WI: George McClellan Secretary of War?

George McClellan was good at organizing and forming an army, but he left a lot to be desired when given a field command. What if Lincoln had chosen to make McClellan his Secretary of War (a position he probably would have been much better suited to) than general-in-cheif? Who would have led the army, would the outcome of the war have been any different without Little Mac leading in the field?
 
McClellan as secretary of war...sufficient to say: He's not qualified. He's not suited to that position any more than to general in chief. Being a Democrat is fine. Being a "loud" and obnoxious Democrat with an attitude towards those who disagreed with him as bad as Stanton if not worse is going to cause trouble.

McClellan is staff material, not policy and not line command.

As for it being different: Depends on who gets the job instead, but almost anyone even vaguely considerable would be at worst no worse than McClellan...and probably more likely to actually attempt to lead the Army of the Potomac to fight the enemy, which on several occasions (the Maryland campaign is a particularly good example - though an alternative to McClellan from the beginning may mean it never happens) would be all to the good.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
McClellan had an ego that made Napoleon look like George Costanza. I can't imagine him doing well in such a position that required tact and diplomatic sensitivity, such as the post of Secretary of War.
 
McClellan had an ego that made Napoleon look like George Costanza. I can't imagine him doing well in such a position that required tact and diplomatic sensitivity, such as the post of Secretary of War.

Once again someone finds a way to say what I meant, but more concisely.

On Mac: When you make Stanton look sensitive, you have problems.
 
George McClellan was good at organizing and forming an army, but he left a lot to be desired when given a field command. What if Lincoln had chosen to make McClellan his Secretary of War (a position he probably would have been much better suited to) than general-in-cheif? Who would have led the army, would the outcome of the war have been any different without Little Mac leading in the field?

According to 67th he was the best field commander ever. So nyah
 
Tact and diplomacy issues aside, I would agree that putting McClellan in a position where he focuses on the big picture instead of being a field commander would have been a great move. The man's genius with logistics is undisputed, and IMO the Peninsular Campaign was the best thought-out offensive of the entire war; if McClellan the field commander hadn't wasted the opportunity created by McClellan the strategist, Richmond might have fallen in 1862.
 
Tact and diplomacy issues aside, I would agree that putting McClellan in a position where he focuses on the big picture instead of being a field commander would have been a great move. The man's genius with logistics is undisputed, and IMO the Peninsular Campaign was the best thought-out offensive of the entire war; if McClellan the field commander hadn't wasted the opportunity created by McClellan the strategist, Richmond might have fallen in 1862.

The man's genius with logistics? We're looking at the man who always and constantly complained he needed more supplies, more men, more everything?

And on the Peninsular Campaign being the best thought out offensive of the war: Grant's final Vicksburg campaign. Tullahoma. Take your pick, but pick one which actually influenced the outcome, please.

I'm not disagreeing with the last sentence, but McClellan's strategic ideas include a plan involving 273,000 men going down the east coast.

Which is...fantastic, in the wrong sense to be a good idea.
 

Wolfpaw

Banned
Don't mean to derail the thread, but the question of a childish, blowhard general becoming SecWar has made me wonder something along the same lines:

What if
Frémont was appointed Secretary of War?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The man's genius with logistics? We're looking at the man who always and constantly complained he needed more supplies, more men, more everything?

Like every general in history? Like Grant standing amidst the shattered remains of his army?

The difference is he didn't get what he asked for and what was needed.

And on the Peninsular Campaign being the best thought out offensive of the war: Grant's final Vicksburg campaign. Tullahoma. Take your pick, but pick one which actually influenced the outcome, please.

Peninsula Campaign it is then.

I'm not disagreeing with the last sentence, but McClellan's strategic ideas include a plan involving 273,000 men going down the east coast.

Which is...fantastic, in the wrong sense to be a good idea.

273,000 of all arms grand aggregate. It's actually a much smaller force by that measure than Grant had in 1864.

Indeed, it's close to what they actually had at the opening of the 1862 campaign season, but much of this force was diverted to protecting Washington etc.
 
