WI German navy destroys British navy in Jutland.

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
AFAIK not a single Battlecruiser was lost to magazine hits.

The most popular hypothesis is that turret or barbette penetrations set up a propellant chain reaction that got to the magazine and blew up the ships.

Opinion at the time was that Indefatigable was already sinking from the hits astern before the final conflagration. Due to the ravages of salvagers (scavengers) her wreck is in no condition to confirm whether it was a magazine penetration, although given the level of armour she was carrying it is just as likely as poor ammunition handling.
 
Several commanders get heart attacks at the beginning of the battle. Sailors sneak in cigarettes to smoke in the magazine.
 

JAG88

Banned
Opinion at the time was that Indefatigable was already sinking from the hits astern before the final conflagration. Due to the ravages of salvagers (scavengers) her wreck is in no condition to confirm whether it was a magazine penetration, although given the level of armour she was carrying it is just as likely as poor ammunition handling.

Problem is the range, you are unlikely to get a shell into the magazine without hitting the water first, and that would set off the shell preventing it from reaching the magazine.
 

JAG88

Banned
Er, no it doesn't.

Go look up diving shells.

Heh.

This is WW1, only the Germans had shells with any relevant delay IIRC, and it was quite short, given that the fights were undertaken at mid ranges (or long at that time 10-15K) with angles of fall between 15º-20º max for the tense shooting German guns it is unlikely they could make it through water, armour and all the way to the center of the ship...

Specially since Indefatigable blew up some 30s after getting hit, not immediately as could be expected from a magazine hit.

See Campbell for that. You do know who that is, right?
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Heh.

This is WW1, only the Germans had shells with any relevant delay IIRC, and it was quite short, given that the fights were undertaken at mid ranges (or long at that time 10-15K) with angles of fall between 15º-20º max for the tense shooting German guns it is unlikely they could make it through water, armour and all the way to the center of the ship...

Specially since Indefatigable blew up some 30s after getting hit, not immediately as could be expected from a magazine hit.

See Campbell for that. You do know who that is, right?

Watch it .
 
Heh.

This is WW1, only the Germans had shells with any relevant delay IIRC, and it was quite short, given that the fights were undertaken at mid ranges (or long at that time 10-15K) with angles of fall between 15º-20º max for the tense shooting German guns it is unlikely they could make it through water, armour and all the way to the center of the ship...

Specially since Indefatigable blew up some 30s after getting hit, not immediately as could be expected from a magazine hit.

See Campbell for that. You do know who that is, right?

You seem to be labouring under a number of misapprehensions.

First, shells do indeed have a delay - a typical AP shell had 25 - 30ms to let it explode after penetrating the armour. That might not seem a long time, but its around 70 foot of flight after it would hit the water.

Second a water impact isn't necessarily sharp enough to trigger the fuze. It may, it may not.

Third, magazines don't 'immediately explode'. They are full of cordite, which burns (if it was a high explosive, you couldn't use it to propel shells). Then the pressure causes an explosion.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
The attached is often regarded as one of the best & even-handed summarisation of OTL Jutland.
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-8012.html

What is interesting is the passage below that suggests that Beatty wasn't (solely) to blame for the ditching of safety measures in turrets, shell rooms & magazines, but also that the attributation of these failings was necessary to prevent a loss of faith by the crews in the underarmoured battlecruisers and to protect both Jellicoe & Beatty.

Magazine Fires
Magazine fires and explosions on the battlecruisers at Jutland were caused by a shell hit penetrating the gun turret igniting ready to use ammunition which would flash back to the magazine. The origins of this problem lie in the quest to achieve a rapid rate of gun fire.

Firing rapidly would require a greater number of shells over a given period. The magazine capacity was typically about 80 rounds, but in rapid short range firing a gun could consume about 60 shells in half an hour. If ammunition was not to run short then more rounds must be carried. To alleviate the problem, in 1913 Admiral Callaghan (Jellicoe’s predecessor) had ordered the magazines to be overloaded. This caused congestion at the bottoms of ammunition hoists, by removing cordite bags from their bulky protective cases before they were needed helped relieve this congestion.

