WI: French tactical victory at Dien Bien Phu

I know a victory at OTL Dien Bien Phu is next to impossible, but hear me out.

Say the French are smart enough to fortify on a hill or plateau rather than valley, still deep in Tonkin near the border with Laos, with the intent to draw the Vietminh into a pitched battle.

Now say that the Vietminh still attack. The French can provide counter-battery fire, but are still facing way more enemy artillery fire than they bargained for. The Vietminh will still cut the supply lines and hit aerial supply drops with antiaircraft, making the base difficult to resupply.

But the French are fighting from the high ground, and can use their artillery, so they hold. They take heavy loses, but the Vietminh suffer much more than in OTL, before being finally deciding to detach. So the French have a tactical, costly, far from decisive victory, and the Vietminh have a bitter defeat.
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How does such a scenario effect the war in Indochina and the peace talks? The French were still looking for a way out, but in this way they would have a better negotiating position, so how might it change things?
 
One might argue Dien Bien Phu was a tactical victory but a strategic defeat.

Its goal was to draw the vietminh into a pitched battle, that succeeded.
The goal was to get the main fighting away from Hué and Hanoi. That succeeded.
The goal was to deplete Vietminh forces through attrition, that succeeded.

It was a tactical victory and the military thought to continue the war after. But, since there were some well known problems (protection forts being out of range from each other, thus not being able to offer supportive fire) and the fact the conference was going on at the exact same time (a stupid move from the French), there was a huge psychological backlash.

Interestingly enough, that allowed the rise of a very French "stab in the back" myth among the militaries, directly leading to the... unfortunate events of Algeria
 
The French can't win in Vietnam. If they had a tactical victory there, there would be a defeat somewhere else after a little while.
 
I know a victory at OTL Dien Bien Phu is next to impossible, but hear me out.

Say the French are smart enough to fortify on a hill or plateau rather than valley, still deep in Tonkin near the border with Laos, with the intent to draw the Vietminh into a pitched battle.

Now say that the Vietminh still attack. The French can provide counter-battery fire, but are still facing way more enemy artillery fire than they bargained for. The Vietminh will still cut the supply lines and hit aerial supply drops with antiaircraft, making the base difficult to resupply.

But the French are fighting from the high ground, and can use their artillery, so they hold. They take heavy loses, but the Vietminh suffer much more than in OTL, before being finally deciding to detach. So the French have a tactical, costly, far from decisive victory, and the Vietminh have a bitter defeat.
-
How does such a scenario effect the war in Indochina and the peace talks? The French were still looking for a way out, but in this way they would have a better negotiating position, so how might it change things?

If I remember "Hell in a Very Small Place" correctly there were plans to, as it was phrased "Get Dien Bien Phu out of the mud" - Since the strong-points were in seasonal swamps - that also moved the southern artillery strong-point "Isabelle" a bit closer so it could provide fire support for the northern strong-points like 'Beatrice'.

That would mean the bunkers and trenches not being underground in a swamp and better fire support, so maybe the Viet Minh quit when casualties get beyond a certain point with no victory in sight. It had happened before at other airheads, which is where the idea for fortifying this particular valley came from.

Anyway effects? It depends on IF the French learn the lesson that their enemy is getting larger, better organised and better equipped a lot faster than they can. Also that they nearly LOST! With the conference starting a newly victorious (?) but newly realistic France might decide to go the way Britain eventually did in Malaya, and let the non-communist nationalists create independent nation(s) that are members of an organisation like the British Commonwealth.

The French already had such a structure, called the French Union, but they kept undermining it by being arrogant prats. If the near disaster at Dien Bien Phu gets through to the brass/politicians that the alternative is the communists taking over and nationalising all their investments then they might change policy. There would have to be a serious effort to minimise corruption etc but it might work.

How this would affect Algeria and the long bloody war that started almost as soon as Indochina ended?

