That is a an underestimate of the garrison - there were 5 British infantry battalions plus 3 local ones, plus artillery, engineers etc.
See
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238336&hilit=invasion+of+malta&start=150
WI: France really fights on from 1940?
- Thread starter tomo pauk
- Start date
That is a an underestimate of the garrison - there were 5 British infantry battalions plus 3 local ones, plus artillery, engineers etc.
See
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238336&hilit=invasion+of+malta&start=150
Much much more French civilian casualties, also metropolitan French may find this non-surrendering irresponsible.
Like, Vichy made horrible things, that had no reason to be. But considering the surrendering, some government doing the opposite is likely to meet disapproval. Why would you keep fighting and endangering your civilians when your onyl ally is a maritime force that has almost 0 chance to free your territory one day, with a Stalin-Hitler non agression pact to the East ?
We shall not consider things from a "USSR and USA will intervene" point of view. It's more about "Axis is gonna win, let's avoid having all of French population killed in a Generalplan West"
I think having some Vichy government that would be pretending to collaborate while slowly preparing a denunciation of the 2nd Treaty of Compiègne would be more likely, like "Evacuating Metropolitan France ? What are you saying ? It's just a standard colonial effort, you don't know what you're talking about, cuz you don't have colonies."
Like, Vichy made horrible things, that had no reason to be. But considering the surrendering, some government doing the opposite is likely to meet disapproval. Why would you keep fighting and endangering your civilians when your onyl ally is a maritime force that has almost 0 chance to free your territory one day, with a Stalin-Hitler non agression pact to the East ?
We shall not consider things from a "USSR and USA will intervene" point of view. It's more about "Axis is gonna win, let's avoid having all of French population killed in a Generalplan West"
I think having some Vichy government that would be pretending to collaborate while slowly preparing a denunciation of the 2nd Treaty of Compiègne would be more likely, like "Evacuating Metropolitan France ? What are you saying ? It's just a standard colonial effort, you don't know what you're talking about, cuz you don't have colonies."
If Japan does not declare war against the US due to the butterflies (or at least no Pearl Harbor), how does that change how a defeated Japan is treated? Would they be allowed to conditionally surrender- would they if they knew Germany was down and the whole world was going after them next?
The French undeserved reputation for surrendering would not happen, that's one small welcome change.
The French undeserved reputation for surrendering would not happen, that's one small welcome change.
Instead of being famous for giving up, they'll be famous for running away.
The Wallies would probably hold Crete, so you'll probably see a lot of cartoons with French or British soldiers kicking Hitler in the balls and running away.
I got the 5000 from this guy's University of London dissertation - http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1317691/ of course he does not provide a source for that number so who knows where he pulled it from.
Deleted member 1487
Thanks for the link.
It appears he wrote a book about Malta, perhaps the source in is there?
https://www.amazon.com/Churchill-Maltas-1939-1943-Douglas-Austin/dp/1445600587
Deleted member 1487
It appears there was some Spanish efforts supporting the Moroccan independence/anti-French movement that could have been useful had Spain joined the Axis and they moved on Morocco:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morocco_in_World_War_II#Moroccan_nationalist_movements
It would be an interesting counterfactual if some of the Gourmier ended up fighting for the Axis to expel the French.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morocco_in_World_War_II#Moroccan_nationalist_movements
It would be an interesting counterfactual if some of the Gourmier ended up fighting for the Axis to expel the French.
nbcman
Donor
That underlined statement is completely untrue even for OTL conditions.
The RN BBs outnumbered the RM in June 1940 not the other way around. The RN Med fleet had 4 BBs (one in dry dock) plus Lorraine was at Alexandria. The RM only had 2 old BBs available.
LA SPEZIA Battleship - CAIO DUILO (comp 10 May 15) refitting until 15 Jul Unavailable
NAPLES 9th Battleship Squadron – LITTORIO at Ansaldo bldg to comp 2 Aug Unavailable
TARANTO 5th Battleship Division (Ammiraglio di Divisione Brivonesi) - CONTE DE CAVOUR (comp 1 Apr 15), GUILIO CESARE (14 May 14) 9th Battleship Division - VITTORIO VENETO at Trieste bldg to comp 2 Aug Unavailable
TRIESTE Battleship - ANDREA DORIA (comp 13 Mar 16) refitting until 26 Oct Unavailable
So there are two old BBs at Taranto available immediately in June with another old BB available in July. The two new BBs aren't available until August at the earliest and both new BBs had extensive issues with their sea trials.
So at best, the RM is outnumbered 2:1 in BBs before adding in the MN 4 BBs and 2 BCs (2 BB Cherbourg, 2 BB & 2 BC Oran). So now it is 10:2 in June or 11:5 in August - at best assuming the RM heavies run away from contact as they did at the Battle of Calabria on 9 July 1940 when they were opposed by the RN Med Fleet at 3:2 BB odds. How well will the RM do when the odds are 2:1 or worse with the MN in the fray?