Loading the guns was made quicker by using the working chamber and the handling room as ready to use storage areas. These areas were originally designed and constructed so that only charges on their way to the guns could use these positions. By removing interlocks and leaving doors open, the passage of ammunition could be speeded up, but this meant that there was now an unobstructed passage from the turret to the magazine, with plenty of unprotected cordite stored in transit. A penetrating hit on a turret would ignite ready to use cordite, sending flames and searing hot gasses down the unobstructed hoist, igniting more cordite en route, until it reached the magazine with catastrophic consequences.

The Lion was lucky in that the shell which hit its Q turret blew the roof off, so the resulting fire was mostly dissipated outwards instead of inwards and down the hoist. But half an hour later embers from the cordite in the working chamber fell down the hoist and ignited cordite still stacked in the handling room at the bottom. Despite the magazine having been flooded, the resulting explosion was severe enough to deform the bulkheads and doors leading to the magazine.

This problem was not confined to the battlecruisers, it was common to the battleships also, which survived because no battleship turret was hit. So the following measures were applied to the whole of the Grand Fleet.

1) Comprehensive anti flash measures were introduced, including the fitting of flash tight doors.
2) Armour protection against plunging shells was increased over the magazines.

It was claimed, soon after the battle, that plunging shells caused the loss of the battlecruisers, and the adding of armour was to reassure the men that their ships were now safe, as it could not be admitted that the pursuit of rapid fire was the real cause, without damaging their morale.

When Sir Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, pointed out that machinery spaces with the same protection as the magazines were not penetrated, suggesting that the magazines had not been penetrated either, his report was suppressed on the orders of Jellicoe. The Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Tudor, who was responsible for the investigation was sent to command the China Station.

Both Jellicoe and Beatty were to have been reprimanded for reversing magazine regulations which stipulated that cordite was not to be stored outside the magazine. But when both Jellicoe and Beatty were promoted after Jutland the reprimands were cancelled.

Flash experiments carried out on the pre-Dreadnought Prince of Wales in 1917 demonstrated that the precautions in force before Jutland would have sufficed, had additional unsafe practices not been followed.


I don't necessarily agree with all of the above (but then I am not as knowledgeable as the poster) but still fascinating stuff.
 

JAG88

Banned
The attached is often regarded as one of the best & even-handed summarisation of OTL Jutland.
http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-8012.html

What is interesting is the passage below that suggests that Beatty wasn't (solely) to blame for the ditching of safety measures in turrets, shell rooms & magazines, but also that the attributation of these failings was necessary to prevent a loss of faith by the crews in the underarmoured battlecruisers and to protect both Jellicoe & Beatty.

Magazine Fires
Magazine fires and explosions on the battlecruisers at Jutland were caused by a shell hit penetrating the gun turret igniting ready to use ammunition which would flash back to the magazine. The origins of this problem lie in the quest to achieve a rapid rate of gun fire.

Firing rapidly would require a greater number of shells over a given period. The magazine capacity was typically about 80 rounds, but in rapid short range firing a gun could consume about 60 shells in half an hour. If ammunition was not to run short then more rounds must be carried. To alleviate the problem, in 1913 Admiral Callaghan (Jellicoe’s predecessor) had ordered the magazines to be overloaded. This caused congestion at the bottoms of ammunition hoists, by removing cordite bags from their bulky protective cases before they were needed helped relieve this congestion.

Loading the guns was made quicker by using the working chamber and the handling room as ready to use storage areas. These areas were originally designed and constructed so that only charges on their way to the guns could use these positions. By removing interlocks and leaving doors open, the passage of ammunition could be speeded up, but this meant that there was now an unobstructed passage from the turret to the magazine, with plenty of unprotected cordite stored in transit. A penetrating hit on a turret would ignite ready to use cordite, sending flames and searing hot gasses down the unobstructed hoist, igniting more cordite en route, until it reached the magazine with catastrophic consequences.

