WI Germany halts U-boat Construction in 1942.

By the fall of 1942 Doenitz knew that his Type VII boats were becoming obsolete. Despote some continued successes he needed a new boat. But what if Adolf said that production of older boats was to stop, and no new boats were to be built, because they were unlikely to be ready in time for the decisive phase of the war in 1943-44? Existing boats were to fight on as best they could but no new keels were to be laid down.
What would the war have looked like in its last two years, if the materials used for u-boat construction (actually wasted since no type XXI ever saw combat) were used to build more antitank guns etc?
 
If they don't build U-boats, in short order the risk to shipping in the Atlantic drops to near zero. All the resources the Allies put in to battling U-boats now can be directed in other ways, shipbuilding capacity used to build ships to replace those sunk can be repurposed, and cargoes of food and war material sunk reach their destinations with a big plus for the Allies. The only thing that really scared Churchill was the possibility of the U-boats getting the upper hand in the Atlantic.

A combination of reduced military R&D in the expectation of a short war, and the continuous tinkering with each existing model of whatever making maintenance a nightmare and not allowing for new types, combined with the disaster that was German industrial planning affected U-boats as well as everything else.
 
um, no. U-boats were Hitler's best naval weapons, he's not giving them up.


But by late 1942 the type VIIs were no longer very effective. Over half were returning from patrols empty handed. They cost a lot to build and prepare for combat, yet they weren't "pulling their weight."
 
think in 1942 to build NOTHING would be to admit defeat, and it was a little early for that, both in reality and their own estimation.

As I posted the existing boats would fight on, but no new ones would be built. From what I've read e.g. Blair Hitler's U-boar War Vol. 2, the existing boats were seen as increasing obsolete by 1943, and the defeat of April-May 1943 had long been anticipated. According to what Blair wrote, U-boat command "had seen it coming for a year or more." From about mid '43 onward essentially the only value of U-boats was to tie down allied strength. But considering the vast resources expended, for minimal damage to the enemy, I don't think that was the best use of resources. Had construction been halted in late '42, the allies might've had an easier time sending tanks and aircraft across the Atlantic. But at least antitank and antiaircraft guns could still achieve their mission of destroying them (whereas u-boats could seldom sink ships anymore). It therefore would've been wiser to drop u-boat construction in favor of greater output of antitank guns, mines, artillery, mortars etc.
 
If they don't build U-boats, in short order the risk to shipping in the Atlantic drops to near zero.

Had construction been halted by the end of '42, it probably would've taken at least 6 months (maybe 12?) for the advent of new operational boats to stop. By then the war at sea was lost anyway. After mid '43 there was little risk to shipping in the North Atlantic anyway, despite the commitment of vast German resources to u-boat construction.


All the resources the Allies put in to battling U-boats now can be directed in other ways, shipbuilding capacity used to build ships to replace those sunk can be repurposed, and cargoes of food and war material sunk reach their destinations with a big plus for the Allies.

But the bulk of shipping ever sunk by u-boats was already sunk by mid-'43, before the hypothetical cessation of construction actually affects numbers of operational boats.
 
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... But the bulk of shipping ever sunk by u-boats was already sunk by mid-'43, ...

This was not understood by the Allies at the start of 1943. Into April or May the Brits thought they were still losing, for other reasons as well as the submarine deployed numbers and cargo ship losses. The PoD here, in the Fall of 1942 brings up a possibility the Brits will see whats going on. That is the German effort cant be sustained through March 43, but losses cause Donitz to preserve precious crews by ending the N Atlantic offensive in January of Feburary vs April. One of Donitz s considerations when he planned the Mid Atlantic offensive in late 42 was sustained production into mid 43 & beyond would offset losses, which were becoming serious, and consolidate the victory over the N Atlantic.

Best case for the Allies is if Donitz drops a N Atlantic offensive entirely and sends the existing submarine fleet to the Mid Atlantic to attack the convoys supplying Op TORCH and the Allied African campaign. When the SYMBOL Confrences comes in January The N Atlantic route is relatively safe - changing the stratigc situation for the Allies.
 
my attempt was to point out they should have built the smaller coastal Elektroboot first, as they started with smaller Type II coastal boat during 1930's https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/start-small-type-xxiii-elektroboot.433603/

think in 1942 to build NOTHING would be to admit defeat, and it was a little early for that, both in reality and their own estimation.

