WI: Germany doesn't declare war on the US?

What if Hitler doesn't formally declare war on the US shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? I have no doubt that the US would eventually have joined in the fight against Germany, just like the Soviets joined in against Japan later on - but with Germany and Japan not being official allies, the US and Germany weren't technically at war after Pearl Harbor, and it wasn't the US that changed this state of affairs. What would have changed, though, if Germany hadn't declared war at that point? When would the US have declared war (assuming a more or less similar course of WWII), and what would have been different until then?

(One thing I can think of is that the amusing joke about the Hungarian diplomat delivering the declaration of war to the US wouldn't exist, but I'm looking for more major effects.)
 
If US declares war, it makes a negotiated peace more possible, which may embolden anti-Hitler plots. It also helps the Germans in the Eastern front until the end of 1942. If they avoid the debacle of Stalingrad, they will slowly but surely be pushed back by the Russians. Then the bombings of Germany start in 1943. North Africa is captured by the British by the end of that year. Italy is still in the war, and it is obvious to everyone that France is where the Americans will attack in 1944. If Hitler gets offed, maybe the Germans can make peace with the West by withdrawing from France without a fight.
 
We've done this a few times.

The US would deliver to Britain, its ally against Japan, a fuckton of weaponry each month "for use against Japan ;)" and Adolf would either sit there and watch Britain become way more powerful with each passing week, or start sinking US flagged cargo, in which case he's just declared war.
 

Deleted member 1487

Without Hitler calling off the Uboat war the US would join in after some sinkings, so war happens potentially a few months later, but US declared, as the US public was a bit war happy after Pearl Harbor. If Hitler calls off the Uboats and makes a public declaration of neutrality, then things get more interesting, but that wasn't Hitler's MO. In fact what is the POD for Hitler not declaring war ITTL?

If US declares war, it makes a negotiated peace more possible, which may embolden anti-Hitler plots. It also helps the Germans in the Eastern front until the end of 1942. If they avoid the debacle of Stalingrad, they will slowly but surely be pushed back by the Russians. Then the bombings of Germany start in 1943. North Africa is captured by the British by the end of that year. Italy is still in the war, and it is obvious to everyone that France is where the Americans will attack in 1944. If Hitler gets offed, maybe the Germans can make peace with the West by withdrawing from France without a fight.
How do you figure it emboldens the anti-Hitler plots more than Hitler declaring war? How does it help the Germans in the East, even if official US entry is delayed a few months? Why would Stalingrad change?
 
Roosevelt's speeches in 1941 were focused on the threat of "The Axis", talking about them working to a common plan. The 9th December Fireside Chat is particularly hostile to Germany. So it's clear that FDR wanted war.

Remember always that Germany and Italy, regardless of any formal declaration of war, consider themselves at war with the United States at this moment just as much as they consider themselves at war with Britain or Russia.

The real question is how soon he can get a DoW through Congress. I have no particular knowledge what Congress was thinking, but we can safely assume that FDR wouldn't ask for a vote unless he could be sure that he'd win it, and that it would take several days at least - more like a week or two - to canvass opinion to reach a conclusion either way. In the meantime, FDR will just use the powers that he already has to attack German warships on sight in the Atlantic, and to deliver anything that he likes to Britain as part of L-L. If Germany wants to stop him, then an act of war will be required.

Does anyone have any information on what Congress was thinking between Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war? I'd imagine they were too shocked, disorganised and busy to give too much thought to Germany. Certainly FDR would have wanted to get the war against Japan organised first. But I'd have thought that by January he'd have been gauging support for expansion of the war.
 
Hitler discussed & toyed with the idea of declaring war on the US several times in 1941. Aside from the economic warfare the Roosevelt administration was waging on Germany, the naval battle in the Atlantic, & the massive loans to Britain, Hitler was also privy to valuable info on the messages between the senior leaders in London & Washington. In early 1941 the Germans penetrated the encryption of the AT3 telephone connection between the US embassy in London and Washington DC. Churchill and Roosevelt used this to converse every few weeks, or to their ambassadors. Other senior officials used the link to sort out questions in their written messages, or for last minute coordination of projects. Hitler received frequent briefs on this message traffic along with transcripts of the messages. From this source it was fairly clear just how deep active support for the Brits ran from the US.

