WI German Army prepared for "General Winter"

postponing typhoon till spring and taking winter quarters on the Oka line is the most logically superior alternative to what the germans did in otl that passes the plausibility test (given that Hitler postponed sickle cut numerous times due to concerns about weather; and he himself heard and considered arguments for taking up winter quarters)

the most superior alternative that doesn't pass the plausibility test (from a Hitler and German command perspective, not from a physically possible point of view) is to launch the briansk and vyzama encirclements to disorganize and wreck the soviet western front THEN pull back to the oka line leaving a scortched earth in their wake

Just curious as to why you think it plausible to dig in but not do it mixed with spoiling attacks (if on a lavish scale)?

Michael
 
So let;s suppose that the Germans fight the battles of Smolensk and Kiev to secure the flank as they did in OTL. But Operation Typhoon is postponed until Spring 1942.

The Soviets still bring up the Siberian divisions and will almost certainly stll mount a winter offensive. But with the Wehrmacht defending better positions and with less extended suply lines winter clothing may be in better supply and the beteer trained and more experienced Germans have a good chance of repelling this with heavy losses.

In April, May or June the Germans can renew the offensive either to Mosocow or a Fall Blau style offensive. Either way success is more likely with te Germans not losing the men they did in Operation Typhoon and facing a Red Army similar in strength to that of June 1942.

Alternatively the Red Army can dig in, rest, train and regroup over the winter and is in a better position to face a renewed German offensive in 1942. Perhaps the Germans forsaw this possibility, realised victory would be impossible at that stage and gambled on Operation Typhoon as a means of winning the war fast before it could not be won outright at all.

But the Germans could still have negotiated from a position of strength even in a military stalemate. Militarily they could still fight on the defensive in 1942 and try to bleed the Red Army into collapse. Perhaps this strategy, adopted as early as 1942, would have had a much better chance of working than it would have had later in the war.

First thing, the soviets did not bring any siberian divisions up.. those were central asian divisions :) Postponing Typhoon means many things: Leeb could not fuck up the cut of Leningrad, so the city would fall by around february. wich makes the Baltic a big axis pond, enable supplying trough Leningrad, etc. oh, and dont forget the shorter front thing! Postponing the Typhoon also means, that the losses in the attacking operations do not exists and due to the prepared stance of the Heer, the losses in defence are lesser. Also, there is a fair chance, that the soviets do something similary stupid, like the leningrad counter offensive (huge losses on the soviet side). And the difference we made here, is all about losses and replacements. A defensive winter in 41 means that by 42, the germans can replace their losses, while in OTL they could not, so they were forced to take the southern route (Fall Blau), since the Moscow front was reinforced like hell. In this scenario, they can chose between them, and if they coose the southern again, they can do it with bigger aviable forces. They can still fuck it up like originally (take the 4th PA on a siteseeing tour and grinding their forces down in a city siege), but they would have been in a much better starting position.
 
First thing, the soviets did not bring any siberian divisions up.. those were central asian divisions :) Postponing Typhoon means many things: Leeb could not fuck up the cut of Leningrad, so the city would fall by around february. wich makes the Baltic a big axis pond, enable supplying trough Leningrad, etc. oh, and dont forget the shorter front thing! Postponing the Typhoon also means, that the losses in the attacking operations do not exists and due to the prepared stance of the Heer, the losses in defence are lesser. Also, there is a fair chance, that the soviets do something similary stupid, like the leningrad counter offensive (huge losses on the soviet side). And the difference we made here, is all about losses and replacements. A defensive winter in 41 means that by 42, the germans can replace their losses, while in OTL they could not, so they were forced to take the southern route (Fall Blau), since the Moscow front was reinforced like hell. In this scenario, they can chose between them, and if they coose the southern again, they can do it with bigger aviable forces. They can still fuck it up like originally (take the 4th PA on a siteseeing tour and grinding their forces down in a city siege), but they would have been in a much better starting position.

OK so instead of Operation Typhoon and Moscow Army Group Centre and Army Group South go over to the defensive for the winter. Redources devoted to Typhoon in OTL go towards the capture of Leningrad instead. The city falls by the end of 1941 or February 1942 The wehrmacht is able oo replace some of their losses but still has to face a Soviet winter offensive which, due to the lack of winter clothing it is not really equipped for. But losses will be nothing like those of OTL in Operation Typhoon and the OTL Soviet winter offensive.

