WI: Germany launched an offensive in Italy instead of on Western Front in spring 1918

WI: Germany launched an offensive in Italy instead of on Western Front in spring 1918

If any of you liked my Polish-German war in the 20’s you may enjoy this.

I originally learned of this idea from reading a paper by Historian Hans Delbruck in which he said that it would have been a better idea to knock Italy out of the war with an offensive in spring 1918 instead of launching another offensive in the West. After reading more about this I have concurred with his assessment it probably would have been a better idea to launch an offensive in Italy in spring 1918. In the last battle in the Italian theater, the Battle of Caporetto, in October and November 1917, the Central Powers pushed Italian forces back 62 miles and killed, captured or wounded 300,000 Italian soldiers. Germany then withdrew its seven divisions from the region and redeployed them elsewhere. Italian forces in the battle had been pushed back all the way to the Piave River; at this point in the war Italy had taken a total of 600,000 casualties and moral was extremely low.

Here are some excerpts from Erwin Rommel’s book “Infantry Attacks” that exemplify this point

“With the feeling of being forced to act before the adversary decided to do something, I left the edge of the forest and, walking steadily forward, demanded, by calling and waving my handkerchief that the enemy surrender and lay down their weapons. The mass of men stared at me from the woods, and a retreat under enemy fire was impossible. I had the impression that I must not stand still or we were lost. I came within 150 yards of the enemy! Suddenly the mass began to move and, in the ensuing panic, swept its resisting officers along the downhill. Most of the Italian soldiers threw their weapons down and hundreds hurried to me. In an instant I was surrounded and hoisted on the Italians shoulders. “Evviva Germania!” sounded from a thousand throats. An Italian officer who hesitated to surrender was shot dead by his own troops. For the Italians on Mrzil peak the war was over. They shouted with joy.”

“As we swung around a sharp bend, the view to the left opened up. Before us-scarcely three hundred yards away- stood the 2d Regiment of the Salerno Brigade. It assembled and laid down its arms. Deeply moved, the regimental commander sat at the roadside, surrounded by his officers and wept with rage and shame over the insubordination of the soldiers of his once-proud regiment.”
In a period of twenty-eight hours Rommel’s forces captured 150 Italian officers and 9000 Italian soldiers, while only taking 6 dead and 30 wounded themselves.

If Germany even used just a fraction of the 74 divisions that took part in the Western Front spring offensive I think Italy would have been knock out of the war in spring 1918. Italy from my point of view was at its breaking point. Without doing this Austria-Hungry would be left to take the offensive alone and that lead to the disastrous Battle of Vittorio Veneto in October 1918, which ultimately lead to Austria-Hungry leaving the conflict. Another reason they should have done an offensive in Italy instead of a offensives on the Western front is that during the Spring Offensive Germany would take 400,000 casualties and more American troops are arriving every day.

Central Powers
Austria-Hungry: 61 divisions
Germany: around 7-20 divisions
Allies
Italy: 51 divisions
France: 3-6 divisions
Britain: 2-5 divisions

The offensives objective would be to break the Italian defensive position on the Piave River and advance in the direction of Venice. The Central Powers would use poison gas and infiltration tactics to help the initial break through. The complaint I have read about for launching the offensive is that the area, due to a poor rail network, could not logistically support and supply a huge force, especially if it was rapidly advancing.
 
By 1918 the Italian army was totally another beast that the one defeated at Caporetto, both in term of morale that of equipment and the A-H was just a shadow of the former self...basically the German will fight almost alone saddled with logistical problem; so it will probably fail or obtain just some limited result at the expense of lot of men and material.
 
I assume a desecive victory would be possible for a joint german-austrian, but such a offensive would demand a complette different olitical outlook of Germany. Obvious a victory in Italy would not decide the War, the decision would still fall at the Western Front. Still such a (easy?) victory would have stabilized Austria, would forced the Allies to divergent rescourses to Italy and proof again the strengh of the german army, without wasting away to many of Germanys resources. This would be very usefull, if it was the political intention of the german leadership to start talks for a compromis peace. But the target of the geman leadership, especiay Hindenburg and Ludendorf, was total victory, a Siegfrieden, were Germany could dictat the western Allies his terms. Such a victory was only possible with sucessfull offensive in the West and demanded "all or nothing" strategy.
 
Tearing the Italian army apart would have been a much better option than wasting the German army on the Western Front. Use diplomacy to divide the Americans from their 'associated powers', use force to deal with the complications to a peace settlement, such as the Italians.

But then again, Germany had been blowing its combination of diplomacy and military strategy since the turn of the century, why suddenly get clever in 1918?
 
