WI: Germany doesn't declare war on the US?

Being that Manstein did not get within 30 miles of Stalingrad by mistake

Nor did the Soviets stop him 30 miles from Stalingrad by mistake.

and I posit that hundreds of planes and 3 more divisions could only have a net positive effect and your response is that things might actually go worse than OTL, I cannot help but think you are simply not assessing the evidence nor considering the real knock-on effects of a POD.

And I outlined why three divisions would not actually be able to improve things. Even with extra three divisions, the commitment of Soviet reserve armies will still check Mansteins advance because multiple armies > three divisions.

That you have to immediately posit a different scenario only illustrates this.

Now, let's pretend, 10th Panzer was committed as a reserve for Case Blue because OKH believes the soonest the Allies will open a second front would be spring 1943.

10th Panzer wasn't committed as a reserve to Operation Blau because it was still resting and refitting after the terrible winter. Now by autumn of '42, after Blau was over, it would be strong enough to be considered combat ready... But it's liable to still be held in the west until after Operation Uranus because the Germans would still be very much concerned with the off-chance that the Anglo-Americans were preparing their operations

But even hand-waving that we're still not out of the woods yet. Because even if the 10th Panzer gets sent to the Eastern Front, it's liable to end up in the a completely different sector until it's far too late, because the German High Command did not realize that the Soviets were going to launch a major offensive against the Sixth Army, did not realize the existing tactical-operational reserves were inadequate, and thus judged the Sixth Army as not needing a stronger panzer reserve. Had they judged otherwise then they would not have needed to send another panzer division... They could have simply altered their existing deployments so they were not so overcommitted to the city fight and disposed of a proper panzer reserve for the flanks that way. But they didn't think so, so they didn't do so. So 10th Panzer is liable to be sent to a sector where the need for a panzer reserve is regarded as more urgent... and thus be in the completely wrong sector when Uranus breaks.

The German myth is that they lost to unending and unstoppable hordes of Russian peasants. In fact they didn't. They lost because they fucked up and were out-generalled. The German forces at Stalingrad were improperly deployed - criminally so in fact. They were inviting disaster. All the strength in the world is worthless if you turn you back on the enemy, close your eyes, and let him stab you in the back. A delayed American entry and a delayed Torch (assuming the former means the latter) doesn't change this.
 
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Any timelines?

OK, here's my timeline.

December 12, 1941: Seeing that Germany has not immediately declared war, FDR asks Congress to declare war on Germany. He uses the rationale of his December 9 radio address Hitler doesn't declare war on USA: the Axis is all in this together.

December 14, 1941: Congress, in an overwhelming let's-get-the-Axis mood, declares war on Germany.

December 15, 1941 and thereafter: Everything goes as in OTL :p
 

Deleted member 1487

The German myth is that they lost to unending and unstoppable hordes of Russian peasants. In fact they didn't. They lost because they fucked up and were out-generalled. The German forces at Stalingrad were improperly deployed - criminally so in fact. They were inviting disaster. All the strength in the world is worthless if you turn you back on the enemy, close your eyes, and let him stab you in the back.
You do realize that the Soviets were fielding something over 2.5 times as many man as the Axis forces combined on the Eastern Front as of August 1942 on, right? They had a decisive advantage in all categories of weapons and much deeper reserves, plus one active front, while the Axis forces were fighting on several different ones. Its not that hard to outmaneuver and overwhelm a force that is much weaker and overextended deep in your own territory while fighting on several other fronts, while having a fragile supply system constantly under attack by guerrillas and a declining motorization, while their air force is progressively stripped out to fight in defense of the homeland while under progressively stronger strategic air attack. Add on top of that when you're able to get massive external help in terms of equipment and raw materials you couldn't make for yourself, which included hundreds of thousands of military supply vehicles that were the best in the world in that category. Not only that, but also being able to externalize the feeding of your army to a degree. Plus with every mile of ground you liberate you are topping up on labor and potential conscriptable population.

Its really like the old saying about George W. Bush: he was born on third base and thought he hit a triple. The reality is that it was the combined might of the Allies, which in terms of both population and industry was at least 5x greater than Germany, plus Soviet strategic depth and attenuated German logistics that enabled the Soviets to survive, recover, and go on the offensive. The German defeat was more attributable to attrition and too many enemies than Soviet generalship and mastery of the art of war. They certainly got very good at attacking by 1944-45 against a collapsing enemy, but they didn't get to that point by inspired generalship, they got their by attrition of the enemy on multiple fronts, within the depths of the largest country on the face of the earth, profligate use of manpower to wear down the invader, and tremendous help from her allies.
 
You do realize that the Soviets were fielding something over 2.5 times as many man as the Axis forces combined on the Eastern Front as of August 1942 on, right?

Which by itself means nothing. The vast bulk of the Red Army at the time was still tactically and operationally no match for the Whermacht and, save the best units, usually suffered heavily in any engagement, win or lose. Had the Germans avoided overcommitting to the city, actually had decent intelligence to decipher Soviet intentions, and then disposed of the proper forces to guard the flanks, it is entirely conceivable Soviet attack could well have turned into a debacle like Operation Mars.

Its not that hard to outmaneuver and overwhelm a force that is much weaker and overextended deep in your own territory while fighting on several other fronts, while having a fragile supply system constantly under attack by guerrillas and a declining motorization, while their air force is progressively stripped out to fight in defense of the homeland while under progressively stronger strategic air attack. Add on top of that when you're able to get massive external help in terms of equipment and raw materials you couldn't make for yourself, which included hundreds of thousands of military supply vehicles that were the best in the world in that category. Not only that, but also being able to externalize the feeding of your army to a degree. Plus with every mile of ground you liberate you are topping up on labor and potential conscriptable population.

In the winter of 1942/43, much of this was still in the future. Lend-lease in 1941/42 was inadequate, the strategic bombing campaign still an ineffective annoyance, the "booty troops" were far within German occupied territory, and the Luftwaffe still overwhelmingly committed to the East. The Soviet economy was reeling from the previous blows while the Germans were sitting astride the entirety of a conquered Europe. Only demotorization of the German army and the fragile supply system apply, but that didn't stop the Germans from inflicting hefty defeats upon the Red Army during Operation Blau or prevent them from defeating Operation Mars.

The reality is that it was the combined might of the Allies, which in terms of both population and industry was at least 5x greater than Germany, plus Soviet strategic depth and attenuated German logistics that enabled the Soviets to survive, recover, and go on the offensive.

