WI: France really fights on from 1940?

[Deleted member 1487]

Roosevelt to Franco.

Translation: "Stop interfering with TORCH or you are NEXT."

What does that have to do with 1940? Late 1942 after Torch is a vastly different situation to Summer 1940.

No they don't. American and German gear is different. Radically so. Enough that if US support stops so does the telephone system and the rail networks. Spain not only loses external trade, but internal trade as well. It is like Greece, thousands of valleys isolated by hills. Come to think of it, that way, the Greeks gave the Axis a hard time, after the country was "conquered" and much the same way. Partisans.

You haven't actually proven that Spanish telecommunications were exclusively American in origin and completely incompatible with anyone else's.

Rail can be regauaged very easily and France's large captured rolling stocks could be used.
Again, what does the limited Greek partisan issue have to do with Axis allied Spain?

This might interest you. The company is called TEXACO. The man is named Rieber, the monopoly is OIL.

That was an interesting article, not sure what it has to do with the TL we're discussing though. Rieber was out at Texaco IOTL right about the time France fell and lost all influence.

You will have a hard time proving that since the Spaniards involved are fighting on both sides of the Pyrenees, or did you miss that part?

There was no info about Spanish resistance, just the refugees fleeing to France and organizing behind the protective shield of Vichy, while not accomplishing much until 1943. So utterly irrelevant to our discussion.

So ineffective that he held 60% of the country in 1944 and took it all over after the "retreat". The UK did not want him. They wanted the Chekists. Seemed to have missed the point about Tito. Just as Wedemeyer missed it about Mao.

1944 has little to do with our discussion, by that time the only reason he held anything was the lack of German manpower and the exist of Italy from the war with the equivalent of two divisions of Italians going over to the partisans. Here I thought we were discussing the situation as of 1940, not 1944 after Germany had already lost the war, bu was just dragging things out.

The US 1898 victory destroyed the Isabelline government or didn't you know this? It is so significant, the Spanish have a whole historical period named for it.

Are you drunk? What relevance does this have to do with anything we're talking about?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

How much do we want to discuss the 1930s Spanish Civil War or what the Spanish did to Napoleon's armies in the 19th century? Tough hombres (men) the Spaniards. At one time they ruled 1/5 of the Earth and for about 100 years longer than the British did. I'm researching their half of the Spanish American War now. Did you know these guys killed off 1/4 of Cuba? The very methods they used we will find used in the Filipino American War again. The Americans emulated them which is why the Filipinos grumble about the Americans, even though they are "pro American". One American senator of the time said that we were worse than the Spaniards when it came to "pacification". "Murdered every man capable of carrying a gun on Samar" was how he put it. Then there is the Moro Crater Massacre. The Spaniards would have approved.

The SCW when the Germans and Nationalist Spaniards won against the Republicans? Since the Spaniards would be on Germany's side, I don't know what relevance that has to do with anything out than the Allies having a bad time if they try and invade Spain.

 

[McPherson]

1. Continuation of a long Franco Roosevelt dance. Just wanted to give you a taste.
2. You got to be kidding?
3. !944 is what happened at the end. IWW does it not show method and progression to that end?
4. Just on the Spanish military alone? You really don't know, do you? Please read. Isabelline or Carlist is important (It is "republican" (Isabelline) or "monarchist" (Carlist) by the time of the Rift Wars.). If you do not know this, then how can you discuss it? Better yet, go back to 1870 and figure out how SPAIN fits into Franco-German relations. It is a mess.

The Americans controlled the Spanish petrol market and infrastructure. The Germans know diddly squat about refineries, hence TEXACO and the Berlin maniac, too. Got to read the fine print.

 

[Tchitchix]

In 1940 right as France is falling by an air force with a worse record than the Italians? Yeah. The AdA was not the RAF or USAAF and certainly in June 1940 was not in a position to turn those grass airstrips into anything more than they already were.

SNIP

I know, you already posted it a lot of time but without giving any evidence of what you say.

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield. Don't you notice that there was absolutly NO facilities and the ground support was maintaining the engines outside in the dust...

