WI: France really fights on from 1940?

[Hardric62]

Also the French were at least intelligent enough not to transmit info about their code breaking via the radio. But their work would be pretty disrupted by having to evacuate their entire bureau to North Africa and destroy whatever couldn't be moved quickly.

You mean, more than it would have been OTL by the necessity of operating in clandestinity inside French, fearing Germans and collabos? Without talking about the Polish experts working with te French?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You mean, more than it would have been OTL by the necessity of operating in clandestinity inside French, fearing Germans and collabos? Without talking about the Polish experts working with te French?

Yes, evacuating to Vichy is different than evacuating to North Africa and trying to intercept from there and having to rebuild the entire office on another continent.

 

[Hardric62]

Yes, evacuating to Vichy is different than evacuating to North Africa and trying to intercept from there and having to rebuild the entire office on another continent.

So intermittent work at best done under clandestinity with far fewer means while fearing interception, denunciation or discovery is better than a few monthes of chaos before rebuilding an office with more means than said clandestinity, able to work round the clock without having to fear any enemy interruption of any sort of your work. Gotcha.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So intermittent work at best done under clandestinity with far fewer means while fearing interception, denunciation or discovery is better than a few monthes of chaos before rebuilding an office with more means than said clandestinity, able to work round the clock without having to fear any enemy interruption of any sort of your work. Gotcha.

What are you talking about? The Vichy cipher work was done by and for the government, there was no problem of interception (they weren't broadcasting), no one was going to denounce them, nor were they going to be discovered on their side of the border and were evacuated before the Germans occupied Vichy. They have far fewer opportunities to actually intercept in North Africa, which is why they weren't evacuated there IOTL after the armistice.

 

[Hardric62]

What are you talking about? The Vichy cipher work was done by and for the government, there was no problem of interception (they weren't broadcasting), no one was going to denounce them, nor were they going to be discovered on their side of the border and were evacuated before the Germans occupied Vichy. They have far fewer opportunities to actually intercept in North Africa, which is why they weren't evacuated there IOTL after the armistice.

Oh, my bad. So, naturally, Anglophobe Vichy gave everything it discovered to the British and Allied, collaborating even more closely with them as a hostile collaborationnist government than as an allied free one? And it was of course impossible in case of FFO to... I dunno, regroup teams together for more efficient work? And naturally, Germans would let their puppets almost openly spy on them like that.

Also, that's funny, I'm reading that Vichy wasn't actually exactly aware of the full extent of these efforts. Looks like the definition of clandestinity to me. And naturally, Polish agents would be able to work more freely in Vichy's France where pro-Germans elements can give them away to the Germans than in an evacuated North Africa.

Also funny thing, I remark the work was already done partly in Algeria during 1940/1942.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

Also funny thing, I remark the work was already done partly in Algeria during 1940/1942.

IIRC the French Navy already had in Algeria from the 1930s a signals intel station aimed at the Italians.

A english language book on French intel operations 1925-1943 would be really useful. The fragments I've found suggest they were ahead of the Brits on the continent. There were doctrinal problems in how the French Army used its intel, but in gathering both the Army and Navy seem to have been capable.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The fragments I've found suggest they were ahead of the Brits on the continent.

In terms of? As far as engima while true in the 1930s, by 1940 they were behind the British effort.

Oh, my bad. So, naturally, Anglophobe Vichy gave everything it discovered to the British and Allied, collaborating even more closely with them as a hostile collaborationnist government than as an allied free one? And it was of course impossible in case of FFO to... I dunno, regroup teams together for more efficient work? And naturally, Germans would let their puppets almost openly spy on them like that.

They had their own needs for SigInt. As it was the Brits were ahead of them by 1940, so there wasn't all that much they'd be able to contribute about the Germans from North Africa after the evacuation, but they'd certainly be able to do work on the Italians. Though from North Africa it would be harder to collaborate with the Brits given the geographical divides and need to avoid radio transmitting of information. Vichy intel did also give a heap of info to the US very willingly, which of course made it's way to the Brits even in 1940-41. Regrouping means what exactly? They could of course send them to Britain or just rebuild their efforts from Algeria, but that takes time and wouldn't necessarily yield the same results as from the continent. The Germans IOTL didn't really have much of a chance to stop Vichy from listening in to their signals, given that they gave them their own territory to control until 1942 and the Poles and some French were able to work freely until right before the November 1942 end of Vichy. Vichy wasn't so much a puppet as a collaborator and even then they still had their own interests, which weren't exactly German friendly.

Also, that's funny, I'm reading that Vichy wasn't actually exactly aware of the full extent of these efforts. Looks like the definition of clandestinity to me. And naturally, Polish agents would be able to work more freely in Vichy's France where pro-Germans elements can give them away to the Germans than in an evacuated North Africa.

I'm sure the intel service wasn't fully trusting of the collaborationist government, that doesn't mean it wasn't endorsed work for the most part. If the Poles were so concerned about being in Vichy, why did they stay from 1940-42 until right before the Germans invaded?

Also funny thing, I remark the work was already done partly in Algeria during 1940/1942.

Against the Italians, sure. Later same with the Afrika Korps and any Luftwaffe or KM units in the area. ITTL there wouldn't be Germans around in the Central Mediterranean to listen in on for a while or potentially at all.

 

[McPherson]

Nice map. This is supposed to invoke visions of French cargo ships sinking all across the eastern Mediterranean? Torpedoed right and left by roving squadrons of SM79 & bombed to burning wrecks drowning thousands of French soldiers?

