WI: Germany concentrates on U-Boat production

Deleted member 1487

So that the RN isn't building even more ASW ships and isn't concentrating the whole of its considerable force against what would otherwise be the only arrow in Germany's naval quiver - the submarine.

I'm commenting here while several miles from my library, so I don't have references immediately available, but it seems to me that the Germans couldn't decide what kind of war they were fighting at sea - much as was the case with the Battle of Britain. They committed to building a surface fleet with at least some capital ships, and then used that fleet for very little. It always seemed to me that they spent way too much time in harbor.

On the other hand, any scenario that involves Germany concentrating on just subs and doesn't have the Brits responding appropriately insults England's collective intelligence - and they were not stupid. If Germany was just building subs, the RN's job is greatly simplified - they only have to defend against subs. The RN advantage is maintained; the battle line just looks a little different.

The big problem early on when the British were relearning ASW wasn't that they didn't have the ships, it was that they were misused. ASW assets were running around chasing phantoms in HK groups, which left convoys with 1-2 escorts of dubious quality. Here there might be more rejects guarding convoys, though these escorts are of higher quality, but the problems of technology, strategy, and tactics still remain. Convoys weren't really effective until 1941, merchant ships didn't want to remain in them, escorts relied on ASDIC that couldn't detect surface ships, which is exactly how Uboats attacked (at night) when going after convoys. Individual ships or laggers were ruthlessly picked off. There was a reason that the early war period was called the 'happy time'. And Uboat losses were minimal. More escorts might have helped in this period, but it also means more Wolfpacks early on, which overloads the defenders and increases losses. Besides that the extra destroyers or corvettes might end up with HK groups instead of escorts.

Also remember that the British didn't really even react in their building policy until March 1939 in their building program once Germany renounced the naval treaty, so Germany, if they time things right, can delay a British response to achieve maximum production advantage over the British (though being Nazis I doubt planning much figured into things...).

Still 1939 - early 1941 was the most vulnerable period in the war at sea for the British; a bigger German submarine threat can cause far more damage at this period than OTL, which, although not a war winner in itself, can change things for Britain for the worse during the critical early period of the war.
 
The big problem early on when the British were relearning ASW wasn't that they didn't have the ships, it was that they were misused. ASW assets were running around chasing phantoms in HK groups, which left convoys with 1-2 escorts of dubious quality. Here there might be more rejects guarding convoys, though these escorts are of higher quality, but the problems of technology, strategy, and tactics still remain. Convoys weren't really effective until 1941, merchant ships didn't want to remain in them, escorts relied on ASDIC that couldn't detect surface ships, which is exactly how Uboats attacked (at night) when going after convoys. Individual ships or laggers were ruthlessly picked off. There was a reason that the early war period was called the 'happy time'. And Uboat losses were minimal. More escorts might have helped in this period, but it also means more Wolfpacks early on, which overloads the defenders and increases losses. Besides that the extra destroyers or corvettes might end up with HK groups instead of escorts.

Also remember that the British didn't really even react in their building policy until March 1939 in their building program once Germany renounced the naval treaty, so Germany, if they time things right, can delay a British response to achieve maximum production advantage over the British (though being Nazis I doubt planning much figured into things...).

Still 1939 - early 1941 was the most vulnerable period in the war at sea for the British; a bigger German submarine threat can cause far more damage at this period than OTL, which, although not a war winner in itself, can change things for Britain for the worse during the critical early period of the war.

The B-24, escort carriers, and detachment of fleet carriers make this such a short lived advantage that I lean towards this being a net negative for the Germans versus just building more trucks and tanks
 

Deleted member 1487

The B-24, escort carriers, and detachment of fleet carriers make this such a short lived advantage that I lean towards this being a net negative for the Germans versus just building more trucks and tanks
Less naval construction doesn't easily translate into more trucks or tanks. It provides more raw materials for that purpose, but not the capacity to build it. It was a net gain to contest the Atlantic as long as possible to prevent the Second Front in France.

Honestly more subs isn't going to win the war and may not eventually make much of a difference other than a higher body count. But coupled with a well thought out air campaign against Britain...that could be decisive. Especially as more subs and the loss of France causes bunching around Liverpool, making it a plump aerial target for a protracted mining and bombing effort, something that was never undertaken except for a few weeks sporadically over the course of the entire war.

Though some here have dismissed the idea that the torpedo problem gets figured out before the war, a submarine shift in focus would mean greater quality control, as OTL several officers were criminally negligent and IIRC were court marshaled for their incompetence in quality control in torpedoes in 1940 (they were battleship oriented men of Raeder's ilk that hated the sub service). A strategic shift would mean more interest in making sure the job of quality control gets done.