Algeria was NOT a colony from the French perspective, it was an overseas Department of France, like Hawaii is an American state. If an independence movement in Hawaii turned violent the US would be highly unlikely to immediately agree that considering it part of the USA was evil colonialism and pull out.

The analogy might look odd from the 2015 perspective, but this is 1954 French politicians and Generals we are talking about. They grew up with Algiers being an somewhat exotic part of France, a different outcome in Indochina will not necessarily change policy. I can't see Algerian nationalists giving up, so it will still be ugly.
 
The analogy might look odd from the 2015 perspective, but this is 1954 French politicians and Generals we are talking about. They grew up with Algiers being an somewhat exotic part of France, a different outcome in Indochina will not necessarily change policy. I can't see Algerian nationalists giving up, so it will still be ugly.

I would disagree with you, or at least I'll say it won't get ugly as fast.

Until the mid-50's, the FLN and other groups in Algeria were for the autonomy, or at least equal rights. It was the independance of Indochine that showed that independance WAS possible.

On the other side, if there is no defeat in Indochine, then the military don't feel like they have to prove their worth and be a counter power against a traitor government. With two defeats in a decade, French military brass were getting rather itchy which led to a brutal response in Algeria.
 
I would disagree with you, or at least I'll say it won't get ugly as fast.

Until the mid-50's, the FLN and other groups in Algeria were for the autonomy, or at least equal rights. It was the independance of Indochine that showed that independance WAS possible.

On the other side, if there is no defeat in Indochine, then the military don't feel like they have to prove their worth and be a counter power against a traitor government. With two defeats in a decade, French military brass were getting rather itchy which led to a brutal response in Algeria.

A sane and rational response leading to peaceful change!

What a novel idea!

Your reasoning seems sound. It would also change mainland French politics, since the Algerian war led to two military coup attempts and De Gaulle coming back as saviour of France allowed to rewrite the constitution. Then there is the knock on effects like the lack of a war leading to different government spending and taxing, people who would have been fighting the war doing other stuff instead...

Honestly I don't know enough of the details to get deeper into those issues. Any thoughts?
 
Eeeeh, I don't know the IVth Republic enough. The general idea is that it was highly unstable which cabinets changing very often but I think that may be Gaullist propaganda and post-act analysis. The IIIrd also had fast changing cabinet and it didn't hurt that much.
Even the Vth has some big changes relatively often. But I digress.

There would be troubles at some point. Algeria WAS France and had a large population. It was also strategically important, at a time when the threat of European war wasn't far fetched at all (including against the British).

Arabs were gonna face big resistance against any movement for more rights, they did try before and you can only continue for so long.

There are so many butterflies here. The Indian colonies left in 57. If there hasn't been a major defeat in Indochine, they might stay longer, or France might be willing to negotiate.
If there is no violent Indochine independance then there's no de Gaulle as you pointed out. Even push it by a few years, he might be too old. That means a different relation with the States, France part of NATO, maybe no reliance on nuclear power and spatial power, which in turn has vast implication on a European level. As far as I know, France is the only country in Europe who has the land to launch space missions (in Guyane).


Eeeeeh, what else. If there's no Algerian independance there's no African independance but rather autonomy (even Gabon wanted to become a département). But I digress, I digress.

What would happen for Indochine? The French can't stay there, there's no way around it, they have to not be direct administrators anymore. However we could see some return to a light protectorate, which would set a big precedent.
 
There are so many butterflies here. The Indian colonies left in 57. If there hasn't been a major defeat in Indochine, they might stay longer, or France might be willing to negotiate.

Without Indochina, the Indian trading posts will have to go. They are really tiny and their only strategic value was as stepping stones to Indochina. Well, that and trade with India, but keeping them would actually hurt a lot the relations with India. (Of course IOTL the Suez affair made keeping them even difficult!).
 
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If there is no violent Indochine independance then there's no de Gaulle as you pointed out.