Some more pictures in the desert, note that German have exactly the same installation and see the medium bombers on the second one, enjoy it:

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1. Continuation of a long Franco Roosevelt dance. Just wanted to give you a taste.

Got something more period relevant?

2. You got to be kidding?

So the effort was limited to a few thousand casualties on each side from 1939-53. That doesn't even rate as resistance by the Dutch wartime standard.

3. !944 is what happened at the end. IWW does it not show method and progression to that end?

Due to circumstances in the wider war. By 1944 the situation in Spain may be that tough, but the war might be over by then ITTL.

4. Just on the Spanish military alone? You really don't know, do you? Please read. Isabelline or Carlist is important (It is "republican" (Isabelline) or "monarchist" (Carlist) by the time of the Rift Wars.). If you do not know this, then how can you discuss it? Better yet, go back to 1870 and figure out how SPAIN fits into Franco-German relations. It is a mess.

Now you're just babbling.

The Americans controlled the Spanish petrol market and infrastructure. The Germans know diddly squat about refineries, hence TEXACO and the Berlin maniac, too. Got to read the fine print.

Uh huh, which is why Germany imploded due to lack of oil in 1939...oh wait.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I know, you already posted it a lot of time but without giving any evidence of what you say.

You clearly haven't been paying attention then.

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield. Don't you notice that there was absolutly NO facilities and the ground support was maintaining the engines outside in the dust...

Some more pictures in the desert, note that German have exactly the same installation and see the medium bombers on the second one, enjoy it:

A grass field is just a field. Aircraft can land and take off, but you don't maintain aircraft serviceability without a ground support apparatus, something the French were fucking abysmal at given they had a 29% operational rate in June 1940 (already repeatedly cited). Film of a dusty field doesn't show the full support apparatus in the area.

 

[McPherson]

1. Read. The Brits claim too much credit.

2. Tied down thousands of troops and police. Body counts are not the measure of a mission kill. FIRST THING they teach competent tacticians.

3. Still end result.

4. I'm not kidding. You don't seem to know the why for the way things worked in Spain the way they did.

5. Germans did not know oil. Americans did. Who lost the war due to oil? G.E.R.M.A.N.Y. Synthetic fuel plants are no substitute when Ploesti is done. Killed at the refineries, not the well heads.

 

[Tchitchix]

You clearly haven't been paying attention then.


A grass field is just a field. Aircraft can land and take off, but you don't maintain aircraft serviceability without a ground support apparatus, something the French were fucking abysmal at given they had a 29% operational rate in June 1940 (already repeatedly cited). Film of a dusty field doesn't show the full support apparatus in the area.

You clearly haven't been paying attention to the videos then.

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield. Don't you notice that there was absolutly NO facilities and the ground support was maintaining the engines outside in the dust...

 

[McPherson]

You clearly haven't been paying attention to the videos then.

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield. Don't you notice that there was absolutly NO facilities and the ground support was maintaining the engines outside in the dust...

THAT is Nichols Field. It is the backend of nowhere on Panay Island. Where is that? 14°30′34″N 121°01′06″E

The planes are A-27s of the 17th Pursuit Sqdrn, about mid 1941. The point? Backend of nowhere like Corsica is Panay. What was needed for an airbase? (^^^). QED.

If a cash strapped USAAC builds concrete aprons, all weather hanger shelters and so forth during the Depression, then it follows that they think they needed all weather capability in the middle of the Philippine Islands (Wish that incompetent, Brereton, had used these bungholes, designed for dispersions, properly instead of concentrating everything at Clark.)

Addenda: as long as we are on grass fighter strips: bomb dumps, oil tankage, personnel, AND PLANES, need revetments (i.e. berms) to protect them from near miss bombs and strafing (cruise missile strikes in modern terms), but try to tell that to an air force today?

(^^^)





​

 

[marathag]

What are you talking about?
...

Which can be rebuilt and standardized as the rail system in the USSR showed in 1941 and beyond.

Both resources are non existant in 1940, so are side by side in never never land.