Certainly a comforting mythology to those with a Anglo-Americentric view of the Second World War, but not one supported by the sequence of events. The Western Allies were still merely poking at the outermost fringe of the Reich and delivering relatively paltry amounts of aid at the time the Soviets had survived, recovered, and gone on the offensive. The relative contributions were still heavily unequal.

They certainly got very good at attacking by 1944-45 against a collapsing enemy

Which is ass-backwards. The Soviets didn't achieve their stunning victories in 1944 because the Germans were collapsing under Allied bombardment. The Germans were collapsing, in part, because the Soviets achieved stunning victories in 1944. Yes, the WAllies made their contribution to that collapse, hence the "in part" in the previous sentence but to state that the most important Soviet victories of 1944 (most notably Bagration) were a function of German collapse that began after said offensives opened is inane.

but they didn't get to that point by inspired generalship

They didn't get to that point by inspired generalship alone, but inspired generalship was a vital part of it for the Soviets. Had Soviet military leadership not evolved to become better then the Germans, then everything else you listed would have been worth a whole lot less.

The reality is that the Soviets did, ultimately, rip the torch of "WWII Masters of Manuever Warfare" from the German hands. If you took the Red Army of 1944 and the German Heer of 1941, adjusted for equipment, and then pitted them against each other... it would be the former who come out on top. Why? Because the Germans use of maneuver warfare (colloquially known as "Blitzkrieg") was a set of special cases where commanders on the ground (often insubordinate) took advantage of the situation gained for them via the use of combined arms. It was very ad hoc and was never a formal doctrine of the Wehrmacht. When those commanders stopped gaining results, the Germans stopped using daring penetrations, which largely vanished from the German repertoire by mid-war. The Soviets, on the other hand actually went much further and institutionalized the concepts of maneuver warfare and deep battle, which became the fundamentals of their offensive operational art in late-WWII.

We can see this in how the Soviets were ultimately able to overcome defenses the Germans could not. The German use of maneuver warfare in its "blitzkrieg" ad hoc form was a trick and was countered by mobile reserves and stubborn defense of isolated pockets. It needed more development to overcome these problems, which it saw in the hands of the Red Army. The Soviets answered these problems by the use of advanced armored columns to attack and pre-empt the "stubborn defence" problem and the use of multiple penetrations advancing in parallel to threaten, confuse and distract the mobile reserves. All of this was then topped off with extensive deception plans to disguise the nature and location of the actual attack. Soviet doctrine stated that the best way to protect the flank of a penetration was to have another penetration advancing rapidly beside it. The enemy reserves then could not attack one salient without risk of being attacked in the flank themselves. The Soviets would also throw small, powerful forward detachments ahead of their penetrations to scout the fastest routes and seize potential lines of resistance before they could form. These detachments tended to be the best troops with the best equipment, and paved the way for the rest of the tank armies following behind - which itself was paving the way for the mass of slower infantry armies following behind them.
 
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Consider that the German-American Bund goes all out, pointing out the Germany had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor and that the REAL WAR is in the Pacific.

After all, the logic has worked for others recently...
 
Consider that the German-American Bund goes all out, pointing out the Germany had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor and that the REAL WAR is in the Pacific.

Nobody listens to them. The German-American Bund had become a marginalized fringe group even before Pearl Harbour. You might as well posit the entire US today suddenly accept the view of the Westboro Baptist Church.

After all, the logic has worked for others recently...

... What?
 
Nor did the Soviets stop him 30 miles from Stalingrad by mistake.

This sounds like a grade school fight. "You only got a punch on me because I let you."

And I outlined why three divisions would not actually be able to improve things. Even with extra three divisions, the commitment of Soviet reserve armies will still check Mansteins advance...

Could three armies be committed instantly? Where were they at the time?

Further, it's not three divisions versus three armies. It's Manstein's army plus three divisions, plus whomever gets drawn off sixth army and elements of 4th panzer. Pulling of Russian forces from one area has an effect on other areas where they could have otherwise been.

10th Panzer wasn't committed as a reserve to Operation Blau because it was still resting and refitting after the terrible winter. Now by autumn of '42, after Blau was over, it would be strong enough to be considered combat ready...

IOTL 10th Panzer was committed to Africa 8 days before the Soviet counteroffensive, and used in France before then (at Dieppe) due to the possibility of an Allied landing. It was refitting, but obviously kept for reserve due to fear of where the American landing would be. This is why I posit that 10th Panzer can be held in Russia, or some ATL equivalent, as they would not just keep it sitting in France when IOTL they were able to commit the unit before the date of Uranus.

Because even if the 10th Panzer gets sent to the Eastern Front, it's liable to end up in the a completely different sector until it's far too late...

That's completely possible. However, being that Nordlicht is a no go and the soonest 10th Panzer would be committed would be the beginning of Fall 1942, Stalingrad is the obvious destination as the Germans were (if my memory serves me right) pulling out replacements that would have gone to other parts of the front and sending them south to the Stalingrad sector. This is why I posit that three divisions, which would ahve not stayed in France after refitting, would have went to Stalingrad...plus hundreds of aircraft too.

the Sixth Army, did not realize the existing tactical-operational reserves were inadequate, and thus judged the Sixth Army as not needing a stronger panzer reserve.

Source.

Interestingly enough, you never counter my argument that a 500-600% increase in German tank reserves may have a crucial impact on the battle, which in my mind concedes that a delay in Torch could have possibly had a big effect in the East for the Germans. Of course, Hitler could have sent them to Africa anyway to reinforce Rommel. All sorts of different decisions could be made. But it is plausible enough they would be sent as additional reserves for Stalingrad, where the knock-on effects could have been decisive. Heck, 150 more superior tanks could have held the Russians off for more time, allowing the Germans to fix some of the wiring damage the mice did and then commit dozens of more Romanian and Panzer 38t tanks. Being that I do not know what the Russians had to face these tanks, I cannot venture to guess that a longer delay would occur. But, this effects German planning too as they now have time to react and move forces accordingly.

It is easy to just sit and die in Stalingrad when you have no choice anyway.
 
My personal view is that sometime after the midterms at the latest when Americans feel the Pacific flank is secure FDR uses some sinking as a pretext to go to war in Europe.

With a wartime controlled press after Pearl Harbor the public is going to be barraged with articles about the German threat all though 1942 and how they are helping our enemies to the East and how they had a hidden hand in Pearl Harbor.
 