By 1918 the Italian army was totally another beast that the one defeated at Caporetto, both in term of morale that of equipment and the A-H was just a shadow of the former self...basically the German will fight almost alone saddled with logistical problem; so it will probably fail or obtain just some limited result at the expense of lot of men and material.

While I do not take my estimation of the A-H Army in 1918 as far as LD, I agree that the Window for a decisive operation in the South had closed.

The best A-H could probably achieve (assume a steady degradation of the Army) was to repell attacks nad minor offensives, but an operation the dimension of OTLs battle Vittorio Veneto was just overwhelming.

One of the problems of the CP was the fact that they just had no more suppiles (bad food, no real replacements for uniforms, bedrolls,...). When the Caporetto (and later the Frühlingsoffensive) showed the plenty of supplies the Entente soldiers enjoyed this had quite an impact on the A-H , but also German morale... especially as the high command had told them that the Entente soldiers were no better off than they.

I also believe even IF they had suceeded in a breakthrough in Italy it would not have a major impace as Rome was still far away and the Italian Peninsula offers multiple opportunities to anchor a defensive line (proved by the WWII ability of Germany to hold back the allies between 1943 - 1945 - and this time the better supplied army would attack)

And even IF Rome fell and IF the Italians would sue for peace the other Entente Nations would only take a look and fight on... (sorry Italians - you were not THAT important)

In 1918 it was possible (low probability) to capture Paris - If this (and I would not take THAT guaranteed) leads to France sue for peace it would with a high likelyhood mean to peace. And this peace would probably be more of an "white" peace with slight advantages to the CPs and not a CP victory. 1918 is just too late (though I love threads like "a Shift in Priorities" or "Hochseeflotte sorties a last time" which have a 1918 POD).
 

Deleted member 1487

The logistics to achieve anything were not there, as the rail roads through the Alps were quite a bit less developed in 1918 than they were in 1939. There is a reason the A-H starved on the North Italian Plain after Caporetto.
Beyond that knocking Italy out of the war achieves nothing other than throwing away troops when the Americans were coming and France and Britain were the real threat. Assuming Italy is knocked out, what does that do for Germany other than have them stay on the defensive in the face of millions of Allied troops in the second half of 1918. which they couldn't stand up to when the army was at the point of the breaking and the homefront on the point of revolution. There is a reason the German army discounted the Italian Front as a viable option IOTL and why they went with the Friedensturm in France.
 
The logistics to achieve anything were not there, as the rail roads through the Alps were quite a bit less developed in 1918 than they were in 1939. There is a reason the A-H starved on the North Italian Plain after Caporetto.
Beyond that knocking Italy out of the war achieves nothing other than throwing away troops when the Americans were coming and France and Britain were the real threat. Assuming Italy is knocked out, what does that do for Germany other than have them stay on the defensive in the face of millions of Allied troops in the second half of 1918. which they couldn't stand up to when the army was at the point of the breaking and the homefront on the point of revolution. There is a reason the German army discounted the Italian Front as a viable option IOTL and why they went with the Friedensturm in France.


Knocking Italy out makes it possible to some A-H divisions to go to the western front support their german brothers, while some others with german support kick the allies out of the balkans.
 

Deleted member 1487

Knocking Italy out makes it possible to some A-H divisions to go to the western front support their german brothers, while some others with german support kick the allies out of the balkans.

A-H troops were there in 1918 anyway and they were slaughtered by the French. A-H troops were not up to the standard of the Western Front, especially their artillery units and methods. As it was too A-H was falling apart in 1918 and those troops were needed just to fight the A-H armed bandits that were raiding the countryside for food, in fact the bandits were military units that went rouge and had their own artillery (!).
Even if Italy were knocked out, A-H would just need their manpower to prevent the monarchy from collapsing, but when Germany is beaten on the Western Front A-H falls apart anyway.
 
Knocking Italy out makes it possible to some A-H divisions to go to the western front support their german brothers, while some others with german support kick the allies out of the balkans.

I think there is a timing issue (as well as the supply issues Wilking mentions). You can't really attack before the OTL June 1918 Piave offensive due to flooded rivers. So any good that could be done would be too late to help on the west.

I bet though if Austria just abandons any plans to attack anywhere in 1918, that a few divisions could go to the west earlier anyway without having to try and knock out Italy.

Unsure what those extra divisions could do during the German offensive other than hold the line in Alsace or someplace, but those German divisions freed up from Alsace would be low grade trench divisions suitable only for defensive work too. Germany needs highly equipped and trained divisions for that.
 
American troops are arriving every day.

That's why Germany launched an offensive in France. They wanted a quick victory to the war before the full American might could be brought against them. With such a large nation joining the Allies without any real war weariness, they needed to strike before the Allies simply used this new manpower to attrit them to death.
 
