WI: George McClellan Secretary of War?

I think it was the combination of bad terrain and Beauregard putting too much trust in Johnston to actually be a general, not a glorified colonel. Which admittedly was a sign of how inexperienced everybody was at the time (as Grant very obviously did not expect an attack. Even though nobody entrenched, the strategic surprise was there, his memoirs be damned in that case. The sign of his skill is in not going into panic mode and directing the battle the whole way through and rather mercilessly exploiting Confederate mistakes).

Yeah. At best Grant was caught wondering why his pickets were being driven in. At worst...

But as you said, he reacted effectively.

True, though I was thinking more about Beauregard in command in Virginia, where his skill and less bloody means of waging war would have been better than Johnston the master of retreating and writing memoirs and Lee the slightly milder John Bell Hood. I can't see Beauregard being so stupid as to launch a Malvern Hill and he did more with less than most CS generals did.

Agreed so far.

Against McClellan that combination might have actually been far deadlier than Lee's extremely risky strategy that in actual fact did produce a sequence of victories for Fitz-John Porter. A factor that tends to be overlooked.

Hard to say. Given McClellan's response to those attacks, it couldn't have fared much worse, and that's assuming Beauregard is even worse than Lee somehow.

The OP, of course, runs aground that McClellan was more abrasive and autocratic than Stanton, whose leadership can best be summed up as a J. Edgar Hoover of the 19th Century, minus the cross-dressing.

Possibly slightly more respectful of the president. Or at least less actively opposed to him.
 
Yeah. At best Grant was caught wondering why his pickets were being driven in. At worst...

But as you said, he reacted effectively.

Even the best generals of wars can make mistakes. See: Battle of Rhzev. Grant was brilliant, but brilliance doesn't mean that major FUBARs are impossible for someone.


Hard to say. Given McClellan's response to those attacks, it couldn't have fared much worse, and that's assuming Beauregard is even worse than Lee somehow.

The Confederacy not taking casualties in repeated headlong attacks and having more men to attack the USA in battles even slightly more co-ordinated would have been a major improvement for the CSA in its own right.


Possibly slightly more respectful of the president. Or at least less actively opposed to him.

And with less tools to do the damage he could do.
 
Even the best generals of wars can make mistakes. See: Battle of Rhzev. Grant was brilliant, but brilliance doesn't mean that major FUBARs are impossible for someone.

Yeah. A better measure of greatness - for individuals and groups - is being able to recover from things going to Hell.

The Confederacy not taking casualties in repeated headlong attacks and having more men to attack the USA in battles even slightly more co-ordinated would have been a major improvement for the CSA in its own right.

One would think.

Maryland might happen as badly though. The idea of Marylanders painting to join the Confederacy would excite Beauregard.

Might not have quite so much contempt for McClellan, though.

And with less tools to do the damage he could do.

Fortunately.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Yeah. At best Grant was caught wondering why his pickets were being driven in. At worst...

But as you said, he reacted effectively.

Who knows, Grant was swanning around on a boat many miles from the field. When he got there he doesn't seem to have done much. However, without a functional command system there was little to do. The only positive thing done all day was Col. Webster making a final fallback position, which seems to have been his own idea.

As to the attack on the second day, Buell commanded it. The forces left to Grant joined in 5 hours later.

Hard to say. Given McClellan's response to those attacks, it couldn't have fared much worse, and that's assuming Beauregard is even worse than Lee somehow.

Grant suffered the same fate at Holly Springs, having his supply base knocked out from under him. He responded in the same way. Both were correct.

Possibly slightly more respectful of the president. Or at least less actively opposed to him.

Which is a rather odd idea. No matter what frustrations he had McClellan was always polite and respectful to the President and chastised those who publically criticised him. Good job too. They actually liked each other and were friendly pre-war (Lincoln having once been McClellan's lawyer) even if the relationship did later sour.

If you're referring to "the snub", it's almost certainly a fabrication by Hay when both those involved were long dead (see Rowland).
 