Which by itself means nothing. The vast bulk of the Red Army at the time was still tactically and operationally no match for the Whermacht and, save the best units, usually suffered heavily in any engagement, win or lose.

On the contrary, it meant everything. If one imagines an ASB making both sides' numbers perfectly 1 against 1 equal on the Eastern Front in 1942, the Soviet Union would have been decisively defeated.

Had the Germans avoided overcommitting to the city, actually had decent intelligence to decipher Soviet intentions, and then disposed of the proper forces to guard the flanks, it is entirely conceivable Soviet attack could well have turned into a debacle like Operation Mars.

Very doubtful. The Axis forces were severely overextended and suffering from supply problems. Better defensive preparations on their part probably could have avoided the losses of OTL, but I don't see the Soviet attack being stopped completely. It is much more likely that it would resemble the course of events in OTL 1943, a slow advance taking massive losses, but grinding forward nevertheless.

In the winter of 1942/43, much of this was still in the future. Lend-lease in 1941/42 was inadequate, the strategic bombing campaign still an ineffective annoyance, the "booty troops" were far within German occupied territory, and the Luftwaffe still overwhelmingly committed to the East.

The Luftwaffe was not "overwhelmingly committed" to the Eastern Front by the end of 1942. It was also heavily engaged in North Africa and preparing to defend against the strategic bomber offensive the next year.

The Soviet economy was reeling from the previous blows while the Germans were sitting astride the entirety of a conquered Europe. Only demotorization of the German army and the fragile supply system apply, but that didn't stop the Germans from inflicting hefty defeats upon the Red Army during Operation Blau or prevent them from defeating Operation Mars.

Because in the cases of Operation Blue and Operation Mars, they didn't apply to anything like the same extent. The big defeats suffered by the Red Army during the former occurred in the opening phases of the offensive, and the defeat of the latter occurred in an area where the front had been static for months.

Certainly a comforting mythology to those with a Anglo-Americentric view of the Second World War, but not one supported by the sequence of events. The Western Allies were still merely poking at the outermost fringe of the Reich and delivering relatively paltry amounts of aid

To an economy that was always on the brink of collapse (as the USSR's was in 1942) even relatively small amounts of assistance is very helpful.

at the time the Soviets had survived, recovered, and gone on the offensive. The relative contributions were still heavily unequal.

Completely ignoring the blockade, which economically crippled the non-German portions of the post-Fall of France Grossraum and heavily weighed down even the German economy.

Which is ass-backwards. The Soviets didn't achieve their stunning victories in 1944 because the Germans were collapsing under Allied bombardment. The Germans were collapsing, in part, because the Soviets achieved stunning victories in 1944. Yes, the WAllies made their contribution to that collapse, hence the "in part" in the previous sentence but to state that the most important Soviet victories of 1944 (most notably Bagration) were a function of German collapse that began after said offensives opened is inane.

There is absolutely nothing "stunning" about four army groups with massive to one superiority in all categories of weaponry being able to destroy a single opposing army group.

They didn't get to that point by inspired generalship alone, but inspired generalship was a vital part of it for the Soviets. Had Soviet military leadership not evolved to become better then the Germans, then everything else you listed would have been worth a whole lot less.

The reality is that the Soviets did, ultimately, rip the torch of "WWII Masters of Manuever Warfare" from the German hands. If you took the Red Army of 1944 and the German Heer of 1941, adjusted for equipment, and then pitted them against each other... it would be the former who come out on top. Why?

Because the Heer would be greatly outnumbered both in manpower and in equipment.

Because the Germans use of maneuver warfare (colloquially known as "Blitzkrieg") was a set of special cases where commanders on the ground (often insubordinate) took advantage of the situation gained for them via the use of combined arms. It was very ad hoc and was never a formal doctrine of the Wehrmacht. When those commanders stopped gaining results, the Germans stopped using daring penetrations, which largely vanished from the German repertoire by mid-war.

Rather hard to effect daring penetrations when the opposition massively outnumbers and outguns one's own side in every way.

The Soviets, on the other hand actually went much further and institutionalized the concepts of maneuver warfare and deep battle, which became the fundamentals of their offensive operational art in late-WWII.

We can see this in how the Soviets were ultimately able to overcome defenses the Germans could not. The German use of maneuver warfare in its "blitzkrieg" ad hoc form was a trick and was countered by mobile reserves and stubborn defense of isolated pockets. It needed more development to overcome these problems, which it saw in the hands of the Red Army. The Soviets answered these problems by the use of advanced armored columns to attack and pre-empt the "stubborn defence" problem and the use of multiple penetrations advancing in parallel to threaten, confuse and distract the mobile reserves. All of this was then topped off with extensive deception plans to disguise the nature and location of the actual attack. Soviet doctrine stated that the best way to protect the flank of a penetration was to have another penetration advancing rapidly beside it. The enemy reserves then could not attack one salient without risk of being attacked in the flank themselves. The Soviets would also throw small, powerful forward detachments ahead of their penetrations to scout the fastest routes and seize potential lines of resistance before they could form. These detachments tended to be the best troops with the best equipment, and paved the way for the rest of the tank armies following behind - which itself was paving the way for the mass of slower infantry armies following behind them.

There is absolutely nothing here that doesn't boil down to "overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers." What do you think would have happened on the Eastern Front in 1944 if an ASB had given the Germans thirty fully equipped and perfectly supplied army groups?
 
OK, here's my timeline.

December 12, 1941: Seeing that Germany has not immediately declared war, FDR asks Congress to declare war on Germany. He uses the rationale of his December 9 radio address Hitler doesn't declare war on USA: the Axis is all in this together.

December 14, 1941: Congress, in an overwhelming let's-get-the-Axis mood, declares war on Germany.

December 15, 1941 and thereafter: Everything goes as in OTL :p

This is (probably, I mean what do I know?) the likeliest scenario. Either Hitler declares war on the US, or he (for whatever reason) decides not to and the US just DOW's Germany a week later. That, or the US starts shipping even more arms and materiel to the UK, in order to "fight the Japanese wink-wink-nudge-nude", some U-Boat sinks a Merchant Marine freighter, and the US DOW's Germany then.

It affects some of the details of the war, but not the overall outcome.
 
This sounds like a grade school fight. "You only got a punch on me because I let you."