Last edited:
Deleted member 1487
Thanks for the info, I was unaware that those ships were laid up and unavailable. That would certainly explain the reluctance to move on Malta in June.
It may be a matter of definition. 5000 is not unreasonable for the infantry element only; but ignores the rest of the Army garrison and other services.
Yeah, the VVs weren't ready. Nor were the Andrea Dorias. The two Cavours could be regarded as "new", having been thoroughly rebuilt, but are firmly inferior to an R-class in a straight up fight. 12.6" guns and an 11 inch belt against 15" and 13" belt. Their superior speed is tactically useful, as was found at Calabria, but defending a beachhead is classic Mahan.
If we take the fleets' availability as for Calabria, then it's:
- 1 aircraft carrier
- 3 battleships
- 5 light cruisers
- 16 destroyers
- 2 battleships
- 6 heavy cruisers
- 8 light cruisers
- 16 destroyers
Deleted member 1487
How about the Italian submarine fleet? They could be set up to intercept a potential Franco-British intervention and provide early warning and direction for land based aviation to strike the fleet.
Yes, Pedestal is a good example of the effective use of submarines in a similar situation. The convoy, operating in relatively restricted waters, had to pass over patrol lines. While the convoy was too fast and had too much air cover to allow a wolf pack to form, luck enabled a U-boat to be in the right place to sink Eagle, and for Axum to unleash its devastating salvo. It's not unreasonable to posit a similar result - call it a battleship mission-killed at least?
Vectoring in land-based air is useful, but the Italian air force's performance during Calabria was hopeless. I think they damaged a cruiser and bombed, ineffectively, their own fleet. They were restricted to level bombing - no torpedoes were available.
Vectoring in land-based air is useful, but the Italian air force's performance during Calabria was hopeless. I think they damaged a cruiser and bombed, ineffectively, their own fleet. They were restricted to level bombing - no torpedoes were available.
Last edited:
Spent some time reviewing information on attacking Malta in 1940. The Italians had been planning for this since 1938, tho the descriptions of these plans lack a lot of critical detail. This thread is of interest: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238336 As usual one has to wade through a large amount of kludge, but there is some good information to mine. Two of the participants, Jeff Lester & John Anderson are good at providing original sources and analyzing what the authors of the secondary sources are presenting. Lester spent considerable time directly mining the Italian military archives & related sources. There no real solid evidence there about how such a effort in July-September would have played out, but one can pick some excellent data out of it with a few hours reading.
The DG10/42 Plan, or whatever name you want to use for a July-August attack, had a important feature. A five day bombardment of the island. This does waive away any serious secrecy for the operation. Best case the Brits are some 36 hours away in surface ship time. A more deliberate sortie can mean 48 hours. That has Cunninghams fleet from Alexandria showing up as the Italian bombardment force is readying for its third day of bombardment. Maybe they hang around to fight, maybe they avoid battle, but either way the bombardment is disrupted for a few days if not permanently. Of course Cunningham can't hang around long & retires east to replenish fuel & ammunition for several days. Cant then the Italian invasion force 11 hours or 24 hours away rush in? Perhaps, but to the west there is Force F at Gibraltar which is 55 to 65 hours away. Maybe Cunningham has held back a extra day for coordinated attack by his fleet & Force H. Or perhaps by chance or design the two play tag team. Then there is the question of if the Italians have the bad luck to kick off their attack after Force H returned to Gibraltar to refuel. That group had been doing something or other off the African coast & was back in latter July. After all that there is a French fleet harbored in NW Africa & lacking anything more important to do than fight the Italian fleet.
Judging from the sea battle of Calabria, the likely Italian reaction to a fight at sea with the bombardment force, and other Brit or Allied battle fleets approaching would be to postpone or cancel the operation.
Leaving all that aside there is this:
Denial may have been at the base of the Italian motivation. Beyond that a Italian Malta splits the Allied Mediterranean the same way it split the Axis Med when the British held it. That is to say it did not actually split anything, but served as a position from which to attrition away any sea traffic in range. Very early on in June & July the Brits had a internal debate on the value of Malta & if it should be defended. The defense school won out, but this suggests the place was not regarded as the end all in Mediterranean strategy that the History Channel school thinks. The Italians already had Sicilly & Pantelleria to split the Med & if they could not do it with that I have to question their ability with Malta. They had a finite number of aircraft and naval craft to deploy & owning Malta does not increase that. Never mind what happens if the attack goes badly.
Of course there are those French airfields in Tunisia. Whatever the value of Maltas air base facilities they are dwarfed relatively by those overshadowing Tripoli. Italia supply ships can dodge about enroute, but ultimately must make the predictable final approach, and become stationary in the harbor. The air forces of 1940 look really bad when attacking ships at seas. The ability to find ships is lame, never mind the hit rates per hundred sorties. But, its different when bombing docked ships & dockside warehouses. The damage per sortie becomes worth the effort & port operations decline as the air attacks are sustained.
