Hello peole, new poster here, although i lurked here for a while (mainly around Ancient China and Byzantine Empire TLs, and the Reds! timeline). I also have been reading tthe FTL's work for years by now, so I'd like to participate here too.
That's all fine, but there are several really silly points in the summary that defy reality. The French holding out in France until August? The French fought hard until the armistice and by then the Germans were days away from Marsellies, the Italians were fixing multiple French divisions at the border who would be trapped when the Germans continued to push down the Rhone valley, the ALA had been swept from the skies in early June and the French army had run out of men. The Rhone front was in collapse by the time the armistice was signed and fighting stopped on the 25th:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bataille_de_la_vallée_du_Rhône_(1940)
See where they were at the time of the armistice:
Not evacuating with full speed means little to stopping the German advance in late June, while it means little gets out of France. Evacuating anything combat related means France falls sooner. Little gets out unless they start sooner than IOTL to leave.
Note: Most of my following arguments are coming from the 'Arguments' Folder on the FTL website, a folder where the authors always stressed they were starting from data crunching docs about state of frces at the time.
Except that... if you except the Alps troops and the Maginot Line troops, by then, resistance was more the exception than the rule, long before 25th June, because nobody really bothered to put the front back into shape after the collapse, and the fact the armistice was asked was well-known rather quickly, wich didn't hep any idea of organizing a resistance to die for nothing. And that advance here, that was mainly motorized units exploiting that fact to take as much as France as possible to weigh in as heavily as possible during the armistice. But that advance was partly a bluff, because of the L-word which has been the bane of all amies since the dawn of time (and make wehraboos recoil in pain just as easily as crucifixes and garlic do that to vampires): Logistics. a stroll in the park to get more territory on a collapsed army is easy, although costly in fuel. Fighting your way through an actual resistance? Now that's way more costly, and you go slower, especially if your opponent do its bet to retreat rather than letting himself be trapped in locations like Lorraine.
And the L-word also means no Bf 109s fighters beyond Toulouse for a while, according to a Luftwaffe report from 15 June, saying it would take between 2 and 3 weeks to get the Bf 109s set up again to finish off the front. And without that escort, serious attempts to stop evacuation by sea are toast, because escortless bombers (or escorted by Bf 110s, which aren't still all that good) aren't going to do the job. They didn't do it back at Dunkirk with fighters cover and only one port to cover, they're going to do it now? Said doc was at the EHESS, with originals back at the BundesArchiv (FTL people did work on the subject before writing).
The L-word in combat situation also means a logistic pause to resupply from roughly 20th June to 5th July, because you fought your way up here and can just throw vanguards forward to do the scaring without losing them. It also means can't go as fast as in reality, with 24km/day for Guderian back in May 40. FTLs authors went with a roughly 20km/day number, getting the Germans at Marseille theoretically by 28th July, 29th in actual FTL. And that means 460km crossed, compared to the 240 ones of May for Guderian. You better believe that a logistic pause is needed to have units in fighting condition for the final wrap-up, especially in an army still massively under-motorized as the Wehrmacht (the bulk of the army still used the horse right until the end). If anything the FTL authours point out in their Arguments section that they took a best case... a
German best case. Anglo-saxons authors with the same data were more inclined to put the final wrap-up during fall And not just because of French resistance, because the army is quite beaten up, but because of the nasty L-word which has always been hampering armies since the dawn of time.
And for the resistance, assuming you have a command actually decided to do something else than surrender, you can have at least some resistance, and units completely disorganized can be directed to the harbors for evacuation. And thhere are reserve troops, troops waiting to be reorganized younger recruits forming recruiting reserves... Again, back at Dunkirk, resistance didn't stop evacuation, and the Wehrmacht was far closer, why should it do it now? Besides, evacuation here also means doing it for the machines of thhe war industry, sabotaging what cannot be taken, and also evacuating the workers, meaning more people who could be evacuated (although here, not all of them could be used for combat once in North Africa).
And regarding planes, Armée de L'Air's datas and numbers from the Armistice Commissions' analyzes got the FTL authors to evaluate that, again with being quite pessimistic, you can end up with 1300 planes in North Africa by 21st of June, assuming you use everything back in Metropole to rpoduce on the last production lines viable for aircraft (like the D.520 at Toulouse, the FTLs authors giving it 3 more weeks, or all the Leo.451 that can be evacuated). That could lead to roughly more than 850 operational, and Lybia and Italia wouuld take priority for them, roughly 650 for the FTL, while having essources for a last stand in Franc and reinforcing Corsica. And there are orders of American material sent to North Africa after that the Battle of Fracne is clearly lost, and even an H.75 is enough to trump anything the Regia Aeronautica has in te air by 1940.