1. Let's look at it realistically? The surviving French fighter cover is not too good. I figure under the circumstances... non existent, as in zero.
1a. French escort vessels of the day? The typical cruiser had 6-9 9 cm AAA guns and 6-10 3.7 cm AAA guns which were linked to a 2 or 3 optical director system that could handle 1 (one) aircraft attack at a time. This is effective to a slant of about 2,000-4000 meters and was H/A ineffective against dive bombers which would be pulling out at bomb release at the moment when the 90s and 37s start to bite; also useless against torpedo attack (not enough shells to cover the threat zone per second with saturation effect) and just inside the Italian bomb/torpedo drop points. The last defense was a battery of manually aimed machine guns usually quads or duals of about 8-12 total of 13.2 mm bullet throwers of an effective slant range of 1,500 meters. Morale effect. Not too shabby compared to German or Italian efforts, but LOUSY by RN standards. Pom Poms quad and octo were at least last chance revenge weapons that could down a Hunchback or a Heinkel.
1b. Even if the French can form up and convoy (takes practice), threat axis align body guard ships to flak trap inbounds, (takes knowledge which the Marine Navale does not have, cref IJN, USN and RN who took more than a decade to learn how to air defend fleets at sea.), find enough sailors to man the merchantmen and head for Algiers and Oran, they have to do this in port while presumably the Luftwaffe is breathing down their necks and the Wehrmacht is hustling south with artillery to ruin their day. NO AIR COVER. Lot different from Dunkirk and that is the French scrambling to load for a journey of 5 days steaming doglegging away from Sardinia with whatever ships that can be manned and sortied. I figure over the week they will have they can clear about 60 merchant ships from the Riviera ports and lift ~100,000 men. Maybe they can get out about 55-60 warships (If they have fuel.). None of these sorties will be well organized (independent sailings) so the exodus will be extremely vulnerable to opportunity attacks.

Leaving aside for the moment aircraft ranges, the ability of the Sardinian airfields to park large numbers of aircraft, the actual aircraft available vs muster strength, & a few other painful details. The question of effectiveness, or number of sorties per ship sunk is useful. What was the Italian record at this time?

2. If the Regia Aeronautica can get 4 or more squadrons of SM79s forward based, I would be surprised. it will more likely be a mixed force of medium bombers, see further. More can be expected from the Luftwaffe than from the Reggia Aeronautica during the first two days steaming. As the standard transit times is about 5 m/s or 18 km/h the danger time close to France is

11 hours steam time vs. Ju 87s and about 38 hours steam time with He 111s. The French will be at sea for days and will be subject to re-attack for at least a day and a half of that time using the contemporary means the LW had. This is NOT Dunkirk. More like Force Z. The Germans will have time to make a bloody shambles of things and they will not need many aircraft to do it under the conditions to be expected in this exodus.
3. Enter the Italians. A typical Italian medium bomber squadron had 6-8 aircraft (a stormo) depending on type. The more typical Italian bomber tactical unit would be the grupo or wing. Sardinia's two major airfields could just support that size force. Figure 40 aircraft split among 6 stormo consisting of Cant 1000Z, some BR-20s and the Savoia Marchetti SM 79s of similar performance and strike capabilities. (It is the Italian way in those days to mix and match.) Operational availability of aircraft based on Italian records is combat ready 60%.
3a. Attacks will be by level bombing. Contrary to popular belief, the RA had practiced this war at sea thing, so they were fair to good at it. Without active air opposition they will be dropping marbles on scared mice from anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 meters altitude just above the effective HA Marine Navale AAA warship engagement envelope. Freighters, however, are DEAD MEAT at mast height release altitudes which the RA know how to do; since French warship slant ranges cannot provide overlap coverage. Incidentally the French are still in He-111 type danger times (38-40 hours steam times) from Sardinian airfields (airpower radius circle 800 kms) versus these Italian aircraft.

Of those ~ 60 freighters that sailed; expect ~15 to 20 to be sunk. Combo of Luftwaffe and RA work over 4 days. That is the expected loss based on RN combat experience of trying to ram better organized convoys through. With the massive confusion and chaos of this French exodus it could be worse. Much worse.

28 June Battle of the Espero Convoy. Hits on Allied ships by Italian aircraft: None. Actually I can't find anything about any Italian aircraft sortied. Guess the air men could not be bothered.

9 July Battle of Calabria. 72 SM79 attacked in two groups. HMS Glouster took a hit on the bridge & continued in action. Note the SM79 dropped their bombs from 12,000 feet - 3,700 meters. At the time this was a common attack altitude for them. Later in the day another 126 aircraft attacked, claiming hits on the HMS Eagle, Warspite and Malaya. None suffered noticeable damage. Score: 198 sorties one hit, none sunk. Or perhaps is should be 148 sorties? The Italian fleet counted fifty Italian aircraft attacking them.

19 July Battle of Cape Spadia. Italian air force distinguished itself by sitting this one out. Not clear if these absences were due to poor coordination between the Navy & AF, or perhaps range, or just not enough time to show up.

12 October Battle of Cape Passero. Yet more empty skies. Excuse is it was a night battle.

11 November Battle of Taranto. Might mean something if the Italians were trained to attack at night with torpedoes.

27 November Battle of Cape Sparvento. Another night battle with no air actions mentioned in connection.

Operation Excess
9 Jan 10 SM79 & 15 CR42 attack, No hits admitted to by the Brits.
10 Jan 2 SM79, 18 He111, 43 Ju87 - HMS Warspite hit & light damage, Illustrious hit & damaged. Second attack had 7 SM79, 20 Ju 87, 14 He111 One hit.
.....For this one we have 114 sorties & three ships hit none sunk.

Warships in wagon wheel defense, convoy discipline, and air cover in several of those cases. NOT VALID EXAMPLES.

From these few actions we have a ships hit rate of one per 78 sorties. It is correct slower less maneuverable cargo ships are more vulnerable, so maybe 1-35 sorties? However data from the 1940 'Kannal Kampf' in the English Channel August-October 1940 reveals a similar hit or sunk rate by the German air forces, vs a mix of cargo & small warships.

Against warships and merchantmen with air cover; again not a valid example.

I hope to do a lot more compilation and analysis of aircraft vs ships from his era. At this point it looks like only a handful of Brit, Japanese, & US airmen had any skill against ships up through 1942.

Try Crete. This shows worst case, but is a useful metric.

