WI Germany halts U-boat Construction in 1942.

haven't seen comments that Type XXIII was useless or have major issues, other than small torpedo capacity. my point overall is that it would have been a more suitable project (coastal defense or simply recon. on Allied moves ... at that point) and more suitable project to build (as it consumed less resources to build, operate, manpower.)

you are postulating that an early end to u-boat construction would benefit by diverting those resources to other more useful weapons programs? would agree up to a point that continuing the same Type VII was fruitless or diminishing returns? I'm only substituting a compromise solution that allows a more limited u-boat war to continue. recall the Exercise Tiger disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exercise_Tiger , with small Elektroboot they might have been able to disrupt some Allied operations in ways that mortars and AA guns could not.

would suggest reclaiming resources for more productive or needed weapons should have looked first to V-2 project and/or streamlined flak operations (as they had tens of thousands of AA flak sorely needed on Eastern Front and their use against Allied aircraft was questioned at the time.)

Maybe another problem was trying to perfect the Walther drive - effectively trying to be revolutionary instead of evolutionary?
 
Maybe another problem was trying to perfect the Walther drive - effectively trying to be revolutionary instead of evolutionary?

link to your (much) earlier thread, which really is full of great info and ideas https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/type-xxi-u-boats-in-early-1943.134297/

MY scenario would be to attempt some of the revamps on existing u-boat fleet AND launch the smaller Type XXIII first of the Elektroboot, viewing THAT as about optimal use of resources. (btw harvesting a lot of deck guns for use elsewhere)
 
Reportedly 30 million tons/year was the minimum needed to keep Britain in the war . To actually invade Europe would require something like 64 million tons . US DOCUMENTS REPORT 127 million tons logistics shipped to the theaters with ~ 78million tons to Europe from 1942-1944.

http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-29/CMH_Pub_70-29.pdf

“Canadian Veterans Affairs” REPORT 165 million tons delivered to EUROPE through the war.

http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/royal-canadian-navy/sww

So if Allied shipping moved 165 million tons of goods/supplies/munitions to Europe throughout the war, then every MV sunk reduces that war effort .

Reportedly Lend Lease required 18 million tons shipped while D-Day also needed another 18 million tons shipped .The allied bombing campaign must have needed about the same , with the war against “ the soft underbelly” needing maybe another 10 million tons?

But all this had to be over and above the tonnage needed to keep UK in the war which was said to be ~ 30 million per year...With rationing & recycling and belt tightening ,that amount may have reduced the annual requirement to ~ 26 million tons . From 1940-45 maybe 225 Million tons total was shipped - but the UK logistics requirement per year reduces this to total of roughly 64 million to defeat Hitler ....THE FOLLOWING IS ROUGH ESTIMATE OF THAT BREAK DOWN



39 million tons in 1940 vs 30 million needed = 9 million t = LEND LEASE [2.2 million ton sunk]

36 million tons in 1941 vs 29 million needed = 7 million t = LEND LEASE + NORTH AFRICA + RAF night bombing [2.38 million tons sunk]

32 million tons in 1942 vs 28 million leaving = 4 million t = LEND LEASE + NORTH AFRICA & SICILY+ Anglo American bombing [7.11 million tons sunk]

34 million tons in 1943 vs 27 million needed = 7 million t = ITALY & D-DAY + Anglo American bombing [2.5 million tons sunk]

42million tons in 1944 vs 26 million needed =16 million t = FRANCE & D-DAY + Anglo American bombing [3/4 million tons sunk]

47 million tons in 1945 vs 26 million needed = 21 million t = VICTORY EUROPE + Anglo American bombing

*Anglo American bombing campaign.
LL = LEND LEASE
NA = NORTH AFRICA
S= SICILY
DD = D-DAY
I = ITALY
Fr = FRANCE
VE= VICTORY EUROPE
18 MILLION LL & 18 MILLION D-DAY+ 3 MILLION TORCH


EST=78 MILLION


Without the U-BOAT war - the amount of war materials transported by 1944 would have been 58 million tons , one year earlier than Historically.
 
But halting production of boats in late '42 wouldn't have stopped the flow of new operational boats until after mid '43. It took months to build a u-boat and more months to train its crew.

