WI Germany and Austria allowed to unite?

MSZ

Banned
But is the rule so sacred that justified exceptions aren't possible? This question is more current than one might think, since there were sort of similar proposals for the Jerusalem Temple Mount.

Depends. Contrary to popular opinion exterritoriality isn't that common, specifically due to all the legal difficulties such a situation brings; embassies or ships docked in ports don't benefit from exterritoriality btw. despite what might be heard sometimes. Sure, its not impossible for it to be a solution, but such a "solution" will lead to other problems everytime a situation not expected by a treaty would happen, and you can't be prepared for every situation.


To deploy those bombs, the airplanes need to fly over Polish airspace, which either way they can't do without Polish permission.

Cruise missiles, wouldn't, nor artillery shells. The problem is more hypothetical than real since the only country Germany could wage war with which would even remotely threaten East Prussia with Poland remaining neutral would be Lithuania - not exactly a powerhouse.

Still, if planes were not allowed to breach Polish airspace due to neutrality, it would mean that Poland is "sheltering" the supply route thus - breaching in its own neutrality. Kind of an impossible situation to resolve.

That's why they'll propably prefer the no-fumes option.

Probably. But fumes are just one out of many problems which I meant to show as an example, that such a tunnel would still need some overground infrastructure, if only for safety reasons (emergency exists, fire safety, etc.). Not sure if you can build such a long tunnel without them.

The corridor tunnel wouldn't be a car tunnel, but a rail tunnel, for two reasons:
1) Cars and trucks can be loaded on trains, but trains cannot be loaded on trucks.
2) At the time, railroads were still the main means of transport. The Reichsautobahn did shift that balance, but ot didn't turn until well after WWII.

Uh, no. It was meant to be an autobahn from the start. Parts of that Autobahn still exists in north-western Poland IIRC. A railway was meant to be built as well since if you build one overground, you may as well build the other. The idea was to make Germany-East Prussia travel as convenient as possible without anybody even realising they had to cross "foreign territory" to get from one to the other. Demanding that car drivers "load up" on a train and travel like that was contrary to point.
 
I think that we should all agree that if this is going to happen at all, then Germany and Austria need to do so by election, not by Germany attempting to march into Austria and Borg it out of existence. 1934 and 1938 created a bad impression of what Anschluss meant (for the good reason that as per the Hossbach Memorandum it really *was* Germany getting the best possible position to inaugurate a general European war). Peaceful unification via a mutually agreed-upon and fair, monitored election is a completely different scenario to either of the Anschluss attempts of OTL.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I think that we should all agree that if this is going to happen at all, then Germany and Austria need to do so by election, not by Germany attempting to march into Austria and Borg it out of existence. 1934 and 1938 created a bad impression of what Anschluss meant (for the good reason that as per the Hossbach Memorandum it really *was* Germany getting the best possible position to inaugurate a general European war). Peaceful unification via a mutually agreed-upon and fair, monitored election is a completely different scenario to either of the Anschluss attempts of OTL.

Unification was a near-universal popular aspiration in Germany and Austria during the 1920s. Weimar Germany and democratic Austria tried to unify by peaceful mutual agreement in 1918-19 and 1931, and both times were stopped by a French veto. It was going to happen by peaceful, democratic means anytime in the 1920s if the Entente powers had not gotten in the way.

To have it happen this way, you need democracy to last a bit longer in Germany and Austria after the onset of the Great Depression, or the Entente powers to stop being dicks about the ToV a bit earlier.

Anyway, even if the Nazis accomplished the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland by the means they used, in all evidence they were still fulfilling the long-standing will of the people involved in doing so.

A separate Austrian state and Czech sovreignty on the Sudetenland only existed and stood in 1938 as a result of ToV coercion and the standing violation of the national self-determination of ethnic Germans by the Entente powers and their proxies, the post-1934 clericofascist dictatorship in Austria and the Czech nationalist ruling elite in Czechoslovakia.

It is a huge tragedy of European history that in the end the complete unification of the German nation only became possible at the hands of a bunch of democidal loonies that used it as a stepping stone for their racist crusade, which amid all the huge suffering it caused, undid the accomplishment and politically tainted it permanently.
 