Which is a rather odd idea. No matter what frustrations he had McClellan was always polite and respectful to the President and chastised those who publically criticised him. Good job too. They actually liked each other and were friendly pre-war (Lincoln having once been McClellan's lawyer) even if the relationship did later sour.

If you're referring to "the snub", it's almost certainly a fabrication by Hay when both those involved were long dead (see Rowland).

Stanton was slightly more respectful and less out to interfere with the president than Hoover was.

I thought it was clear who he was being compared to given Snake's post mentioning Stanton as like Hoover.
 
Yeah. A better measure of greatness - for individuals and groups - is being able to recover from things going to Hell.

Which is also why the Army of Tennessee despite having poorer leadership was the better army to the Army of Northern Virginia.

One would think.

Maryland might happen as badly though. The idea of Marylanders painting to join the Confederacy would excite Beauregard.

Might not have quite so much contempt for McClellan, though.

He wouldn't sit right on the Potomac with one line of retreat to fight the Young Napoleon so it couldn't possibly have done worse.

Who knows, Grant was swanning around on a boat many miles from the field. When he got there he doesn't seem to have done much. However, without a functional command system there was little to do. The only positive thing done all day was Col. Webster making a final fallback position, which seems to have been his own idea.

As to the attack on the second day, Buell commanded it. The forces left to Grant joined in 5 hours later.

On the contrary, General Grant was directly supervising the battle through the entire day, in contrast to General McClellan's supper on the steamship while Fitz-John Porter was defeating Lee in four battles. Porter is the hero of the Seven Days', the Young Napoleon proved himself a piss-poor field leader.

Buell did not command it, he wanted to go back over the Tennessee, it was Grant's plan that went in effect on the second day.

Grant suffered the same fate at Holly Springs, having his supply base knocked out from under him. He responded in the same way. Both were correct.

If he were the caricature-with-the-resemblance-to-the-Zhukov-caricature that people made him out to be he'dve simply slammed on to Vicksburg and lost his army in the process. Instead he cut his offensive short. McClellan would probably have surrendered fearing he faced 13,000,000 Confederates.

Which is a rather odd idea. No matter what frustrations he had McClellan was always polite and respectful to the President and chastised those who publically criticised him. Good job too. They actually liked each other and were friendly pre-war (Lincoln having once been McClellan's lawyer) even if the relationship did later sour.

If you're referring to "the snub", it's almost certainly a fabrication by Hay when both those involved were long dead (see Rowland).

Calling someone the original Gorilla and an incompetent bungling traitor is polite and respectful? :eek:
 
Which is also why the Army of Tennessee despite having poorer leadership was the better army to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Certainly better in this respect.

I'd wager on Cleburne's division over anything, especially Jackson's old division, in the ANV.

No fault of Jackson's, but its a particularly good example of regularly gutted command (not to mention high losses) and that had to hurt.

He wouldn't sit right on the Potomac with one line of retreat to fight the Young Napoleon so it couldn't possibly have done worse.

One would hope not. Or that he'd feel the Army of the Potomac has been so whipped he can launch some grandoise attack on it...

I can see him doing that. I'm not saying he would necessarily do that, but it wouldn't be implausible for someone to write up a scenario where he does.

Same as Lee, for essentially the same reasons. The Confederacy had a severe shortage of generals who were prudent enough to recognize attacks were a bad idea and hard fighting enough to commit to attacks properly when they did strike.

The ANV is not an exception. Hard fighting, yes. Prudent? :D
Right. Tell me another sea story.

In any case, Gettysburg...

...honestly I'd rather not find out on that one. Beauregard's planned alternative fantasy is even worse, but I don't know if he seriously would have tried that.
 
For those of us less familiar with the British in WWII (me), who is Alanbrooke and what does he have to do with this?

There's a theory that seems fairly convincing to me on McClellan that there was a "good McClellan" and a "bad McClellan", and Lincoln tried and failed to help the "good McClellan" become uppermost. I need to find the book that mentions that to give it justice, but it sounded like a pretty fair anaylsis for how McClellan was far from all bad all the time, but had a distinctly...unsympathetic...side.

