would Austria-Hungary be that Germany so blatantly disregarded its interests in the Balkans in favour of Russia's?

II.a Could the French-Russian rapprochement be replaced by a French-Austro-Hungarian rapprochement as a result or could fences between Berlin and Vienna still be mended, assuming Germany wants to?

II.b If a French-Austro-Hungarian rapprochement comes about, how would it affect the development of A-H and Russia into the twentieth century?
 
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Anderman

Donor
Wasn´t it the case the Wilhelm zwo wanted to renew the treaty but the foreign office was against it because it could drag the empire into war with Great Britain?
And the FO wanted an alliance with Great Britain.
 
Austro-Hungarian rapprochement as a result or could fences between Berlin and Vienna still be mended
Vienna knew a war against the german would means the end of the empire, they will begrundge but mostly focus in rule their sphere of influence of the balkans, maybe cooperate with russians if they can keep the serbians out their montenegro.
 
Wasn´t it the case the Wilhelm zwo wanted to renew the treaty but the foreign office was against it because it could drag the empire into war with Great Britain?
And the FO wanted an alliance with Great Britain.

That's not how the wikipedia article describes it. That's not the best source of course, but I've seen it confirmed in literature as well IIRC.

Vienna knew a war against the german would means the end of the empire, they will begrundge but mostly focus in rule their sphere of influence of the balkans, maybe cooperate with russians if they can keep the serbians out their montenegro.

That would lead to a complicated position where Germany has to constantly mediate differences between Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests. An option in that case would be to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence, but reality might not conform to such a division in spheres of influence. For example, they could do a rough east-west split that leads to Serbia, Montenegro and Greece winding in up A-H's sphere of influence and Romania, Bulgaria and the Bosporus into Russia's. The Balkan powers, however, are going to have their own opinions about that and can throw a monkey wrench into a plan like that.

At that point juggling Russia's and A-H's interests will become very complicated, at which point it becomes easier to dump one of the two. If the Germans are smart they should choose Russia over A-H. After all, they were complaining, especially IOTL's WW I, how Germany was shackled to a corpse with its alliance with the Habsburgs. A Franco-Austrian Alliance will be weaker than OTL's Franco-Russian Alliance, so it'd be best to beat the French to the punch and get cozy with St. Petersburg.
 
I. What would happen if Wilhelm II had a change of heart (he changed his mind all the time, so it's in the realm of possibility) and renewed the Reinsurance Treaty? Would the rapprochement between Russia and France be avoided?
Depends on if Russia and German stay peachy once it become apparent that Russia is set to eclipse Germany. If not then this merely delays Franco-Russian rapprochement.

II. What would happen if the treaty, and particularly the secret protocol on the Bosporus/Dardanelles, became public knowledge? More precisely: How pissed off would Austria-Hungary be that Germany so blatantly disregarded its interests in the Balkans in favour of Russia's?
Austria didn't care about the Dardanelles, it was willing to back Russia on that issue OTL. Austria's immediate interests in the Balkans were limited to Bosnia and Novi Pazar, with its ultimate ambition being to merely secure a rail link to Salonika. With the Reciprocity Treaty continuing, the most likely outcome is Germany mediating an Austro-Russian compromise on spheres of influence in the region, potentially enabling a reestablishment of the Dreikaiserbund.

II.a Could the French-Russian rapprochement be replaced by a French-Austro-Hungarian rapprochement as a result or could fences between Berlin and Vienna still be mended, assuming Germany wants to?
As mentioned above there probably wouldn't be a broken fence to mend, probably just some scuffs to paint over.

II.b If a French-Austro-Hungarian rapprochement comes about, how would it affect the development of A-H and Russia into the twentieth century?
Probably about the same actually. The economic relations formed between Austria and Germany and France and Russia were dictated by economic reality, not diplomacy. Since they are now effectively isolated I imagine Austria will spend a lot more on defence and related matters and be more proactive in regards to its southern frontier, so its military will probably give an actually good showing durring TTL's great war analogue,* but I'd still give them at most a year and a half to hold out against the Russo-German-Italian dog pile.