With that the British have much higher losses than OTL, as IOTL around 500 or so ships were attacked with torpedoes that didn't detonate, including battleships, one of which had the entire admiralty including Churchill on board, aircraft carriers, and destroyers, which ended up resulting in the loss of Uboats unnecessarily. Think what would have happened at Norway if the German torpedoes would have worked! Also the vast majority of the ships attacked and not sunk were merchant ships. Tonnage losses would have been that much higher. Now think with 3x more subs in 1939 what would have happened.

Churchill alone not being around to keep the British in the war might well mean the British bow out in 1940-1941.
 
Less naval construction doesn't easily translate into more trucks or tanks. It provides more raw materials for that purpose, but not the capacity to build it. It was a net gain to contest the Atlantic as long as possible to prevent the Second Front in France.

Honestly more subs isn't going to win the war and may not eventually make much of a difference other than a higher body count. But coupled with a well thought out air campaign against Britain...that could be decisive. Especially as more subs and the loss of France causes bunching around Liverpool, making it a plump aerial target for a protracted mining and bombing effort, something that was never undertaken except for a few weeks sporadically over the course of the entire war.

Though some here have dismissed the idea that the torpedo problem gets figured out before the war, a submarine shift in focus would mean greater quality control, as OTL several officers were criminally negligent and IIRC were court marshaled for their incompetence in quality control in torpedoes in 1940 (they were battleship oriented men of Raeder's ilk that hated the sub service). A strategic shift would mean more interest in making sure the job of quality control gets done.

With that the British have much higher losses than OTL, as IOTL around 500 or so ships were attacked with torpedoes that didn't detonate, including battleships, one of which had the entire admiralty including Churchill on board, aircraft carriers, and destroyers, which ended up resulting in the loss of Uboats unnecessarily. Think what would have happened at Norway if the German torpedoes would have worked! Also the vast majority of the ships attacked and not sunk were merchant ships. Tonnage losses would have been that much higher. Now think with 3x more subs in 1939 what would have happened.

Churchill alone not being around to keep the British in the war might well mean the British bow out in 1940-1941.


I don't underestimate the torpedo problem

Ark Royal had 2 or 3 fish (depending on which source you prefer) detonate prematurely that would have blasted her amid ships and sunk her in 1940; instead it gave away the U-boat's position and she was depth charged

I was to just saying that more subs than otl is probably a net loser (except for scrapping GZ and Seydlitz since they would never be completed anyway) versus additional effort not that contesting the atlantic to the degree they did wasn't militarily useful
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't underestimate the torpedo problem

Ark Royal had 2 or 3 fish (depending on which source you prefer) detonate prematurely that would have blasted her amid ships and sunk her in 1940; instead it gave away the U-boat's position and she was depth charged

I was to just saying that more subs than otl is probably a net loser (except for scrapping GZ and Seydlitz since they would never be completed anyway) versus additional effort not that contesting the atlantic to the degree they did wasn't militarily useful

I was referring to others in this thread. And I still think the naval effort was worthwhile, thought it would have been better to make changes obviously.
 
Sorting out the torpedo problem prewar is going to be very difficult.
Some of the problems (maybe most, but noone is really sure) with the magnetic exploder were due to the British degaussing their ships (it certainly didnt help).
As to realising the issues with the contact head - these MAY have been found given a much more thorough (and expensive!) development program, but it didnt last nearly as long as the issues with the mag exploder.
Since noone who had a magnetic exploder got them working properly until 1942-ish (and a lot later for the USN...), it does seem unlikely that Germany along magically works out what the problems are.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorting out the torpedo problem prewar is going to be very difficult.
Some of the problems (maybe most, but noone is really sure) with the magnetic exploder were due to the British degaussing their ships (it certainly didnt help).
As to realising the issues with the contact head - these MAY have been found given a much more thorough (and expensive!) development program, but it didnt last nearly as long as the issues with the mag exploder.
Since noone who had a magnetic exploder got them working properly until 1942-ish (and a lot later for the USN...), it does seem unlikely that Germany along magically works out what the problems are.

AFAIK there wasn't a problem with the contact detonators, those had been around since WW1. In fact once the problem with the magnetic detonators was found the rest of the torpedoes were switched to simple contact heads. (Edit: I did find some information about problems with contact pistols, which again had to do with poor quality control in the torpedo department.)