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1941 to 1946 and was both the pre-eminent British soldier and general of the Second World War and the top strategist in the Allied Camp in Europe. He was responsible for reigning in Churchill's wilder ideas, for picking the top British officers and deciding on the general strategy for the European war - such as stopping the Americans from invading France in 1942, forcing he Mediterranean to be secured before any invasion of Europe was attempted and insisting that the invasion of France was not split between a Northern and Southern invasion.

He is probably the most underapprieciated general of the Allied High Command.

He was relevant to my post because he was Montgomery's advocate. He had been impressed by Monty as a trainer, a professional soldier and by his performance in France and it was Alanbrooke that was responsible for Montgomery's rise to Army Command and further. Alanbrooke, further, was the only man Montgomery always felt he had to be answerable to, was the only man who could berate Montgomery and have any lasting influence, in short, Alanbrooke could control Montgomery where no one else could.

I may have overstated Johnston's influence on McClellan as far as reigning him in but had he remained in the Union he would have been McClellan's advocate in high office. Dont think anyone could reign McClellan in if he went into total egomania. But my point remains that McClellan didn't have someone he felt answerable to, someone who could control him while also supporting his continued presence in the field - he had no Alanbrooke.
 
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1941 to 1946 and was both the pre-eminent British soldier and general of the Second World War and the top strategist in the Allied Camp in Europe. He was responsible for reigning in Churchill's wilder ideas, for picking the top British officers and deciding on the general strategy for the European war - such as stopping the Americans from invading France in 1942, forcing he Mediterranean to be secured before any invasion of Europe was attempted and insisting that the invasion of France was not split between a Northern and Southern invasion.

He is probably the most underapprieciated general of the Allied High Command.

He was relevant to my post because he was Montgomery's advocate. He had been impressed by Monty as a trainer, a professional soldier and by his performance in France and it was Alanbrooke that was responsible for Montgomery's rise to Army Command and further. Alanbrooke, further, was the only man Montgomery always felt he had to be answerable to, was the only man who could berate Montgomery and have any lasting influence, in short, Alanbrooke could control Montgomery where no one else could.

I may have overstated Johnston's influence on McClellan as far as reigning him in but had he remained in the Union he would have been McClellan's advocate in high office. Dont think anyone could reign McClellan in if he went into total egomania. But my point remains that McClellan didn't have someone he felt answerable to, someone who could control him while also supporting his continued presence in the field - he had no Alanbrooke.

Gotcha. And very interesting.

Too bad McClellan saw Lincoln as part of the problem, that might have gone a bit to mitigate things.
 
As Stoker points out in "The Grand Design", Grant essentially followed a variant of McClellan's original plan in 1864.

Actually, what Stoker said on page 60 was “But, executed by someone with a talent for implementation, McClellan’s plan would have stood an excellent chance of success. What Grant proposed for the 1864 campaign echoed parts of McClellan’s 1862 idea. Nonetheless, McClellan, for all his many gifts, lacked the ability to use the army tactically or operationally. The Peninsula Campaign showed this, as did Antietam.”
 
Stoker, "The Grand Design", page 409 - "In the end, McClellan's strategic failure to prosecute the war vigorously protracted it and made escalation nearly inevitable.

A question on terminology: Is the Peninsular Campaign supposed to be considered as distinct from the Seven Days?

According to Stoker.
 
Hell, the British were supplying a larger force than this thousands of miles away a few years earlier.

And where pray tell was this? The total allied forces landed in the Crimea in September 1854 was 67,000 men. (McClellan unfavorably compared their landing and movements with US actions at Veracruz.) Nine months later, the total allied force in the Crimea had risen to 175,000 with only 35,000 of them being British.


And if you do, you will see Stocker does not say what 67th thinks he says.
 
Is that another way of saying "I only read books to confirm my already decided opinions"?

Well, you've certainly been shown to repeatedly incorrectly interpret books in a way that conforms to your already decided opinions. And to repeatedly ignore evidence that shows your already decided opinions are wrong.

If McClellan is guilty of overestimating then Grant is doubly guilty of the same thing.

I'd be interested in seeing your source for this claim.
 
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