WI - Germany eschews naval expansion 1870 onwards?


Riain Does anyone have any figures on the bunkerage of British and German dreadnoughts? Because I think that whole long range thing is overblown given the British had coaling stations all over the place and Germany didn't yet the Goben managed to operate in the Med.

Probably best to ignore the reciprocal dreadnoughts – they weren’t high seas material. The Kaisers I think were about 8,000nm at 4,000 tons of fuel at economical cruising, so call it 2 miles per ton cruising to 2 tons per mile at flank speed, as a rule of thumb. What you’re asking at heart is a design priority question – if the HSF had emphasized range considerations over any other quality, what would a Kaiser or a Konig have looked like? That is to say, if you increased the displacement of a Kaiser to double its bunkerage (making its cruising range 16,000nm), what does the ship look like? I would guess it displaces about 30,000 tons, has 8 x 12” guns for armament (the center turret is given up for increased coal capacity), and has the same speed and armor.

One productive google is oil/coal slurry. Why wasn’t Germany, a leader in all things chemical, on top of that type of experimentation?
 
Caoster I said that building a battle fleet beyond what was needed to contest the North and Baltic Sea is pointless and wasteful. Germany only needs enough battleships to force Britain to employ battleships of her own, and not let Britain enforce a close blockade with cruisers or other cost effective vessels.

Athelstane Germany *did* have cause to develop its heretofore neglected navy by the 1890's. The question was: what kind of navy was suited to its national interests?

Wiking One that would prevent an economy collapsing close blockade.

This exchange hits the mark. Germany was a land power facing a coalition led by the wolrd’s only true seapower. As a landpower, Germany’s navy had two functions. First, to ease the consequences of the blockade so that the Central Powers’ economies could maximize their land power and systematically eliminate their continental rivals, one by one, until it was England alone. Second, to force the Entente to allocate disproportionate resources to maintaining its sea communications. If the entire Germany navy was destroyed, but achieved these ends, then it would have been a resounding strategic success - challenging the RN in direct battle would be a completely worthless endeavor, entirely counterproductive to the main duty of blockade running and resource diversion.

The core principle behind a navy designed to contest the blockade is the concept of strategic raw materials – things where if even a little is imported it has a large effect of negating the blockade, such as nitrates. A navy designed for blockade contest sacrifices armor and armament to achieve endurance and higher speed. A German dreadnought would have sufficient range to enter the Atlantic and return to Germany without fueling, it would a couple knots faster than its British counterparts, it would have a lighter main armament capable of dealing with British armored cruisers or battlecruisers, but not a dreadnought 1:1, and it’s armor protection would be inferior to actual HSF designs. It would have oil/coal fuel (so that it could refuel at sea), it would be supported by a robust logistics network of supply ships and infrastructure, (the HSF would need to bunker at least a million tons of oil for wartime ops). The German merchant marine needs ships with 16-18kt speed to run the blockade, and significant armament to fight off AMC's or light cruisers. Legally, Germany wanted East Indiamen (a heavily armed merchant ship that was recognised as a merchant ship by neutral powers) in the Hague conventions so that it could bust through the blockade, even with merchant ships unsupported by warships.
 
If Britain actually wanted an agreement with Germany why didn't they attempt to create one using professional and effective diplomatic means rather than send an amateur MP who exceeded his authority? It appears that these and the later Haldane mission were more in the nature of 'fishing trips' to see if they can land some whopper as a fluke and perhaps to soothe some people with an interest in a relationship with Germany, rather than actual attempts to reach an agreement.

There was always a certain amateurish element in British diplomacy in the Victorian and Edwardian periods (and beyond).

The question may be not so much whether Britain wanted any deal with Germany, but what kind, and how badly. And yes, some members of the cabinet wanted it more than others. And none wanted a deal, so far as I can make out, which would have made Britain an adjunct to the Triple Alliance.
 
Athelstane The High Seas Fleet *was* strong enough to prevent a close blockade by the RN. But it was not strong enough to prevent a distant blockade



What does a close blockade accomplish that a distant one could not?

Nothing, really, except perhaps the ability to bombard shore installations and harbor facilities - and, if you really want to, relatively easy amphibious assault. But I think we all realize that a landing was simply not in the cards outside Jackie Fisher's fevered imagination.
 
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Athelstane For starters, Salisbury was still authorizing approaches to Germany for a limited alliance agreement as late as 1901.

