WI: Germany developed a Long Range Bomber by 1941?

What if the Luftwaffe developed a long range bomber before the launch of Operation Barbarossa in 1941? By "long range" I mean something like the hypothetical "Ural Bomber", not the more ambitious "Amerika Bomber."

Would the survival of Walter Wever have been enough for this to happen, or would his priorities have been overruled by Goring, or others in the Heer who preferred the Luftwaffe focus on close air support?
 
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During the Second World War, the United States developed aircraft that they needed, aircraft that they might want, and aircraft that they wondered about. They also had engine programs for exotic powerplants that led nowhere. It was the only country which could afford to do so. Everybody else established priorities and only built to specific need based on available resources. Resources to build the Ural Bomber were deemed to be beyond capacity. Had they developed the bombers, they would be short of capacity for something else that was probably vital. They would have also found that the bombers were vulnerable to interception. In the case of the Soviet Union, the MiG company built a number of aircraft which were designed to combat an enemy which never appeared. Since Germany never had a Mustang, their Ural Bomber was pointless. But the reason it wasn't built was that it was a massive undertaking and they didn't have the goods to develop it.
 
There have been many threads devoted to this general topic. My general opinion is that Weaver's survival could have led to the development and introduction into Luftwaffe service a 4-engined long-range bomber in time to participate in Barbarossa, but it would have probably been obsolescent - something like the Short Stirling - and possibly lacking the development potential of early B-17s. I also think it would have been a mistake. The Soviets had plenty of room to move factories even farther east and its is hard to imagine that Germany could have mounted a strategic air campaign remotely as successful as the joint RAF/USAAF effort - which as we know had less effect on production that its supporters hoped.

If Germany developed a force of long-ranged bombers, I suspect the best use for them would be as long-range maritime bombers in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the BoB.
 
If Germany developed a force of long-ranged bombers, I suspect the best use for them would be as long-range maritime bombers in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the BoB.

The Allies made very good use of long-range bombers in the Atlantic. They could supplement the submarines in attacking shipping. Could lead to both sides deploying long-range fighters over the Atlantic as well.:cool: Long range bombers in the Battle of Britain would be... interesting. OTL the Brits were able to concentrate most of their air defense over southern England.
 
The Allies made very good use of long-range bombers in the Atlantic. They could supplement the submarines in attacking shipping. Could lead to both sides deploying long-range fighters over the Atlantic as well.:cool: Long range bombers in the Battle of Britain would be... interesting. OTL the Brits were able to concentrate most of their air defense over southern England.

But, as pointed out by Just Leo, a strategic bomber is really only viable when you also have a long range escort needed to protect it. German committment to long range strategic bombing would have made the development of effective escort fighters essential - something else Germany could hardly affort to spend time on, when faced with zillions of T-34's in Russia. Again, it is essential to remember that, except for perhaps a few months in 1940, neither the USA nor UK really had to worry about being invaded.
 
So the Germany that expects this war to be over in three months with the complete destruction of all Soviet military power and an ensuing complete collapse of Stalin's dictatorship is going to invest in the kind of project suited to a long war that its own prejudices will mean it will have no real reason to invest in because of what, exactly? A Germany that realizes the Axis-Soviet War is a bad, bad idea is not the kind that would do anything like the OTL WWII in the first place. A Germany that expects that to be a long war would probably not start it in the first place.
 
OTL the Brits were able to concentrate most of their air defense over southern England.

Not really. Alhough 11 Group had the most resources, all of the UK (and not just England) was covered.
Something which the Germans found out when they tried to bomb Scapa during the BoB and got intercepted by Spitfires.

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I also find it remarkable that the OP makes a thread about an early-war German strategic bomber less then two hours after yet another one of such threads has been posted.

What's next? Ten identical Sealion threads in an hour?
 
If Germany developed a force of long-ranged bombers, I suspect the best use for them would be as long-range maritime bombers in the Battle of the Atlantic and in the BoB.