USAAC standard and available means of a much more powerfull nation; Phillipines was a strategic place at these days.

You might want to look at the US order of battle December 7 1941. here

Not too good, was it?

But, unfortunatly, this was not the case in France. You hardly found a couple of airfields with concrete take-off runway. Even Le Bourget, main French civilian airport near
Paris and major air base didn't have one at the outbreak of the war, only park runways.
https://journals.openedition.org/insitu/16231#tocto1n2

I am not going to criticize the French military too much, or even at all as I prefer lessons learned approaches. They had a lot on their plates with their 1930s economy and politics. In the French airpower discussion about what could the AdA do before June 1940; I noted that each new French air minister had a new idea and the AdA really had no good air staff like the RAF with a consistent vision and purpose to ride these guys out. No air force got it right, either. (Hey, did I not suggest it earlier, here?) Ground crews training, a LW strength and airbase organization, also a LW strength were 2 giant AdA weaknesses that were handwaved. Lessons learned, not a criticism.

Try to find ONE concrete runway before the war in these airfields:
http://www.anciens-aerodromes.com/?page_id=32520

To go to the point, French High Command was issued of the senior officers that won the WWI and couldn't understand the modern warfare despite lots of younger high-ranking officers were pushing for new tactics and equipments. Lots of complains were raised during the Phoney war about anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons shortage for example. This was more or less the same story for the politician.

Or maybe look for bulldozers and matt rollers among the AdA engineer units? Might be that the AdA looked at concrete or asphalt and looked at French grass strips, checked the floatation problem and the weather, and thought it would be cheaper to buy a bulldozer to fill in a bomb crater on a dirt runway than to pave it and have to fill in a bomb crater with the same bulldozer on a concrete runway? Different logics, but if your airbases have good weather and your aviation is not expected to fight in a monsoon, I can just see the AdA making that wrong pre-war decision?

Firing the old officers and replacing them by those younger ones will boost the efficiency of the whole French army, even if it was far too late to recover (no Marne miracle).

Having a consistent government military policy over time may help more. (Are you listening, DoD?)

Remeber that even in USA, Mitchell didn't saw the success of his ideas before his death. And a sucessfull Pearl Harbour aeronaval attack was the case of a war game few years before the war but nothing was made after that...

Pearl Harbor was wargamed from 1935 on. Even planned against. ROOSEVELT screwed that one up, by not listening to his senior admirals who warned him that the Fleet should not be put within IJN sortie radius pre-war. But FDR wanted to send the Mikado a political message. The IJN replied with interest.

Nothing that sandbags couldn't do (look at some videos posted), that could be achieved at very low cost by ground forces (spads, bags, and manpower).

If the difference is a bulldozer and the training manhours for Filipino infantry, get the !@# !@#$ed bulldozer, from the civilian Manila Construction Company, and ramp up dirt berms. Filling sandbags is a waste of time and training money. Same goes for France 1940.

But you know what? We are at war and there is a threat on Corsica.

I don't care about Corsica. It is gone. How about the Suez Canal? How about the Straits of Gibraltar? How about picking up the shambles of this disaster and doing what can be done? What can be done? In the Mediterranean? Beat the Italians in Libya, first. Clear North Africa. Once that happens, fallout is Somalia, Ethiopia and an exposed Italy and no DAK. This is what the British failed to do. SEAPOWER, which is what the British claimed to be, is determined by the constraints of nearby land geography. MAHAN, principle 3 or 4, I forget. The point is that if you want to limit Vichy to the Metropole, keep the Germans stuck in Europe, and keep Free France in the game in late 1940, the ALLIES HAVE TO CLEAR LIBYA. And that can only be done from EGYPT. French North Africa 1940 lacks the infrastructure and means to take Libya as will be proven by TORCH 2 years later. Sheesh.

Either you consider because of missing proper shelter, you have to give up, or you try to fight with the available means, including improperly protected airfields.

Improvise with the available means to hand. Scratch out grass-field dispersion sites. Raise berms to protect fuel, munitions and people, disperse ye olde airplanes, borrow a few civilian bulldozers, borrow the civilians who run them, too. Use your time and local resources wisely and don't play tennis or whatever the French equivalent of USAAF golf is. Don't be that Brereton or his incompetent boss, MacArthur.

BTW, in such a case, early warning is the best way to deal with. French and British had radars and high mountains are a very good place to keep watch on open sea.

British radar was in the field and still somewhat clunky. The French radar was stuck in the lab or undergoing first field trials with mixed results. Won't be seen until late 1942 operationally and then only with the MN.

 

[Hardric62]

1. Let's look at it realistically? The surviving French fighter cover is not too good. I figure under the circumstances... non existent, as in zero.
1a. French escort vessels of the day? The typical cruiser had 6-9 9 cm AAA guns and 6-10 3.7 cm AAA guns which were linked to a 2 or 3 optical director system that could handle 1 (one) aircraft attack at a time. This is effective to a slant of about 2,000-4000 meters and was H/A ineffective against dive bombers which would be pulling out at bomb release at the moment when the 90s and 37s start to bite; also useless against torpedo attack (not enough shells to cover the threat zone per second with saturation effect and just inside the Italian drop points. The last defense was a battery of manually aimed machine guns usually quads or duals about 8-12 total of 13.2 mm bullet throwers of an effective slant range of 1,500 meters. Morale effect. Not too shabby compared to German or Italian efforts, but LOUSY by RN standards. Pom Poms quad and octo were at least revenge weapons that could down a Hunchback.
1b. Even if the French can form up and convoy (takes practice), threat axis align body guard ships to flak trap inbounds, (takes knowledge which the Marine Navale does not have, cref IJN, USN and RN who took more than a decade to learn how to air defend fleets at sea.), find enough sailors to man the merchantmen and head for Algiers and Oran, they have to do this in port while presumably the Luftwaffe is breathing down their necks and the Wehrmacht is hustling south with artillery to ruin their day. NO AIR COVER. Lot different from Dunkirk and that is scrambling to load for a journey of 5 days steaming doglegging away from Sardinia with whatever can be manned and sortied. I figure over the week they will have they can clear about 60 merchant ships from the Riviera ports and lift ~100,000 men. Maybe they can get out about 55-60 warships. None of these sorties will be well organized (independent sailings) so the exodus will be extremely vulnerable to opportunity attacks.