*assuming one occurs, but honestly it's more likely that Austria sells out France rather than agree to follow its end of this suicide pact.
 
Depends on if Russia and German stay peachy once it become apparent that Russia is set to eclipse Germany. If not then this merely delays Franco-Russian rapprochement.

Agreed.

Austria didn't care about the Dardanelles, it was willing to back Russia on that issue OTL. Austria's immediate interests in the Balkans were limited to Bosnia and Novi Pazar, with its ultimate ambition being to merely secure a rail link to Salonika. With the Reciprocity Treaty continuing, the most likely outcome is Germany mediating an Austro-Russian compromise on spheres of influence in the region, potentially enabling a reestablishment of the Dreikaiserbund.

True, Austria-Hungary promised non-intervention in the Dardanelles in return for Russia accepting Bosnia-Herzegovina's annexation by the former. But the Russians realized Austria-Hungary's promise of non-intervention in the Dardanelles issue was meaningless because of continuing British opposition. As a result, the Treaty of Berlin was amended and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia without Russia gaining anything at all, not in the Dardanelles or anywhere else. They felt screwed over by Austria-Hungary as indicated by Izvolsky's comment about Aehrental: "The dirty Jew has deceived me. He lied to me, he bamboozled me, that frightful Jew." After that, to bring Izvolsky to heel, Austria-Hungary leaked documents that, to Russia's embarrassment, revealed that Russia agreed to a free hand for the Austrians in Bosnia. It greatly damaged their relations.

In an ATL where the Reinsurance Treaty is renewed this could be a serious problem for Austria-Hungary. They're going to have to offer a lot more than a meaningless promise not to intervene in a Russian move on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to keep Russia on side. From there it depends on how much influence Russia demands in the Balkans if Austria-Hungary will agree or not. If Russia requests so much Balkan influence that Vienna cannot agree, the next question is if Germany can settle the differences. If the answer is no, the next question is whether Germany sides with Russia or with Austria-Hungary. That determines whether Europe reverts to OTL's alliance systems or not.

As mentioned above there probably wouldn't be a broken fence to mend, probably just some scuffs to paint over.

See above.

Probably about the same actually. The economic relations formed between Austria and Germany and France and Russia were dictated by economic reality, not diplomacy. Since they are now effectively isolated I imagine Austria will spend a lot more on defence and related matters and be more proactive in regards to its southern frontier, so its military will probably give an actually good showing durring TTL's great war analogue,* but I'd still give them at most a year and a half to hold out against the Russo-German-Italian dog pile.

*assuming one occurs, but honestly it's more likely that Austria sells out France rather than agree to follow its end of this suicide pact.

France actively decided to invest in Russia, so I do see a role for diplomacy here. France can redirect its investments toward Austria-Hungary, which would be especially useful in the Hungarian half of the Empire since it had seen much less industrialization than the well developed Austrian half. As far as the course of a potential war goes, I'd tend to agree. They'd be lucky to last 18 months against a Russo-German-Italian, never mind the fact that Serbia and Romania are almost inevitably going to jump on the bandwagon.
 
True, Austria-Hungary promised non-intervention in the Dardanelles in return for Russia accepting Bosnia-Herzegovina's annexation by the former. But the Russians realized Austria-Hungary's promise of non-intervention in the Dardanelles issue was meaningless because of continuing British opposition.
AH did make their promise, maybe if all three call GB bluff might work, even if the russian fails, again if the dreikaiserbound still exist, ww1 as we know is butterfly away, unless something insane happen in the world.
 
AH did make their promise, maybe if all three call GB bluff might work, even if the russian fails, again if the dreikaiserbound still exist, ww1 as we know is butterfly away, unless something insane happen in the world.

How do the combined navies of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary at the turn of the century compare to the Royal Navy?
 