The Lion was lucky in that the shell which hit its Q turret blew the roof off, so the resulting fire was mostly dissipated outwards instead of inwards and down the hoist. But half an hour later embers from the cordite in the working chamber fell down the hoist and ignited cordite still stacked in the handling room at the bottom. Despite the magazine having been flooded, the resulting explosion was severe enough to deform the bulkheads and doors leading to the magazine.

This problem was not confined to the battlecruisers, it was common to the battleships also, which survived because no battleship turret was hit. So the following measures were applied to the whole of the Grand Fleet.

1) Comprehensive anti flash measures were introduced, including the fitting of flash tight doors.
2) Armour protection against plunging shells was increased over the magazines.

It was claimed, soon after the battle, that plunging shells caused the loss of the battlecruisers, and the adding of armour was to reassure the men that their ships were now safe, as it could not be admitted that the pursuit of rapid fire was the real cause, without damaging their morale.

When Sir Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, pointed out that machinery spaces with the same protection as the magazines were not penetrated, suggesting that the magazines had not been penetrated either, his report was suppressed on the orders of Jellicoe. The Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Tudor, who was responsible for the investigation was sent to command the China Station.

Both Jellicoe and Beatty were to have been reprimanded for reversing magazine regulations which stipulated that cordite was not to be stored outside the magazine. But when both Jellicoe and Beatty were promoted after Jutland the reprimands were cancelled.

Flash experiments carried out on the pre-Dreadnought Prince of Wales in 1917 demonstrated that the precautions in force before Jutland would have sufficed, had additional unsafe practices not been followed.


I don't necessarily agree with all of the above (but then I am not as knowledgeable as the poster) but still fascinating stuff.

Hmmm, According to Campbell the charges in Lion were all in authorized positions, there was no excess charges there and it still would have blown up had its magazine not been flooded.

Check this link, these guys have a different opinion to the usual position popularized by Marder:

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/A_Direct_Train_of_Cordite

It is very interesting and to the point.

This one tracks the changes in cordite handling in he RN:

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/t...Cordite_fire_or_explosion_due_to_enemy_action

The relevant quote:

"The normal ships orders in vogue up to Jutland made it sure, by keeping all cages, waiting trays, etc. loaded with cordite, that there was an excellent train of cordite laid from Gunhouse to Magazine."
 
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Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Hmmm, According to Campbell the charges in Lion were all in authorized positions, there was no excess charges there and it still would have blown up had its magazine not been flooded.

Check this link, these guys have a different opinion to the usual position popularized by Marder:

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/A_Direct_Train_of_Cordite

It is very interesting and to the point.

This one tracks the changes in cordite handling in he RN:

http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/t...Cordite_fire_or_explosion_due_to_enemy_action

The relevant quote:

"The normal ships orders in vogue up to Jutland made it sure, by keeping all cages, waiting trays, etc. loaded with cordite, that there was an excellent train of cordite laid from Gunhouse to Magazine."

Fascinating stuff!:)
 
Wunder von Skagerrak would be a war-winner

I am by no means an expert, and please do tell me if I make huge errors in the battle itself or while wondering about what it could cause. I am myself making a timeline with PoD at German heroic victory at Skagerrak.

I agree to what others have stated in this thread: There is no way that Grand Fleet could've been destroyed in the battle. However, it could've been beaten really badly if luck was on German side. This is kinda unlikely scenario, but more unlikely scenarios have happened in real life.

Let's first assume that German zeppelins managed to scout the area and spot British ships. OTL a storm prevented this. All submarines used in preparations of Jutland are contacted in time, I think there was 10 of them. Now submarines are giving chase to British main fleet.

Battlecruiser action goes pretty much like Germans intended; British seeing the German battleships too late and taking heavy losses. Remaining British ships turn towards main British fleet and start escaping. Because of zeppelins and U-boats, Germans now have accurate information on main British force.

Germans do not engage in prolonged fleet action but turn after firing a few times at the British who barely had time to go into battle formation. This time British do give chase to Germans, because the battle hadn't yet caused heavy damage on main fleets and there was more sunlight hours left.