So, does the Wehrmacht mount a renewed drive on Moscow in April/May 1942 (assuning thwe Soviets are unable to delay this with an offensive like that of the OTL Second Battle of Kharkov? Or does HGitler still decide to go for the Caucasus. Or perhaps he tries to do both since he has more forces in this 1942 than he does in OTL. Perhaps this turns out to be a miscalculation along the lines of the OTL Fall Blau. Onlly in this case Hitler goes after three seperate objectives. Moscow which could easily bcome an ATL Stalingrad. Stalingrad itseld which perhaps goes much the sames as it did in OTL. Same for the Caucasus. If this is how it pans out disaster still occurs in the winter of 1942 - 3.

Alternativel the Wehrmacht can go for a more limited drive on Moscow. Could succeed but perhaps a Stalingrad style battle is fought for Moscow. If everyhing pans out the Germans could mount a later Fall Blau aimed at securing Southern Russia by the end of 1942. If this goes well a further limited offensive to secure the Caucasus. Question is, with continued German sucessd on this scale doe Stalin sue for peace? Or is he overthrown and his successors make a Brest Litovsk style peace with Hitler?
 
OK so instead of Operation Typhoon and Moscow Army Group Centre and Army Group South go over to the defensive for the winter. Redources devoted to Typhoon in OTL go towards the capture of Leningrad instead. The city falls by the end of 1941 or February 1942 The wehrmacht is able oo replace some of their losses but still has to face a Soviet winter offensive which, due to the lack of winter clothing it is not really equipped for. But losses will be nothing like those of OTL in Operation Typhoon and the OTL Soviet winter offensive.
Basically, yes. While the capture of Leningrad is still a big question, but with the holding of Tikhvin (sp?) its more or less granted. And without Typhoon, the defense of Tikhvin is doable.
(Clogging the supply lines with armies marching back and forth is a big no-no in my view).

And in this scenario, resupplying the armies are much more easier, the infantry could reorganise and the mobile untis still can carry out the small encirclements ("small"), but this time, having a "solid" line behind them.

And yes, having the knowledge of the losses and replacements after typhoon, the major decrease of losses in Typhoon and during the counterattack is critical. i do not have right now the numbers, but in 42, the heer could not replace the numbers. Without high losses, maybe they could. Maybe even they can extend the numbers, but thats a big what if...
So, does the Wehrmacht mount a renewed drive on Moscow in April/May 1942 (assuning thwe Soviets are unable to delay this with an offensive like that of the OTL Second Battle of Kharkov? Or does HGitler still decide to go for the Caucasus. Or perhaps he tries to do both since he has more forces in this 1942 than he does in OTL. Perhaps this turns out to be a miscalculation along the lines of the OTL Fall Blau. Onlly in this case Hitler goes after three seperate objectives. Moscow which could easily bcome an ATL Stalingrad. Stalingrad itseld which perhaps goes much the sames as it did in OTL. Same for the Caucasus. If this is how it pans out disaster still occurs in the winter of 1942 - 3.

Alternativel the Wehrmacht can go for a more limited drive on Moscow. Could succeed but perhaps a Stalingrad style battle is fought for Moscow. If everyhing pans out the Germans could mount a later Fall Blau aimed at securing Southern Russia by the end of 1942. If this goes well a further limited offensive to secure the Caucasus. Question is, with continued German sucessd on this scale doe Stalin sue for peace? Or is he overthrown and his successors make a Brest Litovsk style peace with Hitler?

Well, i do not know :) Basically, what we have now, is an unbeated, stronger Wehrmacht, a morale loss for the soviets, a heavily fortified Moscow front (by the soviets) and for the germans, two choices: drive against moscow (OTL, they could not do it, due to the losses and the strenght of the soviets) or the southern route.

Everything possible.

Good start for a writer? :)
 
Just curious as to why you think it plausible to dig in but not do it mixed with spoiling attacks (if on a lavish scale)?

