WI Germany had done everything 'right' with Enigma?

there were a few issues with trying to prevent the cracking of the enigma:
1. Replacing them all would have been horrendously expensive (less so for the navy since they'd only have needed one for every ship), so trying to get a 4-rotor system working would have been a long-winded process that likely would have resulted in a great deal of trouble for the Germans (until you were sure everyone had a 4-rotor machine you'd have to find a way of sending a three-rotor message, thus defeating the point and giving the British a leg up on cryptanalysis for the 4-rotor)
2. There's only a certain number of rotors available, and you will have some sets near the coast, so the British will raid them as soon as they can't read the messages any more.
3. you have to let the guy on the other end know which rotors to use and what their starting positions are, and at least a part of that message can't be in code, so that offers the British another window. for this bit, that means giving them the first half of a six (or eight) letter word, with the last three (or four) letters referring to rotor positions. The key here is that the receiver operator has to work out the missing letters, but if they can do it, so can the British.

1 - You shouldn't send out identical messages in both the 4 rotor and 3 rotor codes. Just by changing phraseology between the two you reduce the value of one as a crib to the other

2 - Having (for example) 8 rotors available being used 3 or 4 at a time greatly increase the complexity of the decrypting problem, especially if you also have the auxiliary patch panel.

3 - You use distributed setup books that change the setup on a preplanned schedule.
These books might have the daily rotor numbers, starting positions, and patch panel connections. This is written on paper that can be destroyed quickly. Each day when changing setups you destroy the page for the previous day. There can be special emergency books that would be 'one time' setups that could be used for special cases.

These are all standard procedures that are used even today
 
1. Since the original version was eight rotors, I would standardize on that one from the beginning, costs and unhandiness be damned.

2. Each battalion, sturmbahn, battery, or ship would have its own two codes, one for sending messages, and the other for receiving. These would change to a new code every next solstice or equinox. Messages sent with the reception code (and vice-versa) should cause officers to smell a rat.

3. The larger or more key the unit, the more enigma rotors used to code the message. Battalions use 4 rotors, regiments and brigades 5, divisions 6, and corps and larger use 7.

4. Each branch of service (and the Waffen ß) has its own rotors, which change completely every 6 months.
 
Why not skip the wireless communications all together, forgo the centralized command structure, giving instead localized control to commanders in the field? For example, without wireless communication Von Paulus could have pulled back from Stalingrad without contravening direct orders from Hitler. The u-boats could have looked for their own targets as opposed to reporting their positions back to HQ and waiting for fleet-wide orders to follow some larger plan.

I imagine once wireless communication was introduced into, for example, the Royal Navy, many older officers looked fondly back on the days when the local commander didn't need to check in with politicians and bureaucrats back home before making any decision beyond immediate tactics.

The French Army operated with elements of this thinking in 1940. The French were very aware of their vulnerability in radio messages & eschewed radios for critical operational & stratigic traffic. Above the tactical level they depended on telephone and telegraph, and on detailed planning giving local commanders a series of complex options for each situation. However this system proved slower than the German communications, contributing to slower reaction & decision making at the operational & stratigic level.
 
The Germans captured several British TYPEX & US SIGABA machines along with operating documents. They were however unable to penetrate either system in any useful way. Does anyone have the facts on why the Germans or Italians could not penetrate these. Was it lack or trying or were the systems unbreakable with 1941-44 technology?
 
The Germans captured several British TYPEX & US SIGABA machines along with operating documents. They were however unable to penetrate either system in any useful way. Does anyone have the facts on why the Germans or Italians could not penetrate these. Was it lack or trying or were the systems unbreakable with 1941-44 technology?

The differences between Typex and Enigma were minor but Typex came with 8 rotors and 5 would be chosen according to the days instructions, 2 rotors didnt move during work but were set to the days setting, the 3 other rotors moved in a different way to Enigma they moved in a random fashion the Enigma rotors moved in sequence . So you have extra layers of security where you have to work out which 5 rotors are in use, then which rotors are the static ones then which sequence the rotors are moving in. I have read that if B Dienst had tried to break Typex in the same way Bletchley Park broke Enigma they would have needed 5 times as many Bombe machines.

Sigaba was different to Typex and Enigma and was reckoned to be another order of security similar to Lorenz which needed the worlds first programmable computer Colossus to break it.

Army Enigma was kept simple so it would be cheap and light and usable for tactical level coding but this meant it was breakable. Typex and Sigaba were kept at a higher level and used less therefore less to work with and cryptoanalysis needs lots of messages. The British and Russian Army used Slidex for tactical messages it was easily broken in 24 hours but by then the intel was too old to be of any use.
http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/slidex/index.htm
 
Everything right - is a lot of thing that need to be changed.
From 5 up to 8 rotors - more difficult to decode.
Better training - never end / start messages with heil hitler for example.
Change codes with more frequency.
Never assume any system is unbreakable.
U-boat arm - way less comms - that also helps with huff-duff.

And this is a very small list of things that can be changed.

In the end, if they do all that and more - only turn the war more costly for the Allies, never ever change the end result.

Be thankful for the errors of the other side.

In a war both sides do a lot of errors - 20/50 years later with benefit of hindsight is easy to see then. Some of then. Learning from that ? Maybe.
 
The differences between Typex and Enigma were minor but Typex came with 8 rotors and 5 would be chosen according to the days instructions, 2 rotors didnt move during work but were set to the days setting, the 3 other rotors moved in a different way to Enigma they moved in a random fashion the Enigma rotors moved in sequence . So you have extra layers of security where you have to work out which 5 rotors are in use, then which rotors are the static ones then which sequence the rotors are moving in. I have read that if B Dienst had tried to break Typex in the same way Bletchley Park broke Enigma they would have needed 5 times as many Bombe machines.

Sigaba was different to Typex and Enigma and was reckoned to be another order of security similar to Lorenz which needed the worlds first programmable computer Colossus to break it.

Army Enigma was kept simple so it would be cheap and light and usable for tactical level coding but this meant it was breakable. Typex and Sigaba were kept at a higher level and used less therefore less to work with and cryptoanalysis needs lots of messages. The British and Russian Army used Slidex for tactical messages it was easily broken in 24 hours but by then the intel was too old to be of any use.
http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/slidex/index.htm

Thanks.

Note here that tho the Germans were not able to penetrate TYPEX & SIGABA, or the French communications of 1940 they still managed some noteable battlefield success. That was accomplished by better developing other sources.
 
It doesn't really matter how many rotors there are mind, because every time you add a new set, the British will just launch a commando raid to bag them.
 
Enigma and Africa 42

Another one big benefit for the Germans not having their Enigma cracked is the Africa. I remember reading somewhere that Ultra show that the US Attache in the Cario Embassy was inverdently leaking info to the Italians secret service. So Rommel got alot of high level/detail intel until the US attache was sent home. If the Enigma wasn't cracked, then this could have gone on past El Alamien. So Maybe Rommel wouldn't have attacked knowing that major reinforcement was on the way OR that the line was held strongly.
 
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