When giving chase, British destroyers and cruisers move faster and slower battleships are at the rear of British formation, largely unprotected. German U-boat crews can't believe their luck and sink many of the battleships by surprise attacks.

There is a chaos in British formation, and when the main fleet of Germans notices this, they turn around again and engage the British cruisers and destroyers. British decide to live to fight another day and try to make a run for it, but they now have to pass the submarines, which again cause heavy damage on British fleet.

This would be a great victory for the Germans and a black day for Royal Navy. I'd imagine about 4:1 ratio in British losses versus German losses. The battle would be known as Wunder von Skagerrak and used heavily in propaganda to raise German morale through the roof. British would probably try to hide their defeat from the public.

Now, lets try to guess what this would cause in the long run. German High Command would think this means there is hope fighting against Britain on the sea openly, and not resort to unlimited submarine warfare. This in turn would cause USA not to join the war (I can't imagine a Zimmermann telegram when USA has good relations with Central Powers). This alone could be a war-winner.

Germans would focus in sea battles where submarines are used against enemy main fleets instead of blowing up merchant ships. These attacks would be almost always supported by smaller German fleets and/or Zeppelins.

Also, fighting against the British openly would cause panic in British homefront. British blockade could be broken in 1917 and Britain would concentrate on keeping its own coast safe. I do not think Germans would try to invade Britain, but British public does not know it. However, Germans can't hope for more than breaking the blockade. Channel is too heavily guarded and British harbours would be full of British ships.

Breaking the blockade and humiliating the Royal Navy could have even larger butterfly effects than USA keeping out of the war. German homefront would be pretty much safe now. Britain would panic and maybe draw some troops back home from France. This would strain the relations of Entente. However, I do not think that there would be immediate effects. Somme and Verdun would still go as in OTL.

With no USA in war, after Brest-Litovsk there would be total panic and fear of losing the war in France and Britain. Germany could plan Kaiserschlacht better and before massing troops in Western Front could knock out Greece and help Austria-Hungary to hold against Italy. Germans would wait until a panicked Entente offensive, and only after that launch what we knew as Spring Offensive.

Entente Spring Offensive would happen, as a last ditch effort to knock Germany out before superior German force would be moved completely on Western Front, and it would use early Blitzkrieg tactics and combined arms to cause some initial successes. However, it would probably be less successful than Spring Offensive OTL. A few points of Hindenburg Line would break agains fast and intense bombardment followed by hundreds of tanks and infantry advancing behind tanks.

However, tanks were unreliable and Germans already knew how to take them out. The losses in Spring Offensive would be bit heavier on Germans than Entente, but Entente would lose most of its tanks which couldn't be replaced in time and many of them fell in German hands. In the end Germans would retake Hindenburg Line, though at heavy cost, and capture many Entente tanks and artillery.

Very soon after than, Kaiserschlacht would be launched, and it would work. Entente defense would be weaker with no America, part of British army staying in Britain, and hundreds of thousand losses in previous offense. Kaiserschlacht would use Stosstruppen as in OTL, who were kept safe from front lines during Entente offensive.

Amiens and Hazebrouck would fall in Michael and Georgette respectively, and British force would have to try to hold Channel ports and retake these cities, but Germans would reinforce the positions heavily. Blüher-Yorck and Gneisenau would go pretty much as in OTL, with French forces throwing everything and the kitchen sink to halt the advance towards Paris, and mostly succeed. Germans capture only marginally more territory than in OTL.

Champange-Marne would be a huge success for Germany, with outnumbered French forces thinking all is lost and refusing to counter-attack. Large mutinies and lack of counter-attacks enable Germans to create a large salient, almost streching to Verdun. Only things stopping Germans from rolling to France now were logistics slowing the German advance and France drawing most of East army there. Peace talks between Central Powers and France and Belgium were opened in secret.