Do you even have a basic understanding of how the relief attempt unfolded? The Soviets were not confident they knew where the relief attempt would come from and which route it would take, so they held back a large reserve until the relief attempt began and was properly identified as the relief attempt while massing yet more forces elsewhere to smash. They then committed enough of that reserve to stop it, holding back the rest in case more German forces appeared or the 6th Army attempted a breakout. In the mean time, Soviet forces further to the north undertook Operation Little Saturn, which destroyed the Italian 8th Army and threatened to capture Rostov. Manstein's choice at that stage was one of two options. Either one, he could try and keep banging his head against the Soviet wall to get to the 6th Army which, even if the ASBs decided to personally intervene to let him get through, he would have to spend weeks waiting to get back up to strength in order to conduct a requisite fighting retreat, during which time the Soviets would take Rostov and thereby effectively reclose the encirclement (assuming they don't do so anyways by attacking the corridor following the arrival of the 2nd Guards Army) adding both Manstein's forces and the entirety of Army Group B too it. Or he could abandon the relief attempt, turn around, and deal with the threat to his rear while the 6th Army continued to tie down 7 Soviet armies. Being an intelligent general, Manstein went with the latter option.

Could three armies be committed instantly? Where were they at the time?

At the start of Operation Winter Storm, the Stalingrad Front had eleven armies, including the aforementioned 2nd Guards which was being deployed from the STAVKA reserve. Seven of those armies were guarding the encirclement itself and one manning the frontline to the southwest over which Manstein attacked. The remaining two (5th Shock and 5th Tank), along with some independent corps, were held as a Front reserve to block either a breakout attempt that got through the initial defending forces or a relief attempt. In the end, they only had to commit one army and one mechanized corps to stop Manstein, with further commitments later to push him back.

sixth army and elements of 4th panzer.

Even ignoring that Hitler won't let 6th Army do that, they were already too weak to even breakthrough the two armies guarding the end of the encirclement closest, much less deal with any potential reserves the Soviets send their way.

Pulling of Russian forces from one area has an effect on other areas where they could have otherwise been.

Nah, the Soviets don't need to pull forces from another area. They already had a powerful reserve on hand for just this eventuality and were even reinforcing it, with the 2nd Guards Army on the way, when Manstein's offensive began.

IOTL 10th Panzer was committed to Africa 8 days before the Soviet counteroffensive, and used in France before then (at Dieppe) due to the possibility of an Allied landing. It was refitting, but obviously kept for reserve due to fear of where the American landing would be.

And would most likely continue to do so because just because the American's enter in June 1942 instead of December 1941 (or, more probably, January-February 1942 instead of December 1941) does not mean they will automatically discount the prospect of an American landing somewhere in late-1942 as they can't be sure that the Americans haven't been preparing and coordinating for one with the British even before they officially entered the war.

That's completely possible. However, being that Nordlicht is a no go and the soonest 10th Panzer would be committed would be the beginning of Fall 1942, Stalingrad is the obvious destination as the Germans were (if my memory serves me right) pulling out replacements that would have gone to other parts of the front and sending them south to the Stalingrad sector.

So your pretending that it either replaces those replacements in their place on the front and that it doesn't get thrown into the city battle and torn up there. The "ifs" just keep piling up...

plus hundreds of aircraft too.

Between improved Soviet air defense measures, a resurgent VVS, and the inclement weather, the Luftwaffe was unable to provide any meaningful assistance to the ground forces. Even before Uranus, in fact, they were failing to provide adequate support despite still having the upper hand. "Ironically, at a stage when the Luftwaffe held and almost unchallenged air superiority, its air attacks grew fairly ineffective." ["Black Cross, Red Star," vol.3, p.214] Flying in clear skies Stukas were not able to suppress Soviet artillery firing across the Volga, nor close the Volga to shipping or interdict the rail routes. Concentrations of Soviet flak were also able to deter and diminish Axis air attacks to manageable levels, even when their fighters were no longer flying.

As I noted to Crimson King below, the Germans retained the overwhelming bulk of their close air support in the Eastern Front, which is the part that would actually matter the most in the subsequent fighting. And yet, the Luftwaffe was unable to successfully detect nor check the sudden appearance of the Soviet tank armies during Operation Uranus, despite belatedly conducting furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations. In the end Stalingrad was one of the Soviet's greatest exploitation successes, and it was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power. Certainly the Germans at Stalingrad could have used the forces they sent to the Med to better resupply the 6th Army and keep it in the fight a little longer (assuming they don't get blown up when the Soviets overrun their air fields during Little Saturn anyways), but to argue that these aircraft would somehow have changed the results of Uranus is quite a reach.


The head of OKH on October 23rd, in a supplement to an earlier order, told the army that "the Russian is at this time hardly in a position to begin a large offensive with long-range goals" (Inside Hitler's High Command, Page 190).

The Fuhrer's Luftwaffe Adjutant also noted that Hitler was misinformed about the state of 6th Army's reserves, particularly the 14th and 22nd Panzer Divisions. (Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, page 231).

Interestingly enough, you never counter my argument that a 500-600% increase in German tank reserves may have a crucial impact on the battle,

If you actually read my post, that's because I all but flat out stated that (A) it would and (B) they wouldn't even need the 10th Panzer to do so. As Antony Beevor noted:

"Paulus has often been blamed for not disobeying Hitler later, once the scale of the disaster was clear, but his real failure as a commander was his failure to prepare to face the threat. It was his own army which was threatened. All he needed to do was to withdraw most of his tanks from the wasteful battle in the city to prepare a strong mechanized force ready to react rapidly. Supply and ammunition dumps should have been reorganized to ensure that their vehicles were kept ready to move at short notice. This comparatively small degree of preparation - and disobedience to Fuhrer headquarters - would have left the Sixth Army in a position to defend itself effectively at the crucial moment." -Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege Page 228-229.

Repairing the tanks from the mice problem was something they could have done at any time prior to the Soviet offensive. It was never done because the Germans just never saw the need. They even found it somewhat amusing when they first identified the problem prior to Uranus. They won't see the need to keep the 10th Panzer in reserve either, even if we handwave continued German concerns about the Americans and assume it gets deployed to the Eastern Front, the Stalingrad sector, and not inside Stalingrad itself.

which in my mind concedes that a delay in Torch could have possibly had a big effect in the East for the Germans.