1 ... I am not going to dignify that with another answer than 'they evacuate planes, but can't be assed to spare a few units to cover harbors?'.
1a And that's still enough for the anti ships planes vailable to Italians at the time.
1b Except convoys were the standard way of having civilians ships maneuver during WW2 for Allies (except if you're American during the first monthes of the war)? and Luftwaffe... Do you even know the words 'action radius'? And why do you and wiking keep acting like the AdA is only manned by morons even dumber than an Easy Mode AI from an RTS and never cover the ports with the few units they have left? And you only need to have an harbor ale to get ships to evacuate, even beaches when the situation is bad enough. And Germans' ogistics isn't letting them arrive with combat units afte actually fighting before Late July/Early August

2. If the Regia Aeronautica can get two squadrons of SM79s forward based, I would be surprised. More can be expected from the Luftwaffe than from the Reggia Aeronautica the first two days steaming. As the standard transit times is about 5 m/s or 18 km/h the danger time close to France is 11 hours steam time vs. Ju 87s and about 38 hours steam time with He 111s. The French will be at sea for days and will be subject to re-attack for at least a day and a half of that time using the contemporary means the LW had. This is NOT Dunkirk. More like Force Z. The Germans will have time to make a bloody shambles of things and they will not need many aircraft to do it under the conditions expected.

And the action radius of the Ju 87 and He 111 allows this from northern France? With an escort of Bf 109s? And allow them to attack at sea even further south than the Mediterrannean harbors? Why did they never used the magic motors able of such an exploit again?

3. Enter the Italians. A typical Italian medium bomber squadron had 6-8 aircraft (stormo) depending on type. The more typical Italian bomber tactical unit would be the grupo or wing. Sardinia's two major airfields could just support that size force. Figure 40 aircraft split among 6 stormo consisting of Cant 100Z, Fiat BR-20 and Savoia Marchetti SM 79s of similar performance and strike capabilities. (It is the Italian way in those days.) Operational availability of aircraft based on Italian records is 60%.
3a. Attacks will be by level bombing. Contrary to popular belief, the RA had practiced this war at sea thing, so they were fair to good at it. Without active air opposition they will be dropping marbles on scared mice from anywhere between 3,000 to 4,000 meters altitude just above the effective HA Marine Navale AAA warship engagement envelope. Freighters are DEAD MEAT at mast height release altitudes which the RA know how to do; since French warship slant ranges cannot provide overlap coverage. Incidentally the French are in He-111 danger times (38-40 hours steam times) from Sardinian airfields (airpower radius circle 800 kms).

3 And a handful of planes is supposed to do all that? And Sardinia isn't the next door, you know.
3a 'Vertical bombing', I hear 'Waste of fuel and bombs'. And again, the AdA has enough teeth left to make such a small effort a slaughter for Italians, especially if units are moved to Corsica to stop that. And He 111 in Sardinia? Dude, it will be monthes before Mussolini begs for even one German unit, and that the special fuel they need is even there.

Warships in wagon wheel defense, convoy discipline, and air cover in several of those cases. NOT VALID EXAMPLES.

Everyday operations, everyday tactics, and things the French are able to do too. Valid exmples, showing how ridicule your presumptions are.

Against warships and merchantmen with air cover; again not a valid example.

What a coincidence, this is exactly what is evacuating. Again, valid examples.

I don't care about Corsica. It is gone. How about the Suez Canal? How about the Straits of Gibraltar? How about picking up the shambles of this disaster and doing what can be done? What can be done? Beat the Italians in Libya, first. Clear North Africa. Once that happens, fallout is Somalia, Ethiopia and an exposed Italy and no DAK. This is what the British failed to do. SEAPOWER, which is what the British claimed to be, is determined by the constraints of nearby land geography. MAHAN, principle 3 or 4, I forget. The point is that if you want to limit Vichy to the Metropole, keep the Germans stuck in Europe, and keep Free France in the game in late 1940, the ALLIES HAVE TO CLEAR LIBYA. And that can only be done from EGYPT. French North Africa 1940 lacks the infrastructure and means to take Libya as will be proven by TORCH 2 years later. Sheesh.

No, it is very much not, for the Italians don't have the means of taking at laone, especially while they attack the Alps, and once units are moved here (something easier tto do than it is for the Italians to move units in Sardnia) your Sardinian bombers pipe dream will burst like a bubble. And the fact absolutely no threat was to be expected from Tunisia would be why Italia posted the bulk of its troops in western Lybia? And again, OTL, Italians supplied more troops in the Desert War with Tripoli alone that what the French would require to crush Tripolitaine with less logistical means than Tunisia. Why would Tunisia be unable to supply such an offensive? And please try to be professionnal enough to realize that evaluation made for all-motorized American units from 42/43 don't meant that colonial infantry units from 1940 can't operate from the logistical base built with said colonial infantry units in mind, please.

British radar was in the field and still somewhat clunky. The French radar was stuck in the lab or undergoing first field trials with mixed results. Won't be seen until late 1942 operationally and then only with the MN.

Or you ask a British CLAA wit their radar to help you, and given the emergency and need and the tremendous help it brings for an ally evacuating his ressources to keep fighting with you, the British accept to lend one.

 

[Dave Howery]

it seems it's a debatable point about Franco joining in. So let's move on to what's next.
Spain joins the Axis... what next? I'd imagine that if Germany really wanted to, they could conquer Gibralter. Then what?
Spain doesn't join the Axis, but we still have the FF in NA. What's Hitler's next move?

 

[DracoLazarus]

it seems it's a debatable point about Franco joining in. So let's move on to what's next.
Spain joins the Axis... what next? I'd imagine that if Germany really wanted to, they could conquer Gibralter. Then what?
Spain doesn't join the Axis, but we still have the FF in NA. What's Hitler's next move?