I'm breaking with my habit of not responding to 67th Tigers, because this is not something covered often enough to be familiar to the average reader (unless I am mistaken):

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordview.cfm?content=/005/0007

For the main army of operations I urge the following composition:
.
250 regiments of infantry, say ........... 225,000 men

100 field batteries, 600 guns ............ 15,000 men

28 regiments of cavalry ................. 25,500 men

5 regiments engineer troops ............ 7,500 men

---------
Total .................................... 273,000 men


This is not remotely realistic or close to what was done OTL - but of course, for those who thought they never had enough of anything and couldn't move an inch until they got everything, its surprisingly small. I mean, its only over twice as big as the Army of the Potomac at its height.

The suggestions begin on page 5 and end on page 11.

Note how McClellan assumes Johnston has two or three times as many men as he actually did, and that they are far better equipped than they actually were.

Whatever Mac was on, I'm glad Grant wasn't on it. The US managing to lose the war in 1864 because of such calculations would be criminal.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I'm breaking with my habit of not responding to 67th Tigers, because this is not something covered often enough to be familiar to the average reader (unless I am mistaken):

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordview.cfm?content=/005/0007

For the main army of operations I urge the following composition:
.
250 regiments of infantry, say ........... 225,000 men

100 field batteries, 600 guns ............ 15,000 men

28 regiments of cavalry ................. 25,500 men

5 regiments engineer troops ............ 7,500 men

---------
Total .................................... 273,000 men


This is not remotely realistic or close to what was done OTL - but of course, for those who thought they never had enough of anything and couldn't move an inch until they got everything, its surprisingly small. I mean, its only over twice as big as the Army of the Potomac at its height.

The suggestions begin on page 5 and end on page 11.

Note how McClellan assumes Johnston has two or three times as many men as he actually did, and that they are far better equipped than they actually were.

Whatever Mac was on, I'm glad Grant wasn't on it. The US managing to lose the war in 1864 because of such calculations would be criminal.

"I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's country and crush the rebellion in its very heart."

This was an estimate for the entire active force excepting that in the East. The plan was perfectly feasible. The numbers achievable.

As Stoker points out in "The Grand Design", Grant essentially followed a variant of McClellan's original plan in 1864.
 
"I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's country and crush the rebellion in its very heart."

This was an estimate for the entire active force excepting that in the East. The plan was perfectly feasible. The numbers achievable.

As Stoker points out in "The Grand Design", Grant essentially followed a variant of McClellan's original plan in 1864.

The plan was not feasible for "the main army of operations" as one single force. The numbers are easily achievable total, but not as suggested as one army, supplied by water or rail.

And comparing the 1864 campaign to McClellan's suggestion in any but a general sense...yeah, sure. Let's disregard the differences for the sake of calling it a "variant" as if that means it can be very dissimilar but still basically the same idea.

Start with ignoring that Grant aimed to destroy enemy armies and McClellan didn't. Its not as if its a minor difference to most people, but hey.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The plan was not feasible for "the main army of operations" as one single force. The numbers are easily achievable total, but not as suggested as one army, supplied by water or rail.

and yet somehow Napoleon managed this without steamships and locamotives?

Hell, the British were supplying a larger force than this thousands of miles away a few years earlier. I fail to see why Americans couldn't do the same 60 miles from their capital....

And comparing the 1864 campaign to McClellan's suggestion in any but a general sense...yeah, sure. Let's disregard the differences for the sake of calling it a "variant" as if that means it can be very dissimilar but still basically the same idea.

Yeah.....

Read Stoker; http://www.amazon.com/Grand-Design-Strategy-U-S-Civil/dp/0195373057
 
and yet somehow Napoleon managed this without steamships and locamotives?

Napoleon, who could confiscate anything necessary, vs. a democratic government...looks very similar.

Hell, the British were supplying a larger force than this thousands of miles away a few years earlier. I fail to see why Americans couldn't do the same 60 miles from their capital....