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Unification was a near-universal popular aspiration in Germany and Austria during the 1920s. Weimar Germany and democratic Austria tried to unify by peaceful mutual agreement in 1918-19 and 1931, and both times were stopped by a French veto. It was going to happen by peaceful, democratic means anytime in the 1920s if the Entente powers had not vetoed it.

To have it happen this way, you need democracy to last a bit longer in Germany and Austria after the onset of the Great Depression, or the Entente powers stopping being dicks about the ToV a bit earlier.

Anyway, even if the Nazis accomplished the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland by the means they used, in all evidence they were still fulfilling the long-standing will of the people involved in doing so.

A separate Austrian state and Czech sovreignty on the Sudetenland only existed and stood in 1938 as a result of ToV coercion and the standing violation of the national self-determination of ethnic Germans by the Entente powers and their proxies, the post-1934 clericofascist dictatorship in Austria and the Czech nationalist ruling elite in Czechoslovakia.

It is a huge tragedy of European history that in the end the complete unification of the German nation only became possible at the hands of a bunch of democidal loonies that used it as a stepping stone for their racist crusade, which amid all the huge suffering it caused, undid the accomplishment and politically tainted it permanently.

Note that the key point in that post was "the Hossbach Memorandum made it clear that Germany was strengthening itself for a general European war." The Nazis, simply put, cared about Anschluss only insofar as it made Hitler's goal of exterminating Europe's Slavs and Jews in the process of a general European war four years from release of the Memorandum possible. It was not an issue to them in itself.

And *that* in a sense really is a tragedy as regardless of its popular approval in either country, if it had impaired their goals of a general European war in four years they would have unceremoniously never referenced it again. No matter what Germans or Austrians at the time wanted.
 

Eurofed

Banned
Note that the key point in that post was "the Hossbach Memorandum made it clear that Germany was strengthening itself for a general European war." The Nazis, simply put, cared about Anschluss only insofar as it made Hitler's goal of exterminating Europe's Slavs and Jews in the process of a general European war four years from release of the Memorandum possible. It was not an issue to them in itself.

And *that* in a sense really is a tragedy as regardless of its popular approval in either country, if it had impaired their goals of a general European war in four years they would have unceremoniously never referenced it again. No matter what Germans or Austrians at the time wanted.

No doubt Hitler was quite willing to compromise with the irredentist aspirations of the German people if it suited his larger strategic objectives. He easily gave up claims on South Tyrol as long as Italy stayed friendly to his foreign policy, and had France done so as well, he would have just as easily given up Alsace-Lorraine.

Now, admittedly South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine ranked much, much lower than Austria, Danzig-West Prussia, and the Sudetenland in the irredentist agenda of the German people. The former were only sought by the most extremist fringe of German nationalism. The latter were a most dearly felt mainstream aspiration across the political spectrum. So for the Nazis giving up the former out of foreign policy expediency was much easier than giving up the latter.

Nonetheless, there seems to be sufficient evidence to suggest that if interwar Poland had willingly accepted to become an Axis partner like Hungary and Romania, Nazi Germany quite possibly would have limited its irredentist claims to Danzig and an extraterritorial railway-highway across the Corridor.
 

Cook

Banned
No doubt Hitler was quite willing to compromise... He easily gave up claims on South Tyrol as long as Italy stayed friendly to his foreign policy, and had France done so as well, he would have just as easily given up Alsace-Lorraine.

Now, admittedly South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine ranked much, much lower than Austria, Danzig-West Prussia, and the Sudetenland in the irredentist agenda of the German people...

Nonetheless, there seems to be sufficient evidence to suggest that if interwar Poland had willingly accepted to become an Axis partner...

Hitler’s first foreign treaty was with Poland, renouncing any claims to Polish territory to cement the Non-Aggression Pact and normalise relations. This was done while Hitler was still only the Chancellor of Germany and prior to his assumption of dictatorial powers. He suffered no political damage for giving up this ‘long cherished aspiration’. Poland remained a partner of Germany for more than five years; one of Hitler's longest foreign policy relationships.


