WI: Franco-Prussian War becomes Absolute?

TFSmith121

Banned
As was said "Europe had lost a mistress and gained a master"

Without a spring campaign, it's just a question of degree when they sue for peace. When the French ask for terms, demand an indemnity of ten billion francs instead of five, permanent military reduction, turning over colonies, etc. The peace the Germans got was certainly less than ideal, making a war of revenge on two fronts inevitable without qualitatively limiting France's war-making capacity. What's the absolute most the Germans can get away with? If the war continues 4 months after OTL armistice, do the foreign powers intervene? etc

As was said "Europe had lost a mistress and gained a master" ... so possibly, yes.

Remember, although the Three Emperor's League was formed in 1873, as soon as the 1875 "war in sight" crisis the British and Russians protested, and the Germans recognized as strong as they were, they weren't that strong, which is what led to the next stage, the permanent alliance system in the 1880s, and even that did not lead to war until a quarter century later and an entirely different generation.

Given that Wilhelm I, Fritz, and Bismarck were content with the results of 1871, my takeaway is they got everything they reasonably thought was possible.

Best,
 
If they're not stupid, they'll remember how skilled the Prussians were at rapid deployment via railways from the last war, and this time they won't have the benefit of allying with most of the German Confederation. Since the new Republican armies were pretty much tapped, and much of the fighting was being done by partisans, mobilization by foreign powers just means the Germans can torch the place and shuttle back east, where they can rely on their superior officer corps, staff organization, and industrial capacity to keep Austria or Russia (I really doubt both, unless you have a smoking gun) at bay.


People are not stupid so they are going to note that the Prussian and other German field armies are in France well away from their railheads. It takes time to turn around and march back...and oh wait that means withdrawing troops from your campaign in France...well that is awkward.

Then we have the problem that war stocks have been depleted by months of actual shooting and most of the war stocks that are available have been forward deployed to be available to the field armies...so they are in the wrong place for campaigns in East Prussia and Silesia and Bavaria and Saxony etc.

So basically you have a mad scramble to withdraw the Heer, enough to make a difference but not enough so that you lose in France...oh wait does not the Prussian doctrine of operations require overwhelming force? Shame that overwhelming force ratio is simply unavailable as you have pissed off both the Russians and the Austrians if not more powers besides.

Well maybe the landwehr will hold them off for long enough...maybe.

The biggest flaw in your plan though is that it is clear to everyone even without you stating the reason that the aim is to take France off the board so Prussia/Germany can go after its next victim more easily.

You may really think that the rest of Europe will wait patiently like sheep to be slaughtered but no one who has studied the time period does.
 
So basically you have a mad scramble to withdraw the Heer, enough to make a difference but not enough so that you lose in France...oh wait does not the Prussian doctrine of operations require overwhelming force? Shame that overwhelming force ratio is simply unavailable as you have pissed off both the Russians and the Austrians if not more powers besides.

Well maybe the landwehr will hold them off for long enough...maybe.
The Russians had a prewar agreement with the Germans that they would invade Galicia with 300,000 men if Austria mobilized in support of France, because the two had a long term rivalry the Russians were looking to settle. Germany and Russia have a common enemy, but different ambitions, which makes them good allies. Austria risks a three front war and immediate destruction if they attack Silesia; the Italians will nab Dalmatia and the Russians Galicia while they're fighting the Prussians again, not to mention any internal uprisings by opportunistic ethnic nationalists.

The Germans aren't in danger of losing in France; by this point (risking foreign intervention) they've achieved their objectives of unifying Germany and effectively disarming France. If the Austrians really want to go for it, the Germans can hold the border against Republican rabble with minimal forces, while letting their reserve forces in Germany hold off the Austrians until the main body shows up shortly after the Austrians complete mobilization.

The biggest flaw in your plan though is that it is clear to everyone even without you stating the reason that the aim is to take France off the board so Prussia/Germany can go after its next victim more easily.

You may really think that the rest of Europe will wait patiently like sheep to be slaughtered but no one who has studied the time period does.

No, I think the rest of Europe will seize the chance to destroy their rivals if given the opportunity, which is why the not-stupid statesmen will not give them the opportunity. Austria's best interest is not risking their five hundred year imperial enterprise in an opportunistic war of revenge, it's investing in strengthening its own state by reforming their military and education systems. Germany's ambitions of an overseas colonial empire don't contradict Austria's aims of Balkan hegemony, and their dreams of Grossdeutchland were shelved when the South German states supported the war with France.
 
No, I think the rest of Europe will seize the chance to destroy their rivals if given the opportunity, which is why the not-stupid statesmen will not give them the opportunity. Austria's best interest is not risking their five hundred year imperial enterprise in an opportunistic war of revenge, it's investing in strengthening its own state by reforming their military and education systems. Germany's ambitions of an overseas colonial empire don't contradict Austria's aims of Balkan hegemony, and their dreams of Grossdeutchland were shelved when the South German states supported the war with France.