How do the combined navies of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary at the turn of the century compare to the Royal Navy?
Badly, maybe Germany and Russia might be worry but was tilll 1910 all three were enought rival RN(even if Russian were badly depleted from the russo japanese war and A-H navy is pretty small) but more that sucess as a team would patch up any doubt that the dreikaiserbound work, because that work..for now, again that might move the britain to support more the italians and ottomans in the balkans...
 
But the Russians realized Austria-Hungary's promise of non-intervention in the Dardanelles issue was meaningless because of continuing British opposition.
The same surely goes for Germany's pledge in the Reassurance Treaty.

France actively decided to invest in Russia, so I do see a role for diplomacy here.
The vast majority of it was private investment, no diplomacy involved.

They'd be lucky to last 18 months against a Russo-German-Italian, never mind the fact that Serbia and Romania are almost inevitably going to jump on the bandwagon.
Romania certainly, more proactive Austrian "diplomacy" could keep Serbia in Austria's sphere.
 
In an ATL where the Reinsurance Treaty is renewed this could be a serious problem for Austria-Hungary. They're going to have to offer a lot more than a meaningless promise not to intervene in a Russian move on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus to keep Russia on side. From there it depends on how much influence Russia demands in the Balkans if Austria-Hungary will agree or not. If Russia requests so much Balkan influence that Vienna cannot agree, the next question is if Germany can settle the differences. If the answer is no, the next question is whether Germany sides with Russia or with Austria-Hungary.

Germany will side with Russia and Austria-Hungary knows that. Of course, Russia knows it can't push too hard either or it'll have the rest of the Great Powers on it. Austria-Hungary may not like the amount of territory it's handing over, but they will have a comfortable buffer zone in the Balkans and possibly an understanding about regaining territory from Northern Italy.
 
The same surely goes for Germany's pledge in the Reassurance Treaty.

As long as their fleet isn't big enough to threaten the Royal Navy's supremacy, then yes. By the 1910s, the High Seas Fleet is a force to be reckoned with, more so if it joins forces with the Russian and Austro-Hungarian navies. In 1914, these three navies had a combined total of 27 dreadnoughts, assuming no butterflies in capital ship construction.

The vast majority of it was private investment, no diplomacy involved.

As I've understood it, government direction of the economy has always been a thing in France. I'm sure the government could 'encourage' its investors to redirect their investments toward Austria-Hungary if diplomacy requires it.

Romania certainly, more proactive Austrian "diplomacy" could keep Serbia in Austria's sphere.

And by "diplomacy" I assume you mean veiled threats directed toward Serbia concerning armed intervention if they try to leave Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence, correct? That'll work, at least as long as Austria-Hungary is able to back those threats up with actions should the need ever arise.
 
As long as their fleet isn't big enough to threaten the Royal Navy's supremacy, then yes. By the 1910s, the High Seas Fleet is a force to be reckoned with, more so if it joins forces with the Russian and Austro-Hungarian navies. In 1914, these three navies had a combined total of 27 dreadnoughts, assuming no butterflies in capital ship construction.
So the Reassurance Treaty fixes the issues in the Austro-Russian understanding.

As I've understood it, government direction of the economy has always been a thing in France. I'm sure the government could 'encourage' its investors to redirect their investments toward Austria-Hungary if diplomacy requires it.
They could probably do something, but I'm not sure how much they can divert.

And by "diplomacy" I assume you mean veiled threats directed toward Serbia concerning armed intervention if they try to leave Austria-Hungary's sphere of influence, correct? That'll work, at least as long as Austria-Hungary is able to back those threats up with actions should the need ever arise.
I'm thinking military occupation of Belgrade durring the May Coup.
 
So the Reassurance Treaty fixes the issues in the Austro-Russian understanding.


They could probably do something, but I'm not sure how much they can divert.


I'm thinking military occupation of Belgrade durring the May Coup.

Interesting, I'm wonder how the 19th century will unfold wit an intact League of the Three Emperors. I can't see Britain, France and Italy standing up to that, not even with Japan and the Ottomans on their side.
 
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