WI: french victory at Crécy (1346)

The Battle of Crécy was one of the first major battles of the Hundred Years' War, fought in northeastern France. Edward III of England's army, composed of english soldiers and some german mercenaries, managed to defeat the numerically superior french army led by Philip VI. The battle saw the start of the decline of the knight+crossbow combination in comparison with the more successful longbow.
But what if the french army had won the battle? I hear that Philip was advised to rest in the first day instead of attacking straight up, but he declined (by pressure of other noble commanders) and did so anyway, so that could be a PoD. There's another PoD in the constable of France, Raoul II, not being captured by the english.
-How would such a victory affect military technological/tactical development? Would the knight+crossbow combo end up being seen as better than the longbow?
-What are the immediate effects on the Hundred Years' War? Can the french recapture Calais? Is such a battle capable of ending the war outright instead of dragging it through a century or are the english kings too greedy for the french throne?
-What happens to Philip VI?
 
The cavalry+crossbow combo never overcame the longbow.

Just consider the french victories (be it at Paray or earlier under de Guesclin and Clisson) or quasi-victories (Verneuil were cavalry with milanese armors technically neutralized the longbow) in the hundred years war, and you will see it was tactics and quality of command and of execution of orders that were more decisive than weapons combo.

The longbow was overcome only when the cannon was improved enough. And this did not happen before the mid 1430's.
 

longsword14

Banned
The cavalry+crossbow combo never overcame the longbow.

Just consider the french victories (be it at Paray or earlier under de Guesclin and Clisson) or quasi-victories (Verneuil were cavalry with milanese armors technically neutralized the longbow) in the hundred years war, and you will see it was tactics and quality of command and of execution of orders that were more decisive than weapons combo.

The longbow was overcome only when the cannon was improved enough. And this did not happen before the mid 1430's.
You need proper coordination and the sense to force battles in such a manner that you are not the one attacking tactically. Longbows are a peripheral thing.
People keep on repeating about bow abilities (especially longbow before guns), yet nobody in their right minds would give archers an easy victory if it were the Swiss from the Burgundian Wars attacking.
Bows are not firearms, they do not create enough shock quickly.
 
There is a myth about longbows. Their velocity is about 40 m/s. A crossbow is about 80 m/s. A "haquebut" or "handgun" is about 180 m/s during the 1420's when the "blackpowder cake" is invented. Thus a haquebut could litterally tear up a milanese plate armour at 50 meters. The longbow is very efficient against chainmails, not against a steel breastplate, except at very close range. The problem wasn't the vulnerability of the men-at-arms during a cavalry charge, it was the vulnerability of the horses who only began to enjoy significant protections in the 1400's. That's why the calvary charges at Crécy and Agincourt were such a disaster. Horses are wounded or panic, many fall, the confusion is total, the cavalry unit loses its cohesion, men are trampled by mad horses. English men-at-arms arrive on foot and slaughter the survivors.
To win at Crécy is simple: let the genoese crossbowmen have their bulwarks. Like a shield wall. Shoot and advance until you're at very close range. Then a infantry charge to keep the pressure on the English center. Then cavalry charges on the English left flank, which wasn't protected by a village or a dense wood (unlike the right flank).
The Longbow wasn't the reason of the English victory at Crécy. It was an incredibly bad battle plan which cost the French the victory. Basically it was frontal cavalry charges again and again... Without letting the genoese crossbowmen the time to retreat or step aside! Which, as a consequence, led the french cavalrymen to trample their own men, which in return gave the English arches the time to shoot their volleys, adding further chaos to an already chaotic situation. Have Philippe VI being less stupid (which is asking A LOT btw) and accept a more cautious battleplan. Victory is then assured
 
here is a map to show you how the french battleplan just SUCKED
Bataille_de_Crécy_26_août_1346.png
 

longsword14

Banned
When one has cavalry and is in one's own home, use it ! Why let the other side consolidate there position ? To prevent cavalry from being dangerous stakes and pits were dug in.
Rapid marching attack columns of men at arms mixed with mounted support could have intercepted any army marching deep into France. Crossbowmen cannot shoot enough to kill an enemy very quickly but it is not the point of missile troops in the middle ages.
All that said, a heavily defended block of men will be hard to get at anyway, but to do it with cavalry? Was it not conventional wisdom that whoever moves first (infantry on infantry) loses?

