WI General Mark Clark Captured Before Operation Torch?

NoOneFamous said:
The breakout from Anzio cuts off the retreating German forces and Rome falls sooner.
You mean Rome falls later, don't you? Since Clark doesn't change the orders, the breakout is sooner (the day of the landing?), & 5th Army (or VI {?} Corps) doesn't simply drive north to claim the glory of liberating Rome.
 
True, however the Germans will lose the best part of an Army IIRC so that could make the post-Rome situation rather interesting.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The breakout from Anzio cuts off the retreating German forces and Rome falls sooner.

Thanks to the disruption of Operation Torch, to say nothing of the compromise of Ultra, the overall war situation by 1944 would be completely different and this situation would never have arisen.
 
Have you considered that Clark getting captured might have been the idea? Eisenhower had enough incompetent subordinates to deal with already. ;)
 
DoomBunny said:
Have you considered that Clark getting captured might have been the idea? Eisenhower had enough incompetent subordinates to deal with already. ;)
LOL.:D:D

That's a man cut out to be PotUS, for sure.:p
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
What would Germany have done if it had received firm proof that Enigma had been compromised? Would they have had to keep using Enigma in the short run or would there be an immediate fix to the problem?
 
Anaxagoras said:
What would Germany have done if it had received firm proof that Enigma had been compromised? Would they have had to keep using Enigma in the short run or would there be an immediate fix to the problem?
IIRC, they got that when Automedon was captured by Atlantis, & simply went looking for a spy. They refused to believe the Brits could continue to break it.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
IIRC, they got that when Automedon was captured by Atlantis, & simply went looking for a spy. They refused to believe the Brits could continue to break it.

I know, but what if they did conclude it had been broken? What would they have done in response?
 
Re: Enigma

Being Briefed on ULTRA did not include the details of how the Enigma decrypts worked. Clark only understood valuable intellegence came from reading high level German radio traffic, but not on the workings of Beltechy Park and the Bombe decryption machines.

The Germans never discounted the idea Enigma could be 'broken'. What they did not understand were two things: 1. The Poles had managed to find the actual mathmatical basis of the machines function, & in doing so discovered the number of combinations on the rotors were actually far less than the manufactor and German radio security people calculated.

2. The Poles had contrived a machine basis for rapidly finding the Enigma keys or rotor settings.

The Germans thought that by traditional methods the key or rotor setting could be found for a specific message. But, traditional methods would have to sift through billions of combinations. Once the key was found for a message it was only good for that or a few other messages. The Germans did eventually suspect rapid methods were in use, but they did not understand how rapid. They thought that adding rotors, the Stecker Board, and better operator procedures were sufficient to stay ahead any enemy efforts.

Bottom line here is if they learn from Clark the Enigma encrypted messages are being read they would only thighten procedures, add another rotor, or maybe make the Stecker board more complex. That could shut the Allies out of the Enigma messages for a few months, but that happened several times during the war and proved not to be a severe handicap. Alternatives to the Enigma machine were not in easy reach in 1942, plus replacing the thousands of machines in use would be a colossal logistics task. Germany had nothing like the NCR or IBM factories for mass producing those numbers in a few months.
 
Have you considered that Clark getting captured might have been the idea? Eisenhower had enough incompetent subordinates to deal with already. ;)

No, not thought that at all. Clarks reputation as incompetent came later after much of the Italian campaign. During his previous career in the Army Clark had established a solid reputation as a top notch leader, small unit commander, and staff officer. His performance evaluations as company, and battalion command placed him in the top 10% of his peers. He did well in the Army schools scoring high in his classes. When staff positions were open he was selected for slots in key combat units, not camp administration or similar sidline positions. In 1939/40 while division operations officer Clark was tasked with planning and organizing the first major amphibious exercise the US Army had participated in since 1928. This was a high profile operation under scrutiny of senior officers from the division commander all the way up through Corps and up to the Army staff in Washington DC. Clarks performance in this was praised by both the exercise evaluators and others who came to watch. After leaving the division Clark was run through a number of other high profile staff positions where he was handed a series of tough planning assignments, including the peperations for Op. Torch, support of US II Corps in Tunisia, and planning for Op Husky. In all that his performance was judged superior. Along the way Clarks superiors, including Eisenhower, dismissed or replaced many other officers who were not cutting it, so it was not like they were soft on their subordinates and staff. Up until the Italian campaign Clark had a reputation as a highly capable Army officer.
 
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