That's because your mind looks at what the Germans could do and then automatically assume they would do it. There is a significant difference. What the Germans could do is based on their physical resources. What they would do is based on their actual historical organization, beliefs and skills. As I noted above, even OTL, without the 10th Panzer, the Germans could have assembled an adequately strong enough panzer reserve for the 6th Army to beat off Operation Uranus. But they didn't and they didn't do so for reasons that had nothing to do with Operation Torch.

For example, according to Adam Tooze a Nazi Germany operating with perfect hindsight could have committed its limited stocks of strategic resources to maximize production in 1941/42, rather than in 1944/45 when it was too late, as they did historically. Tooze says that the argument that the Germans failed to mobilize is incorrect, or at least incomplete, and the issue was the Germans had a tightly time limited window in which they could go to maximum production due to limited stocks of resources, wear on machinery, and allocations of manpower. In any event, assuming that to be the case, then the Soviet materiel advantage in the Summer of 1943 could have been significantly offset or pre-empted had Hitler made the decision to industrially go for broke years earlier than he did. Of course the German's reason for NOT doing so was that it would have drained their war economy, and he was hoping for a quick war against Russia allowing Germany to then turn back and deal with the British Empire and America. Essentially, full commitment of resources against the Soviets would have meant a tacit admission that Germany would be unable to beat to the Western Allies, which wasn't the game the Nazis wanted to play.

So it wasn't overall inevitable that the Germans would find themselves outnumbered by Soviet equipment on the Eastern Front (ignoring for now questions of who out-generalled who), but it was inevitable by the end of 1942. The decisions that would ensure that it would be so had already been made years prior.

Similarly, at the operational level, had the Germans had far better intelligence on Soviet numbers and intentions then they would have been able to position what limited forces they still had for better effect, and absolutely achieve better results. I already gave an example as to how this could have worked at Uranus but another example is Citadel. Had 4th Panzer Army been reinforced and troops not dispersed to respond to diversions then it is absolutely the case that the Germans could have done better against the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive than they did historically. But again, barring some hand waving for a singular intelligence coup, achieving the kind organization capable of reliably providing this kind of insight requires a top to bottom shake up and reform of the whole broken German intelligence apparatus for the Eastern Front. It also requires leaders who still believed they could win the war to accept some very harsh truths such honest intelligence would have told them. However, in the historical context of poor German intelligence then defensive failures were inevitable, and postulating scenarios where the Germans consistently have their forces positioned perfectly to block the Soviets is hardly realistic.

So certainly had the Germans consistently had the intelligence to ideally position their forces in anticipation of Soviet moves it would have been possible for them to secure a far better result in the war than OTL. Once again however, fixing this problem would have required years of prior investment in a superior intelligence organization, and was not something that was suddenly going to be fixed in 1942 or '43.

On the contrary, it meant everything. If one imagines an ASB making both sides' numbers perfectly 1 against 1 equal on the Eastern Front in 1942, the Soviet Union would have been decisively defeated.

Way to miss my point. Read my quote again: I said that the Soviet numerical superiority by itself meant nothing. We have repeated instances in history where the side with even more overwhelming numerical and material superiority loses battles, and occasionally even the whole war, loses them catastrophically. The Soviets in the first stage of the Winter War against the Finns. The Americans (with the notable exception of the Marine Corps) at the Yalu River against the Chinese First Stage Offensive. The Iraqis against the Iranians. The Arabs against the Israelis repeatedly. The Libyans against the Chadians in the Toyota War. In some of these examples, the advantage in numbers and/or material by the loser was even more egregious then what the Soviets enjoyed against the Germans at any point in 1941-45. The Axis inferiority in numerical forces relative to the Soviets did not doom them to lose. Their failure to properly read their enemy in '42-'43 and deploy their limited forces accordingly did.

Very doubtful. The Axis forces were severely overextended and suffering from supply problems.

None of which prevented them from defeating Operation Mars, where their forces had been deployed properly to absorb an attack.

The Luftwaffe was not "overwhelmingly committed" to the Eastern Front by the end of 1942.

Yes it was. In approximately 2/3rds of its air strength was committed to the east in 1942, as was the bulk of the attrition inflicted upon it. And even as late as Kursk, nearly 85% of German close air support assets were deployed on the Eastern Front.

Because in the cases of Operation Blue and Operation Mars, they didn't apply to anything like the same extent. The big defeats suffered by the Red Army during the former occurred in the opening phases of the offensive,

Was there supper to be more to this thought? Because that's my point: Operation Blau ocurred when the Germans were already pretty far down their supply chain and well into their demotorization... and still inflicted major defeats on the Red Army. That the Red Army then responded to those defeats by pulling off a fighting retreat until the German forces hit their culmination point doesn't change that the Germans inflicted those defeats.

and the defeat of the latter occurred in an area where the front had been static for months.

You are aware that the description "where the front had been static for months" is the describes the Stalingrad sector of the front in November 1942 quite perfectly, right? What, with the front having been static for months and all...

To an economy that was always on the brink of collapse (as the USSR's was in 1942) even relatively small amounts of assistance is very helpful.

Except the near-universal assessment by economic historians is that WAllied assistance in 1942 was inadequate. Whether it be Overy, Tooze, or Harrisson, to name the big ones, they all say the same thing: WAllied aid didn't make a difference in 1941-42.

Completely ignoring the blockade, which economically crippled the non-German portions of the post-Fall of France Grossraum and heavily weighed down even the German economy.

Which still left the Germans by the end of '42 with at least twice as large an economy as the USSR.

There is absolutely nothing "stunning" about four army groups with massive to one superiority in all categories of weaponry being able to destroy a single opposing army group.

Well, of course you aren't stunned, because you clearly don't have the first actual clue of how monumentally difficult a task it is to organize, supply, and coordinate so many men and machines in a free-wheeling advance over hundreds to thousands of kilometers. I bet you think Barbarossa was even less of big deal, right? After all, the Germans on 1944 could still at least put up a competent defense on the tactical-operational level unlike the Red Army of 1941...

Even leaving that bit of sarcasm aside, the Soviets didn't obtain as much as 40:1 local superiorities because they outnumbered the Germans by 40:1 across the whole front or even in that sector of the front... even a glance at the numbers show they didn't. They achieved such superiority the same way the Germans had: by maneuvering and concentrating their forces.

Because the Heer would be greatly outnumbered both in manpower and in equipment.