All of Hitler’s territorial claims were based on the perceived weakness of the other country and of the potential value of having them as an ally, even temporarily. Hence Hitler gave up claims to Polish territory when Poland was strong and Germany was relatively weak and gave up claims to Italian and Czech territory when he needed those countries’ acquiescence to seize Austria. He then allied with the Poles to betray and seize Czech territory and Lithuanian territory. Hitler seized the South Tyrol and absorbed it directly into the Reich in 1944 following the fall of Mussolini.

Each country in succession was inevitably betrayed after they were no longer deemed useful and the opportunity presented itself to knife them in the back. There was no rigid master plan, it was all opportunism.
 
I think that we should all agree that if this is going to happen at all, then Germany and Austria need to do so by election, not by Germany attempting to march into Austria and Borg it out of existence. 1934 and 1938 created a bad impression of what Anschluss meant (for the good reason that as per the Hossbach Memorandum it really *was* Germany getting the best possible position to inaugurate a general European war). Peaceful unification via a mutually agreed-upon and fair, monitored election is a completely different scenario to either of the Anschluss attempts of OTL.

I agree that your position of free-elections prior to an "Anschluss" fits the original question. Thus we have a timeframe: such an Anschluss has to happen prior to early 1933, afterwards neither Germany nor Austria qualify any more OTL.

If this occurs, IMHO this means the earlier, the better. It was tried in 1919/20 already. The question is: would it have made that much of a difference? Probably not. Austria's electorate wouldn't have changed the overall outlook generally due to being too few voters. I would assume that adding the Austrian voters would have hurt the DNVP (as it was a very "Ostelbische"-Prussian party), the KPD (Vienna rather being a strong SPÖ stronghold) and perhaps the liberal parties DDP/DVP.
Hitler would have been a German from the start, and I think that the Austrians wouldn't have been less inclined to vote NSDAP than other Germans - especially if Hitler becomes the most prominent Austrian on the Pangerman political scene.

Maybe Austria would have hurt Hindenburg's chances to become president in 1925 so different candidates might run?

Would it soften German irredentism? My guess again: only slightly. Other aspects of the TOV were more prominent during most of the 1920s: the Polish border, the Rhineland occupation, the Ruhr occupation, reparations in general and the war guilt clause.
OTOH, Germany would inherit the Austrian irredentism concerning Südtirol.

Also, if Austrian Anschluss is allowed, there will from the start be more pressure on the CSR - it is a simple geopolitical consequence. But maybe this leads to an earlier solution during the 1920s. Maybe a true federalization of the CSR to become what it had been promised to be in the initial pitch: "a Switzerland of the East".

Economically, the Austrians would suffer just as well as the rest of the Germans under inflation, structural unemployment and the Depression later on.
But that would be a bit better than OTL's interwar Austria. The trick is that nobody would know. Would a lot of Austrians complain about Germany? Would they imagine to be better off, had they voted against unification? Would they feel ruled from far-away Berlin without being taken into account? I guess they would.

If, and I repeat, if Germany becomes nevertheless Hitler's Führerstaat, that would give the Nazis a head-start. Earlier rapprochement with Mussolini. No hassle about Austria in 1934. And a larger economical base.


All of Hitler’s territorial claims were based on the perceived weakness of the other country and of the potential value of having them as an ally, even temporarily. Hence Hitler gave up claims to Polish territory when Poland was strong and Germany was relatively weak and gave up claims to Italian and Czech territory when he needed those countries’ acquiescence to seize Austria. He then allied with the Poles to betray and seize Czech territory and Lithuanian territory. Hitler seized the South Tyrol and absorbed it directly into the Reich in 1944 following the fall of Mussolini.

Each country in succession was inevitably betrayed after they were no longer deemed useful and the opportunity presented itself to knife them in the back. There was no rigid master plan, it was all opportunism.

Well, if your masterplan is as ambitious as Hitler's, you can afford to be flexible and act exactly as he did. It is a lot smarter than outright stating the Germany would not negotiate with Poland, France, Denmark, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Luxemburg, the CSR, Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sveden, Norway, Hungary, Romania, Japan and all parts of the British Commonwealth unless they agreed upon the merging of all Germans (and Germanic people) within the Reich, the return of all former German colonies, the creation of a massive colonial empire in Eurasia and several genocidal moves.
 
