WI: Germany Did Not Build a High Seas Fleet?

3) The physical standards of the German army will take a steep nosedrive. The French were drafting 92% of their men while the Germans were drafting about 50%. Go back to gym class and think how much better the guy picked half way was compared to the guy picked next to last. The Germans would be dropping like flies from marching towards the Marne

Yes, the ‘next to last’ went to the navy.
 
Yes, the ‘next to last’ went to the navy.

Shoveling coal ain't for wimps either. There is simply a marked decline in quality when you go to such a large draft. The poor physical condition of the French army cost many Frenchmen their lives

Any expansion of the German army is likely to make their casualties on the March to the Marne much larger
 
Germany could have spent money on other things besides North Sea focused battleships and not increased the size of the army dramatically.

1) Fortresses (lots of steel to keep Krupp happy). (A west wall or an east wall)
2) Battleships like the British (would have worked almost just as good for risk theory)
3) Artillery and equipment for the reserve army corps
4) Make their torpedo boats bigger like the British. (i.e. Torpedo boat destroyers). (Make the German fleet a trade protection fleet like the British.)
5) Coastal fortifications
6) Colonial infrastructure
7) A strategic supplies reserve.
8) The heavy infantry weapons mentioned above.
9) Or just a few less Battleships (1 less per year) and saved some tax dollars or debt.

If army expansion is really decided upon, couldn't the "low tier" extra draftees be put in the Landwher or such other reserve, useful in the Vosges or fortress garrisons, encircling cut of fortresses and such. The gym class analogy is kind of poor IMO, everybody in my gym class could walk, carry a pack and shoot a gun. Now some might be able to march quicker for a longer time, reload quicker, or dig a hole quicker etc, but still usable people in lots of situations.
 
) Fortresses (lots of steel to keep Krupp happy). (A west wall or an east wall)
2) Battleships like the British (would have worked almost just as good for risk theory)
3) Artillery and equipment for the reserve army corps
4) Make their torpedo boats bigger like the British. (i.e. Torpedo boat destroyers). (Make the German fleet a trade protection fleet like the British.)
5) Coastal fortifications
6) Colonial infrastructure
7) A strategic supplies reserve.
8) The heavy infantry weapons mentioned above.
9) Or just a few less Battleships (1 less per year) and saved some tax dollars or debt.

I don't think Germany was particularly short of fortresses or coastal defences. Nor were German battleships and destroyers significantly short ranged compared to the RN. In any case a trade protection fleet must be bigger that the enemy or it will be defeated in detail, so trade protection or non-submarine anti commerce strategy isn't really an option in the face of the RN.

The colonial infrastructure, strategic stockpiles and debt reduction is good, but I wonder how much impact a reduction in the navy battleships budget would have on these things.
 
I don't think Germany was particularly short of fortresses or coastal defences. Nor were German battleships and destroyers significantly short ranged compared to the RN. In any case a trade protection fleet must be bigger that the enemy or it will be defeated in detail, so trade protection or non-submarine anti commerce strategy isn't really an option in the face of the RN.

The colonial infrastructure, strategic stockpiles and debt reduction is good, but I wonder how much impact a reduction in the navy battleships budget would have on these things.

I am thinking the trade protection fleet would be good against France or Russia or Japan but wouldn't particularly annoy Britain for the reasons you mention, but would still have risk fleet value if theoretically combined with Russia and/or France. 2 Battleships per year built like Britain's current or previous class, vs the 3 or 4 OTL would be enough against France and Russia alone, could probably hold the Baltic at least if Britain joined in anyway.

A thicker net of fortresses (a west wall) would be handy if you did an east first strategy maybe. Agree that Germany has a lot of fortresses, but this is partially about making sure Krupp still hires lots of people
 
Despite the repeated genuine images of WW2 wheeled transports wallowing in Russian mud the frozen or summer months allow road movement and given German forces in the East an extra dimension after France would have been defeated

Lucky Horses never got stuck
2mhw799c-1401980785.jpg
:openedeyewink:
 
2) The French will realize that Plan XVII is hopeless and adopt a defensive-offensive after the Russians mobilize strategy.

Not seeing a smaller German Navy and possible larger Army leading to this. Cult of the Offensive was too strong, they rejected that with Michel being canned in favor of Joffre after the more defensive plan was brought out
 
Not seeing a smaller German Navy and possible larger Army leading to this. Cult of the Offensive was too strong, they rejected that with Michel being canned in favor of Joffre after the more defensive plan was brought out

I'd argue its almost inevitable. Plan XVII was controversial to begin with. The essential error the French made was that they didn't think the Germans would use their reservists in the front line. The French thought the Germans had about twenty five fewer divisions than they did. When Joffre ordered the attack through the Ardennes, he believed that there would be only a small screening force that would be overrun quickly not two armies.

The increase in German army strength would be obvious and Plan XVII's hopelessness clear even to the most ardent fans of the offensive
 
I'd argue its almost inevitable. Plan XVII was controversial to begin with. The essential error the French made was that they didn't think the Germans would use their reservists in the front line. The French thought the Germans had about twenty five fewer divisions than they did. When Joffre ordered the attack through the Ardennes, he believed that there would be only a small screening force that would be overrun quickly not two armies.

The increase in German army strength would be obvious and Plan XVII's hopelessness clear even to the most ardent fans of the offensive

But that's not how it worked OTL.
Plan XV of 1903 assumed the German would attack thru Belgium, and that the French response would be:

1. Move into Belgium for a meeting engagement with the Germans
2.??
3. Send the Bosche scurrying back and On. To. Berlin., winning the War

Plan XVI wasn't all that different, except Michel wanting an Army to be held back, if the Germans tried sneaking thru the Ardennes or something else sneaky, given how the Germans were improving interior RR lines, then do what XV did, just from a different location further south. But waiting for the Germans in French Territory? Heresy. So he had to resign.


Plan XVII of 1911, Joffre got the three years of active service so the troops could work on more close order drills, while rear area jobs/work would now be done by called up reservists, and free up more of the active service men to be part of the attack. The number of men in each company increased. Alsace and Lorraine were to be the main focus, along with Plan XV going into Belgium.

This was done even though the French had a good idea of of what the German Schlieffen Plan was from spies.

As long as additional troops were not being put down around Metz in new defensive works, you would see no change in Plan XVII
 
This is the issue the BEF found with reservists called to the colours. First class performance in battle but many were too unfit in marching in boots and could not keep up. Now if you can make a worthwhile proportion lorry mounted then you can pass fresh troops through the exhausted ones and do the same again when they have rested. A German investment in motorising the German economy as the reserve vehicles to be called up with their drivers etc.

My understanding is that Germany did put a fair amount of effort into adding motorized capability to their logistics corps in the years leading up to WW1. They could have done more with more resources, of course, but my read is that they were already past the point of diminishing returns. The main bottlenecks were the capacity of French roads (which were pretty much saturated IOTL during the run-up to First Marne) and the difficulty of servicing trucks (which were still a bleeding-edge technology at the time) in the field quickly enough to keep up with hard use.

This paper (a USMC Command & Staff College master's thesis) has a ton of information.

Lucky Horses never got stuck:openedeyewink:

The obvious solution to that is to replace some of the horses with other draft animals that do better on soggy terrain. Perhaps sea lions?
 
If in fact the operational figures for the trucks were loss of 2% every day in action , I would suggest many more trucks could have allowed more sustained supply transportation, facilitating faster more reliable movement in the initial maneuver phase of the war.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491685.pdf

Reinhard Frank reports only 40,000 truck built in WW-I.

Thanks "maniakes" for the link!
 
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