WI: General Abraham Lincoln

Bit of a curious inversion - how would Abraham Lincoln have done during the Civil War had he been not Commander in Chief but just another political general fighting in the war?

Let's take as our POD that Seward gets nominated in 1860 and still wins the election (if he wins NY and all the states Lincoln won by reasonable margins, he can't exactly lose).

John Wentworth gets the VP spot, or some other western former Democrat - Seward declines to put Lincoln in the cabinet (Lincoln's own cabinet of opponents was rather atypical) - and the former Rep. and would-be President is left sitting around with very little to do when the Civil War starts.

At some point in the war, Seward ends up short on political capital and prevails on his former rival to accept a military appointment "for the good of the country" - and there is at the least a significant chance of Lincoln accepting.

When/where/to what is he likely to be appointed, and how does he do as a military officer?

It needs to be noted that the vast majority of political generals were terrible, especially those who were immediately given large independent commands. That said, people like Richard Taylor and John C. Breckenridge started out in subordinate roles and gradually became quite competent - and neither man had any prior combat experience.

Any thoughts on where a General Lincoln might fall on the spectrum?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Any thoughts on where a General Lincoln might fall on the spectrum?
I don't think he'd do very well, to be honest - he seemed to prefer "action" (meaning assaults, close-in fighting, casualties preferable) to manoeuvring or properly sorting out supply and training, and that's not really a situation that would result in someone getting a good reputation. Specifically I'm thinking of his statement about Fredericksburg:

".. if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."

In reality, that would have resulted in the total extinction of the Army of the Potomac with Lee's army still being in reasonable strength - the relative casualty rate was astonishingly bad the first time around, and if you keep doing it in Lanchester simulation the army dies out by about the fifth iteration IIRC.
It's not likely to get that far, but only because the army's morale is going to be pathetically bad by the third bloody assault.



Something else to consider, though, is whether President Seward results in more secession than President Lincoln. He was considered a hardliner compared to Lincoln!
 
Something else to consider, though, is whether President Seward results in more secession than President Lincoln. He was considered a hardliner compared to Lincoln!

Maybe, maybe not, considering Seward also wanted to abandon Ft. Sumter instead of resupplying it, in which case the whole course of secession goes pear-shaped.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
Maybe, maybe not, considering Seward also wanted to abandon Ft. Sumter instead of resupplying it, in which case the whole course of secession goes pear-shaped.
What I mean is that the South considered him someone with a "proven" desire to force emancipation. That might lead to second-wave secessions earlier than OTL, for example, and if Maryland shows signs of going then the Union has to resort to military force or lose their capital...
 
I don't think he'd do very well, to be honest - he seemed to prefer "action" (meaning assaults, close-in fighting, casualties preferable) to manoeuvring or properly sorting out supply and training, and that's not really a situation that would result in someone getting a good reputation.

Lincoln did prefer action, but not your definition of action as "assaults, close-in fighting, casualties preferable". Lincoln understood that unneeded delays cost money and lives (more men died from disease than combat in the Civil War), as well as increasing war weariness and the chance that the Confederacy might be formally recognized. Lincoln did not always understand when delays were necessary, but his generals were often poor at explaining those reasons.

Lincoln had a major advantage over most political generals on both sides, he knew he was an amateur. Like he did when McClellan was down with typhoid, I'd expect Lincoln to study any military works he could get his hands on. Lincoln also understood the need of a proper staff, as shown by his OTL Cabinet, so any deficiencies he might have in supply or training would be compensated for, plus Lincoln would learn from those subordinates. Lincoln's Cabinet shows he had a good eye for organizational talent and an excellent ability to get people to work together, a couple areas where many political generals failed. Fort Stephens shows a high level of physical courage, which would impress his troops. Lincoln also saw how to use the Union's advantages to overcome the Confederate's advantages, a level of strategic insight that escaped most generals. There's a good chance General Lincoln would be weak tactically, since he liked to take his time on decisions. OTOH, when he did reach a decision, Lincoln was both determined on reaching his goal and flexible on his methods. Like Sherman, Lincoln would probably be a lot better on the operational and strategic levels.

Specifically I'm thinking of his statement about Fredericksburg:

".. if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."

In reality, that would have resulted in the total extinction of the Army of the Potomac with Lee's army still being in reasonable strength - the relative casualty rate was astonishingly bad the first time around, and if you keep doing it in Lanchester simulation the army dies out by about the fifth iteration IIRC.
It's not likely to get that far, but only because the army's morale is going to be pathetically bad by the third bloody assault.

That was the wrong battle for Lincoln to pick as an example, but you are missing Lincoln's larger points. The first is that even with higher Union casualty rates from having to take the offensive, attrition would exhaust the Confederacy first. The second is that even lost battles would bring the Union closer to winning the war. The third is that disease was the biggest killer of the war - 5 men died of disease for every 3 men killed by the enemy. The Union lost about 1300 men killed at Fredericksburg, but they were losing about 4700 men every month to disease. A week of Fredericksburgs would cost the Union about 9000 dead, less than they would lose to disease in two months, let alone the year Lincoln used in his example.

Something else to consider, though, is whether President Seward results in more secession than President Lincoln. He was considered a hardliner compared to Lincoln!

That is a possibility.
 
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