WI:German Army rebels against Hitler

Also, if the Army rebels, the SA and SS are going to counter their attack. Civil War seems likely.

Are you aware of the size of the SS in 1939? Who do you think was manning their "technical" bits (such as, their artillery)? As to the SA, they had been tamed. They can use their clubs and pistols on unarmed civilians, but they aren't going to stand their ground in a street against infantrymen with fixed bayonets and a MG.

That's not the problem. The problem is whether the infantrymen will obey orders that can be construed as treachery against the Führer.
 

Deleted member 1487

There were Polish reasons too. The question assumes the Poles were aware they were going to get trampled. They weren't. Many Poles thought they had a fair chance against Germany alone, and admitting they needed a foreign military deployment would be an insult. And the same choice not to provoke Germany was on for some while in 1938 in Poland too (then they began playing to Hitler's hand, some would say).
Not sure I buy that. They had French forces stationed in their country for a while too and were pretty serious about their alliance with at least France. Seems more like they felt western European forces would be better served attacking out of France to take the pressure off of them. The Poles knew they couldn't win against Germany one on one and banked on their allies pulling off a large part of the German army; in that context they could stalemate them, not alone though.
 

Deleted member 94680

Are you aware of the size of the SS in 1939? Who do you think was manning their "technical" bits (such as, their artillery)? As to the SA, they had been tamed. They can use their clubs and pistols on unarmed civilians, but they aren't going to stand their ground in a street against infantrymen with fixed bayonets and a MG.

That's not the problem. The problem is whether the infantrymen will obey orders that can be construed as treachery against the Führer.

There seems to be a willingness to transpose the facts and figures of, say, a “Valkyrie situation” from 1944 back to any possible Heer mutiny in any time prior to it in Nazi Germany.

IMO, in any timeframe pre-Overlord (and certainly pre-Barabarossa) the SS would be incapable of doing anything against the Heer if the Heer chose to rebel. References to the SA post June ‘34 are pretty amusing too.

The problem when one comes to discussing any kind of Heer mutiny (post Blomberg’s sycophancy) is the loyalty binding most of the Generals to the person of Hitler. It will take a severe PoD to change the approach of the Generals ITTL. It was this problem, OTL, which stymied most (if not all) of the attempts and plots against Hitler and the plotters found impossible to overcome.
 
Without Hitler crossing certain lines or coming off much more mentally unstable then he did in ‘39/‘40 it’s hard for me to imagine a coup plot in those years reaching critical mass.

You need to put together a combo of a more openly unhinged Hitler in ‘39, more open war crimes with Hitler forcing the army itself it get its hands dirtier then it’s comfortable with at that point, and the war going South.

As a traditional soldier, Blaskowitz kept firm control on the men under his command in their dealings with civilians and was opposed to Army participation in war crimes by the SS and Einsatzgruppen. He handed out death sentences to members of the SS for crimes against the civilian population, which were rescinded by Hitler.

Between November 1939 and February 1940 he wrote several memoranda to higher military officials, in which he detailed SS atrocities in Poland, their negative effects on Wehrmacht soldiers and the insolent attitude of the SS toward the army. However, his protests failed to produce results, and merely earned him the enmity of Hitler, Hans Frank, Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler, while Chief of Staff Alfred Joel dismissed them as naive and "uncalled for".

Commander-in-Chief Walther von Brauchitsch forwarded Blaskowitz's first memorandum to Hitler on 18 November, who launched a tirade against Blaskowitz, denouncing his concerns about due process as "childish" and poured scorn on his "Salvation Army attitude." In February 1940, Blaskowitz prepared a list of 33 complaints against the SS. Among his complaints were strip searches and rape of Jewish women, a whipping orgy in Nasielsk affecting 1,600 Jews, and a clear case of race mixing committed by a junior SS officer. Blaskowitz concluded that "It is a mistake to massacre some 10,000 Jews and Poles, as is being done at present; for—so far as the mass of the population is concerned—this will not eradicate the idea of a Polish state, nor will the Jews be exterminated.” Blaskowitz was relieved of his command on 29 May 1940.

In May 1944, following the appointment of Gerd von Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief in the West, Blaskowitz was appointed the head of Army Group G. This comparatively small command, consisting of the 1st Army and the 19th Army, was given the task of defending southern France from the imminent Allied invasion. When in Normandy, he managed to convince Field Marshal Erwin Rommel that the "rumours" Rommel had heard about atrocities on the Eastern Front were actually true.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannes_Blaskowitz

It wasn’t one factor that led to the July Plot, it wouldn’t be one that leads to a several years earlier version of the same idea.
 