As it was the the attrition rate rose during the first months of 1943 & hit un sustainable levels in March-April. Thats with continued production. Ceasing new construction in the last quarter or two months of 1942 emphasizes the North Atlantic battle as a losing proposition sooner. One of the peculiarities of that battle is the Brits did not realize they were winning it. This was in part because they were aware of the general scale of new submarine construction & Saw clearly the threat. If construction ceases in the winter of 1942/43 the Brits are going to figure it out fairly quickly and draw other conclusions.



In January 1943, due to awful weather, U-boats achieving very little in the North Atlantic. In the mid Atlantic they slaughtered a TMM oil convoy. Many more boats there could've caused real problems for the North African campaign. At a minimum it would've improved the morale of the u-boat crews, who suffered greatly standing watch etc in the North Atlantic storms.

Huges & Costellos 'The Battle of the Atlantic' shows every cargo ship sunk and submarine lost by calendar quarter. For those its very clear where the primary and secondary battles in the 'Atlantic were.

Assuming the allies shifted ASW assets to the mid Atlantic, the u-boats might've returned to the North Atlantic by April, when the weather improved.

The Allies did shift substantial ASW weapons to the mid Atlantic routes, from the start of Operation TORCH, & kept them there covering the supply convoys for the early to mid Tunisian campaign. Internally within the Royal Navy there was debate over this allocation and later criticism.
 
One idea I've seen floating around is that the Germans were in a position were evolutionary changes were useless to them - the value gained by having (for example) an anti-tank gun or U-boat that was a few percent better than the previous model was essentially nil, given the gigantic numerical inferiority they were suffering. This meant that, in order to have any shot at avoiding disaster, pursuing revolutionary changes was their best option. Sure, most of them wouldn't work... but they were outmatched anyway, so what's the difference? The ones that DID work might just be enough of a revolution to make a difference. Anyone have any thoughts on this?
 
link to your (much) earlier thread, which really is full of great info and ideas https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/type-xxi-u-boats-in-early-1943.134297/

One idea I've seen floating around is that the Germans were in a position were evolutionary changes were useless to them - the value gained by having (for example) an anti-tank gun or U-boat that was a few percent better than the previous model was essentially nil, given the gigantic numerical inferiority they were suffering. This meant that, in order to have any shot at avoiding disaster, pursuing revolutionary changes was their best option. Sure, most of them wouldn't work... but they were outmatched anyway, so what's the difference? The ones that DID work might just be enough of a revolution to make a difference. Anyone have any thoughts on this?

point of that earlier u-boat thread was that changes COULD have been introduced and/or refits that would have improved greatly (if not revolutionary) for Type VII u-boats.

of course the u-boat war at best stalls Allied invasion of Europe? does nothing against Soviets other than close Arctic route for Lend Lease (at the very best case?)
 
So if all that Naval spending was directly towards the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe, would have that been enough to cut off the Soviet Ports in the Arctic Circle and shipments from Iran?

The goal is to cut off those shipments, yes? If the Docks are gone, it doesn't matter how many Liberty ships full of cargo there are afloat if it can't be delivered.

That way, would be restrained like China was, no economical way of delivering supplies
 
That could damage midwar deliveries, but OTL the Persian & Far Eastern Routes dominated as entries for deliveries. Difficult to see German air power seriously disrupting either of those.
 
One idea I've seen floating around is that the Germans were in a position were evolutionary changes were useless to them - the value gained by having (for example) an anti-tank gun or U-boat that was a few percent better than the previous model was essentially nil, given the gigantic numerical inferiority they were suffering. This meant that, in order to have any shot at avoiding disaster, pursuing revolutionary changes was their best option. Sure, most of them wouldn't work... but they were outmatched anyway, so what's the difference? The ones that DID work might just be enough of a revolution to make a difference. Anyone have any thoughts on this?

Industrial efficiency was something Germany could improve even in the early part of the war. Pre-fab sectional construction done earlier might make a huge difference, especially if guns and systems were more standardized. Altering Plan Z to focus on subs would be equally revolutionary, or taking a Type XI and upping the batteries and engines would be a major headstart.
 
Even switching production to one standard type- like the type VII B4 the war & TYPE IX , once war begins - allows large enough build that combined with the longer sea endurance of the TYPE IX - increases the number of subs at sea through out the war by 1/3 . Which in turn should also increase the overall WALLIE MV loses by 1/3.

Z-PLAN was at best a propaganda ruse -Raeder used to hold Hitler to his word upgrade the KM for battle with the RN .

If additional steps are taken to improve individual U-Boat performance [referred to by Thaddeus]; the possible increase should be twice as many U-Boats at sea and twice as many MV losses.
 
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