As I posted the existing boats would fight on, but no new ones would be built. From what I've read e.g. Blair Hitler's U-boar War Vol. 2, the existing boats were seen as increasing obsolete by 1943, and the defeat of April-May 1943 had long been anticipated. According to what Blair wrote, U-boat command "had seen it coming for a year or more." From about mid '43 onward essentially the only value of U-boats was to tie down allied strength. But considering the vast resources expended, for minimal damage to the enemy, I don't think that was the best use of resources. Had construction been halted in late '42, the allies might've had an easier time sending tanks and aircraft across the Atlantic. But at least antitank and antiaircraft guns could still achieve their mission of destroying them (whereas u-boats could seldom sink ships anymore). It therefore would've been wiser to drop u-boat construction in favor of greater output of antitank guns, mines, artillery, mortars etc.

understood YOUR point, my point was IF you built the technologically advanced Type XXIII you are using so much less resources and it was a much more manageable project they actually would have been completed (to your point about uncompleted Type XXI)

also once US entered the war it was not genius to assume coastal defense would be needed, and the Type XXIII could be moved overland to Med and Black sea as needed. (also they required a smaller crew another problem KM faced)

recall after D-Day all the efforts to deploy mini-submarines? (fruitless)

also note the Type XXIII is approx. 1/8th size of Type XXI and 1/4 size of Type VII (a crude comparison but does show some of the savings)
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Realistically it wasn't material shortage for things like antitank guns that was the bottleneck.

Scrapping the U-boat buildpprogram fter 1942 doesn't have much practical impact, save for perhaps an increase in the QUALITY of the material used (due to the tight tolerances required for pressure hulls they couldn't cut corners on the steel too much.)

Past that, there's not a lot of practical impact it has for the Germans.
 
The PoD here, in the Fall of 1942 brings up a possibility the Brits will see whats going on. That is the German effort cant be sustained through March 43, but losses cause Donitz to preserve precious crews by ending the N Atlantic offensive in January of Feburary vs April. One of Donitz s considerations when he planned the Mid Atlantic offensive in late 42 was sustained production into mid 43 & beyond would offset losses, which were becoming serious, and consolidate the victory over the N Atlantic.

But halting production of boats in late '42 wouldn't have stopped the flow of new operational boats until after mid '43. It took months to build a u-boat and more months to train its crew.

Best case for the Allies is if Donitz drops a N Atlantic offensive entirely and sends the existing submarine fleet to the Mid Atlantic to attack the convoys supplying Op TORCH and the Allied African campaign. When the SYMBOL Confrences comes in January The N Atlantic route is relatively safe - changing the stratigc situation for the Allies.

In January 1943, due to awful weather, U-boats achieving very little in the North Atlantic. In the mid Atlantic they slaughtered a TMM oil convoy. Many more boats there could've caused real problems for the North African campaign. At a minimum it would've improved the morale of the u-boat crews, who suffered greatly standing watch etc in the North Atlantic storms.
Assuming the allies shifted ASW assets to the mid Atlantic, the u-boats might've returned to the North Atlantic by April, when the weather improved.
 
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Realistically it wasn't material shortage for things like antitank guns that was the bottleneck.

Scrapping the U-boat buildpprogram fter 1942 doesn't have much practical impact, save for perhaps an increase in the QUALITY of the material used (due to the tight tolerances required for pressure hulls they couldn't cut corners on the steel too much.)

What about freeing up additional labor?
 
Skip development of the larger Walther u-boat and jump directly to the type XXI 12-18 months earlier. Or better still, accelerate war production to 24 hour factory shifts in 1939 instead of earlier 1941 (again, 12-18 months). Either gets the Elektroboat in the water probably before D-day and maybe early enough to harass the supply convoys to Russia in various parts of the world. That delays the war long enough to make the end much bloodier and possibly atomic.

Halting construction accelerates the defeat of Germany by about the same margin as British troops get better supplied and Amercians can divert resources from Liberty ships, literally built faster than the Germans could sink them, to tanks and other war materiel.
 