Germans did a terrible job at regauging, and taking French Rolling Stock cripples French transport.d

 

[ejpsan]

I am more concerned about the political side of this question, I think that FDR still runs for a third term if France still fights on and I can see something like a "Sell and Replace" policy where the United States sells exiting military stock to ship to the Allies and then uses the money from the sales to purchase new stock.
I think in order to prove to the American people that France is still serious about staying in the war and not trying to improve their bargaining position, they are going to have to make a show of holding on to Corsica as long as possible and do a limited offensive against the Italians in Libya before the Labor Day General election campaign kick off in the United States.
I think that FDR still wins and if the French are able to make some headway against the Italians, this might lead to an earlier Lend-Lease Act.
If the campaign in Libya does better then expected, this might stop the Italians from going with their plans to invade Greece in October 1940 and get rid of Mussolini.
France still fighting on will I think take the USM off the table and lead to a much different Battle of Britain and Battle of Atlantic, how different is what I leave to more knowledgeable people on this site to tell me.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

Sigonella was an all weather bomber base. Ju 88s are better but "Hunchbacks" will work. Stage forward into airfields in Sardinia as was done RTL. NO "Dunkirk Miracle" via sea to Bone, I'm afraid. So it is academic, this whole exercise.

Nice map. This is supposed to invoke visions of French cargo ships sinking all across the eastern Mediterranean? Torpedoed right and left by roving squadrons of SM79 & bombed to burning wrecks drowning thousands of French soldiers?

Leaving aside for the moment aircraft ranges, the ability of the Sardinian airfields to park large numbers of aircraft, the actual aircraft available vs muster strength, & a few other painful details. The question of effectiveness, or number of sorties per ship sunk is useful. What was the Italian record at this time?

28 June Battle of the Espero Convoy. Hits on Allied ships by Italian aircraft: None. Actually I can't find anything about any Italian aircraft sortied. Guess the air men could not be bothered.

9 July Battle of Calabria. 72 SM79 attacked in two groups. HMS Glouster took a hit on the bridge & continued in action. Note the SM79 dropped their bombs from 12,000 feet - 3,700 meters. At the time this was a common attack altitude for them. Later in the day another 126 aircraft attacked, claiming hits on the HMS Eagle, Warspite and Malaya. None suffered noticeable damage. Score: 198 sorties one hit, none sunk. Or perhaps is should be 148 sorties? The Italian fleet counted fifty Italian aircraft attacking them.

19 July Battle of Cape Spadia. Italian air force distinguished itself by sitting this one out. Not clear if these absences were due to poor coordination between the Navy & AF, or perhaps range, or just not enough time to show up.

12 October Battle of Cape Passero. Yet more empty skies. Excuse is it was a night battle.

11 November Battle of Taranto. Might mean something if the Italians were trained to attack at night with torpedoes.

27 November Battle of Cape Sparvento. Another night battle with no air actions mentioned in connection.

Operation Excess
9 Jan 10 SM79 & 15 CR42 attack, No hits admitted to by the Brits.
10 Jan 2 SM79, 18 He111, 43 Ju87 - HMS Warspite hit & light damage, Illustrious hit & damaged. Second attack had 7 SM79, 20 Ju 87, 14 He111 One hit.
.....For this one we have 114 sorties & three ships hit none sunk

From these few actions we have a ships hit rate of one per 78 sorties. It is correct slower less maneuverable cargo ships are more vulnerable, so maybe 1-35 sorties? However data from the 1940 'Kannal Kampf' in the English Channel August-October 1940 reveals a similar hit or sunk rate by the German air forces, vs a mix of cargo & small warships.

I hope to do a lot more compilation and analysis of aircraft vs ships from his era. At this point it looks like only a handful of Brit, Japanese, & US airmen had any skill against ships up through 1942.

 

[Tchitchix]

The planes are A-27s of the 17th Pursuit Sqdrn, about mid 1941. The point? Backend of nowhere like Corsica is Panay. What was needed for an airbase? (^^^). QED.

If a cash strapped USAAC builds concrete aprons, all weather hanger shelters and so forth during the Depression, then it follows that they think they needed all weather capability in the middle of the Philippine Islands (Wish that incompetent, Brereton, had used these bungholes, designed for dispersions, properly instead of concentrating everything at Clark.

