WI France hadn't sold the Louisiana Territory?

[stevep]

One: It is an argument. Every country with an ounce of sense uses its means to further its interests.

Very faulty logic. As I said it’s an argument as to why the US wants New Orleans. Nothing at all to do with why they could take it in the face of French opposition.

Two: New Orleans isn't that good of a defensive position, was very small, and had few people present. It isn't a fortress city, merely a strategic city. One has a tactical advantage; the other not so much. If anything is going to be defended, it would be the profitable Caribbean colonies that are also in reach of the US.

I could point out it did quite well in 1815. And that was against a largely veteran, if poorly lead army with control of the sea. In this case it was be a smaller army having to advance overland through hostile territory.

Three: Should Napoleon even try to mount a campaign in America, he would be making several mistakes on a strategic level.

-He would be turning his attention from Europe, the only thing he really cares about (as history has shown), and towards something he doesn't even control. He will have stretched supply lines with no real base, be vulnerable to British naval superiority, have poor lines of communications, and basically face all the problems Britain faced in the American Revolution tenfold.

My previous comments mentioned I was assuming no Franco-British war. As such no British threat and much better supply lines than the Americans. Also he is not seeking to suppress internal unrest amongst a significant fraction of a population by largely restraint and legal means. He is seeking to defend French territory, occupied by Frenchmen, against a foreign invasion.

-He would quckly make a US-Britain alliance faster than anything else. Britain won't want any threat to Canada, which is what a Napoleonic army in America would be. Having the US gain New Orleans is a win-win for Britain, as running interferance would both all but insure the US success and weaken Napoleon (who the British don't care to appease). That's one less potential trading partner for Napoleon when the war with Britain comes, and one more ally for Britain.

Possibly but very possibly not. Britain would have no quarrel with French forces getting tied down defending Louisiana against American attacks. Especially since while it lasted it would remove the real threat to Canada, from the US. Once the French started counter attacking and possibly occupying large areas of the US it might be different but that could be too late for the US. Also, given that we are presuming both major powers are looking for a lasting peace Britain could well be frustrated at US actions enough to leave them to hang, or simply offer to mediate, based on the US giving up its insane demands. [Since it is talking about attacking one of the two superpowers the world has that's the best description that applies at this point].

-Napoleonic tactics of big even lines don't work well in North America, because much of the east is wooded, hilly, and near impossible to arange big formations on. And when you consider what the US did to british formations marching through woods in the Revolution, Napoleonic tactics will soon meet "unsporting" and "cowardly" american woodsman tactics. Unless, of couse, Napoleon is going to be foolish enough to only be defensive around New Orleans, in which case he can't hit anything importnat.

True but the French also made extensive use of large numbers of skirmishers. They would have thousands of natural allies in the local Indians. American woodmen would probably find themselves cut to pieces if they tried to operate in small groups, as opposed to simply being blasted if they tried to operate as an army. If you think the French would be considering fighting a sporting or gentlemanly war I suggest you read up on the peninsula conflict.

-At the time, the US had one of the biggest merchant marines of the world. It was only broken over Jefferson's stupid Embargo Act and the abuses of by Napoleon and the British. A war would mean no Embargo Act, no British seizures (good relations/alliance and all that), and the makings of a significant US navy to fight the French supply lines. And since Britain wouldn't be sad to see Napoleon bloodied, "volunteers" and assistance via Canada are perfectly likely.

You would have to build that navy while your coasts and merchant marines would be exposed to attack by the very large French fleet. We're talking a pre-Trafalgar POD here so, even without their Spanish allies the French could muster tens of SOL when the US lacked even one. A few of those would be able to protect any convoy and others could provide cover for lighter frigates blockading or otherwise harassing US shipping. As you say the US had a large merchant marine and I can just see how desperate the British trading interests would be to insist on protecting one of their main rivals. Or the loyalists driven from their home to fight in support of their former enemies.

Once again, suggests that Napoleon is Europe focused. He has no benefit to a distraction in New Orleans. And just because Britain wants peace doesn't mean that it will give France a free hand. The US and USSR wanted peace with eachother, but supported client states and allies opposed to the other. Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cuba, South Korea, the list goes on.

Only in areas that they could or were of interest to them. The west didn't support unrest in areas recognised as part of the Soviet sphere, such as eastern Europe.