I think you mean Algerian

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Even push it by a few years, he might be too old. That means a different relation with the States, France part of NATO,

France never left NATO. It left NATO united military command. There is a difference. US government decided to relocate their troops and infrastructure when told they would have to pay if they wanted to stay.

E
maybe no reliance on nuclear power and spatial power, which in turn has vast implication on a European level.

Nuclear depends on whether there is a Suez ITTL or not, France nuclear power was not initiated by De Gaulle, even if he was in power when it came bore fruits.

Spatial? WHy? If anything, no or delayed Algerian independence means French Space program goes faster than OTL, as they do not lose their first launch center in Hammaguir.


E
As far as I know, France is the only country in Europe who has the land to launch space missions (in Guyane).

It depends what you want. CSG is nearly ideally located from an orbital mechanics PoV and being on the coast (only alcantara is maginally better). However, if you accept some disadvantage you can launch from higher lattitudes (e.g. Kenedy Baikonour or Plesetsk). OTL, Italy launched from Malindi (in Kenya) and UK from Australia.

If necessary, Ascension island has about the same advantages as Kourou.
 
fhaessig said:
I think you mean Algerian
Nope, I meant de Gaulle come back in '58, should have precised :)

fhaessig said:
France never left NATO. It left NATO united military command. There is a difference. US government decided to relocate their troops and infrastructure when told they would have to pay if they wanted to stay.
Still, the symbolic here stands, it was a slap in the face of the American, a show of force.

fhaessig said:
Nuclear depends on whether there is a Suez ITTL or not, France nuclear power was not initiated by De Gaulle, even if he was in power when it came bore fruits.
Maybe I misunderstood but I always learned the nuclear program was a huge part of de Gaulle's program to reclaim French glory. After rechecking, it seems like the French nuclear program was started by de Gaulle's post-war administration and then accelerated when he came back.

fhaessig said:
Spatial? WHy? If anything, no or delayed Algerian independence means French Space program goes faster than OTL, as they do not lose their first launch center in Hammaguir.
I did not know that, thanks for the info!
 
It's a Stretch

It would be a stretch to happen, everything the French assumed and planned would have to work correctly. There were signs that the Viet-Minh were having major morale problems in mid-April and if not for the earlier successes may have given up the ghost.

NORGCO is correct, getting the French out of the swamplands would be a major plus. Probably too late to move Isabelle, but as an old artilleryman, selecting that position is about the stupidest thing I can think of. And spending all the time and effort to build an auxiliary airstrip when the first one wasn't overloaded. Duh!!!

Here is a list of things that could make a difference:
1. The biggest thing is getting both Navarre and Cogny to realize the decisive battle for Indochina was occurring in Dien Bien Phu; not in Annam, where Navarre was obsessed with Operation Atlante, nor the Red River Delta, Cogny's hot-button.
2. Navarre needed to decide around 10-15 December that DBP was the decisive battle and focused everything on reinforcing the position. Once that decision was made, Cogny as the Northern theater commander needed to execute or get replaced.
3. Swapping out the battalions that were demoralized before the battle is a major gotta do. The two T'ai battalions and the independent companies were about 2500 mouths to feed and probably only 300-500 ended up fighting. Swapping them out for 2 or 3 good battalions gives you more combat power and less mouths to feed.
4. Bring in more tanks, as many as you can.
5. Provide more crew served weapons, especially automatic weapons to the French units. Some French battalions only had 4 light machine guns and 12-28 automatic rifles (BAR equivalents). By comparison, US Infantry battalion of that period had 24 LMGs and about 45 BARs while a USMC Infantry battalions had 36 LMGs and 81 BARs. Talk about a firepower difference.
6. Make sure the units are up to strength before 13 March; 3/13 DBLE was probably 200 personnel short when attacked at Beatrice. That's really tough to do with the French personnel policies; it probably would have been better for them to have fewer battalions overall but the ones the remained would be much more capable.

Do these things and the French might have had a chance to hold until a ceasefire.

Read "The Last Valley" and "Hell in a Very Small Place"; both are excellent.
 
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