Riain If Britain actually wanted an agreement with Germany why didn't they attempt to create one using professional and effective diplomatic means rather than send an amateur MP who exceeded his authority? It appears that these and the later Haldane mission were more in the nature of 'fishing trips' to see if they can land some whopper as a fluke and perhaps to soothe some people with an interest in a relationship with Germany, rather than actual attempts to reach an agreement.

It was Salisbury himself that penned the famous memo in May 1901 which stated that the burden of alliance with Germany was greater than the burden of neutrality, therefore alliance with Germany made no sense. This memo was intended to end any discussion of alliance with Germany, and it did so. Later, around December 1901, he axed his foreign secretary’s proposal for an Entente with Germany.

With respect to Haldane in 1912, he was sent to Berlin to see if there was any ground for better relations or a naval deal. The French reacted poorly and the whole thing was shelved after it became clear that any continuation along the lines of the premise Haldane had introduced would threaten the Entente policy.

1. Again, what Salisbury was rejecting was the alliance framework that Holstein and Bulow had decided to insist upon - join the Triple Alliance. Salisbury quite properly decided that an alliance which would commit Britain to defending Austrian control of Galicia, Bosnia or Tyrol was simply not in Britain's interest.

2. The Haldane mission *really* collapsed once the British learned the true contents of the proposed German 1912 Novelle, which would have massively expanded the High Seas Fleet's manpower and escort ships and submarines, giving it year round striking power - enlargements that the German government was unwilling to walk back.
 
There was always a certain amateurish element in British diplomacy in the Victorian and Edwardian periods (and beyond).

The question may be not so much whether Britain wanted any deal with Germany, but what kind, and how badly. And yes, some members of the cabinet wanted it more than others. And none wanted a deal, so far as I can make out, which would have made Britain an adjunct to the Triple Alliance.

I wouldn't think the Japanese Treaty was done by amateurs, nor clearing up the points of contention with France and Russia which cleared the way for the wartime alliance. The difference of course is that these things were seen as valuable enough to pursue properly.
 
1. Again, what Salisbury was rejecting was the alliance framework that Holstein and Bulow had decided to insist upon - join the Triple Alliance. Salisbury quite properly decided that an alliance which would commit Britain to defending Austrian control of Galicia, Bosnia or Tyrol was simply not in Britain's interest.

Salisbury's memo was a 'no' to an alliance with Germany, not an instruction to probe at different terms of alliance.

2. The Haldane mission *really* collapsed once the British learned the true contents of the proposed German 1912 Novelle, which would have massively expanded the High Seas Fleet's manpower and escort ships and submarines, giving it year round striking power - enlargements that the German government was unwilling to walk back.

The British exaggerated their reaction at the contents of the novella to extract themselves from an increasingly embarrassing political situation of their own making.
 
Salisbury's memo was a 'no' to an alliance with Germany, not an instruction to probe at different terms of alliance.

Salisbury saw no point in probing at this point, because the Triple Alliance was all that appeared to be on offer from Berlin.

The British exaggerated their reaction at the contents of the novella to extract themselves from an increasingly embarrassing political situation of their own making.

What your basis for saying that?
 
Nothing, really, except perhaps the ability to bombard shore installations and harbor facilities - and, if you really want to, relatively easy amphibious assault. But I think we all realize that a landing was simply not in the cards outside Jackie Fisher's fevered imagination.
Did Germany keep up shipping between the Elbe, Weser, and Baltic?

I honestly don't know, but it seems quite vital to German capabilities if they can manage that much.
 
Salisbury saw no point in probing at this point, because the Triple Alliance was all that appeared to be on offer from Berlin.

Salisbury saw no point in joining the Triple Alliance or an alliance with Germany of any type. Later in 1901, he was hostile even to the idea of an Entente with Germany based on the status quo along the shores of the Med and Persian Gulf. Seems to me that the British PM already had formed a preference for a French entente policy by 1901 and considered any arrangement with Germany to be at cross purposes to that endeavour.

What your basis for saying that?

Not too interested in whether we agree or disagree on the point, but my opinion remains that the British deliberately overreacted to the information in the German novella in order to extract themselves from an increasingly embarrassing discussion about conditional neutrality that they did not wish to entertain. It's pretty clear (to me) from Haldane's initial comments in Berlin that he went in with a genuine intention to pursuing a naval-political deal, but by the time he got back to London Grey and the PM had cold feet, no doubt for fear of the increasingly hostile French reaction.
 
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