If Napoleon, or some other French leader, is satisfied with the predominant position in Europe he has already he would not want to rock the boat too much. Also if he has the immensely rich potential of Louisiana he would seek to protect it, especially if it was being openly threatened by an upstart neighbour.

Come now, how long would it hold together without a military tradition/victories? If France doesn't have future victories to offer its clients, then pretty soon those people aren't going to stick around. Nations/groups held together by military might need war to stay whole.

Ah, but at that time there was a lot else to hold them together. French reforms were still viewed positively in many parts of Europe and the French clients in western Germany and Italy generally preferred French domination to that of Prussia or Austria. It took another decade or so of war and looting to alienate increasing numbers of those peoples and many Germans and Italians stayed loyal until very near the end.

We know, through historical documents, that the US was going to seize it if it wasn't sold. We know, though history, Napoleon was only interested in Europe. If anything, it only suggests that even if he did decide to pursue a costly war with the US over uncontroled territory that wasn't worth the price paid, he'd quickly get side tracked by events in Europe, be unable to spare the resources for anything in America, and get handed a defeat by the US or else face the cost in gold, resources, and manpower of defending something so far away. This would cause France troubles sooner rather than later.

We are talking AH here so your suggestion of Napoleon being only interested in Europe, which is factually inaccurate anyway is irrelevant. The US wants New Orleans its just that I doubt its ability to take it from a much larger and more powerful state. Given that the US would pay a higher cost than France for the operation why do you think imperial France would say quit before the US?

Better suited for another topic, since this is about New Orleans. With no other POD, Napoleon will still get beaten. Sooner, if he wastes resources on a backwater no one lives in. If he goes to war with the US, Sam Fulton won't be offering the steam boat. Without the steam boat, invasion of Britain is near ASB. In fact, the conquest of most of Europe is near ASB. Especially since a Britain-aligned US would pick up some of the slack for losing European trading partners.

Interesting. You argued that Napoleon would be better off following his existing course of continued conflict in Europe. That only makes sense if he eventually win virtually total domination of Europe. Or did you just mean it was better for the US that he follows such a course rather than defend his interests in the Americas? I was just pointing out that following your suggestion the US faces an even bigger problem a little further down the line.

Not really. Even after losing the wars, France still got to keep a significant empire. Britain would be no exception. Quebec may be free/recolonized, but there are many more areas (ie India) that are worth the efforts to claim, and Canada isn't really one. Especially since Britain may immitate France and "give" Canada to the US, on secret treaty to keep it away from a potential negotiating table.

That is because it was defeated by a coalition of powers that wanted a lasting and reasonably stable peace. If a military dictator wins he is likely to want a more draconian peace, such as those inflicted on Prussia and Austria historically.

Even assuming he does ASB manage to win, Napoleon's first interest is to gain control over his new gains, keep others from aligning against him, and otherwise not waste energy in unproductive fields. Demanding a city that was quickly swamped by another nationality over 10 years ago would be pretty low on the list.

Why are you assuming a so much greater rate of western expansion of the US? Or that an autocratic ruler with a desire for military solutions at least as great as the early Americans will be happy with historically French areas under foreign rule. Especially if they were obtained by either military attacks or pressure. What was that someone said earlier about the need to keep the French army active?

If you're going to have France even have a hope of keeping New Orleans, you'll need a POD so far back that the setting of this tread is no longer an issue. Otherwise, it's in Napoleon's best interest to get rid of baggage for cash and to focus on the real prize. People who try and get greedy (like he did) end up biting more than they can chew. This is the same case for the dispute over New Orleans. It's worth less than nothing now, will be worth less than nothing for untold decades even it is held, and he's planning for a big fight. Why bother with swampland and mountain men?

You have still given no idea how the Americans, presuming continued Franco-British peace, are going to seize the area in the face of superior French forces, backed up by the local inhabitants and with much superior logistics. Just saying that the Americans will drive the French out doesn't wash.

Steve

 

[Dean_the_Young]

Steve, you are presuming a radical shift in the foreign policies of two competing powers who are planning to go to war in the immediate future and are trying to introduce PODs so far back that the situation is changed radically. Further more you aren't even truly detailing why these PODs are coming around, only making them up to support a semi-vague point. A specific alternative POD or a short term POD is one thing, an extremely vague and scene altering POD is different when debating details.