Addenda: as long as we are on grass fighter strips: bomb dumps, oil tankage, personnel, AND PLANES, need revetments (i.e. berms) to protect them from near miss bombs and strafing (cruise missile strikes in modern terms), but try to tell that to an air force today?

USAAC standard and available means of a much more powerfull nation; Phillipines was a strategic place at these days.

But, unfortunatly, this was not the case in France. You hardly found a couple of airfields with concrete take-off runway. Even Le Bourget, main French civilian airport near Paris and major air base didn't have one at the outbreak of the war, only park runways.
https://journals.openedition.org/insitu/16231#tocto1n2

Try to find ONE concrete runway before the war in these airfields:
http://www.anciens-aerodromes.com/?page_id=32520

To go to the point, French High Command was issued of the senior officers that won the WWI and couldn't understand the modern warfare despite lots of younger high-ranking officers were pushing for new tactics and equipments. Lots of complains were raised during the Phoney war about anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons shortage for example. This was more or less the same story for the politician.

Firing the old officers and replacing them by those younger ones will boost the efficiency of the whole French army, even if it was far too late to recover (no Marne miracle).

Remeber that even in USA, Mitchell didn't saw the success of his ideas before his death. And a sucessfull Pearl Harbour aeronaval attack was the case of a war game few years before the war but nothing was made after that...

Addenda: as long as we are on grass fighter strips: bomb dumps, oil tankage, personnel, AND PLANES, need revetments (i.e. berms) to protect them from near miss bombs and strafing (cruise missile strikes in modern terms), but try to tell that to an air force today?

Nothing that sandbags couldn't do (look at some videos posted), that could be achieved at very low cost by ground forces (spads, bags, and manpower).

But you know what? We are at war and there is a threat on Corsica.

Either you consider because of missing proper shelter, you have to give up, or you try to fight with the available means, including improperly protected airfields.

BTW, in such a case, early warning is the best way to deal with. French and British had radars and high mountains are a very good place to keep watch on open sea.

 

[Aber]

It seems you have no idea of what was an airfield in the beginning of the war and, for some theaters, until the end. A grassfield IS an airfield. ]

Indeed. Western Desert Air Force operated airfields behind German frontlines in North Africa, with support facilities flown in on transport aircraft.

 

[Hardric62]

I am more concerned about the political side of this question, I think that FDR still runs for a third term if France still fights on and I can see something like a "Sell and Replace" policy where the United States sells exiting military stock to ship to the Allies and then uses the money from the sales to purchase new stock.
I think in order to prove to the American people that France is still serious about staying in the war and not trying to improve their bargaining position, they are going to have to make a show of holding on to Corsica as long as possible and do a limited offensive against the Italians in Libya before the Labor Day General election campaign kick off in the United States.
I think that FDR still wins and if the French are able to make some headway against the Italians, this might lead to an earlier Lend-Lease Act.
If the campaign in Libya does better then expected, this might stop the Italians from going with their plans to invade Greece in October 1940 and get rid of Mussolini.
France still fighting on will I think take the USM off the table and lead to a much different Battle of Britain and Battle of Atlantic, how different is what I leave to more knowledgeable people on this site to tell me.

Thanks to point another political factor which would/could motivate an early offensive against Lybia.

Well, the Lybian offensive can clearly doom the colony within monthes of its decision. The North Africa Army was built and supplied to fight them, French light tanks there are invulnerable to the Italian 47mm local units don't have in significiant numbers anyways, the Regia Aeronautica can easily be outnumbered and surpassed in quality by French/US planes, and Alexandria and bases of North Africa allows for an easy strangling of logistics, especially since Italians didn't send anything OTL before early July 1940 (not the stocks before, and they had to be sure the French were truly not supporting the British).

I recently saw the 'Viva Balbo' TL here on this forum, where Mussolini gets assassinated in 1937, leading to a change of head amongst Italians fascists. The author was pretty clear about the fat the Regia Marina by then was a paper tiger ill-trained and ill-supplied, with not really good commanders (Cavignari), a Regia Aeronautica a patchwork of mostly failed designs for wildly different tactics, and the Regio Esercito was already severely lacking in supplies and vital weapons like AT cannons on the mainland, and how that situation was pretty much the mirror of the OTL one. Pretty sure Lybia can only have these problems to a greater extent.