No you think I am arguing with you while what I am doing is explaining the flaws in your reasoning to neutral observers. Just as you think that Russia will sacrifice its long term interests for Germany's long term gain because that is your desired result. Ask yourself who finances the Russian government in this time frame or do not, others will ask that question.

Ask yourself why no one did return to Napoleonic style efforts to completely crush and subdue their enemies in the period up until the Great War went meta and became an end in itself, an end that saw the Germany defeated and the conservative classes that had ruled it from inception thrown on to the back foot, or do not as again others will ask those questions.

There are a certain range of actions that the new Germany can take in regards France and a certain point beyond which it cannot go or rouse the whole of Europe against it. This after all is a Europe that still remembers Napoleon and does not want to see that again.

The short war suited Germany. France was seen as the aggressive imperialist militarists and Germany was praised for its rapid defeat of that enemy and its making only modest exactions against them.

A longer war however requires more of the population on the home front and further risks in ever enlarging increments of probability foreign intervention. Even if Germany is careful then the longer the war the greater the risks and the smaller the rewards. This has been explained above. Nothing has changed.

If Germany goes barbarian then it will be treated as barbarian. The German project will be ended, by force by the rest of the European powers. Russia will not hold to an agreement that threatens it future by unleashing an unshackled monster on its western frontier.

You can explore prolonged war scenarios but in by far the great majority of them it is Germany not France that will emerge weaker than OTL due to the resulting strains both internal and external.
 
Why would Russia and Austria fight for France?

Russia couldn't stand France since 1854 and the Crimea war and Austria had huge doubts on France since Bismarck had revealed France wanted to establish a sphere of influence in Catholic southern Germany, that's also why Bavaria joined in the fight.

Sure, they were afraid of Prussia becoming too powerful but Austria/Bavaria had been bested at Sadowa and France wasn't worth risking total annihilation on their part as well.

You can give France all the men and all the rifles you want, fact is, if they can't get in range cause they get pounded by Krupp artillery, men and rifles are of little use as WWI showed.
 
Why would Russia and Austria fight for France?

Russia couldn't stand France since 1854 and the Crimea war and Austria had huge doubts on France since Bismarck had revealed France wanted to establish a sphere of influence in Catholic southern Germany, that's also why Bavaria joined in the fight.

Sure, they were afraid of Prussia becoming too powerful but Austria/Bavaria had been bested at Sadowa and France wasn't worth risking total annihilation on their part as well.

You can give France all the men and all the rifles you want, fact is, if they can't get in range cause they get pounded by Krupp artillery, men and rifles are of little use as WWI showed.

They would not be fighting for France but for order in Europe and their own future security...assuming of course that Germany crossed the line that would trigger such an intervention but as outlined above that does seem to be the OP assumption.

Russia for example did not want to see Central Europe dominated by France and Austria but that was when it looked like France was the the threat. Now for Russian security in places like Poland Germany needs a counterweight. If France is too damaged to provide that counterweight the obvious replacement is Austria and the obvious time to act is while German armies are still entangled in France.

However other powers will also take an interest if Germany behaves like a rogue nation and flouts the conventions of international behaviour.

Britain can easily provide artillery as well as rifles and indeed all the sundries of war should she desire and without committing even to war herself. Now many in Britain backed Germany at first but that was when France was playing fast and loose with the rules of diplomacy and German was behaving like the upstanding pupil. If Germany smashes up a British market then that changes and of course public opinion will change also in the face of what would be seen as atrocity.

Germany could of course try and extend its war to Britain but that is extremely foolish in the extreme.

So the most likely candidates of interest are Russia, Austria and Denmark. Britain occupies a second tier of interest but again it is concerned about order and good conduct in Europe and the balance of power. Countries like Italy and Spain form a third tier with most likely neutrality but that might cease should Germany push its zone of effect into southern France and there be able to threaten their borders and interests.

There are rules of conduct in European affairs though conventions might be a better term. They are somewhat vague and somewhat flexible but they represent what the publics and the political power elites of Europe will and will not tolerate. Cross those lines and any nation opens itself up to a united front.

In addition you should also consider that is does not necessarily suit Germany in the long run to remove France as a market or even as a counterweight to Britain. Further Germany is country of strong liberal and humanist traditions that would be appalled at the very idea of some of the conduct envisaged. The conservatives were able to win over and sideline the liberals by lulling them with nationalism seemingly offered on acceptable terms, presenting the unacceptable face of militarism and imperialism would lose that support and would further inflame the regionalists in Germany as well.
 
Further Germany is country of strong liberal and humanist traditions that would be appalled at the very idea of some of the conduct envisaged. The conservatives were able to win over and sideline the liberals by lulling them with nationalism seemingly offered on acceptable terms, presenting the unacceptable face of militarism and imperialism would lose that support and would further inflame the regionalists in Germany as well.

So what would the German liberal response be to such conduct as described? Perhaps this is my ignorance speaking, but I thought that prior to his dismissal Bismarck had the German liberal element very cowed.
 