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Contrary to what some people here seem to think, France did have plans for a sizable offensive operation. It would have been too slow-paced and definitely half-hearted, but the main problem weren't either of these two features: it was that it would take something like a month to be ready, 3 weeks at best (they had planned for two starting from September 2).

French plans routinely exceeded their actual capabilities. The reality is that French mobilization was still getting going when the Germans finished crushing the Poles and began moving forces back west. The French Army had 40 divisions worth of troops in August of 1939, and five of those were fortress divisions and immobile, and five were placed on the Italian frontier. They were in the process of breaking these divisions up into the cadres for the formation of a 100+ division force, as per their mobilization plan for total war, so on paper the number of divisions rapidly rose from September onwards (to 65 three weeks in, not 108), but this just served to render those divisions so divided incapable of immediate offensive action.

The French offensive would have run out of steam by mid-October at the latest, probably much sooner. After having made more headway than OTL's offensive, sure, but not significant gains.

At which point it would have been ~80 German divisions (including seven panzer divisions) against 30 French divisions (and only one tank division) exposed in front of their fortifications. The most likely result is that the French forces would be destroyed. If France loses the best of her army - the seed she intended to build her larger force around - in 1939, Hitler will probably win his argument with OKH and begin the invasion of France in the fall of 1939 (as he wanted) rather than in the summer of 1940. And without those divisions, France would probably lose.
 
French plans routinely exceeded their actual capabilities. The reality is that French mobilization was still getting going when the Germans finished crushing the Poles and began moving forces back west. The French Army had 40 divisions worth of troops in August of 1939, and five of those were fortress divisions and immobile, and five were placed on the Italian frontier. They were in the process of breaking these divisions up into the cadres for the formation of a 100+ division force, as per their mobilization plan for total war, so on paper the number of divisions rapidly rose from September onwards (to 65 three weeks in, not 108), but this just served to render those divisions so divided incapable of immediate offensive action.

Personally, I believe that the political decision would be to carry out an additional offensive operation by the end of September, with whatever was ready, if Poland is still standing or has at least a corner at the Romanian border.
That offensive I qualified as half-hearted not just in terms of tactics and will, but also because of the shortcomings you mention.


At which point it would have been ~80 German divisions (including seven panzer divisions)

That seems to assume a magical level of fast redeployment from Poland, not to mention that the basic assumption is that the Soviets are not in to do their part. The Germans would begin redeploying some divisions by early October, because, even without the Soviets, the Poles cannot hold out for much longer, but not tens of them. And the panzer divisions would be the more dented ones.

against 30 French divisions (and only one tank division) exposed in front of their fortifications.

That's unclear. The fortifications you refer to are the German ones? Personally I believe the French would have by now gained at least one foothold in the MRL of the Westwall which, as we know, had a very thin outer crust and then a building yard.

The most likely result is that the French forces would be destroyed.

I don't think so. Stopped, certainly, also because, once Poland is over, it will be the French decision makers who'll want the Armée to stop. Destroyed, no, and certainly not the "most likely" result. Also, I would not assume that the Germans can work their Blitzkrieg magic in this situation. Constrained frontages in difficult terrain, plenty of rainy days when the Stukas can't take off, tanks that are receiving half their allocation of 37mm rounds, etc.
 
Not sure I buy that. They had French forces stationed in their country for a while too and were pretty serious about their alliance with at least France. Seems more like they felt western European forces would be better served attacking out of France to take the pressure off of them. The Poles knew they couldn't win against Germany one on one and banked on their allies pulling off a large part of the German army; in that context they could stalemate them, not alone though.

Sorry, when I wrote "against Germany alone" I did not mean that the Polish generals thought they'd win "one on one", i.e. that they would be alone too. I meant that they would never have dreamed that the Germans would come to an agreement with their other enemy on the other side. They would of course expect the French to do their part.
In such a situation (Germany at war on both sides), the Polish generals, and let's not forget they tended to be one and the same with their political leaders at this time, seem to have thought that Poland had an even chance of keeping Germany at bay and even making inroads at least in Eastern Prussia.
Therefore, they thought they did not need foreign troops, even if allied, on Polish soil. Yes, they had had French troops - but I think that was a long way back.
 
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