Plus the Italians and Germans were bombing the French ports on the Mediterranean:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardement_de_Marseille_(1940)
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombardement_de_Toulon
Meanwhile the French fleet based on Toulon was occupied trying to bombard Italy rather than assisting and evacuation:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opération_Vado
One escortless raid for Germans, one raid for Italians, who were then focused on the Als offensive, where they weren't exactly doing wonders. Assuming priority is given to harbors' protections right until the end, things will lead to the Italians getting a tiny itty bitty slaughtered, having at the time their best fighter with the Cr.42, a biplane. G.50 was inferior, and MC.200 was out for all of summer 40 becase they had to fix a fault crashing the plane when maneuvering too much, with the delays for finding and fixing the problem, fix production lines, ge tthe planes to units and conversion, the MC.200 wans't really used until end of 40). And no torpedo bombers yet, the experimental units are created in the second half of 1940, with units acutally created by the end of 40 again. and again, the L-word means it will take a while for the Germans to put in place Bf 109s for bomber escort, and since escortless bombers is suicide, all that means time can be used for evacuation. And again, the Luftwaffe couldn't stop Dunkirk, why could it stop evacuation now?
And... Four cruisers, and that means the entire navy can't do anything to evacuate? In the optic of a decision to evacuate everyhing possible, the Marine naionale will certainly give prriority to making sure evacuation convoys' protection, something that bombing Italian ports also do by intimidtaing the Regia Marina, by the way. Regia marina who also has to worry about the British ships in the Mediterrannean sea, or helping to supply Lybia, and wasn't already that aggressive back in OTl against British alone when they were spread thin accross the Atlantic and Mediterrannean Sea alone, so with a French lfeet around, which will probably fight as i it has nothing to lose, whle they only have to BBS disponible by then (two old one getting an overaul, and the Vittorio Venetos still getting finished), and that the Fench alone have 3 battleships and two battlecruisers alone? Yeah, nope.
And PS, evacuation mainly asks for cargos and convoys escorts, so that would be the main sort of ships being concentrated on evacuation, while battle units could be used elsewhere.
Corsica as another example; it lacked an airport or air base IOTL and the only civilian air service to the island was a seaplane ferry to Marseilles started in 1935. Vichy apparently had an inactive air unit officially based in the one grass field landing strip they had on the island, which is today the main airport on the island. They were not and won't be any sort of transit point for air units out of France, same with naval units. It was didn't have a naval base either:
https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the...ut-a-naval-base-there-in-preparation-for-WWII
Once France falls taking Corsica is extremely easy and wouldn't require any sort of major paratrooper operation in 1941. The Italians could take it in 1940 by themselves, especially given the proximity of Italian and Sardinian bases that would impede any sort of French support for the island once the mainland falls.
1) I seriously doubt there was absolutely nothing in Corsica, ecause tat looks like giving up the island to the Italinas on the air front, and even if it happened, do you really think there wouldn't be any effort to build air bases here?
2) I'm sorry,
what? Once again, let's take an OTL example. Crete, 1941, not far at all from Greece. British fleet on shambles, no air cover to speak of, and only remnants of broken units. German still used paras here, and Merkür was enough of a bloody mess that ducking
Hitler thought that the bill was too much for him. The Italians alone, with their air force of biplanes fighters and no real anti-ships bombers yet, and a total failure on the attack ground front (they didn't use obsolete biplanes and German planes on that front for the fun of increased difficulty and more complex logistic, you know), an outnumbered fleet and most of their efforts spent in France, against French and British fleets, and whatever effort will be made to defend the last piece of Metropolitan France on the air and ground front, when there was probably troops already there for doing the job? You bet that paras would have been a necessity for not making it a slaughter for the Italian army and navy, one it couldn't replace with its quite lacklutser war industry. And, you know, that mention of Sardinia could have been why FTLs authors included an invasion of Sardinia, because that was a strategic necessity. You can't assume one side in a war won't do anything just to arrang their opponents.
The Franco/Spanish stuff is just entirely contrary to Spanish scholarship on Franco and his desire to enter the war provided the material prerequisites were available.
And he asked for slices of the French colonial empire, knowing that Hitler wouldn't do it out of fear of pushing the French to reist him after all. He didn't do it for Mussolini, and he fought (badly) the French, not even in 1942. Why do it for Franco? In diplomacy, a polite to say 'nope' is always to ask for the impossible. And material-wise, his demands were also beyond what Gerany could afford to spend on other countries.
And even ignoring that... He didn't join the gagn-bang in 40 when it looked like the Axis had it all but won, why do it here?
Also how are the French going to invade Libya in 1940 given their messed up situation? The Italians had 8-9 divisions on the Tunisian border and the Brits were in no position to help until late in 1940.