I am doing my best to stick to the thread topic, which defines a simple POD, which is "What if Napoleon hadn't sold". No radical changes in the past. The immediate reasoning could be anything from delusions of grandeur of a future North American Empire, follows the advice of his foreign minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, so on. If you want to use a reasonable POD, fine. But please have a specific and reasonable POD, and if it is policy change please keep in mind the views of the time and not the views of someone looking back at the past.

In fact, one possible interpretation to this topic is that France doesn't sell the Louisiana Territory, it merely surrenders it to the US as Napoleon had considered. Lord knows that the US had been pushing for years that France had no legal right to its North American claims.


Also, for those interested in the Negotiations/ relevant politics of the purchase, here is the wiki article on it. I've reviewed it, and most of it is sound and can be trusted. It traces the events that convinced Napoleon to sell, including loss of the profitable American possessions and rising worries (and treaty breaking) with Britain.

Negotiation
Jefferson laid the groundwork for the purchase by sending Livingston to Paris in 1801, after discovering the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France. Livingston was to pursue a purchase of New Orleans, but he was rebuffed by the French.
In 1802, Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours was enlisted to help negotiate. Du Pont was living in the United States at the time and had close ties to Jefferson, as well as to the political powers in France. He engaged in back-channel diplomacy with Napoleon, on Jefferson's behalf, during a personal visit to France. He originated the idea of the much larger Louisiana Purchase as a way to defuse potential conflict between the United States and Napoleon over North America.[3]
Jefferson disliked the idea: purchasing Louisiana from France would imply that France had a right to be in Louisiana. A strict constructionalist, Jefferson also believed that a U.S. president did not have the authority to engage in such a deal because it was not specified in the constitution, and that to do so would moreover erode states' rights by increasing federal executive power. On the other hand, he was aware of the potential threat that a neighbor like France would be for the young nation, and was prepared to go to war to prevent a strong French presence in the region. Meanwhile, Napoleon's foreign minister, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, was vehemently opposed to selling Louisiana since it would mean an end to France's secret plans for a North American empire.
Throughout this time, Jefferson had up-to-date intelligence on Napoleon's military activities and intentions in North America. Part of his evolving strategy involved giving du Pont information that was withheld from Livingston. He also gave intentionally conflicting instructions to the two. He next sent Monroe to Paris in 1803. Monroe had been formally expelled from France on his last diplomatic mission, and the choice to send him again conveyed a sense of seriousness.
Napoleon was faced with the defeat of his armies in Saint-Domingue (present-day Republic of Haiti) where an expeditionary force under his brother-in-law Charles Leclerc was attempting to reassert control over a slave rebellion that threatened France's most profitable colony.
Political conflicts in Guadeloupe and in Saint-Domingue grew with the restoration of slavery on May 20, 1802, and the defection of leading French officers, like the black general Jean-Jacques Dessalines and the mulatto officer Alexandre Pétion in October 1802, within the context of an ongoing guerrilla war. The French had successfully deported Toussaint L'Ouverture to France in June 1802, but yellow fever was destroying European soldiers and claimed Leclerc in November.
Lacking sufficient military forces in America, Napoleon needed peace with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to implement the Treaty of San Ildefonso and take possession of Louisiana. Otherwise, Louisiana would be an easy prey for the British or even for the Americans. Britain had breached her promise to evacuate Malta by September 1802 as stipulated in the peace of Amiens, and in the beginning of the year 1803, war between France and Britain seemed increasingly unavoidable. On March 11, 1803, Napoleon decided to start building a flotilla of barges to invade Britain.
These circumstances led Bonaparte to abandon his plans to rebuild France's New World empire. Napoleon gave notice to his business minister, François de Barbé-Marbois, on April 10, 1803, that he was considering surrendering the Louisiana Territory to the United States. On 11 April 1803, just days before Monroe's arrival, Marquess de Barbé-Marbois, Napoleon's minister of the treasury, offered Livingston all of Louisiana instead of just New Orleans. President Jefferson had instructed Livingston to only purchase New Orleans. However, he was certain that the United States would accept such a large offer.
The American negotiators were prepared to spend $10 million for New Orleans but were dumbfounded when the entire region was offered for $15 million. The treaty was dated April 30, 1803, and was signed on May 2. On July 14, 1803, the treaty reached Washington D.C. The Louisiana territory was vast, stretching from the Gulf of Mexico in the south to Rupert's Land in the north, and from the Mississippi River in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west. Acquiring the territory would double the size of the United States at a cost in the currency of the day of less than 3 cents per acre (7 cents per ha).