With Hazebrouck and Amiens taken, BEF logistics are almost broken. Final German push towards Paris seems like a certain thing, and everything that can be moved, is moved from reserves to form a strong line streching from Amiens to Compiegne to Verdun. However, final push towards Paris never happens, with peace talks already happening. Entente tries to break the the German salient desperately, but before British forces can be moved for the offensive, the last German push which had to be called off OTL happens; the Hagen Offensive, taking Dunkirk and pushing the British to Calais. Belgium capitulates 17th of November 1918.

While the offensives never reached Paris, France surrendered nevertheless, in 21th of November 1918. The back of her army was broken, Russia was out of the war, British forces were limited to north of France, mutinies and revolts were happening everywhere, money had ran out, and German shells were already hitting Paris. As soon as France capitulates, German troops are given permission to move over French territory.

With everything collapsing around them, BEF evacuates to Britain. Some shots are exchanged over the Channel, but everyone knows war is over. However, Britain is pretty much safe, and agrees to white peace with Germany in 1st of December 1918, and returning most of her colonies in Africa, with no other reparations required.

Last Entente powers in Europe, Portugal and Italy, capitulate in 12th of December 1918, when German troops threaten Italy from France. China, Japan and Brazil and other Entente powers across the globe surrender in 22th of December 1918, in so called "Christmas Peace". Peace treaties against France and Italy were Versailles-level rough, but everyone else survived with very minor reparations, because at this point no one wanted war anymore and Germany really didn't have the ability to project power across the world.

After that there are way too many butterflies in the air, but you can try to read any of the many Central Victory 1918 timelines.
 
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When giving chase, British destroyers and cruisers move faster and slower battleships are at the rear of British formation, largely unprotected. German U-boat crews can't believe their luck and sink many of the battleships by surprise attacks.

Falls at the first Hurdle Im afraid

Uboats might have been usefull against a fat slow Merchant Man (often by surfacing and shooting it with the deck gun) or have the odd sucess agaisnt the odd Warship (see live bait squadron for an exceptional success but those were obsolete ships) - but generally Uboats were not prticularly good vs manouvering faster warships.

Hell a U-Boat tried to attack the heavily damaged HMS Warspite after Jutland when the BB was withdrawing - The Surfaced Uboat missed and only barely avoided being rammed by the old Girl in return.

Also U boats are slow - much slower than the Grand Fleet (battleships are faster than a WW1 Uboat) - so unless all 10 happened to be in the right location at the right time and battleships virtually ran right over them then they are not going to be playing any part in the battle. They are not suddenly pouncing on 'unprotected' battleships.

The part they played was to act as a forward screen there purpose was to warn the HSF of any British Movement - and obviously chance their luck if an opportunity presented itself.

But the idea that the submarines would have played any significant role in the battle is too fanciful.
 
There goes that idea

But would all 10 submarines getting to positions to blow up British ships when they return to Britain be plausible? Or all 10 submarines called to the location of the battle in advance, and then sinking large British ships when no one is looking? Naval warfare is not my strongest area.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
But would all 10 submarines getting to positions to blow up British ships when they return to Britain be plausible? Or all 10 submarines called to the location of the battle in advance, and then sinking large British ships when no one is looking? Naval warfare is not my strongest area.

The only people who tried to use pre-SSK submarines primarily in fleet battles were the Japanese.
It did not work out for them.
And those were WW2 boats, not WW1 ones.
You might get a lucky torpedo or three, but no more than that - and even that might not get a sinking for each torp.
 
But would all 10 submarines getting to positions to blow up British ships when they return to Britain be plausible? Or all 10 submarines called to the location of the battle in advance, and then sinking large British ships when no one is looking? Naval warfare is not my strongest area.

Not really, the odds tend to be against submarines in attacks on real warships. Surface warships are built for surface combat and they also tend to good at dodging torpedoes if they spot them. Worse you tend to need more than one lucky hit to actually sink most battleships, recall Marlborough took a torpedo hit shortly before 7 o'clock and was still able to dodge several others in at least two separate attacks all the while fighting a battle. She then did not detach from the fleet until 2 am which meant forcing her hull through the water at high (though declining) speed rather than taking proper measures to limit flooding. Then she made it home.