The logistics to achieve anything were not there, as the rail roads through the Alps were quite a bit less developed in 1918 than they were in 1939. There is a reason the A-H starved on the North Italian Plain after Caporetto.
Beyond that knocking Italy out of the war achieves nothing other than throwing away troops when the Americans were coming and France and Britain were the real threat. Assuming Italy is knocked out, what does that do for Germany other than have them stay on the defensive in the face of millions of Allied troops in the second half of 1918. which they couldn't stand up to when the army was at the point of the breaking and the homefront on the point of revolution. There is a reason the German army discounted the Italian Front as a viable option IOTL and why they went with the Friedensturm in France.

Wrecking the German army on the Western Front caused the unrest that broke out in the fall. Knocking Italy out of the war would have secured the domestic situation in Austria and Germany and, by plundering Italy, sustained the CP into 1919.
 
That's why Germany launched an offensive in France. They wanted a quick victory to the war before the full American might could be brought against them. With such a large nation joining the Allies without any real war weariness, they needed to strike before the Allies simply used this new manpower to attrit them to death.

This assumes that Wilson intended to use a million Doughboys as cannon fodder for British and French war aims. The alternative possibility would be that Wilson had no such intention to be a puppet, and that Germany and the United States could reach a deal on the basis of the strength of the German army, and the fact that it was no longer in France or Belgium.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wrecking the German army on the Western Front caused the unrest that broke out in the fall. Knocking Italy out of the war would have secured the domestic situation in Austria and Germany and, by plundering Italy, sustained the CP into 1919.

There were issues starting in 1917 with both the army and on the homefront. Massive protests and strikes in Germany started with the Hindenburg Program's attempts to militarize labor and didn't stop until the end of the war. With the army the real break down started after Paschendaele, but cracks were forming after the Somme, Verdun, and Brusilov offensive.

Assuming it was even possible to knock Italy out of the war in 1918, which it wasn't thanks to logistic issues, Allied reinforcements after Caporetto, strong Allied defensive lines, a much improved Italian army, etc., then all it does is let the Allied armies build up in France and launch their multiple attacks on German positions throughout 1918 in to 1919 when their manpower and material position would double.
Ludendorff recognized that staying on the defensive in France was not a viable option into 1919, because the weight of Allied manpower and firepower would crush Germany; Paschendaele really tried his nerves and he realized after that Germany couldn't stand up to another Allied mass offensive because even though Germany came out slightly ahead in losses from that campaign, they couldn't replace them in the long run and the Allies could. Once Cambrai happened and Germany realized that the tank was coming in numbers that they couldn't match, while the French alone outproduced Germany is aircraft, the game was up unless he could break the Allies before the US was coming.

Remember Ludendorff was playing for all the marbles, not a negotiated peace; had he wanted that, he could have likely had it IOTL if he made a fair offer on Belgium at the height of Kaiserschlacht.


This assumes that Wilson intended to use a million Doughboys as cannon fodder for British and French war aims. The alternative possibility would be that Wilson had no such intention to be a puppet, and that Germany and the United States could reach a deal on the basis of the strength of the German army, and the fact that it was no longer in France or Belgium.

Both Wilson and Pershing were ready to fight to the bitter end to crush the Kaiser, as both stated on several occasions. Pershing was getting ready to fight into the 1920's and conquer Berlin by force.
 
Wrecking the German army on the Western Front caused the unrest that broke out in the fall. Knocking Italy out of the war would have secured the domestic situation in Austria and Germany and, by plundering Italy, sustained the CP into 1919.

Knocking just Italy will alleviate but not resolve A-H internal situation, at least in 1918 and as i said it will not be a walkover but a costly battle even if succed. Regarding sustain the CP by plundering Italy, well even we were not rich or have tons of supply, don't expect to live for much with what the people will left before run.
 
I think there is a timing issue (as well as the supply issues Wilking mentions). You can't really attack before the OTL June 1918 Piave offensive due to flooded rivers. So any good that could be done would be too late to help on the west.

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Which is why the CPs tried an offensive in June 1918, attacking through the Asiago plateau. The offensive fizzled in the first couple of days, and was the last and feeble attempt on the Italian front.

Crossing the Piave river against prepared positions would not have been a walk in the park, and it is doubtful that the CPs had the means to try it in 1918. Even managing to cross the Piave would not have been enough, since there was another defensive line already prepared on the Adige.

OTL Ludendorff offensive made (and still makes) more sense: if the Germans manage a break-through they can truly look forward to a negotiated peace (overall victory is impossible by 1918). OTOH even if they manage a break-through in Italy what can they gain?
 
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