Not remotely. If the only difference between the 1941 Red Army and the 1944 Red Army was their manpower and equipment, then I would be saying the Germans would be the ones coming out on top. The real difference between the '41 and the '44 Red Army is in their skill and that gulf is vaaaast. In 1941, they were still reliant on human wave assaults and haphazard artillery bombardments to make their breakthrough. In '44 and '45, they relied upon small, task-oriented assault groups with heavy engineer and firepower support closely coordinated with intricate artillery assault plans. Their '41 armored formations fumbled about, shedding equipment just by moving and shattered upon engaging in combat. By '44-'45, their armored formations used tactics relying on the firepower and maneuver of tanks and assault guns. They constantly probed, bypassed, and attacked deeply. They prevented the establishment of coherent defenses for as long as they could and, even in the event a German counter-attack managed to break them, they would quickly rally and reform. And in '41, only the senior operational and strategic commanders dared show initiative, whereas by '44-'45 it was present at all levels.

Rather hard to effect daring penetrations when the opposition massively outnumbers and outguns one's own side in every way.

Which didn't stop the Germans in 1941-42. They cut through Soviet tactical defenses in hours and the operational defenses in days despite facing similar or even worse numerical odds then they did in their failed attacks against the Soviets in 1943-1945.

There is absolutely nothing here that doesn't boil down to "overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers."

Clearly you didn't even read what I wrote, because there is nothing there which says that. A detachment of 6-700 men seizing a vital bridge before the enemy can even organize a defense so the forces behind them can pass over it. Or an advanced force leading the main body of armor around an enemy strongpoint, thereby leaving it cut off and isolated and vulnerable to being destroyed by the follow-on forces is not "overwhelming the enemy with superior numbers". These work whether you outnumber the enemy 3:1 or are outnumbered by the enemy 3:1

Now it is true that the Soviets massed overwhelming local superiorities at the initial breakthrough stage of their successful offensives... but then so did the Germans. So did the Anglo-Americans. So did the Japanese. Overwhelming local superiority is a basic military perquisite for a successful breakthrough. Indeed the failure of a number of Soviet offensives in 1941-43 (Mars included) and even a few Anglo-American ones in 1943-44 boil down to them failing to adequately deplpoy their forces for the attack so as to turn their strategic or operational numerical superiority into a tactical one. Similarly, the failure of a number of Axis defenses in this period (including their failure at Stalingrad) boil down to defend to the failure of the Germans to deploy their forces so as to the offset enemies offensive concentrations. Ditto for the failure of Soviet and WAllied defenses in 1940-42. And there-in lies the hypocrisy of it all: when the Germans maneuver to obtain massive local superiorities it's "German military genius tactics" but when the Soviets, or sometimes even WAllies, do the exact same thing it's "blundering Soviets/WAllies overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers".
 
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Do you even have a basic understanding of how the relief attempt unfolded?
Basic? I don't even have a basic understanding of breathing, bruh.

They then committed enough of that reserve to stop it, holding back the rest in case more German forces appeared or the 6th Army attempted a breakout.

Just enough to get them within 30 miles, so the distance was on purpose, sure. If a coordinated breakout was actually attempted, it would have not succeeded IOTL, but it would have got closer--close enough for a good amount of men to break out like Group Stemmerman did in 1944. IOTL, a similar encirclement of sixth army (again!) occurred in 1944 in Ukraine.

OEF-map-6.jpg


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Out of 60,000 Germans encircled, 45,000 got out.

Or he could abandon the relief attempt, turn around, and deal with the threat to his rear while the 6th Army continued to tie down 7 Soviet armies. Being an intelligent general, Manstein went with the latter option.

True, but we do not even know how quickly the cauldron gets sets up, being that IOTL the Germans lacked reserves to deal with Uranus. Heck, Uranus might be blunted, and with an actual chance to withdraw unlike OTL, Hitler may authorize a withdrawal (something that was not possible, even if the will existed, IOTL.)

Nah, the Soviets don't need to pull forces from another area. They already had a powerful reserve on hand for just this eventuality and were even reinforcing it, with the 2nd Guards Army on the way, when Manstein's offensive began.
Again, I ask, where?

So your pretending that it either replaces those replacements in their place on the front and that it doesn't get thrown into the city battle and torn up there. The "ifs" just keep piling up...

Of course they do, I only need to defend the idea that forces could be plausibly used better to defend my thesis that a delayed US declaration of war could have effects in the East.

Between improved Soviet air defense measures, a resurgent VVS, and the inclement weather, the Luftwaffe was unable to provide any meaningful assistance to the ground forces. Even before Uranus, in fact, they were failing to provide adequate support despite still having the upper hand.

That changes with hundreds of more German aircraft in Russia instead of Tunisia, hence me harping on it.

[Uranus] was conducted into the teeth of Luftwaffe air power.

Actually, it wasn't, the Germans pulled a ton of aircraft out of the theater OTL.

The head of OKH on October 23rd, in a supplement to an earlier order, told the army that "the Russian is at this time hardly in a position to begin a large offensive with long-range goals" (Inside Hitler's High Command, Page 190).

Does not mean that the Germans would not deploy more reserves.

Repairing the tanks from the mice problem was something they could have done at any time prior to the Soviet offensive. It was never done because the Germans just never saw the need.

You are misinformed. The mice bit through the wires as the Germans were warming up their tanks getting them read for battle. They surrounded the tanks with hay (which attracted mice) and as soon as they fired them up the mice were all like, "Bro, it's warm in that tank, let's go there beats the cold."

So, the additional German tanks would have not been in any more disrepair. In fact, they could have been surrounded wit hay the sam way and ran into the problem when the tanks were started up. Or, with more men on hand (with better tanks), perhaps they would ahve been more conscientious before firing the tanks up. We do not know, it was a strange event that did not occur often in WW2, and it could have gone either way. Small butterflies can obviously change it, because the event was not caused by months of neglect.
 
Basic? I don't even have a basic understanding of breathing, bruh.

Uh... You might want to retake High School biology then? :p

Just enough to get them within 30 miles, so the distance was on purpose, sure.

Not entirely on purpose. The Soviets did have to wait long enough to make sure it wasn't a feint to draw away their forces and then there would be existing inertia behind the German advance that they would have to defeat once the main forces engaged. That took about ten-twenty miles.

In any case, it actually didn't matter how far Manstein got in the end. On December 18th, before Manstein had even got to that 30 mile mark, the Italian 8th Army had already disintegrated and Soviet T-34s were rampaging within Army Group Don's rear. Manstein just couldn't afford to take the time to not only open up a corridor, but then also hold it open long enough for 6th Army's men to regain enough strength to withdraw. By the time that would occurred, the Soviets would already be cooling their treads in Rostov and Manstein would be looking forward to a future of joining Paulus in Soviet captivity.