A larger force as one army? Source?

Well, you're usually good at seeing any way the US is a bunch of 98 pound weaklings. Does the fact McClellan is suggesting it make it realistic?


Too many books to read, not enough time for books that can't distinguish between Grant and McClellan except to praise the latter.
 
For those blaming McClellan for failing to act, should we really be blaming Pinkerton instead?
 
For those blaming McClellan for failing to act, should we really be blaming Pinkerton instead?

No. McClellan chose to trust that he (Pinkerton) knew what he was doing, made little effective use of his cavalry, and...

The real point is not whether McClellan thought he was facing a hundred thousand men at Antietam. The problem is that McClellan fought to avoid losing rather than to win. There always has to be every possible precaution against losing and if that means there's nothing left over to see it through to victory, well, at least the dastardly Republicans weren't able to destroy the army this time thanks to my (McClellan's) care and effort.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Napoleon, who could confiscate anything necessary, vs. a democratic government...looks very similar.

Napoleon still had to pay for things, just like the USG. It's just the USG objected to spending the money necessary to win.

Well, you're usually good at seeing any way the US is a bunch of 98 pound weaklings. Does the fact McClellan is suggesting it make it realistic?

Hardly on either point.

Too many books to read, not enough time for books that can't distinguish between Grant and McClellan except to praise the latter.

Is that another way of saying "I only read books to confirm my already decided opinions"?

No. McClellan chose to trust that he (Pinkerton) knew what he was doing, made little effective use of his cavalry, and...

Dangerous ground here. If McClellan is guilty of overestimating then Grant is doubly guilty of the same thing.
 
Although i do wish to remain on the sidelines, because my knowledge of the ACW is limited, yet still competant, is this going to turn into another 67 vs everyone thing?

Do we need popcorn because these are very interesting.
 
Basically George McClellan had the same kind of personality defect Bernard Montgomery had in that the higher up in the chain of command he got the more of a difficult and unlikable a person he became on a personal level. Such character defect could be overlooked in the field if he secured success and had an advocate in high office who could control him but would not make him suitable for any position in government.

Unfortunately for McClellan in OTL he didn't have his own Alanbrooke. Ironically McClellan's Alanbrooke was Joe Johnston.
 
Napoleon still had to pay for things, just like the USG. It's just the USG objected to spending the money necessary to win.

:rolleyes: Yeah, the only possible reason is that the USG failed to see the vision of the Young Napoleon. It couldn't possibly be an unreasonable plan.

Hardly on either point.
Then why do your arguments tend to look like that? And why does this plan count as reasonable for the United States government again?

Is that another way of saying "I only read books to confirm my already decided opinions"?
No. Its saying that the description of McClellan in Williams is more convincing as an account of what kind of general he was than that found by those who either portray him as an utterly worthless turd or those who think he was the savior of the Union.

Dangerous ground here. If McClellan is guilty of overestimating then Grant is doubly guilty of the same thing.
Show one example in the OR (with a link, not just a quote) where Grant overestimates as two or three times as strong as they actually were and uses that as a reason not to attack any time soon.

Just one. If you can do that, I'll seriously consider getting Stoker's book.


Basically George McClellan had the same kind of personality defect Bernard Montgomery had in that the higher up in the chain of command he got the more of a difficult and unlikable a person he became on a personal level. Such character defect could be overlooked in the field if he secured success and had an advocate in high office who could control him but would not make him suitable for any position in government.

Unfortunately for McClellan in OTL he didn't have his own Alanbrooke. Ironically McClellan's Alanbrooke was Joe Johnston.

For those of us less familiar with the British in WWII (me), who is Alanbrooke and what does he have to do with this?

There's a theory that seems fairly convincing to me on McClellan that there was a "good McClellan" and a "bad McClellan", and Lincoln tried and failed to help the "good McClellan" become uppermost. I need to find the book that mentions that to give it justice, but it sounded like a pretty fair anaylsis for how McClellan was far from all bad all the time, but had a distinctly...unsympathetic...side.
 
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