Michael

Hitler had a mental block about line straightening and giving up ground... that's why I said physically possible, but not plausible from a German command perspective... the realistic type alternative course is for hitler to listen to Rundstedt and Kluge who said the army was spent and should take winter quarters on the present line with the assumption of resuming the advance in the spring once the army revived itself
 
Hitler had a mental block about line straightening and giving up ground... that's why I said physically possible, but not plausible from a German command perspective... the realistic type alternative course is for hitler to listen to Rundstedt and Kluge who said the army was spent and should take winter quarters on the present line with the assumption of resuming the advance in the spring once the army revived itself

Erm, *Hitler* was the one that didn't want to push things past October and wanted the offensive to stop. The Generals, like Halder, Bock, Guderian, and company were the ones that convinced him that the Wehrmacht could take Moscow. The Generals, of course, used a Dolchstosslegende to avoid admitting that in this case the Fuhrer was right (and understandably unwilling to ever trust them again). Hitler was evil, he was not necessarily stupid.
 
Hitler had a mental block about line straightening and giving up ground... that's why I said physically possible, but not plausible from a German command perspective... the realistic type alternative course is for hitler to listen to Rundstedt and Kluge who said the army was spent and should take winter quarters on the present line with the assumption of resuming the advance in the spring once the army revived itself

Uhm... maybe im wrong, but as far as i remember, hitler wanted to hold the further advance, and especially Guderian wanted to push forward.

(By the way, i find it fascinating, that how many times had Adolf that raw animalistic instinct - and being right! - regarding decisions, at least, until about 42.)
 
Erm, *Hitler* was the one that didn't want to push things past October and wanted the offensive to stop. The Generals, like Halder, Bock, Guderian, and company were the ones that convinced him that the Wehrmacht could take Moscow. The Generals, of course, used a Dolchstosslegende to avoid admitting that in this case the Fuhrer was right (and understandably unwilling to ever trust them again). Hitler was evil, he was not necessarily stupid.

Agreed,

the question I was responding to was about the germans conducting an "active" defense once they take up their winter line; and I pointed out that Hitler didn't like surrendering territory

Halder, Bock and Guderian pressed the offensive to be launched, Hoeppner, Kluge and Rundstedt were against it; like Kursk Hitler would have been better off trusting his first instinct instead of being talked into an attack
 
Uhm... maybe im wrong, but as far as i remember, hitler wanted to hold the further advance, and especially Guderian wanted to push forward.

(By the way, i find it fascinating, that how many times had Adolf that raw animalistic instinct - and being right! - regarding decisions, at least, until about 42.)

Hitler had proved himself numerous times from 1935 to 1941 to be much more shrewd and clever than his generals; no small amount of credit and estimation should be given to him for this
 
Uhm... maybe im wrong, but as far as i remember, hitler wanted to hold the further advance, and especially Guderian wanted to push forward.

(By the way, i find it fascinating, that how many times had Adolf that raw animalistic instinct - and being right! - regarding decisions, at least, until about 42.)

Militarily that didn't entirely stop *after* 1942. Hitler didn't want an atomic bomb because he figured it wouldn't be used in the European war, and he was right: the Trinity Test was a month after WWII was over in Europe. Hitler's insistence on calling off Citadel in the wake of Husky was strategically sound, too, as it meant that the Germans were now facing a different kind of war and needed other strategic priorities. Hitler's idea of the Italian Campaign also wound up rather sharply reflecting the reality of that theater of operations. It was in 1944 when Hitler turned into a raving maniac and by then he was too drugged up to matter and even stalemate was out of the question. Between Overlord and Bagration, his military options were gone anyway. By 1945, of course.....:eek:

Agreed,

the question I was responding to was about the germans conducting an "active" defense once they take up their winter line; and I pointed out that Hitler didn't like surrendering territory

Halder, Bock and Guderian pressed the offensive to be launched, Hoeppner, Kluge and Rundstedt were against it; like Kursk Hitler would have been better off trusting his first instinct instead of being talked into an attack

True. The other side of waiting for the offensive is that it would have been an instance of the Germans attacking into the teeth of Soviet defenses given the entire winter and spring to prepare themselves. Such a fight would have been a mixture of Stalingrad and Kursk, as even in 1942 well dug-in Soviet defenses could be a pain for the Nazis to have to slog through.
 