The problem was realizing the Mag heads were not functional. This had little to do with degaussing, that came later after the mag heads were withdrawn and the British captured a German magnetic mine. The problem was polarity the further north one traveled. The 1939 mag detonators were only useful at the longitude of the testing facility where the detonators were developed. Edit: there were also several other issues, but degaussing wasn't one of them, at least not in the articles I found.

Proper testing would/should have sorted this out pre-war.

http://uboat.net/history/torpedo_crisis.htm
A commission was set up in mid-April to investigate the case thoroughly. The commission came out with a comprehensive report in late July, which placed a considerable blame on the Torpedo Department. The TD, it was found, had supplied the boats with the new magnetic firing pistol with four-blade propellers before it had undergone the necessary trials. Consequently, the personnel of the Torpedo Experimental Institute responsible for that SNAFU were court-martialed and sentenced to prison terms.

In December 1942, well into the war, a new, improved magnetic pistol was introduced which also functioned on contact. It proved very efficient. Until then, writes Dönitz, "the effectiveness of our torpedoes was no greater than it had been during the First World War" (94). Indeed, inter-war naval doctrine called for a single torpedo that would be able to break the back of even a battleship. In fact, far more money was spent on big gunnery research than on torpedo improvement, with the result that when the war broke out, the torpedo that the Navy required existed only in the minds of the complacent Torpedo Department and the Torpedo Experimental Establishment - the monopoly producer and tester of the torpedoes, respectively. Had they had more competition from private industry, we would have had a better torpedo, to put it in Dönitz's words.

The obvious point here is that a more submarine-centric Kriegsmarine would have made these investments and had better torpedoes for the war.
 
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The contact heads were too delicate, iirc - they almost copied one they captured from a salvaged British submarine in 1939, but decided to fix their own design instead!

As to the mag pistol - yes, magnetic effects were poorly understood, and so was the variability. But degaussing does give you an additional problem, the ships field is far weaker than you are expecting. Eventually they fixed them due, I think, a lot of trial and error and action reports, but it took a while.
Mind British ones werent much better... it always seemed just a little too much bleeding-edge until the late war...:)
 

Deleted member 1487

The contact heads were too delicate, iirc - they almost copied one they captured from a salvaged British submarine in 1939, but decided to fix their own design instead!

As to the mag pistol - yes, magnetic effects were poorly understood, and so was the variability. But degaussing does give you an additional problem, the ships field is far weaker than you are expecting. Eventually they fixed them due, I think, a lot of trial and error and action reports, but it took a while.
Mind British ones werent much better... it always seemed just a little too much bleeding-edge until the late war...:)

So are you agreeing that a better quality control would have turned up the faultiness of the detonators? I'm not suggesting that they would have fixed them, but at least identified the problem and used the less faulty contact pistols.
 
So are you agreeing that a better quality control would have turned up the faultiness of the detonators? I'm not suggesting that they would have fixed them, but at least identified the problem and used the less faulty contact pistols.

I dont know; it wasnt like the US fiasco regarding detonators, they seemed to have done proper testing. Maybe it was because they were coinsidering the contact det the backup, since they intended to use the mag det as the main one until they realised it had issues
It didnt take them very long to fix their contact detonators, it was the years it took for the mag ones
 

Deleted member 1487

I dont know; it wasnt like the US fiasco regarding detonators, they seemed to have done proper testing. Maybe it was because they were coinsidering the contact det the backup, since they intended to use the mag det as the main one until they realised it had issues
It didnt take them very long to fix their contact detonators, it was the years it took for the mag ones

Nevertheless, the missed opportunities were enormous.
 
wiking said:
a submarine shift in focus would mean greater quality control
Why? Your saying it doesn't make it true. What motivates the change? As I said, increased demand for torpedo production is likely to have just the opposit effect. Show me why it wouldn't.
wiking said:
they were battleship oriented men of Raeder's ilk that hated the sub service
And the senior officer in charge of the USN Mark 6, which was a fiasco, was a submariner. Not being a submariner doesn't mean much. Nor does having one in charge guarantee good torpedoes. You'd need a complete shift in emphasis, making torpedoes more important for the entire navy, comparable to IJN. TTL, you'd appear to need a wholesale shift in doctrine to the Jeune Ecole & a sub-dominated navy, & even that isn't guaranteed to get you better torpedoes.

Astrodragon said:
I dont know; it wasnt like the US fiasco regarding detonators, they seemed to have done proper testing.
Oh, no.:eek::eek:
wiking said:
The problem was realizing the Mag heads were not functional. ...The problem was polarity the further north one traveled. The 1939 mag detonators were only useful at the longitude of the testing facility where the detonators were developed. Edit: there were also several other issues, but degaussing wasn't one of them, at least not in the articles I found.