With the lack of strategic depth, Spain probably loses Spanish North Africa quickly, so crossing Gib to invade NAfrica is probably out.

 

[Dave Howery]

Spain probably loses Spanish North Africa quickly,

eh... who's going to take it from them?

 

[DracoLazarus]

eh... who's going to take it from them?

Free France and Britain.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

it seems it's a debatable point about Franco joining in. So let's move on to what's next.
Spain joins the Axis... what next? I'd imagine that if Germany really wanted to, they could conquer Gibralter. Then what?

The Straits are closed, which cuts off North Africa from shipping and they have to rely on a low capacity line through Morocco that ran close to Spanish Morocco. Moving across the straits if you control them are pretty easy, Siebel ferries would work, same with supplies. The issue is when this all happens, as it impacts how quickly the French could respond and in what strength. Since Axis logistics would be an issue, the biggest benefit of Spain would be to close the Straits, having Uboat bases much further forward, intimidate Portugal into selling them whatever at below market prices, having a forward deployed aircraft carrier by having Spain so close to North Africa, and basically starve out the French until they could build up enough logistics to actually invade North Africa. The French fleet could probably flee to Egypt in a second evacuation and then the Axis combines to make run on Egypt into the Middle East with most of North Africa already secured. Malta would be SOL, Uboats would have a lot easier time in the Atlantic, especially further south along the African coast, and even some longer range aircraft could operate out there as well, really hurting British efforts in the area.

On the Allied side there isn't all that much the Allies could do in 1940-41 other than try to grab as much of the Spanish colonies as possible ASAP and try to get SOE into Spain ASAP and as their focal point to try and disrupt Axis logistics by sabotage and stimulating resistance. Success would be limited if France and the rest of Western Europe and the Balkans is anything to go by from 1940-43. The Allies would really need the US to enter the war, as Stalin is going to be happy to sit out and supply the Fascists against the Imperialists so long as he is getting paid; on a long enough time line I wonder if he might even judge the situation favorable enough to invade Iran and the Middle East as Hitler was trying to get him to do in 1940.

US entry is going to be tougher I'd image, as without Barbarossa as well as the freezing of Japanese credit caused by the invasion of French Indochina in 1941 the Japanese aren't going to attack the US. If for some reason they do there is the chance that depending on whether the Soviets have officially entered the Axis that Stalin joins the war on the side of the Axis, but even if not then the Allies will have a very bad time in 1942 as the Japanese gobble up things in the Pacific and split Allied resources as IOTL, but now the Allies don't have the USSR in the war on their side and 75% of the German army and 50% of the Luftwaffe in Russia, while the Mediterranean Front is going worse for the Allies.

Spain doesn't join the Axis, but we still have the FF in NA. What's Hitler's next move?

Honestly I have no idea what sort of move they plan on making other than letting the French recover and defeat the Italians, probably driving them from the war. I guess you could then fight the Allies in Italy, which seems epically stupid to allow to happen if you have the means to prevent it. In the meantime I guess there is the OTL strategy: a delayed BoB and then Barbarossa. Probably no Greek campaign because Italy is too busy fighting in North Africa in 1940 to attempt it. That means no Italians in the East either and perhaps the equivalent of the Afrika Korps + Luftwaffe to defend Italy when that situation gets bad enough for Mussolini to ask for help. Then OTL but with an early Italian campaign and no North African campaign as we know it.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

With the lack of strategic depth, Spain probably loses Spanish North Africa quickly, so crossing Gib to invade NAfrica is probably out.

How? French logistics in 1940 are terrible to go after it and the Brits are on their backfoot. They didn't have the means to take the Spanish islands off of North Africa until 1941 IIRC. They will probably be able to take them eventually due to how the logistics are against the Germans and Spanish, but in the meantime Spanish North Africa will be made untouchable as the Allied fleets cannot risk running Gibraltar after if falls due to the coastal guns and Luftwaffe, as well as Axis naval forces. That means German and Spanish forces can supply North Africa, which means that whatever the French and British can slap together in 1940-41 isn't going to evict them, especially with the French supply lines via Gibraltar cut. The Wallies IOTL 1942 were deathly afraid Franco would enter the war and cut the Straits, which would doom Allied forces landing in French North Africa, so in 1940 the closing of the Straits would be pretty fatal to the French, especially as after the evacuation they don't have forces that are offensively capable until they reorganize a lot. Naval forces could sortie, though the Axis will know they are coming thanks to the fact the Germans were reading their codes to degree ULTRA wasn't able to with the Germans until 1943, which means an aerial ambush of the French naval forces coming. The AdA could attack, as IOTL they bombed Gibraltar with ~86 bombers in revenge for Mers el Kebir, but that won't achieve that much as it didn't IOTL against Gibraltar:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milit...uring_World_War_II#Vichy_French_attacks:_1940

 

[Catspoke]

Honestly I have no idea what sort of move they plan on making other than letting the French recover and defeat the Italians, probably driving them from the war. I guess you could then fight the Allies in Italy, which seems epically stupid to allow to happen if you have the means to prevent it. In the meantime I guess there is the OTL strategy: a delayed BoB and then Barbarossa. Probably no Greek campaign because Italy is too busy fighting in North Africa in 1940 to attempt it. That means no Italians in the East either and perhaps the equivalent of the Afrika Korps + Luftwaffe to defend Italy when that situation gets bad enough for Mussolini to ask for help. Then OTL but with an early Italian campaign and no North African campaign as we know it.

Why wouldn't Mussolini allow Hitler in early here. In this TL, Italy has secured a big chunk of southern France in occupation, (assuming November 1942 division), plus Corsica, instead of OTL looking for glory in Greece or Egypt he kind of already has it, as much as Italy is capable of. Its pretty obvious the threat to Italy's colonial empire.