And Atlantic battle can indeed be very different. French navy and base networks to help means a better network fighting U-Boots, and commercial roads to North Africa in the Atlantic can go towards Dakar through Southern Atlantic to avoid Type VII U-Boots and better profit from coastal overwatch while going to North Africa. That also means Germans will need more Type-IX with greater range, but costing more to build.

Nice map. This is supposed to invoke visions of French cargo ships sinking all across the eastern Mediterranean? Torpedoed right and left by roving squadrons of SM79 & bombed to burning wrecks drowning thousands of French soldiers?

And don't forget that by the tme of the start of the war, Sicily only had reco planes (McPherson posted that list of units himself), no 'Ju. 88' as claimed until Germans are properly begged to, something Mussolini will only do once things have gone down the drain, and that by Sumer 1940, the Junkers 88 mentioned here wasn't even operational in big numbers yet, and still prone to technical problems. And the logistical Issue of different fuel used by Germans planes of course. And the fact Sardinia only had a few units of bombers and one of fighters, Cr.32 to boot. The Regia Aeronautica won't be able to be a threat for a while (FTL does have them causing an abort on a invasion of Pantellaria by damaging transport ships used for the invasion, but they have Stukas by then, and that was not a free victory by any mean).

I hope to do a lot more compilation and analysis of aircraft vs ships from his era. At this point it looks like only a handful of Brit, Japanese, & US airmen had any skill against ships up through 1942.

FTL gives a pretty similar impression in its battle, although Japanese look a bit ore skilled. Blame the tctics still being designed by then. Also, keep in min than 50% of hits was considered as rather exceptional.

Also Tchitchix, my thanks for your defense about Corsican airfields.

 

[Aber]

Well, the Lybian offensive can clearly doom the colony within monthes of its decision. The North Africa Army was built and suppied to fight them, French light takns therre are invulnerable to the 47mm, the Regia Aeronautica can easily be outnumbered and surpassed in quality by French/US planes, and Alexandria and bases of Nort Africa allows for an easy strangling of logistics,

Also note that the British reaction is likely to be sending forces (especially Infantry tanks) from the UK to Tunisia rather than Egypt because:
It is much closer
There are Italian naval forces in the Red Sea
Tripoli is much closer to the Tunisian border (even the Torch plan assumed that Tripoli would be taken from the west)
A serious threat to Tripoli is likely to pull Italian forces away from Egypt.

 

[Hardric62]

Also note that the British reaction is likely to be sending forces (especially Infantry tanks) from the UK to Tunisia rather than Egypt because:
It is much closer
There are Italian naval forces in the Red Sea
Tripoli is much closer to the Tunisian border (even the Torch plan assumed that Tripoli would be taken from the west)
A serious threat to Tripoli is likely to pull Italian forces away from Egypt.

Nah, sorry I think they'll settle for a pincer attack:
British logistic bases are in Egypt after all, so creating similar bases in Tunisia for British units would delay their intervention, and to be fair, since they'd use a different equipment than French, it would be a bit taxing for Tunisian installations to supply everyone
Transferring troops through the Mediterrannean Sea is very much possible during a FFO Summer (no anti-ships plane units for Italians, heck not even bombers in Sicily by the start of the war, outnumbered fleet...)
Said forces don't really fare very well FTL, where British and French together can leave enough ships to jugulate them without problems (doesn't help that local subs climatization is using a toxic gas). And didn't stop units from the Commonwealth to arrive in Egypt anyways OTL, why should they here?
Taking Cyrenaica is also important, it does have harbors too after all. Smaller ones, but still.
French can do that alone, and once it's done, only five divisions in the same bad shape than the one in Tripolitaine, Blackshirt units having only half the number of regular units (when supplies are there, which aren't there for worst training (the SS' brilliant lack of performance during Campaign of France, people?) are there in Egypt, which is also the place where the British are building up an armored division, and where you can more easily base French units from Syria for supporting that offensive.
Edit: Wait, Italians only had five divisions in Eastern Lybia, but only three regular ones before Blackshirts units from the west arrived. The others were one colonial Lybian division and another Blackshirt Division, so 60000 men tops once you counted minor units completing the corps without said reinforcements from West to face the British and French reinforcements in Cyrenaica (and not all units on the frontline sir, some of them ave to be in reserve further inside the country). Seems like a crime to not attack such a weak force for triggering a pincer attack.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