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Deleted member 1487

If they don't build U-boats, in short order the risk to shipping in the Atlantic drops to near zero.
Not really; lag time from a Uboat being laid down to entering service could be as much as 18-24 months, especially for the bigger boats. If they stopped ordering any new Uboats on January 1st 1942 that wouldn't be felt at the front until after May 1943 when the Uboat deployments were called off:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battl...campaign_(March_1943_–_May_1943,_"Black_May")
Faced with disaster, Dönitz called off operations in the North Atlantic, saying, "We had lost the Battle of the Atlantic".[56]

In all, 43 U-boats were destroyed in May, 34 in the Atlantic. This was 25% of German U-boat arm (U-Bootwaffe) (UBW)'s total operational strength. The Allies lost 58 ships in the same period, 34 of these (totalling 134,000 tons) in the Atlantic.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-772
Name: U-772
Ordered: 21 November 1940
Builder: Kriegsmarinewerft Wilhelmshaven
Yard number: 155
Laid down: 21 September 1942
Launched: 31 October 1943
Commissioned: 23 December 1943


War patrols
After the usual six-month shakedown and training period in the Baltic, U-772 sailed from Trondheim on 13 August 1944 for her first war patrol

Also it should be noted that even in 1944 the Germans still spent as much on naval construction as Panzers. In 1942 it was something like 400% as much:
german+war+economy-5.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

Realistically it wasn't material shortage for things like antitank guns that was the bottleneck.

Scrapping the U-boat buildpprogram fter 1942 doesn't have much practical impact, save for perhaps an increase in the QUALITY of the material used (due to the tight tolerances required for pressure hulls they couldn't cut corners on the steel too much.)

Past that, there's not a lot of practical impact it has for the Germans.
The diesel engine industry was tied up with naval construction, so it could mean diesel engines for panzers, plus of course all the labor, materials, industry, etc. that would be pretty easily shifted to panzer production.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
The limiting factor was the inefficient as hell production the Germans were using, the lack of a complete war footing at the factories, etc. Not just money and material thrown at the problem.

IIRC Nibelungenwerke, in 1944 after they finally sorted their other bullshit out, was cranking out MORE Panzer IV's on its own than the monthly average for total production in 1943.

I believe it was Vomag, Nibelungenwerke, and Krupp manufacturing them. This means that Nibelungenwerke had latent capability to crank out over 300 a month.

The factories running nowhere near capacity were the real limit.
 

Deleted member 1487

The limiting factor was the inefficient as hell production the Germans were using, the lack of a complete war footing at the factories, etc. Not just money and material thrown at the problem.

IIRC Nibelungenwerke, in 1944 after they finally sorted their other bullshit out, was cranking out MORE Panzer IV's on its own than the monthly average for total production in 1943.

I believe it was Vomag, Nibelungenwerke, and Krupp manufacturing them. This means that Nibelungenwerke had latent capability to crank out over 300 a month.

The factories running nowhere near capacity were the real limit.
Not really the issue by 1942. In the case of the Nibelungenwerke that was in large part due to finally coming fully online, as it only started production in 1942, was still working it's way into full production in 1943, and finally focused on 1 type in 1944 with it's full capacity as intended on models that were also 'cut down' types, i.e. not as quality as earlier years. Nibelungenwerk didn't have the potential for 1944 capacity in 1943, but it could have produced more had it not been focused on building other types like the Porsche Tiger and Ferdinand/Elefant tanks among others. It was also being used to repair damaged tanks as well.
https://translate.google.com/transl...wikipedia.org/wiki/Nibelungenwerk&prev=search
It should be noted too that the workforce increased by double between 1942-44.

Now if Uboats had been taken out of production to use the labor, resources, and metal working machinery for tank production, output could have been boosted MUCH earlier.
 
IIRC Blair said the XXIII was all but useless.

haven't seen comments that Type XXIII was useless or have major issues, other than small torpedo capacity. my point overall is that it would have been a more suitable project (coastal defense or simply recon. on Allied moves ... at that point) and more suitable project to build (as it consumed less resources to build, operate, manpower.)

you are postulating that an early end to u-boat construction would benefit by diverting those resources to other more useful weapons programs? would agree up to a point that continuing the same Type VII was fruitless or diminishing returns? I'm only substituting a compromise solution that allows a more limited u-boat war to continue. recall the Exercise Tiger disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exercise_Tiger , with small Elektroboot they might have been able to disrupt some Allied operations in ways that mortars and AA guns could not.

would suggest reclaiming resources for more productive or needed weapons should have looked first to V-2 project and/or streamlined flak operations (as they had tens of thousands of AA flak sorely needed on Eastern Front and their use against Allied aircraft was questioned at the time.)
 
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