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Perkeo

Banned
Would it soften German irredentism? My guess again: only slightly. Other aspects of the TOV were more prominent during most of the 1920s: the Polish border, the Rhineland occupation, the Ruhr occupation, reparations in general and the war guilt clause.

Don't underestimete the psychological impact. Note that of the five sources of irredentism of the TOV
1) Polish border
2) Rhineland occupation
3) Ruhr occupation (AFAIK a violation rather than an aspect of the ToV)
4) reparations in general
5) war guilt clause
only two (No 1 and 4) still have an actual impact after the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 that ended any accupations and the exclusion of Germany from the league of nations.

If memories of past occupations and blame of war guilt to a past German government changed the situation for the worse, an undeniable progress the ToV-revision policy will change things for the better.

The Weimar Republic is often depicted as bound to fail due to the constant state of crisis, but the political system was the victim rather than the cause of the crisis - and managed to prevail for quite a while given the most unfortunate circumstances.

OTOH, Germany would inherit the Austrian irredentism concerning Südtirol.

I cannot imagine the Entente allowing the Anschluss unless the Südtirol-question is settled for good in favor of Italy. It is hard to imagine how they should have that leap of insight anyhow. Fear that Germany becomes a Red Sowjet ally?

Economically, the Austrians would suffer just as well as the rest of the Germans under inflation, structural unemployment and the Depression later on.
But that would be a bit better than OTL's interwar Austria. The trick is that nobody would know. Would a lot of Austrians complain about Germany? Would they imagine to be better off, had they voted against unification? Would they feel ruled from far-away Berlin without being taken into account? I guess they would.

From the OTL German unification I extrapolate that the Astrians will blame ANY of their problems on the Anschluss, no matter wether it's true or not. The We-Want-Habsburg-Austria-Back-Party will be guaranteed a significant number of seats in the Reichstag. If Hitler is as clever as he was IOTL, he can unite the reactionaries of both "Germanies", but that doesn't get him to power if the democratic nationalists are strengthened.
 
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Don't underestimete the psychological impact. Note that of the five sources of irredentism of the TOV
1) Polish border
2) Rhineland occupation (AFAIK a violation rather than an aspect of the ToV)
3) Ruhr occupation
4) reparations in general
5) war guilt clause
only two (No 1 and 4) still have an actual impact after the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 that ended any accupations and the exclusion of Germany from the league of nations.

You are right, but we still have Hitler in '33 and war in '39 - despite the Anschluss occuring in the end.

Hitler's view of things is crucial here. His irredentism is not to be satisfied. And to stop Hitler, I am not sure if it is enough to allow Austria to become German before '33. It might butterfly his takeover away. But I fear that the economic problems and general fatigue with "the system" (however unjustified that is) did more to bring him to the brink of power (over which Hindenburg carried him, so to say).

The Weimar Republic is often depicted as bound to fail due to the constant state of crisis, but the political system was the victim rather than the cause of the crisis - and managed to prevail for quite a while given the most unfortunate circumstances.

I agree with you generally, the Weimar constitution and its resilience are often widldy underestimated. It was not doomed, IMHO. Last day to stop Hitler and to save the republic? Jan 29th, 1933.

I cannot imagine the Entente allowing the Anschluss unless the Südtirol-question is settled for good in favor of Italy.

Well, wasn't that actually done in St. Germain already? A "Southern Locarno" might help, but if it comes to war, it is just another peace of paper. Also, if the issue is to be negotiated, Italy might feel international pressure to grant the Germans autonomy (as they enjoy nowadays); but they would most probably deal with Mussolini's Italy. That could become interesting.

From the OTL German unification I extrapolate that the Astrians will blame ANY of their problems on the Anschluss, no matter wether it's true or not. The We-Want-Habsburg-Austria-Back-Party will be guaranteed a significant number of seats in the Reichstag.

Yes, but it will still only be a splinter-party unless the Austrian Christsozialen start waving that banner, which is imaginable. However, the weight of Austria within a Großdeutschland is still significantly smaller than those of the Ex-DDR within today's Germany. They will probably play a role similar to the BVP in Bavaria.

If Hitler is as clever as he was IOTL, he can unite the reactionaries of both "Germanies", but that doesn't get him to power if the democratic nationalists are strengthened.