The Luftwaffe drifts down into southern Italy, as much as the airfields can support, but the Germans can improve this quickly.
Even a regimental sized with some 88 mm flak and some Panzer IIIs in Tripoli can really improve Italian capabilities.

Worst case, even if the Italian colonies are lost, Italy has some big bargaining chips in her possession worth far more in Southern France and Corsica when peace comes. She can get her colonies back.

 

[McPherson]

1 ... I am not going to dignify that with another answer than 'they evacuate planes, but can't be assed to spare a few units to cover harbors?'.
1a And that's still enough for the anti ships planes vailable to Italians at the time.
1b Except convoys were the standard way of having civilians ships maneuver during WW2 for Allies (except if you're American during the first monthes of the war)? and Luftwaffe... Do you even know the words 'action radius'? And why do you and wiking keep acting like the AdA is only manned by morons even dumber than an Easy Mode AI from an RTS and never cover the ports with the few units they have left? And you only need to have an harbor ale to get ships to evacuate, even beaches when the situation is bad enough. And Germans' ogistics isn't letting them arrive with combat units afte actually fighting before Late July/Early August

A. The subject is the expected conditions during a panicked evacuation. The AdA is bugging out with everyone else; hence no air cover.

And the action radius of the Ju 87 and He 111 allows this from northern France? With an escort of Bf 109s? And allow them to attack at sea even further south than the Mediterrannean harbors? Why did they never used the magic motors able of such an exploit again?

B.

"Hey Max? Why are we flying down the Alps to some airfield near Bologna?"
"Because Ernst, the French are trying to flee out of Nice, Marseilles and Toulon.
"Clever! We outflank them!"
"Ja... AIRPOWER! Learn it, love it, and use it!"

3 And a handful of planes is supposed to do all that? And Sardinia isn't the next door, you know.
3a 'Vertical bombing', I hear 'Waste of fuel and bombs'. And again, the AdA has enough teeth left to make such a small effort a slaughter for Italians, especially if units are moved to Corsica to stop that. And He 111 in Sardinia? Dude, it will be monthes before Mussolini begs for even one German unit, and that the special fuel they need is even there.

C.

Those are airpower circles. For a navy those are matters of life AND DEATH.

Everyday operations, everyday tactics, and things the French are able to do too. Valid exmples, showing how ridicule your presumptions are.

I am an expert on this subject. The British could sort of do it well (WW I?), the Americans were still learning and the Japanese (海軍表面船群) (naval surface groups) had all of us cold at least as far as 1940. The MN is not even in the convoy war ballgame. They had no need to practice before June 1940. After 1940? Vichy learns.

What a coincidence, this is exactly what is evacuating. Again, valid examples.

How about the Arctic convoys?

No, it is very much not, for the Italians don't have the means of taking at laone, especially while they attack the Alps, and once units are moved here (something easier tto do than it is for the Italians to move units in Sardnia) your Sardinian bombers pipe dream will burst like a bubble. And the fact absolutely no threat was to be expected from Tunisia would be why Italia posted the bulk of its troops in western Lybia? And again, OTL, Italians supplied more troops in the Desert War with Tripoli alone that what the French would require to crush Tripolitaine with less logistical means than Tunisia. Why would Tunisia be unable to supply such an offensive? And please try to be professionnal enough to realize that evaluation made for all-motorized American units from 42/43 don't meant that colonial infantry units from 1940 can't operate from the logistical base built with said colonial infantry units in mind, please.

The GERMANS can.

Or you ask a British CLAA wit their radar to help you, and given the emergency and need and the tremendous help it brings for an ally evacuating his ressources to keep fighting with you, the British accept to lend one.

They are too busy saving Malta. If the RN has any brains (And with Somerville that may be open to debate. YMMV can and should vary.) they will not want a premature Crete. There's a reason I cited that example. Call it Gallic logic.

McP.

 

[Tchitchix]

You might want to look at the US order of battle December 7 1941. here

Not too good, was it?

SNIP

I don't see you point. Of course, the US Army, supported by the first world economy, was impressive. But the discussion was about Corsica and the possibility to base combat aircraft. What I think I have demonstrated.

Even if you are far too much enthousiastic about the anti-ship capabilities of the Axis, this is another reason the invade Sardinia weakly defended by two infantry divisions and some coastal defense. The island is too large to be defended by so few units.

I don't care about Corsica. It is gone. How about the Suez Canal? How about the Straits of Gibraltar? How about picking up the shambles of this disaster and doing what can be done? What can be done? In the Mediterranean? Beat the Italians in Libya, first. Clear North Africa. Once that happens, fallout is Somalia, Ethiopia and an exposed Italy and no DAK. This is what the British failed to do. SEAPOWER, which is what the British claimed to be, is determined by the constraints of nearby land geography. MAHAN, principle 3 or 4, I forget. The point is that if you want to limit Vichy to the Metropole, keep the Germans stuck in Europe, and keep Free France in the game in late 1940, the ALLIES HAVE TO CLEAR LIBYA. And that can only be done from EGYPT. French North Africa 1940 lacks the infrastructure and means to take Libya as will be proven by TORCH 2 years later. Sheesh.

You don't care, Allies do. Even if I agree with you on the most impportant think to achieve: denying North Africa to Axis, removing two divisions from Corsica will be of no help for that.

As already explained, keeping Corsica and invading Sardinia will be a big threat on Italy and will make Axis attacks on French convoys up to Algiers or even Oran much more difficult. And Allies have the means to do it in parallel with Lybia.

BTW, French MN did practice convoys from the beginning of the war, Mediterranean float was on duty to do that for supplying France from colonies.

Poor infrastructure in FNA, are you kidding? There was much more roads, railway, harbour, airfields, not to mention the arsenals to support the FNA Army and MN than Italian in Lybia.