Under-strength and under-equipped dvisions out of 12000 men for regular and Lybian divisions, and only 6000 for the two Black-Shirts divisions, divisions which were only at full strength because another was dissolved, and facists militas weren't elite troops by a fr cry (first SS units were made of concentration camps gurds for instance, and surprise, brutallizing ill-treated prisoners don't actuually prepare you to war), totalling roughly 90000 men. 300 planes tops, not all of them operational at the same time of course, and again, biplanes (more CR.32 than CR.42 to boot) and failed planes, with the SM.79 the only real decent ones here, and escortless... A logistic that was pretty much in shambles because they had to empty the stocks here to annex Albania and hadn't renewed them still, and wouldn't while they were fighting in France (tehy didn't wait late 40 to attack Egypt for fun and love of difficulty, you know), and no real hope of doing it either way against the French and British fleets (Malta was already enough to give them hell in OTL. With two fleets in position to stop them? Yeah, nope). And beyond the fact that emptying the Egyptian border with Brits alone would have been stupid, there was a French expiditionary corps in Syria, originially set up for intervention in the Balkans, of three divisions with their logistical support. So yeah, Egyptian border is a threat, and there are British reinforcement to take into consideration too (easier to send because let's face it, if the Wehrmacht finish off resistance in Metropole by early August, with one month to set the Luftwaffe again against England, like historically with better condiditons, Battle of England is more of a bluff than in reality, so possibilities to reinforce Egypt are greater).
French Armee de Terre in North Africa of 1940 had 420000 men by June 1940, with artillery totalling 1400 cannons, and supply for 3 monthes of operations (they had an army in the Alps to counter an Italian attack, do you really think there would be nothing in one of the biggest part of the colonial empire, esecially one counting Algerie, which was nominally consisting of three French departments?), plus Air and naval forces present and evacuated, and an offensive strategy in North Africa in case of war with Italia (likely since 1935) since the 20s, and logistic here was built for generation and training of forces from the empire, originally for sending troops in Metropole. They'll do for Metropole evacuees, and even counting sovereignity troops and and troops to keep Franco away, there are plenty men to crush at least Tripolitaine now to squash possibilities of reinforcements for good, and the rest of Lybia with the English a bit later. Again, D1, R35 and H35/39 of NA weren't that good, but Italians had almost nothing to stop them. Use them as an armored mass, with their stocks present here in North Africa. And beyond the strategic necessity there is also the one factor which can decide to give a go to even the worst operations: Political factor. After and during losing Metropole you need to boster morale, and one of the best way of oing so is oing on the offensive to porve that you aren't finished. And Itlaian Lybia is perfect for that, especially when the war plans were thought for an offensive apporach here for a long while.
Why does the Greece invasion still happen given the very active situation in North Africa and the Mediterranean, no prospect for an armistice on the horizon, and the jewel of grabbing the French colonies in North Africa very up for grabs? Why does Barbarossa happen in 1942 given that Hitler thought it was 1941 or never due to Soviet rearmament efforts? Especially with the Mediterranean very active and France still a significant threat?
1) Allies bribing them with the Dodecannese islands (why let the Italians keep air and naval bases to poison life in Eastern Mediterrannean Sea when you can take them), plus Metaxas' death at OTL date leading to less pro-Axis thinking... What was left of it since it's deadly obvious Mussolini wants to nvade Greece ('Nah, I didn't invade Albania for a base for ground troops agianst Greece, I just wanted another balnear station on the Adritatic, honest.').
2) USSR and the Lebensraum are Hitler's deinfing monomania, he won't waste time for a few acres of sand when there is his life's great plan to accomplish (he did in OTL only because he needed to prop up Mussolini), especially when, as you said, USSR is a 'now or never deal'.
3) Better organized and earlier support from Allies means that continental Greece only falls by the end of June/early July 1941. WIth the delay to put forces back in place for attacking USSR (always the L-word and historical delay), that's almost all of summer gone. Even Hitler can't believe he'll win in what little time is left. So no choice, that's spring 42 or nothing. Besides, there is the fact that finishing off France in North Africa is beyond his means (Italia doesn't have the fleet to support a ladning invasion there, air logistics isn't good enough, especially with a short-range focused Luftwaffe, and again, no Franco). But he can put in place air forces limiting what they can do from this southern bank too, and from Greek islands and Dodecannese.
In Asia the Japanese don't invade Indochina, but US-Japanese relations are like OTL...and then they try to invade anyway, just later?
Indochina wasn't just invaded OTL because it was vulnerable and as a base to attack Malaya you know, but also because it was the main supply route for Nationalists Chinese. Who were at war with Japanese for years by now. With (light) Allied suport for supplies and weapons. The choice made by OTL authors was 'Japan tries to pressure weakened France into stopping to supply China. They say nope to that, despite increased pressures (and use of pasties by goading Thailand into seizing bits of Camdogia). US don't take kindly to that. Voila, deterioration of relationships.' Gven the almost total control the army had of Japan by then (army who forced the governemnt to approve after the facts their invasion of China), and a blatant will to see the end of the war in China to its end in a Japanese victory at all costs if only for reasons of not losing face, which wasn't endearing them to the Americans in any way, I don't see why this couldn't happen in FTL. France
is baldy weakened after all, and Europeans country focused on Europe, so the opportunity is still there.
I don't know who participated in this TL and what special knowledge they have, but clearly they aren't very knowledgeable about a great many things, including French capacity for resistance as of mid-June 1940.
I consider that one as rather disrespectful though, given the fact the FTL authors always stressed the fact they started with datas from the time, always analyzed them thoroughly to avoid missing something,and di so with years of work.