Lets imagine for a moment he becomes enraged over some later event, a AT3 message, a US attack on a sub, a US ambassadors conversation with Darlan or Petain, ext.. & declares war in January, February, or even late December. Or perhaps the converse & the DoW come earlier, perhaps in response to the US occupation of Iceland?
 

Deleted member 1487

Adolph being Adolph?

His whims changed frequently
Not really in terms of his choice to DoW the US. He resisted it until the point he felt it was inevitable and then jumped in on his terms. Kershaw has a decent section in his bio of Hitler about how and why he came to the decision and it was not on a whim, nor capricious.
 
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The real question is how soon he can get a DoW through Congress. I have no particular knowledge what Congress was thinking, but we can safely assume that FDR wouldn't ask for a vote unless he could be sure that he'd win it, and that it would take several days at least - more like a week or two - to canvass opinion to reach a conclusion either way. In the meantime, FDR will just use the powers that he already has to attack German warships on sight in the Atlantic, and to deliver anything that he likes to Britain as part of L-L. If Germany wants to stop him, then an act of war will be required.

Does anyone have any information on what Congress was thinking between Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war? I'd imagine they were too shocked, disorganised and busy to give too much thought to Germany. Certainly FDR would have wanted to get the war against Japan organised first. But I'd have thought that by January he'd have been gauging support for expansion of the war.

Previous to PH the bulk of Congress were reconciled to the idea that the US would be at war with Germany NLT late spring 1942. They'd voted for the War Powers Acts in 1940, and for extending and expanding them in late 1941, along with many other statues designed to put the US on a war footing. The strongest bipartisan faction in latter 1941 was no longer the isolationist, but the America First group, who's core tenants included cessation of LL to the Brits and Russians, because the US would need the material when it soon joined the war.
 
How do you figure it emboldens the anti-Hitler plots more than Hitler declaring war?
No unconditional surrender demand. No point in trying to off Hitler when there is no chance for peace.

How does it help the Germans in the East, even if official US entry is delayed a few months?

The Germans knew that a Torch, or France landing, or something was coming in 42 due to US entry IOTL. Delay US entry 6 months and the forces and resources committed to deal with Torch and its aftermath could have been crucial in 6th Army's relief.

According to Wiki:

[T]he Germans moved first and by 9 November, there were reports of 40 German aircraft arriving at Tunis and by 10 November, aerial reconnaissance reported 100 aircraft. Two days later, an airlift began that carried over 15,000 men and 581 long tons (590 t) of supplies and ships brought 176 tanks, 131 artillery pieces, 1,152 vehicles and 13,000 long tons (13,000 t) of supplies. By the end of the month, three German divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division and two Italian infantry divisions had arrived. Walther Nehring was assigned command of the newly formed XC Corps on 12 November and flew in on 17 November... A hasty intelligence review showed about 125,000 combat and 70,000 service troops, mostly Italian, in front of them [the Allies].

Now, pay careful attention to the numbers. The Germans were able to bring in three divisions by the end of November and hundreds of aircraft. By December nearly 200,000 German and Italian troops were brought in. Operation Uranus started on the 19th. If these men were not in reserve to counter a US-led attack whereever it was supposed to have come, they could have been committed in the east. Manstein got within 30 miles of Stalinrad IOTL. Three fresh divisions and hundreds of combat aircraft could have proved pivotal in relieving six army.
 
I keep going through this: Hitler dosen't declare war on USA Once again: "How hard a time would FDR have had in getting a declaration of war through Congress? I think a Gallup poll figure from December 10, 1941 should settle that: "Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?": yes — 90%, no — 7%.""
 
But what was the polling in November?

Oh, of course most people opposed joining the war *then*. The point is that Pearl Harbor radically changed US public opinion about going to war not only with Japan but with Germany. The general reaction in the US press--including the former isolationist press--to the German DoW was incidentally one of indifference. It was a mere formality, they said; the US and Germany were already really at war, Japan could not have pulled off Pearl Harbor without German inspiration, etc. Richard Hill's *Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor* is good at documenting this. e.g. https://books.google.com/books?id=61WMf6XRVT8C&pg=PA28
Note that the *Chicago Tribune* said that a declaration of war against Germany after Pearl Harbor but before the German declaration of war would have resulted in *a few* No votes! "A few!" And this is the voice of Midwest isolationism speaking...