IOTL, a similar encirclement of sixth army (again!) occurred in 1944 in Ukraine.
...
Out of 60,000 Germans encircled, 45,000 got out.

Difference was, those men were not being asked to wade through 30 miles of multi-feet-deep snow while already dropping dead from starvation. They were reasonably fed and the winter of '43-'44 was much milder compared to the ones of '41-'42 and '42-'43. So here's the challenge: malnourish yourself to the point you are barely able to even stand, then strap down yourself with all the gear the average German soldier carried, and try to 30 miles through a blizzards with snow drifts so deep you could literally bury a tank in one. See how far you get before you fall over and die.

Now consider that at no point during that excursion, do you have to deal with being shot at by ~150,000 Russians with tanks and artillery.

True, but we do not even know how quickly the cauldron gets sets up, being that IOTL the Germans lacked reserves to deal with Uranus.

And will do so ITTL, given your lack of demonstration that the Germans would transfer the 10th Panzer.

Again, I ask, where?

That, I am less clear on. I have where they were ultimately deployed to block Manstein, but not where they were before that. Logic does suggest that they would have initially been encamped at a midway point between the two potential routes the Soviets identified the Germans might use to try and break-in or break-out... so about several day's march.

Of course they do, I only need to defend the idea that forces could be plausibly used better to defend my thesis that a delayed US declaration of war could have effects in the East.

No. You also need to also demonstrate that they would do it, which was you haven't even begun to do.

That changes with hundreds of more German aircraft in Russia instead of Tunisia, hence me harping on it.

Already addressed this: none of the aircraft were the type that would have been useful in blunting Uranus... that is, CAS aircraft.

Actually, it wasn't, the Germans pulled a ton of aircraft out of the theater OTL.

Actually, it was. No aircraft were actually pulled out of the Stalingrad sector. At all. The six bomber groups withdrawn from Luftlotte 4 were taken from the Caucasus sector, not the Stalingrad one. They were then replaced by three German bomber groups brought down from Luftlotte 1 in the North and three Romanian bomber groups [Bergstrom, "Black Cross Red Star, vol.3," page 245] The hardest hit group by the Mediterranean deployment was actually Luftflotte 5 all the way in Norway, which had four Gruppen and one Staffel stripped, and leaving just one Gruppe to operate over the Barents Sea. [Bergstrom, p.194-195]

Does not mean that the Germans would not deploy more reserves.

So explain: why would they send more reserves when they aren't expecting any offensives that might demand them?

You are misinformed.

No, I am not.

"The 22nd Panzer Division, as a reserve formation had been starved of fuel, and during its long period of immobility, mice had sought shelter from the weather inside the hulls. They had gnawed through the insulation of electric cables and no replacements were immediately available." - Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, Page 231 (Emphasis mine).

The mice problem was a direct function of neglectful maintenance.
 
I'd like to point out to the two posters above me (and I'm a big fan of reading about Soviet/German military operations around Stalingrad in 1942 as the next person) but the thread is about what might happen, or more likely WHEN the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA will declare war on Germany sans an earlier German DOW on the US.

Sure, the butterflies (if you're a fan of those things) from a (slightly?) later DOW will impact on Soviet/German operations later in 1942, but surely the above arguments (which I've seen hashed out before) belong in a separate thread?
 
Way to miss my point. Read my quote again: I said that the Soviet numerical superiority by itself meant nothing. We have repeated instances in history where the side with even more overwhelming numerical and material superiority loses battles, and occasionally even the whole war, loses them catastrophically. The Soviets in the first stage of the Winter War against the Finns. The Americans (with the notable exception of the Marine Corps) at the Yalu River against the Chinese First Stage Offensive. The Iraqis against the Iranians. The Arabs against the Israelis repeatedly. The Libyans against the Chadians in the Toyota War. In some of these examples, the advantage in numbers and/or material by the loser was even more egregious then what the Soviets enjoyed against the Germans at any point in 1941-45. The Axis inferiority in numerical forces relative to the Soviets did not doom them to lose. Their failure to properly read their enemy in '42-'43 and deploy their limited forces accordingly did.

Yes, well, the conflict under discussion is the Eastern Front, not any of those others. My claim was that Soviet numerical superiority by itself was meaningful in allowing the USSR to survive in 1941-2 and then take the offensive thereafter. I wasn't claiming numerical superiority is an iron law which allows victory in all wars.

None of which prevented them from defeating Operation Mars, where their forces had been deployed properly to absorb an attack.

You are aware that the description "where the front had been static for months" is the describes the Stalingrad sector of the front in November 1942 quite perfectly, right? What, with the front having been static for months and all...

The Stalingrad sector had not been static for anywhere near as long as that over which Operation Mars was launched. Furthermore, it is a known fact, which every account of the battle I have ever read has mentioned, that the Axis forces which participated suffered major supply problems, which would have applied, at least to some extent, regardless of what their defensive dispositions were. I have never read anything similar for Army Group Center by late 1942.

Yes it was. In approximately 2/3rds of its air strength was committed to the east in 1942, as was the bulk of the attrition inflicted upon it.

Source? Even if true, this ignores the massive number of flak guns retained in Germany, which would have made a huge difference in stopping armored offensives had they been sent to a land front.

And even as late as Kursk, nearly 85% of German close air support assets were deployed on the Eastern Front.

Which means nothing more than they weren't useful defending against the bomber offensive. Bombers without fighters to escort them are like cars without engines unless the opposing side is either massively technologically inferior or has no air force at all.

Was there supper to be more to this thought? Because that's my point: Operation Blau ocurred when the Germans were already pretty far down their supply chain and well into their demotorization... and still inflicted major defeats on the Red Army. That the Red Army then responded to those defeats by pulling off a fighting retreat until the German forces hit their culmination point doesn't change that the Germans inflicted those defeats.

The point was that the supply problems Army Group South faced during the opening of Operation Blue weren't as bad as those later on because the overextension was less.

Except the near-universal assessment by economic historians is that WAllied assistance in 1942 was inadequate. Whether it be Overy, Tooze, or Harrisson, to name the big ones, they all say the same thing: WAllied aid didn't make a difference in 1941-42.