What about bombing the Baku oilfields, and the associated refineries at the beginning of the Barbarossa campaign after the majority of the Russian air force had been destroyed on the ground? The Allies were able to cause a great deal of destruction when they bombed the Romanian Ploiești refineries (Operation Tidal Wave). No doubt the damage could have been repaired, but at the cost of time, and vital resources. Later, after capturing Crimea, the Northern Iranian oil fields could have been targeted as well.
 
I think before Wever died - the decision had been made to abandon the initial spec. and go for Bomber 'A' - which turned out to to be the twin-engined He-177.
However, supposed the Do-19 is proceeded with as an interim type (but with bigger engines - Goring 'sells' it to Hitler not on numbers but to its awesome size - all the better to intimidate the French! So instead of building so many Do-17s, they get Do-19s e.g. instead of 11 Kampfgruppen, at the start of WW2, there's just 2 (for recon) and 3 of Do-19 with another 3 six-months later. The deficit in light bombing is helped by the Me-110 taking on a fighter-bomber role earlier.
In this TL the upgrade would have another four-engined aircraft, so the He-177 is more like the 177B or 274 only earlier, not only that but there is less likely any need for the Fw-200 - the emergency recon./bomber.
 
I think before Wever died - the decision had been made to abandon the initial spec. and go for Bomber 'A' - which turned out to to be the twin-engined He-177.
[pedant]The He-177 was four engined... just it had a kind of odd arrangement whereby two engines would drive a single propeller (when not setting the aircraft alight)[/pedant]
 

CalBear

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Overall, the advantage of true heavy bomber to the Reich would be negligible. There are several reasons for this

  • Unescorted bombers tend to suffer crippling losses, especially when most of the mission is over enemy territory. The situation for the Luftwaffe in the East would be pretty much a mirror for the RAF/USAAF effort IOTL, and not the relatively safe quick dashes that marked the Blitz (where the RAF really only had about 100 miles of airspace that they could play defense with).
  • Every fighter devoted to bomber escort in the East is one fewer defender in the West. The USAAF used to have roughly one fighter for every three bombers early in the war. Once Doolittle took over, that number went up (although the escort method also changed radically) and hovered at around one escort fighter for every two daylight bombers
  • Every heavy bomber means about five fewer fighters available for the Luftwaffe to defend the West. Put another way, every Luftwaffe heavy shot down = an Allied fighter ace.
  • The other way the math works is that every heavy costs the Luftwaffe between 2 & 3 mediums (He-111, Ju-88) or around 1-1 in Condor production
The Luftwaffe would have needed at least 1,500 heavies to make any sort of credible offensive (even that force will wind up eaten up within 4 months at 10% loss per mission). That is 7,500 fewer defensive fighters challenging the 8th, assuming the Germans do not keep putting out more aircraft.

Bombing offensives require almost ungodly amount of production. The production requirements were such that the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the UK, could build enough bombers AND fighters. As an example the Luftwaffe accepted just about as many Do-17, He-111, He-177, Ju-188 & Fw-200 airframes combined than the RAF accepted Lancasters and the U.S. produced almost 4,000 more B-24s than the Luftwaffe did Ju-88 (while also building about 12,000 B-17s, 10,000 B-25s, & 5,300 B-26).

Of course you then run into my favorite STUNNING production number, with the U.S. actually building 7,500 A-20 Havocs (I mean, the A-20? Who knew???:confused:).

Overall, I'd say that if the Reich had decided to build a couple thousand heavies, Hap Arnold would have sent them champagne.
 