Remember a typical German submarine of World War 1could manage perhaps 16-17 knots surfaced and 10 knots underwater for a very short time before her batteries went flat.

Also the idea of the screen abandoning the battleships in your scenario is a bit off. The British had a great deal of practice when it came to sailing in large formations.

Further talking of slow boats versus fast ships but in an extended chase what about the HSF 2nd Battle Squadron? Though the Deutschlands can make an 18 and bit knot top speed nominally they would struggle to maintain it with their reciprocating machinery. In a long chase there is a very real chance that the Grand Fleet would have caught and sunk the pre-dreadnoughts which is hardly the Skaggerak Battle the Imperial Navy would have hoped for.

A lucky submarine might have sunk one of the British Dreadnoughts and that would have been a triumph but really heavy losses are unlikely. Despite all the claims that battleships were obsolete at the time the only way to clear modern battleships off the highs seas reliably was with a fleet of modern battleships.
 
But would all 10 submarines getting to positions to blow up British ships when they return to Britain be plausible? Or all 10 submarines called to the location of the battle in advance, and then sinking large British ships when no one is looking? Naval warfare is not my strongest area.

The British battleships could all do 20+ Knots, The Queen Elizabeths could do about 24 knots and the Battle cruisers about 27-30 + Knots

Destroyers and Cruisers could do 25-30+ knots

A submerged U-Boat can do a maximum of 9 knots submerged but this would exhaust the batteries in a very short period of time - probably an hour or less - travelling submerged at 3 knots (at steerage speed) would allow the same batteries to last many many hours and the sub would probably surface at night to recharge - but even this maximum speed is too slow to intercept anything but a crippled warship unless said warship virtual sails over or close by.

On the surface it can use its engines and could travel at a maximum of about 15 knots - but a surfaced U boat vs then modern warships isnt in a good place and its still slower!

Think of Submarines at this time being movable Mine fields with the 'potential' to damage or sink a ship 1 or 2 miles away.

Now spread your 10 submarines in a line - like infantry pickets but say 4 or 5 miles apart - your line is now a line covering an area of the North Sea 50-60 miles long by 10 miles deep.

This is how they were used at Jutland, primarily to spot the British ships and radio their reports in - not to sink them unless the opportunity presented itself - like the attempt on the damaged Warspite after the battle.
 

Tyr Anazasi

Banned
NinjaCarrot,

some points:

1. replace the Uboats with a night torpedo attack by German destroyers/torpedo boats. Should have the very same effect.

2. Britain would then have to keep soldiers in Britain, which would be missed elsewhere.

3. Entente would run out of money in 1917. They would hardly have reached 1918. Collapse would have been sooner. Also the minor powers (including Italy) of the Entente would fall at first. Also the mutinies in the French army would have been worse in 1917.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
3. Entente would run out of money in 1917. They would hardly have reached 1918. Collapse would have been sooner. Also the minor powers (including Italy) of the Entente would fall at first. Also the mutinies in the French army would have been worse in 1917.
Uh... how do you run out of money when you're the producers of the global reserve currency of the time?
I can see running out of DOLLARS, which is different and would harm but not cripple the war effort. (No longer able to purchase from the US.)
 
NinjaCarrot,

some points:

1. replace the Uboats with a night torpedo attack by German destroyers/torpedo boats. Should have the very same effect.

It was a foggy night though to be fair that did not stop the British light forces discovering the Germans, the German destroyers on the other hand completely failed to detach from their own main body which does not bode well for the success of their torpedo attack. Further assuming they had not simply gotten lost in the North Sea which is a strong possibility given the prevailing conditions they would then have found actually spotting ships in the dark and mist let alone launching a successful torpedo attack on them was rather hard as the British were demonstrating back in OTL.

So basically the German light forces have to do not merely a lot better than they did OTL but a lot, lot better and then to have any meaningful impact on the RN have to do a lot, lot better than the British light forces who actually did do a lot, lot better than the Germans in OTL.

Colour me sceptical.
 
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