This paper by Harrison, devoted specifically to the question of why the Soviet economy didn't collapse in 1941 comes to the conclusion that from page 11 "Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus improvement in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend–Lease was stabilising. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it can hardly be doubted that collapse was near. Without Lend–Lease it would have been nearer."

Which still left the Germans by the end of '42 with at least twice as large an economy as the USSR.

A margin which would have been far greater had it not been for the blockade.

Well, of course you aren't stunned, because you clearly don't have the first actual clue of how monumentally difficult a task it is to organize, supply, and coordinate so many men and machines in a free-wheeling advance over hundreds to thousands of kilometers.

This is the sort of thing which really shouldn't be stunning for leading economic/military powers. It would be very impressive if it had been pulled off by a country like Venezuela or Burma, but not the Soviet Union. The fact that the early-war Red Army was incapable of performing such a feat says more about how utterly inept it was than the competence of the late-war Red Army.

I bet you think Barbarossa was even less of big deal, right? After all, the Germans on 1944 could still at least put up a competent defense on the tactical-operational level unlike the Red Army of 1941...

They were both strategic offensives conducted by multiple army groups, and therefore equally significant.

Even leaving that bit of sarcasm aside, the Soviets didn't obtain as much as 40:1 local superiorities because they outnumbered the Germans by 40:1 across the whole front or even in that sector of the front... even a glance at the numbers show they didn't. They achieved such superiority the same way the Germans had: by maneuvering and concentrating their forces.

And you don't think the Germans would have been able to achieve similar superiorities had they possessed four fully equipped, perfectly supplied army groups set against a single Soviet front (that is, reversing the overall historical margins of numerical superiority during Operation Bagration)?

Not remotely. If the only difference between the 1941 Red Army and the 1944 Red Army was their manpower and equipment, then I would be saying the Germans would be the ones coming out on top. The real difference between the '41 and the '44 Red Army is in their skill and that gulf is vaaaast. In 1941, they were still reliant on human wave assaults and haphazard artillery bombardments to make their breakthrough. In '44 and '45, they relied upon small, task-oriented assault groups with heavy engineer and firepower support closely coordinated with intricate artillery assault plans. Their '41 armored formations fumbled about, shedding equipment just by moving and shattered upon engaging in combat. By '44-'45, their armored formations used tactics relying on the firepower and maneuver of tanks and assault guns. They constantly probed, bypassed, and attacked deeply. They prevented the establishment of coherent defenses for as long as they could and, even in the event a German counter-attack managed to break them, they would quickly rally and reform. And in '41, only the senior operational and strategic commanders dared show initiative, whereas by '44-'45 it was present at all levels.

Strawman. I didn't say the late-war Red Army wasn't better than its early-war counterpart, but that it never became qualitatively equal to that of Germany. If you want to disprove this assertion, find an example of a Soviet offensive which succeeded despite involving equivalent numbers on both sides (and I don't mean the breakthrough sectors, but in the sense of having similar overall numbers of manpower and equipment, like Germany vs the Anglo-French in 1940).

Which didn't stop the Germans in 1941-42. They cut through Soviet tactical defenses in hours and the operational defenses in days despite facing similar or even worse numerical odds then they did in their failed attacks against the Soviets in 1943-1945.

Which says much more about the incompetence of the early-war Red Army than the brilliance of the late-war one.

Clearly you didn't even read what I wrote, because there is nothing there which says that. A detachment of 6-700 men seizing a vital bridge before the enemy can even organize a defense so the forces behind them can pass over it. Or an advanced force leading the main body of armor around an enemy strongpoint, thereby leaving it cut off and isolated and vulnerable to being destroyed by the follow-on forces is not "overwhelming the enemy with superior numbers". These work whether you outnumber the enemy 3:1 or are outnumbered by the enemy 3:1

Any examples of the Red Army successfully implementing such tactics when outnumbered 3:1?

Now it is true that the Soviets massed overwhelming local superiorities at the initial breakthrough stage of their successful offensives... but then so did the Germans. So did the Anglo-Americans. So did the Japanese. Overwhelming local superiority is a basic military perquisite for a successful breakthrough. Indeed the failure of a number of Soviet offensives in 1941-43 (Mars included) and even a few Anglo-American ones in 1943-44 boil down to them failing to adequately deplpoy their forces for the attack so as to turn their strategic or operational numerical superiority into a tactical one. Similarly, the failure of a number of Axis defenses in this period (including their failure at Stalingrad) boil down to defend to the failure of the Germans to deploy their forces so as to the offset enemies offensive concentrations. Ditto for the failure of Soviet and WAllied defenses in 1940-42. And there-in lies the hypocrisy of it all: when the Germans maneuver to obtain massive local superiorities it's "German military genius tactics" but when the Soviets, or sometimes even WAllies, do the exact same thing it's "blundering Soviets/WAllies overwhelm the enemy with superior numbers".

It's "superior tactics" when a similarly-sized force is able to maneuver so as to defeat a similarly-sized force (like in Case Yellow). It's "overwhelming the enemy with superior numbers" when a massively outnumbered force is overwhelmed by one which (in the overall sense I mentioned above) massively outnumbers it.
 
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In light of reliant valiant said, I will give Obsessed the last word other than on two points.

On December 18th, before Manstein had even got to that 30 mile mark, the Italian 8th Army had already disintegrated and Soviet T-34s were rampaging within Army Group Don's rear. Manstein just couldn't afford to take the time to not only open up a corridor, but then also hold it open long enough for 6th Army's men to regain enough strength to withdraw. By the time that would occurred, the Soviets would already be cooling their treads in Rostov and Manstein would be looking forward to a future of joining Paulus in Soviet captivity.

It is worth noting that the reserves you speak of, according to Soviet Storm, did not have enough fuel to fight Manstein. So the only forces that opposed Manstein's southern thrust were the ones directly in front of him. Three more divisions, perhaps, he closes the gap with sixth army before December 18th.

"The 22nd Panzer Division, as a reserve formation had been starved of fuel, and during its long period of immobility, mice had sought shelter from the weather inside the hulls. They had gnawed through the insulation of electric cables and no replacements were immediately available." - Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, Page 231 (Emphasis mine).

The mice problem was a direct function of neglectful maintenance.
While that appears to be a better source than Soviet Storm, being that I work on cars and know that mice don't bite on cold wires, the presentation of events from Soviet Storm (that the mice bit the wires as the tanks were idling) makes more technical sense.
 
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