So what would the German liberal response be to such conduct as described? Perhaps this is my ignorance speaking, but I thought that prior to his dismissal Bismarck had the German liberal element very cowed.

Post our OTL Franco-Prussian War he did. he had a nice short war that proved the conservative system worked.

Here we are looking at a longer war. That opens all sort of problems in itself. Seen from the liberal POV it gives the old guard liberals more time to muster their arguments and more time to be heard. Their main argument from my reading seems to have been that militarism does not work and (modern audience are not shocked by this bit) leads to war. In OTL Bismarck delivered one last quick war as a means of birthing the Empire and then kept a lid on things.

Here you have men, productive working men, away from their homes for longer. More atrocity stories against the Germans (as opposed to against the French those are fine in Germany) and the very strong probability of growing anti-German sentiment aboard and how they are perceived abroad matters to Germans.

Add in to that as strains grow on local economies the men of '48 will be able to adjust their tune to chime with that of regionalist conservative elements such as the government of Bavaria whom Bismarck had outmanoeuvred but here could quite easily see a chance at the reversal of fortunes should the war drag on (and thus the price they could demand for sticking with it rise).
 
No you think I am arguing with you while what I am doing is explaining the flaws in your reasoning to neutral observers. Just as you think that Russia will sacrifice its long term interests for Germany's long term gain because that is your desired result. Ask yourself who finances the Russian government in this time frame or do not, others will ask that question.

What are Russia's long term objectives? Pan-Slavic Balkan hegemony against the Ottomans and Austrians, plus control of Central Asia against the British. And Germany's? An overseas colonial empire like the big kids. Both of them benefit from expanding at France and Austria's expense.

Furthermore, let's not idealize diplomacy in the 19th century; states work on a 'realpolitik for me, Balance of Power for thee' basis. Russia wanted to bowl over the Turks in the Crimean War and the '78 War, but Britain and France intervened. If Russia has a chance to knock out their other rival in the Balkans and secure their long term objectives, they'll take it. Nobody wants Balance of Power for its own sake, they want it to protect their interests and achieve their objectives, and if achieving their objectives upsets the Balance of Power, that's something the losers will just have to deal with.

However, it will not likely come to this, because the Austrians are aware they have competing interests with the Russians and Italians, and will not risk immediate and total destruction by shackling their survival to a corpse against the biggest military power on the continent, who utterly thrashed them just four years ago. Even if it means accepting second place in the Balkans, it's still better than risking immediate and total collapse. Austrian intervention would be insanity of the highest order.

A longer war however requires more of the population on the home front and further risks in ever enlarging increments of probability foreign intervention. Even if Germany is careful then the longer the war the greater the risks and the smaller the rewards. This has been explained above. Nothing has changed.
In the end, Germany's lighter-than-it-could-have-been peace with France left them able to fight on equal terms within four years and looking for allies. Because Germany showed preference for Austria in Balkan affairs, Russia concluded an alliance with France. The strategic logic of the situation crushed the German Empire as if in the jaws of a vice, leading them to draw Belgium, Britain, and the United States into the war. That's the risk they run leaving France enraged but intact. The benefits of a spring campaign -winning the French-German rivalry once and for all- outweighs the most likely cost (nothing of substance, since the Austrians and Russians aren't insane enough to ignore their interests purely to appease von Metternich's ghost). If Austria intervenes, most likely scenario is that Prussia's co-rivals take advantage of them taking on the biggest military power on the Continent, and you have an alliance of mutual interest forged in battle.
 
=dandan_noodles]And Germany's? An overseas colonial empire like the big kids. Both of them benefit from expanding at France and Austria's expense.
Not sure Germany's objective would be to get many colonies at this stage, simply because France had few of them. Sure it had the sugar islands but even at this point they were integral parts of France.
Algeria would be very hard to get to given the lack of Mediterranean coast. The Germans would have to go the long way round and go under the watchful eye of Gibraltar, plus for that reason, GB might not appreciate Germany getting into their lake after defeating France.

There were a couple comptoirs in Africa sure, and Cochinchina but that place was a mess they'd have to clean up. At this point it's not entirely pacified, anti-christian pogroms are constant and warbands roam the land, not sure it's worth it
 
Not sure Germany's objective would be to get many colonies at this stage, simply because France had few of them. Sure it had the sugar islands but even at this point they were integral parts of France.
Algeria would be very hard to get to given the lack of Mediterranean coast. The Germans would have to go the long way round and go under the watchful eye of Gibraltar, plus for that reason, GB might not appreciate Germany getting into their lake after defeating France.

There were a couple comptoirs in Africa sure, and Cochinchina but that place was a mess they'd have to clean up. At this point it's not entirely pacified, anti-christian pogroms are constant and warbands roam the land, not sure it's worth it
Not necessarily France's 1870 colonies, but colonies that would have come under French control in the coming decades that they will be unable to pursue, and mostly as a symbol of being a world power than for practical benefit.
 
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