Proper testing would/should have sorted this out pre-war.
The contact heads were too delicate
That exactly describes the problems with the Mk 6.:eek::eek: All of them.:eek: (Mutual sabotage?:rolleyes::p) (To be clear: it's correctly "exploder", not "detonator". Just don't ask why.:confused:)
I dont know; it wasnt like the US fiasco regarding detonators, they seemed to have done proper testing.
No, in fact, BuOrd did more/less what the German torpedo establishment did, came to more/less the same conclusions, & ended up with more/less the same failures.:eek::rolleyes: A question: did the Germans test against warship hulls, or merchants? BuOrd didn't understand merchant hulls would produce different (weaker) magnetic fields, & so different triggering characteristics.

Add to that, tho, the USN Mk 14 torpedo wasn't properly tested, so BuOrd didn't know it wasn't running at the correct depth.:rolleyes: Which masked the problems with the magnetic feature.:eek::rolleyes: They then had to deal with disbelief of senior Sub Force officers in the field, including the Mk 6's project officer,:eek: by then commanding subs in Oz...:rolleyes: (They weren't helped by BuOrd inspectors, sent out to investigate, actively sabotaging the torpedoes under inspection.:eek: Blair records one case; there may've been others.:eek:)
wiking said:
It didnt take them very long to fix their contact detonators, it was the years it took for the mag ones
It took long enough to get the trials done, when they could have been done in the matter of a few days at war's start.:rolleyes: Once the problem was identified, which was the headache, fixing it was dead easy.:rolleyes:
 
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Deleted member 1487

Why? Your saying it doesn't make it true. What motivates the change? As I said, increased demand for torpedo production is likely to have just the opposit effect. Show me why it wouldn't.

And the senior officer in charge of the USN Mark 6, which was a fiasco, was a submariner. Not being a submariner doesn't mean much. Nor does having one in charge guarantee good torpedoes. You'd need a complete shift in emphasis, making torpedoes more important for the entire navy, comparable to IJN. TTL, you'd appear to need a wholesale shift in doctrine to the Jeune Ecole & a sub-dominated navy, & even that isn't guaranteed to get you better torpedoes.

The mindset change is critical to any qualitative change in the torpedo department. The Kriegsmarine after WW1 was still stuck in the mindset of Mahan. This dominated the minds of the officers, who resented the submarine and its weapons, perhaps even blaming them for the loss in WW1. As a result there was little effort to develop the weapons of the Submarine; torpedoes and mines were given tertiary importance in development and were denied the necessary funds to truly develop the technologies until after the war started. Even worse they did very little to maximize efficiency in development.
From what I've been able to tell the court marshals were well deserved, though I haven't seen the minutes of the investigation or trial. Fundamentally it was a problem of mindset and the officers of the torpedo ordinance department took direction from Raeder, who neglected the submarines prior to the war.

Without Raeder, which would be required to emphasize submarines in building practices, there is a radical shift in mindset and personnel in the Kriegsmarine. They would know that torpedoes and submarine related systems have priority and probably would be getting more personnel and money to achieve their mission. Though I cannot categorically state that this would prevent or identify the problems with the torpedoes, it would make it much more likely that the problems are identified prewar and corrected, thanks to more dedicated personnel, but much more importantly money and probably private industry involvement to produce multiple models that would compete for production resources.

Even if the Torpedo Department doesn't find the issue with there own model, involving a number of private businesses in development, i.e. competing designs, then it becomes more likely that testing identifies the best of the bunch for the subs, which prevents the crappy TD model from entering mass production.
 
wiking said:
The mindset change is critical to any qualitative change in the torpedo department. The Kriegsmarine after WW1 was still stuck in the mindset of Mahan. This dominated the minds of the officers, who resented the submarine and its weapons, perhaps even blaming them for the loss in WW1. As a result there was little effort to develop the weapons of the Submarine; torpedoes and mines were given tertiary importance in development and were denied the necessary funds to truly develop the technologies until after the war started. Even worse they did very little to maximize efficiency in development.
From what I've been able to tell the court marshals were well deserved, though I haven't seen the minutes of the investigation or trial. Fundamentally it was a problem of mindset and the officers of the torpedo ordinance department took direction from Raeder, who neglected the submarines prior to the war.

Without Raeder, which would be required to emphasize submarines in building practices, there is a radical shift in mindset and personnel in the Kriegsmarine. They would know that torpedoes and submarine related systems have priority and probably would be getting more personnel and money to achieve their mission. Though I cannot categorically state that this would prevent or identify the problems with the torpedoes, it would make it much more likely that the problems are identified prewar and corrected, thanks to more dedicated personnel, but much more importantly money and probably private industry involvement to produce multiple models that would compete for production resources.