There is only one small gauge coastal railway from Tripoli to 60 km of the border. One or two air raids and it's over. AdA has the means to ban the daily trafic on the coastal road without consistent Italian opposition. The units guarding the frontier will be isolated and subject to artlillery shelling for one or two weeks before the start of the invasion. On the opposite, Italian will have difficulties to do the same: there was two railways path to reach Gabes, one coastal and another 150 km from the coast, with much more facilities to repair if needed. And the high number of fighters will make this task quite difficult for the Italian.

The question of the available truck has been raised. There was 7 logistical units (23ème, 24ème, 25ème, 26ème, 27ème, 28ème and 123ème escadron du train) in FNA in 1939, each composed of two companies, one with horses and one with cars and truck except for the 123ème fully equiped with trucks. The average number of trucks in one company seemed to be 500 with unit capacity from 600 kg to 4 tons, with an 1 ton average. Three of these escadrons (25ème, 26ème and 27ème) were sent to France to support three DIA (infantry division from Algeria) in 1940, meaning there was 2,500 trucks available in FNA at the fall of France. This is enought to support the attack. And again, during the preparation, American trucks should be received from USA.

ritish radar was in the field and still somewhat clunky. The French radar was stuck in the lab or undergoing first field trials with mixed results. Won't be seen until late 1942 operationally and then only with the MN.

Somewhat clunky, perhaps but existing and some have been sent to France prior to May and at least one was operationnal in the BEF, the others was for the French army.

French radar allowed AdA to intercept Italian raid who suffered heavy casualties in June. Who cares about having a prototype if it makes the job?

http://sam40.fr/avril-1939-la-detection-electromagnetique-a-lheure-anglaise/

 

[Hardric62]

The Straits are closed, which cuts off North Africa from shipping and they have to rely on a low capacity line through Morocco that ran close to Spanish Morocco. Moving across the straits if you control them are pretty easy, Siebel ferries would work, same with supplies. The issue is when this all happens, as it impacts how quickly the French could respond and in what strength. Since Axis logistics would be an issue, the biggest benefit of Spain would be to close the Straits, having Uboat bases much further forward, intimidate Portugal into selling them whatever at below market prices, having a forward deployed aircraft carrier by having Spain so close to North Africa, and basically starve out the French until they could build up enough logistics to actually invade North Africa. The French fleet could probably flee to Egypt in a second evacuation and then the Axis combines to make run on Egypt into the Middle East with most of North Africa already secured. Malta would be SOL, Uboats would have a lot easier time in the Atlantic, especially further south along the African coast, and even some longer range aircraft could operate out there as well, really hurting British efforts in the area.

And how the Spanish block the Straits exactly? With their aviation of ghosts, and their navy of phantoms? And their nonexistent heavy artillery will help taking Gibraltar I guess? For someone pretending to admit that it won't be easy for Spain if Franco joins, you're sure optimistic about their capabilities.

On the Allied side there isn't all that much the Allies could do in 1940-41 other than try to grab as much of the Spanish colonies as possible ASAP and try to get SOE into Spain ASAP and as their focal point to try and disrupt Axis logistics by sabotage and stimulating resistance. Success would be limited if France and the rest of Western Europe and the Balkans is anything to go by from 1940-43. The Allies would really need the US to enter the war, as Stalin is going to be happy to sit out and supply the Fascists against the Imperialists so long as he is getting paid; on a long enough time line I wonder if he might even judge the situation favorable enough to invade Iran and the Middle East as Hitler was trying to get him to do in 1940.

Nothing will move before a meeting Franco/Hitler. OTL Hendaye was late October OTL, so let's use that as a point of reference (you said yourself that Franco was eager to join Hitler, surely he can't do the negociations faster than that?). It still takes several weeks for the needed suplies to reach the Spanish troops, and other weeks for German expeditionnary forces necessary to take Gibraltar to arrive. In all that time, the Allied are supposed to do nothing in Marocco to secure their position? Because it will be obvious what's happening once the first trains of German supplies are spotted, and with monthes since the evacuation, enough units will have been formed to doom Spanish Marocco.

Honestly I have no idea what sort of move they plan on making other than letting the French recover and defeat the Italians, probably driving them from the war. I guess you could then fight the Allies in Italy, which seems epically stupid to allow to happen if you have the means to prevent it. In the meantime I guess there is the OTL strategy: a delayed BoB and then Barbarossa. Probably no Greek campaign because Italy is too busy fighting in North Africa in 1940 to attempt it. That means no Italians in the East either and perhaps the equivalent of the Afrika Korps + Luftwaffe to defend Italy when that situation gets bad enough for Mussolini to ask for help. Then OTL but with an early Italian campaign and no North African campaign as we know it.

He props up Mussolini where he can, like OTL, taking Corsica and Sardinia to secure his southern flank for the one year he figures out he need to take the USSR, and goes with the Great Project he has been obsessing over from the beginning of his political life. Once the ressources of the USSR are the property of the 1000 years Third Reich, what threat will be a decadent government lost in the sand with his so-called armies made of drafted savages?

How? French logistics in 1940 are terrible to go after it and the Brits are on their backfoot. They didn't have the means to take the Spanish islands off of North Africa until 1941 IIRC. They will probably be able to take them eventually due to how the logistics are against the Germans and Spanish, but in the meantime Spanish North Africa will be made untouchable as the Allied fleets cannot risk running Gibraltar after if falls due to the coastal guns and Luftwaffe, as well as Axis naval forces. That means German and Spanish forces can supply North Africa, which means that whatever the French and British can slap together in 1940-41 isn't going to evict them, especially with the French supply lines via Gibraltar cut. The Wallies IOTL 1942 were deathly afraid Franco would enter the war and cut the Straits, which would doom Allied forces landing in French North Africa, so in 1940 the closing of the Straits would be pretty fatal to the French, especially as after the evacuation they don't have forces that are offensively capable until they reorganize a lot. Naval forces could sortie, though the Axis will know they are coming thanks to the fact the Germans were reading their codes to degree ULTRA wasn't able to with the Germans until 1943, which means an aerial ambush of the French naval forces coming. The AdA could attack, as IOTL they bombed Gibraltar with ~86 bombers in revenge for Mers el Kebir, but that won't achieve that much as it didn't IOTL against Gibraltar:

A) Logistical basis in North Africa have been built for the North African army, they are perfectly able to support operations of colonial infantry in North Africa. If these bases made an invasion impossible, why exactly was Lybia massing so many forces on its Tunisian border exactly? Wanting to go on a picnic?
B) Again, you seem to think the Allies are sitting drooling with glassy eyes on the mud while the Axis attacks them. Once the writing on the wall here is clear, they'll attack Marocco themselves, precisely to make sure the straits can be cut off that easily. And hold Gibraltar aslong as they can.
C) Funny, you mention a land railway through Marocco, then say the loss of the Straits is enough to doom Free France. Take your cake or eat it.
D) Uh uh. Ultra was not effective until 1943, while the British were able to do things like predict barbarossa using it. Duly noted.