BTW the Germans had broken all the important French codes by 1939-40, so they'd have some pretty important intel about what French plans would be:
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-french-war-ministrys-fld-code.html

From recently released TICOM reports and various books it is clear that the Germans could read French Army tactical codes (2), the Navy’s main cipher system (3) and the Airforce’s ‘Aviation Militaire’ (4). By exploiting these systems the Germans obviously got valuable intelligence. However their main success that directly contributed to their victory in 1940 was achieved against a high level enciphered code used by the French War Ministry.

From the early 1930’s the German codebreakers could read the code used between the French War Ministry and the various military districts. This was a 4-figure codebook of 10.000 values enciphered with additive sequences. In September 1939 there was a change in the method of encipherment and columnar transposition was used instead of addition. Unfortunately for the French this method had been used by one of their military districts prior to September 1939, thus allowing the Germans to solve it and figure out how the transposition keys were chosen. Thanks to this compromise the Germans could read messages of the War Ministry and the military districts till June 1940. The information gained concerned the French army’s order of battle, the weak point of the Maginot Line, the mood of the troops and the population in France and in the colonies, the order of battle of the British troops stationed on the mainland and their movements.

‘Even before the military action with France began, the military systems of French higher staffs were solved. This was a 4 or 5-figure code that was systematically transposed (tableau carve) .In the cryptograms a few parallel passages (repetitions) were discovered .The interval between these passages was constant and must therefore correspond to the width of the transposition box as cryptanalytic studies have shown.If I am not mistaken the keys (Loesungen ? ? ? ) ? ? the box itself were taken from the same code book. Despite all the cunning of this cryptographic system, the occurrence of short parallel passages proved fatal. By the aid of these deciphered messages tabs could be kept on the French Army far back into the homeland.’

The importance of this intelligence is even admitted by the official history ‘British Intelligence in the Second World War volume 1’, p163-4

‘It later became clear that, until the fall of France, Germany enjoyed not only the strategic initiative but also the advantage of good operational intelligence………. During the planning and the carrying out of the attack on France the work of the enemy intelligence department of the General Staff of the German Army was of crucial importance and its value fully justified the prestige which the department had always enjoyed. The work has been described by General Ulrich Liss, head of the department from 1937 to 1943. He emphasizes that partly on the basis of British army documents captured in Norway, which provided all it needed to know about the British order of battle, and partly from the cypher traffic between the French War Ministry and the army groups, armies and home authorities, most of which it read from soon after the outbreak of war until 10 May, the department had a very comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the dispositions and qualities of the Allied forces………… During the campaign its intelligence continued to be good, and Sigint continued to be the best source.’

According to Hüttenhain’s manuscript ‘Einzeldarstellungen aus dem Gebiet der Kryptologie‘, p14-16 the code used between the French War Ministry and the military districts was a 4-figure codebook of 10.000 values, enciphered with short additive sequences. Since this method of encipherment offered limited security and the underlying code remained in use for years these messages could be read by the Germans. However a different system was used by the military district in the border with Italy. Here the code was transposed based on codewords. After finding two messages with parallel passages the German codebreakers were able to solve this system in 1938 and they realized that the transposition keys were created by using the codegroups of the codebook. Thus from mid 1939 the traffic of this military district could also be solved. In September 1939 when WWII broke out the French War Ministry instead of changing the cipher procedures, ordered that this system of transposition was to be used by all the military districts. Since the 4-figure codebook remained in use the Germans could read this traffic up to June 1940 and Hüttenhain says that the German leadership was informed of all significant operations within the French armed forces.