(Hill unfortunately buys into what I consider untenable conspiracy theories about FDR, but that is another matter.)
 
I keep going through this: Hitler dosen't declare war on USA Once again: "How hard a time would FDR have had in getting a declaration of war through Congress? I think a Gallup poll figure from December 10, 1941 should settle that: "Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?": yes — 90%, no — 7%.""

I'm wary of the hindsight in those figures. Anyway, it's Congress that needs to be convinced, not the public.
 
I'm wary of the hindsight in those figures. Anyway, it's Congress that needs to be convinced, not the public.

Well, that poll is not really "hindsight"--it was conducted *before* the German declaration of war. And Congress is not likely to go against FDR *and* 90 percent of the people.
 
Well, that poll is not really "hindsight"--it was conducted *before* the German declaration of war. And Congress is not likely to go against FDR *and* 90 percent of the people.

To put it mildly. If the vast majority of Americans want war there will be war. Congress critters want to be re-elected again and again.
 
Three fresh divisions and hundreds of combat aircraft could have proved pivotal in relieving six army.

The relief attempt failed because Manstein ran into multiple reserve armies the Soviets committed in December that stopped Manstein dead when he ran into them at that 30 mile mark. In fact the best and most powerful army in the whole Red Army at the time, the 2nd Guards, was deploying into the region and had Manstein tried to keep going it's counter-attack would have likely smashed his spearheads. Furthermore, Army Group Don's entire left flank was disintegrating under the hammer blows of Operation Little Saturn.

Three divisions isn't going to solve that. Either they get tied up trying to shore up the left-flank or they get committed to the drive and also get stalemated by the overwhelming force the Soviets will throw in their way. At best, Stalingrad still goes as per OTL. At worst, the Soviets slam the door on the Germans at Rostov and trap both Army Group Don and Army Group A forces in the Caucasus.
 
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Three divisions can't solve the disparity to overcome the multiple reserve armies the Soviets committed in December that stopped Manstein dead when he ran into them at that 30 mile mark. In fact the best and most powerful army in the whole Red Army at the time, the 2nd Guards, was deploying into the region and had Manstein tried to keep going it's counter-attack would have likely smashed his spearheads. Nor does it solve the greater problem of the disintegration of Army Group Don's entire left flank under the hammer blows of Operation Little Saturn. At best, Stalingrad still goes as per OTL. At worst, the Soviets slam the door on the Germans at Rostov and trap both Army Group Don and Army Group A forces in the Caucasus.
Being that Manstein did not get within 30 miles of Stalingrad by mistake and I posit that hundreds of planes and 3 more divisions could only have a net positive effect and your response is that things might actually go worse than OTL, I cannot help but think you are simply not assessing the evidence nor considering the real knock-on effects of a POD.

If Stalin gets pneumonia in 1940, your response is that the Russians are in Berlin by 1944.

If the Germans capture the Wallies at Dunkirk, your response is that the Russians are in Berlin by 1943.

If Hitler got a bad night sleep on August 13, 1941 your response is that the Russians repulse the Germans at Kiev.

It gets tiring! :p

On a more serious note, the German 48th Panzer Korps (22nd Panzer and 1st Romanian) was held in reserve and IOTL counterattacked the northern pincer of Uranus. According to Soviet Storm (@ 35:40) , field mice took "dozens" of tanks out of commission when they gnawed through wiring as they were idling. There were as few as 30-something operational Panzer 38ts, and they held out for a day before withdrawing.

Now, let's pretend, 10th Panzer was committed as a reserve for Case Blue because OKH believes the soonest the Allies will open a second front would be spring 1943. IOTL 10th Panzer had the following tanks in November 1942:

...21 Pz.Kpfw.ll, 105 Pz.Kpfw.lll, 20 Pz.Kpfw.IV and 9 Pz.Bef.Wg. shipped with Panzer-Regiment 7.

Now, maybe mice might have bit through all of their wires. Or, with hundreds of more planes, two other German divisions, and more German focus on the area, better maintenance might have prevented the whole mouse episode. Nevertheless, I think we can say we have a good chance of increasing German panzer reserves on November 19th by about 500-600 percent. If you think that will have no effect on the outcome of a battle, especially when the vast majority of these tanks were superior to the Panzer 38ts that were committed IOTL, I got a great bridge to sell you in Brooklyn.
 
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