Even if the Torpedo Department doesn't find the issue with there own model, involving a number of private businesses in development, i.e. competing designs, then it becomes more likely that testing identifies the best of the bunch for the subs, which prevents the crappy TD model from entering mass production.
I'm not sure just replacing Raeder would be enough, but if you're presuming a complete culture change, more attention is credible. A change that large does need explaining in itself...

I'm also not sure private contractors would even get an OK, if there's an entrenched bureaucracy. BuOrd resisted til very late, & had Congress on the side of NTS. If you've got a complete change in senior officers, this may not be so big an issue.

Private contractors aren't a guarantee of quality, tho. The early Westinghouse electric torpedoes were plagued with bugs. Torpedo production is highly specialized, so getting it right isn't easy or simple.

Beyond that, as I've said, you still need to establish why the KM thinks its torpedoes are in need of more testing, when the doctrine change is pushing for more production & fewer delays...
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm not sure just replacing Raeder would be enough, but if you're presuming a complete culture change, more attention is credible. A change that large does need explaining in itself...

I'm also not sure private contractors would even get an OK, if there's an entrenched bureaucracy. BuOrd resisted til very late, & had Congress on the side of NTS. If you've got a complete change in senior officers, this may not be so big an issue.

Private contractors aren't a guarantee of quality, tho. The early Westinghouse electric torpedoes were plagued with bugs. Torpedo production is highly specialized, so getting it right isn't easy or simple.

Beyond that, as I've said, you still need to establish why the KM thinks its torpedoes are in need of more testing, when the doctrine change is pushing for more production & fewer delays...

All solid points. Raeder was an interesting character and initially the best person for his job...in 1928. He was all for kleinkrieg and had a remarkably sober understanding of Germany's strategic naval needs. But he was still wedded to the idea of a large surface fleet and longed for rebuilding the battleships of the Imperial Navy. He had little understanding of the use of the naval air force nor an appreciation of the Uboat, which he viewed as auxiliary to the fleet. The doctrine of Mahan was still alive and well in Raeder.

Why he would be removed is uncertain. I'd need to look into things, but my best idea would be to have the Wehrmacht's rearmament centralized under Blomberg, which prompts Raeder to resign in protest. Maybe raise Doenitz as his replacement, which means major personnel changes. Of course the earliest this could possibly happen is in 1936.

I'm not claiming that private contractors would assure quality, we can see the effects of that today, but it would inject competition into the mix, which would improve quality, though who knows how much.

The push for more testing would be that more funds are available and more improvements are desired. The Uboat article I posted covers it a bit; more was spent on ballistics for larger and larger main guns on ships Germany was treaty bound NOT to build than torpedo development and testing, which most German ships COULD use. It seems the testing issue was due to the lack of dedication of the Torpedo Development, so personnel being shifted around by a more 'uboat-minded' Gross Admiral should help.
 
wiking said:
The doctrine of Mahan was still alive and well in Raeder.
That makes him pretty typical of all senior navy officers in all nations into the '40s. The ones who weren't Mahanian disciples were pretty rare animals. If, as noted upthread, you can find someone who followed the Jeune Ecole, you've probably got your guy. How you move him into Raeder's job over the objections & machinations of the others is another question. Unless he's Hitler's favorite...? Which has implications for KM more broadly, probably not pleasant ones.:rolleyes:
wiking said:
Maybe raise Doenitz as his replacement, which means major personnel changes. Of course the earliest this could possibly happen is in 1936.
For this scale of change, IMO you're cutting it pretty fine with a date that late.
wiking said:
...but it would inject competition into the mix, which would improve quality...
I'm less sure it would in itself. If it did nothing but reveal the flaws in the private contractors' output, & force an examination of quality control generally, that might get you where you want. I still wonder if the entrenched bureaucracy of the torpedo establishment wouldn't simply say, "See? They can't build torpdedoes that work, we can.":rolleyes:
wiking said:
The push for more testing would be that more funds are available and more improvements are desired.
IDK if this is changing direction for you or not, but it occurs to me you can get the improved torpedoes by more emphasis on DDs & MTBs (moving closer to the IJN model), which would use torpedoes, too. Would they be the same ones? No. Would you uncover many of the problems of the sub torpedoes? I think you would. (It certainly applied to the USN Mk 14/15.) If there's German-Japanese co-operation...? Or is that too late, too? (I don't quite see IJN releasing the Type 93/95 for export or licence manufacturing, but...)
 
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