And the best part? The French never learned their lesson:

Additional information:
The US report SRH-361 ‘History of the Signal Security Agency volume two - The general cryptanalytic problems’, p136 mentions a French cryptosystem solved in 1944 that was similar to that solved by the Germans in the 1930’s. This was a transposed code, with the transposition keys created from the codegroups of the codebook.

So any French operations during and after the evacuation are going to be known about and their positions and situation in the colonies will be known in detail.

That's just the French. B-Dienst was into British naval codes into 1943.

 

[Hardric62]

So any French operations during and after the evacuation are going to be known about and their positions and situation in the colonies will be known in detail.

So... Like the Germans' ones were OTL, without never realizing themselves than Ultra had broken through their precious Enigma, despite the fact early efforts to break through would have certainly be spotted amongst the French War Ministery's transmissions if what you say is true?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So... Like the Germans' ones were OTL, without never realizing themselves than Ultra had broken through their precious Enigma, despite the fact early efforts to break through would have certainly be spotted amongst the French War Ministery's transmissions if what you say is true?

Nope. Bletchly Park wasn't even remotely that deep into German codes for a long time. The Lorenz Cipher was only broken in 1942:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_cipher#Code_breaking

Also the French were at least intelligent enough not to transmit info about their code breaking via the radio. But their work would be pretty disrupted by having to evacuate their entire bureau to North Africa and destroy whatever couldn't be moved quickly.

Enigma breaks were intermittent until later in the war. Plus as 1939-41 showed British efforts didn't result in much actionable intelligence for Allied forces.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombe#The_British_Bombe

The first bombe was named "Victory". It was installed in "Hut 1" at Bletchley Park on 18 March 1940. It was based on Turing's original design and so lacked a diagonal board.[33] On 26 April 1940, HMS Griffin captured a German trawler (Schiff 26, the Polares) flying a Dutch flag; included in the capture were some Enigma keys for 23 to 26 April.[34] Bletchley retrospectively attacked some messages sent during this period using the captured material and an ingenious Bombe menu where the Enigma fast rotors were all in the same position.[35] In May and June 1940, Bletchley succeeded in breaking six days of naval traffic, 22–27 April 1940.[36] Those messages were the first breaks of Kriegsmarine messages of the war, "ut though this success expanded Naval Section's knowledge of the Kriegsmarines's signals organization, it neither affected naval operations nor made further naval Enigma solutions possible."[37]

It took until a commando raid in March 1941 to get more code books and get enough breaks in the system to start reliably breaking into the naval enigma, but even then only part of it and with delay. In 1942 the introduction of an extra rotor shut out ULTRA for 10 months.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis_of_the_Enigma#British_bombe

In the summer of 1940 following the Franco-German armistice, most Army Enigma traffic was travelling by land lines rather than radio and so was not available to Bletchley Park. The air Battle of Britain was crucial, so it was not surprising that the concentration of scarce resources was on Luftwaffe and Abwehr traffic. It was not until early in 1941 that the first breaks were made into German Army Enigma traffic, and it was the spring of 1942 before it was broken reliably, albeit often with some delay.[139] It is unclear whether the German Army Enigma operators made deciphering more difficult by making fewer operating mistakes.[140]

The Luftwaffe enigma was the most broken system and achieved in late May 1940, but that didn't really help the British all that much for quite some time other than yielding OOB info of what was deployed against Britain in 1940. And of course all the nonsense the Goering would have sent, like demanding pilots were deloused before meetings where they were to be decorated.

Against the Brits though, the German SigInt branch had the upper hand until 1943:
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2012/05/b-dienst-vs-bletchley-park-invasion-of.html

The Merchant Navy code and the Merchant ships code were captured from commercial ships. Their enciphering tables were solved throughout the war. The official history ‘British intelligence in the Second World War’ says that these two systems ‘were a prolific source of information to the B-Dienst second only to the Naval Cypher No3 in their importance to the battle of the Atlantic’.

Taken together, these successes meant that from the start of the war till the summer of 1943 the German High Command had the upper hand in the field of intelligence. Thus Doenitz could place his U-boat groups at the time and place where they would do the most damage.