Why attack anyway? Harry the men marching at every point and kill stragglers, block crossings and flank roads. Forcing the enemy to spread itself is the sensible thing to do, Edward had this problem with finances which forced him to work in a narrow time frame. This is why English armies started burning and killing areas to force the French to a fight. Du Guesclin showed the proper method to fight, where small rapid attacks did much to grind the army away.
 
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When one has cavalry and is in one's own home, use it ! Why let the other side consolidate there position ? To prevent cavalry from being dangerous stakes and pits were dug in.
Rapid marching attack columns of men at arms mixed with mounted support could have intercepted any army marching deep into France. Crossbowmen cannot shoot enough to kill an enemy very quickly but it is not the point of missile troops in the middle ages.
All that said, a heavily defended block of men will be hard to get at anyway, but to do it with cavalry? Was it not conventional wisdom that whoever moves first (infantry on infantry) loses?

Why attack anyway? Harry the men marching at every point and kill stragglers, block crossings and flank roads. Forcing the enemy to spread itself is the sensible thing to do, Edward had this problem with finances which forced him to work in a narrow time frame. This is why English armies started burning and killing areas to force the French to a fight. Du Guesclin showed the proper method to fight, where small rapid attacks did much to grind the army away.
While everything you say is logical and make sense, you have to know that the mentality of the first XIVth century wasn't the same about tactics and strategy. First, the cavalry at Poitiers was a heavy cavalry, the vast majority of the men coming from the nobility. That's not light cavalry: not the same equipment, not the same training or mission/mentality.
So harrassing the ennemy wasn't their job and they were probably not good at it.
Second, you're last paragraph is describing at strategy used in the 1370's, not in 1346. Du Guesclin was an exceptional man in the way that he had a "flexible mind": he didn't care about the military thinking of his time: he wanted results, no matter the methods. Thus his capacity to train his men-at-arms as a force able to be mobile and to conduct guerilla warfare, harrassing the ennemy like a light cavalry force. Charles V supported him and supported his strategy but you have to know that this strategy WAS NOT POPULAR during the 1370's-1380's. This strategy was called the "shell strategy". You fortify the cities, use a scortched-earth policy, let the english army wander without supplies in the country while in the same using harassment tactics with Du Guesclin and his fellows to maximize the losses of the English. Once the English were forced to perform an unglorious retreat, then you send Du Guesclin to retake the cities which had been taken. It's effective but not glamorous. Even after Crécy and Agincourt, there was a good part of the population and nobility who denounced the King's strategy (because letting an army wandering in the country and destroying the recolts is a costly strategy for the common people and was perceived as a cowardly act).
So there is no chance that in 1346, when the war has just begun, that Philippe VI accepts to lead that kind of war. The best that he can do is to apply the boucicaut plan of 1415 which, for knights of the 1340's, constituted an acceptable option (encirclement and destruction was the 1415 plan) . Again, culture and ethos matter in military history.
 

longsword14

Banned
@jeandebueil
Maybe I went too far, but the thrust of my argument was that instead of just concentrating on the final stage of war,i.e the battle itself, something more could have definitely been done, as in forcing the enemy to move in certain ways (nothing as extreme as the shell strategy, which cannot be justified in the early stages of the conflict).
 
@jeandebueil
Maybe I went too far, but the thrust of my argument was that instead of just concentrating on the final stage of war,i.e the battle itself, something more could have definitely been done, as in forcing the enemy to move in certain ways (nothing as extreme as the shell strategy, which cannot be justified in the early stages of the conflict).
Indeed. In a sense, Philippe VI could have followed the Poitiers strategy of 1356 (per se not a bad one): to pursue and encircle the enemy.
 
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