Why wouldn't Mussolini allow Hitler in early here. In this TL, Italy has secured a big chunk of southern France in occupation, (assuming November 1942 division), plus Corsica, instead of OTL looking for glory in Greece or Egypt he kind of already has it, as much as Italy is capable of. Its pretty obvious the threat to Italy's colonial empire.

The Luftwaffe drifts down into southern Italy, as much as the airfields can support, but the Germans can improve this quickly.
Even a regimental sized with some 88 mm flak and some Panzer IIIs in Tripoli can really improve Italian capabilities.

Worst case, even if the Italian colonies are lost, Italy has some big bargaining chips in her possession worth far more in Southern France and Corsica when peace comes. She can get her colonies back.

The carnival Caesar will only begs for German help once things are too far gone for them to help, like he did OTL. Only the events in Greece delayed Lybia's fall long enough for the DAK to arrive. It won't happen here, and even if some part of Lybia is left to be saved... How does it arrive? Tripolia and its region will have been the first target of an offensive, and future convys have to fight both the Mediterrannean Fleet and the French Fleet. No convoy with ships big enough for tanks is coming.
That said, FTL does ve German reinforeents arriving by the end of 1940 to attack Malta and invade Corsica and take back Sardinia. But no more. FOr Hitler, the war was always about USSR and eradication of communism.

A. The subject is the expected conditions during a panicked evacuation. The AdA is bugging out with everyone else; hence no air cover.

So, while the AT is doing everything it cans yet to delay Germans to allow for as many people as possible to get out, the AdA will do nothing at all? You serious?

"Hey Max? Why are we flying down the Alps to some airfield near Bologna?"
"Because Ernst, the French are trying to flee out of Nice, Marseilles and Toulon.
"Clever! We outflank them!"
"Ja... AIRPOWER! Learn it, love it, and use it!"

"Except it won't happen, dummköpfe. Mussolini isn't agreeing on Germans planes in Italia until things are scheiss for him, We are needed to suort our troops in France, and Italains use a different sort of fuel than us, without talking about all the supplies. It would take weeks to get operational, far too long. It would actually be better to take position on airfields in center France to do that!"
"That's why you're the pilot, Helmut. You're the smartest of us all."
"I know."

Those are airpower circles. For a navy those are matters of life AND DEATH.

Not when the lanes have no formation to ship attack yet. And there is the logistics, and the fact that Ju 88 aren't even available in big enough numbers for actual formed units by Summer 1940, and still have some kinks to be worked out...

I am an expert on this subject. The British could sort of do it well (WW I?), the Americans were still learning and the Japanese (海軍表面船群) (naval surface groups) had all of us cold at least as far as 1940. The MN is not even in the convoy war ballgame. They had no need to practice before June 1940. After 1940? Vichy learns.

Because no French ship was navigating in WW1 and before June 1940, especially not the ones going to carry the weapons bought in America.

The GERMANS can.

And it will be monthes before they are here, with the logistic base repaired for an invasion.

They are too busy saving Malta. If the RN has any brains (And with Somerville that may be open to debate. YMMV can and should vary.) they will not want a premature Crete. There's a reason I cited that example. Call it Gallic logic.

There will be no serious threat to Malta while the French are still holding. Supporting the evacuation with one ship coming from costs almost nothing, for a return in investment too massive to be ignored.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Why wouldn't Mussolini allow Hitler in early here. In this TL, Italy has secured a big chunk of southern France in occupation, (assuming November 1942 division), plus Corsica, instead of OTL looking for glory in Greece or Egypt he kind of already has it, as much as Italy is capable of. Its pretty obvious the threat to Italy's colonial empire.

The Luftwaffe drifts down into southern Italy, as much as the airfields can support, but the Germans can improve this quickly.
Even a regimental sized with some 88 mm flak and some Panzer IIIs in Tripoli can really improve Italian capabilities.

Worst case, even if the Italian colonies are lost, Italy has some big bargaining chips in her possession worth far more in Southern France and Corsica when peace comes. She can get her colonies back.

Mussolini was very serious about proving he was an equal partner and was pretty pissed Hitler didn't tell him about German military plans in advance of doing them, so was pretty petty about things like 'his' theater so he could show what Italy could do on it's own. Also Italy only got what they got in France due to German success, not Italian. Until he was in a situation in which his forces were badly beaten he wasn't about to 'lower' himself to a begging secondary partner, especially if he thinks he can grab Tunisia on his own. So in the meantime he goes for Corsica and builds up to invade Tunisia, but events would overtake him one way or the other. Just based off his OTL narcissism and stupidity I can't see Mussolini letting the Germans into his turf until and unless he had no other option. Plus as it was Mussolini was pushing Franco to repay his SCW debt by entering the war and by forcing Hitler to look for other avenues besides Italy as an entry point into the Mediterranean it makes it a Spain-or-nothing scenario and I think Mussolini would want Hitler to put pressure on Franco to enter the war, because if he did it would hurt both the British and French logistically and make his life a LOT easier in the Central Mediterranean, as it also makes the focus of French and British attention Spain instead of Italy. Really Mussolini has ever reason to push Hitler into other avenues besides his backyard.