Hitler had proved himself numerous times from 1935 to 1941 to be much more shrewd and clever than his generals; no small amount of credit and estimation should be given to him for this

I would actually extend that to an extent into 1943. Blue was not an unsound idea, necessarily, and it *did* wrong-foot the Soviets for a third time. It gave the Nazis their closest chances to outright win the war on their own steam, and it was preceded by Second Kharkov which was the greatest Nazi victory of the war, hands-down. Even in 1943 Hitler's judgment of the Italian campaign proved sound, and he had the sense to call Citadel quits instead of trying to prolong it and giving the Soviets a victory to rival Stalingrad or Bucharest in scale. The problem for the Nazis *and* Hitler by 1944 was not only that Hitler was tipping in terms of addiction into the raving maniac variety but also that the disparity between the Allies and the Axis was becoming insuperable. No amount of good generalship or highfalutin' future technology could have reversed that in that context.

Hitler the real man was rather scarier and more frightening than the Hitler caricature that's seen in some histories and alternate histories both. He was a reckless gambler but at the same time his armies had an unbroken string of victories up to Moscow, and in the Battles of Kiev, Briansk, and Vyazma won some of the biggest victories in military history to that point.
 
Militarily that didn't entirely stop *after* 1942. Hitler didn't want an atomic bomb because he figured it wouldn't be used in the European war, and he was right: the Trinity Test was a month after WWII was over in Europe. Hitler's insistence on calling off Citadel in the wake of Husky was strategically sound, too, as it meant that the Germans were now facing a different kind of war and needed other strategic priorities. Hitler's idea of the Italian Campaign also wound up rather sharply reflecting the reality of that theater of operations. It was in 1944 when Hitler turned into a raving maniac and by then he was too drugged up to matter and even stalemate was out of the question. Between Overlord and Bagration, his military options were gone anyway. By 1945, of course.....:eek:



True. The other side of waiting for the offensive is that it would have been an instance of the Germans attacking into the teeth of Soviet defenses given the entire winter and spring to prepare themselves. Such a fight would have been a mixture of Stalingrad and Kursk, as even in 1942 well dug-in Soviet defenses could be a pain for the Nazis to have to slog through.

It would depend how the Russians handled the lull; if they sat put and reorganized the army and built up defensive lines; then yes the rest period would be quite beneficial to them, if they attacked head on against the still in tact heer over the winter and into the spring it wouldn't go well, and they might be weakened enough from these battles that the germans can resume the advance a la 2nd kharkov
 
I would actually extend that to an extent into 1943. Blue was not an unsound idea, necessarily, and it *did* wrong-foot the Soviets for a third time. It gave the Nazis their closest chances to outright win the war on their own steam, and it was preceded by Second Kharkov which was the greatest Nazi victory of the war, hands-down. Even in 1943 Hitler's judgment of the Italian campaign proved sound, and he had the sense to call Citadel quits instead of trying to prolong it and giving the Soviets a victory to rival Stalingrad or Bucharest in scale. The problem for the Nazis *and* Hitler by 1944 was not only that Hitler was tipping in terms of addiction into the raving maniac variety but also that the disparity between the Allies and the Axis was becoming insuperable. No amount of good generalship or highfalutin' future technology could have reversed that in that context.

Hitler the real man was rather scarier and more frightening than the Hitler caricature that's seen in some histories and alternate histories both. He was a reckless gambler but at the same time his armies had an unbroken string of victories up to Moscow, and in the Battles of Kiev, Briansk, and Vyazma won some of the biggest victories in military history to that point.


eh case blue is a situation where Hitler screwed up really bad; (note that at second kharkov he listened to the right person; Kliest and correctly told Paulus to resume the advance or be replaced)... but he let Bock fuck around with his left flank too long, and was too slow in firing him for not obeying orders; then he diverted the 4th panzer army which threw away the entire campaign against the advice of Kliest, Hoth and Weichs.... that was one of the few times where the generals where not in two camps; all of them said the 4th panzer army needed to advance to the volga and block the river before the southern front could expanded and List wrote a long memo to the OKH and Hitler saying that the roads where congested enough with the 1st panzer army's vehicles and that the 4th would only slow the advance without adding any combat power at the point of attack, and that his advance would be made easier by their blocking the volga to prevent reinforcement from the north
 