The DG10/42 Plan, or whatever name you want to use for a July-August attack, had a important feature. A five day bombardment of the island. This does waive away any serious secrecy for the operation. Best case the Brits are some 36 hours away in surface ship time. A more deliberate sortie can mean 48 hours. That has Cunninghams fleet from Alexandria showing up as the Italian bombardment force is readying for its third day of bombardment. Maybe they hang around to fight, maybe they avoid battle, but either way the bombardment is disrupted for a few days if not permanently. Of course Cunningham can't hang around long & retires east to replenish fuel & ammunition for several days. Cant then the Italian invasion force 11 hours or 24 hours away rush in? Perhaps, but to the west there is Force F at Gibraltar which is 55 to 65 hours away. Maybe Cunningham has held back a extra day for coordinated attack by his fleet & Force H. Or perhaps by chance or design the two play tag team. Then there is the question of if the Italians have the bad luck to kick off their attack after Force H returned to Gibraltar to refuel. That group had been doing something or other off the African coast & was back in latter July. After all that there is a French fleet harbored in NW Africa & lacking anything more important to do than fight the Italian fleet.
Judging from the sea battle of Calabria, the likely Italian reaction to a fight at sea with the bombardment force, and other Brit or Allied battle fleets approaching would be to postpone or cancel the operation.
Leaving all that aside there is this:
Denial may have been at the base of the Italian motivation. Beyond that a Italian Malta splits the Allied Mediterranean the same way it split the Axis Med when the British held it. That is to say it did not actually split anything, but served as a position from which to attrition away any sea traffic in range. Very early on in June & July the Brits had a internal debate on the value of Malta & if it should be defended. The defense school won out, but this suggests the place was not regarded as the end all in Mediterranean strategy that the History Channel school thinks. The Italians already had Sicilly & Pantelleria to split the Med & if they could not do it with that I have to question their ability with Malta. They had a finite number of aircraft and naval craft to deploy & owning Malta does not increase that. Never mind what happens if the attack goes badly.
Of course there are those French airfields in Tunisia. Whatever the value of Maltas air base facilities they are dwarfed relatively by those overshadowing Tripoli. Italia supply ships can dodge about enroute, but ultimately must make the predictable final approach, and become stationary in the harbor. The air forces of 1940 look really bad when attacking ships at seas. The ability to find ships is lame, never mind the hit rates per hundred sorties. But, its different when bombing docked ships & dockside warehouses. The damage per sortie becomes worth the effort & port operations decline as the air attacks are sustained.
The earlier French doctrine of very low level attack with bombers may allow some luck, but its bad form here to depend on it. At the start I would not count the French as any better than anyone else at attacking ships at sea. Particularly warships. Conversely the Italians had a habit of playing the game conservatively in these opening battles. A series of French/Allied air attacks, however ineffectual would likely enhance Italian caution. (Which may be a universal choice for everyone in these early battles.)
Every secondary source I've read states the evacuation priority was for skilled technicians, and air force personal over common combat arms. Most of those were still well to the north on the 17th June when the evacuation orders were started. I'd probably have to go to French sources to find details on the evacuation. There is some evidence in their air operations after the 17th. One is the 27 July raid on Gibraltar. 64 M-167 bombers from four airfields made a serial attack. Since this operation had been contemplated shortly after 3 July, and stalled until approval by both the Italians and Germans it appears this operation was possible from early to mid July.
The counts drawn from actual Brit records suggest "5000" corresponds to the Brit or Commonwealth infantry, artillery, & combat support. The Malta regiment was on top of that. Adding in service units and RN personnel at least 8,000 were probably present & perhaps over 9,000. But the raw numbers are really not the thing. The ground battle depends on each side plans, preparations, and decisions during the critical moments of the fight. Those preparations include how the MG & artillery of the defense are deployed.
Still all that is moot. Unless the Brits write off Malta the odds are the Italian Navy backs off from any serious confrontation, or is run off with losses.
Deleted member 1487
So does that mean the ground combat arms get left behind and the evacuation is mostly specialists? That screws the French in yet another way. Of course the situation after the armistice IOTL isn't necessary helpful ITTL, because the evacuation never happened and the French basically got the keep everyone not captured yet as of June 22nd.
I have no doubt the French could put together at least 100 or more bombers as of July ITTL, especially given that they were prepping those American aircraft in North Africa anyway, the question is whether they'd have 100, 200, or 500 or so total operational aircraft able to be supported for operations against the Italians and potentially later the Germans and Spanish. Plus of course how many men actually capable of fighting infantry units and how effective those units would be. Someone earlier mentioned the French forces in Syria, which based on the info I can find about them were pretty underequipped and weak and got rolled by a fewer number of Brits and a hodge-podge of allies in 1941 without much trouble, despite the French having a superior number of aircraft (289 total, including about 200 from North Africa):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria–Lebanon_Campaign
Why return to Gibraltar to refuel when there are several ports in FNA they can now used. I believe the RN had used them before the fall of France in OTL.