By the early 1930's most of the Versailles provisions restricting German armaments had lapsed. The reichsheer, and reichsmarine, though were all too influential politically and their machinations paved the way for the nazis. (Admittedly, this is a stretch), but I've wondered if a surviving Wiemar republic might have went on to establish an independent air force centered on heavy bombers. Equipped with poison gas, incendiary or fuel-air explosive bombs, the planes could have served as a strategic deterrent. Training + R&D secretly done in the USSR via the Rapallo pact would allow the new force to be deployed fairly rapidly. Building advanced bombers would have an obvious "stimulus" effect on the German aircraft industry during the depression.
This new air force might provide a more cost-effective defence than a powerful, modern army and navy, but it would almost certainly be less of a domestic political threat to the Wiemar Republic, and would in turn facilitate the abolition of the problematic truppenamt (general staff by any other name) and cancellation of the "pocket battleships".
-this occurred to me about a year ago but I didn't think it justified writing a TL
 
If a good very long range bomber becomes available in 1940, the British might be in slight difficulties in the Atlantic as it could do a better job than the Fw 200 Condor did OTL. Condors sank 85 ships of 363,000 tons between 1st August 1940 and 9th February 1941 and in addition damaged other ships which were sunk by U-boats (for example, the 42,000 ton Empress of Britain). There were 26 Condors produced in 1940 and serviceability was low so that on most days only 6-8 were available.

I once proposed a fairly extreme suggestion of the early development of the Me 264, which would have been much faster and longer ranged than the Condor whatever its serviceability. OTL there is a fairly complicated debate about the qualities of the Me 264 with various test pilots disagreeing and I may be being optimistic in assuming that Messerschmitt would have got a tricycle undercarriage right quickly.
 
Calbear raises some good points, but there's also that the USSR would be very likely to know whom the intended target of those heavy bombers would be. The required R & D would mean the USSR would have a rather different attitude to the lead-in to the war, meaning the eventual Barbarossa is under a much greater disadvantage than OTL.
 
The Carrier Battle I agree was silly with the Nazi Nuke as the most silly but the author in his notes does go into relative likelihoods of some of the changes. Overall it played out in gross detail as it should have. Better Luftwaffe leadership in the end just didn't matter, as the marco economics were just too stacked against them with the USA in the war.

The technical points were interesting to read if nothing else.

Michael
 
If a good very long range bomber becomes available in 1940, the British might be in slight difficulties in the Atlantic as it could do a better job than the Fw 200 Condor did OTL. Condors sank 85 ships of 363,000 tons between 1st August 1940 and 9th February 1941 and in addition damaged other ships which were sunk by U-boats (for example, the 42,000 ton Empress of Britain). There were 26 Condors produced in 1940 and serviceability was low so that on most days only 6-8 were available.

I once proposed a fairly extreme suggestion of the early development of the Me 264, which would have been much faster and longer ranged than the Condor whatever its serviceability. OTL there is a fairly complicated debate about the qualities of the Me 264 with various test pilots disagreeing and I may be being optimistic in assuming that Messerschmitt would have got a tricycle undercarriage right quickly.

the problem with this is that the issues the Germans had was with the management and allocation of LW assets to the KM. For a start, you'll have to have Goering fall under a bus. Condors also had range issues.

I simply dont believe an early 1940's jet with that sort of range and loiter time is practical, especially with German engines. early jets were fuel hogs. Youd need something bigger than the B-36 (rember, for AntiShipping work you need time rather than just distance), and that was really pushing the current tech envelope. You also, to make it reasonably effective, need AS radar which the Germans didnt have. And you then hope that while your developing all this the allies dont just build a few escort carriers to ruin your day anyway....
 
I simply dont believe an early 1940's jet with that sort of range and loiter time is practical, especially with German engines. early jets were fuel hogs. Youd need something bigger than the B-36 (rember, for AntiShipping work you need time rather than just distance), and that was really pushing the current tech envelope. You also, to make it reasonably effective, need AS radar which the Germans didnt have. And you then hope that while your developing all this the allies dont just build a few escort carriers to ruin your day anyway....

I think you're confusing the Me-264 with the Me-262. That said, if Germany did have a fully modern long range recon bomber and not an airliner lashup it would have been an effective adjunct to U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic
 
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