It would depend how the Russians handled the lull; if they sat put and reorganized the army and built up defensive lines; then yes the rest period would be quite beneficial to them, if they attacked head on against the still in tact heer over the winter and into the spring it wouldn't go well, and they might be weakened enough from these battles that the germans can resume the advance a la 2nd kharkov

Eh, Stalin actually predicted the Germans would do this IOTL so he'd probably be fine with letting the Germans win themselves to death against those defenses before attacking. The downside of that is Stalin will have a longer learning curve about his own General Failure tendencies.

eh case blue is a situation where Hitler screwed up really bad; (note that at second kharkov he listened to the right person; Kliest and correctly told Paulus to resume the advance or be replaced)... but he let Bock fuck around with his left flank too long, and was too slow in firing him for not obeying orders; then he diverted the 4th panzer army which threw away the entire campaign against the advice of Kliest, Hoth and Weichs.... that was one of the few times where the generals where not in two camps; all of them said the 4th panzer army needed to advance to the volga and block the river before the southern front could expanded and List wrote a long memo to the OKH and Hitler saying that the roads where congested enough with the 1st panzer army's vehicles and that the 4th would only slow the advance without adding any combat power at the point of attack, and that his advance would be made easier by their blocking the volga to prevent reinforcement from the north

True, but the Soviets also had a bunch of screw-ups that almost negated the impact of the Nazi screw-ups. There's a reason I consider victories won on the other guy's FUBARs to still qualify in that regard. I think we can both agree that Operation Blue as it unfolded was not exactly one of brilliant generalship on anybody's part up until the Soviet encirclement of Sixth Army, and that this is a case where the Soviets won by exploiting German mistakes more than anything they actually did.
 
Hitler had a mental block about line straightening and giving up ground... that's why I said physically possible, but not plausible from a German command perspective... the realistic type alternative course is for hitler to listen to Rundstedt and Kluge who said the army was spent and should take winter quarters on the present line with the assumption of resuming the advance in the spring once the army revived itself

OK, what do the soviet do then? Stalin had is own mental blocks. The biggest being in love with counter attacking. I don't see Stalin sitting for more than a month or two on the outside.

Michael
 
Assuming the Germans halt for the winter apart from an attempt to take Leningrad in the autumn of 1941 (which probably has an excellent chance of succeeding but could result in high German losses) the Soviets start a winter offensive, Since there is no Operation Typhoon the Soviets could open thiir offensive earlier. Perhaps as early as November. The Germans have stonger forces than OTL and are in better defensive positions. Operation Mars (November - December 1942) and the real 1941 - 2 Soviet winter offensive provide a good guide regarding how this will probably go.

The Germans will still suffer severely due to lack of winter clohing but the Red Army will suffer from lack of training, poor tactics etc. Net result the Soviet Winter Offensive is something of a disaster with the Germans being well placed to resume the attack in Spring 1942.

Question is do the Germans drive on Moscow which probably has a good chance of success as long as they don't do Fall Blau at the same time. They could do it later in the year after Moscow falls however going for Stalingrad and the Volga first. Once this area is secure take the Cuacasus to secure the oil. The key point will be to avoid over extending and keepinng enough mobile reserves to deal with Soviet offensives against AG North or Centre. WEven in OTL the Soviets launched several offensives in these sectorsand would probabl do so in this one, particularl aiming to retake Moscow and Leningrad.
 
Cash said:
what would be the impact if the German High Command had taken Napoleon's lesson to heart regarding Russia and General Winter? Let's say Barbaross is launched per OTL, but with winter clothing and other supplies already laid in and ready for distribution when the weather turns colder in September/October.
I'd want to know how you overcome the German expectaiton of victory in 10wk or less, which would obviate the need.
BriefMortal said:
German engines ran on petrol and guess what petrol does at low temperatures that Soviet diesel doesn't do?
And what would that be?:confused::confused: Because if it was gasoline that was the problem, nobody where I've lived my whole life could drive about 8mo of the year.:eek: We do use some fancy multigrade motor oils that work when it's cold enough to freeze the nuts off a Pz 4, tho.:p
 
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