Uniting reactonaries and amalganating them into the German brand of fascism called National Socialism was never enough to allow the sort of electoral success the NSDAP enjoyed in 1930-33. Hitler had to reach beyond that and his party did so not only by advocating radical political changes, extreme populism and wild promises; but also by a degree of electioneering unknown to most of the other parties. If they can pull it off depends on a lot of factors and butterflies. If you write a timeline, I would say you could go either way without anyone screaming ASB.

I can hardly see anyone being able to unite true Habsburg reactionaries with their Prussian counterparts. And again - you wil hardly be able to decide pan-German elections in Austria. They would account for less than 10% of Reichstag-seats.
 

Perkeo

Banned
You are right, but we still have Hitler in '33 and war in '39 - despite the Anschluss occuring in the end.

Hitler's view of things is crucial here. His irredentism is not to be satisfied.

But HIS irredentism only matters when he comes to power - see below.

And to stop Hitler, I am not sure if it is enough to allow Austria to become German before '33. It might butterfly his takeover away. But I fear that the economic problems and general fatigue with "the system" (however unjustified that is) did more to bring him to the brink of power (over which Hindenburg carried him, so to say).

That is the one thing I strongly disagree with. A democratic Anschluss WOULD significantly reduce the general fatigue with "the system", for the reason I've already stated: An undeniable success in ToV revision policy weakens the claim that ToV revision won't work. That's not a butterfly, that's a major shift.

ITTL the year 1933 ends up as one of the following:
a) the last time democracy managed to fight off Hitler before he (or the Commies...) came to power in the year 1936
±2
b) the final victory of democracy over facism
and communism
And the deciding factor between the two will be the question wether there's recovery after 1933 or just another crisis.

Well, wasn't that [South Tyrol given to Italy]actually done in St. Germain already?

A "Southern Locarno" might help, but if it comes to war, it is just another peace of paper. Also, if the issue is to be negotiated, Italy might feel international pressure to grant the Germans autonomy (as they enjoy nowadays); but they would most probably deal with Mussolini's Italy. That could become interesting.

If the ban on Anschluss is revoked, any clause of St. Germain will be considered revocable unless explicitily stated otherwise. So the very least Italy - all the more Mussolini's Italy - will demand is clarification regarding the Italo-Austrian border.

I wonder if this is another buterfly against Hitler: Quarrel with facist Italy leads to resentments towards German facism?

Yes, but it will still only be a splinter-party unless the Austrian Christsozialen start waving that banner, which is imaginable. However, the weight of Austria within a Großdeutschland is still significantly smaller than those of the Ex-DDR within today's Germany. They will probably play a role similar to the BVP in Bavaria.

The NSDAP WAS a splinter-party until 1930, and Weimar Germany didn't ave a 5% clause. A strong basis in (OTL and TTL) Bavaria (OTL and TTL) and (TTL) Austria could be enogh to keep the NSDAP in the game.

Uniting reactonaries and amalganating them into the German brand of fascism called National Socialism was never enough to allow the sort of electoral success the NSDAP enjoyed in 1930-33. Hitler had to reach beyond that and his party did so not only by advocating radical political changes, extreme populism and wild promises; but also by a degree of electioneering unknown to most of the other parties. If they can pull it off depends on a lot of factors and butterflies. If you write a timeline, I would say you could go either way without anyone screaming ASB.

I can hardly see anyone being able to unite true Habsburg reactionaries with their Prussian counterparts. And again - you wil hardly be able to decide pan-German elections in Austria. They would account for less than 10% of Reichstag-seats.

If there is one thing Hitler was good at it's uniting supposedly contradictory ideologies under his banner.
 
Would it be on-topic to discuss a post-1945 alternate-history scenario that ends with Germany and Austria uniting soon after East/West German unification in 1990 here?
 
Would it be on-topic to discuss a post-1945 alternate-history scenario that ends with Germany and Austria uniting soon after East/West German unification in 1990 here?
If it's not, please do make a thread on it, it'd be quite interesting. Mind you, it could get quite political.
 
Yeah, no kidding. I've been recently doing research on the topic (I'm a Third World native), and so far my mind has been blown by ridiculous excesses in the Allied occupation policy of Germany.
 
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