 

[stevep]

Steve, you are presuming a radical shift in the foreign policies of two competing powers who are planning to go to war in the immediate future

True, I am considering that Napoleon and Britain might avoid renewed conflict. While there was a lot of concern about French power on the continent and possession of the low countries there was also a measure of war weariness after a decade of conflict which had cost a lot and seen few gains. As such I don’t think it was too impractical.


I agree that it is a totally different thing if the war between France and Britain resumes. Then the US would be able to rely on a isolated Louisanna and may even be able to use the sea to supply forces for an attack on the region. Presuming Napoleon hadn't strongly reinforced the region because of his desire to maintain it, which would be pretty reckless if he expected war with Britain to resume, it would then probably fall. [Although it could take several years of very hard fighting].

and are trying to introduce PODs so far back that the situation is changed radically. Further more you aren't even truly detailing why these PODs are coming around, only making them up to support a semi-vague point. A specific alternative POD or a short term POD is one thing, an extremely vague and scene altering POD is different when debating details.

False! What PODs are you referring to here? The only thing I can think of is that, as an alternative to Napoleon changing his tune, I suggested possibly that a year or so before the time in question it might have been another general who was chosen to have led the coup against the directorate.

The point I am making is that if France doesn't want to sell and doesn't get involved with a new war with Britain then the US has the proverbial cat in hell's chance of conquering the region. Even more than in our ongoing discussion on a possible war on the Oregon border that would be a case of the US adopting Japan 41 tactics. Especially since an imperial France at this time would probably be far less generous than Britain in the 1840s' to an attacking US. France at the time is just too powerful, as well as far too militant for the US to suceed in anything so insane.

Steve

 

[Dean_the_Young]

True, I am considering that Napoleon and Britain might avoid renewed conflict. While there was a lot of concern about French power on the continent and possession of the low countries there was also a measure of war weariness after a decade of conflict which had cost a lot and seen few gains. As such I don’t think it was too impractical.

Napoleon had been planning for war with Britain long before the Americans came sniffing around. He was already giving up his western possessions as well, since he couldn't hold the valuable ones and New Orleans is a cost with only incredibally-long range value. The US's offer was accepted because it fit his plans; he gets rid of lands he felt he could not control or have any worth from, and in exchange gets the money for it.

The upcoming British and French conflict already has the roots planted, such as how Britain had broken the Peac of Amiens and Napoleon had broken other treaties. When both sides break multiple agreements, there isn't the trust needed for such large policy gambles. If they do make a treaty/agreement, what proof is there that the other side won't just back track on it?

The breakdown of French-British relations, with parts even to the revolution, is touched in this wiki article. Notice how major tensions had been around for a long time.

Taken from the Treaty of Amiens.

However, objections to the treaty quickly grew in the United Kingdom, especially as it seemed that the UK was making all the concessions. In addition, Bonaparte had interfered with the Batavian and Cisalpine Republics and sent troops into Switzerland, breaking earlier treaties. Concerns were also raised by the sending of a major French Army to the Caribbean island of Santo Domingo, where it reimposed slavery and cracked down on the independence movement. As a result the British Government balked at implementing certain terms, such as evacuating their military presence from Malta, due to this French refusal to respect other terms of the treaty. Despite appeals from French Foreign Minster Talleyrand, Bonaparte refused to concede much, especially as it was rumoured that he had designs on Egypt again. As a result Addington strengthened the Royal Navy, and imposed a blockade of France.
Although it has been alleged that the United Kingdom seized all French ships in British ports, there appears to be no evidence to support such an assertion. Napoleon certainly believed (or invented) it, stating that six ships had been seized "on the high seas," although these ships and their captains have never been named. In response, on 22 May 1803 (2 Prairial, year XI) Bonaparte, as First Consul, ordered the imprisonment of almost all British civilians in France. This was an act that was denounced as illegal by all the major powers. The detainees were men between the ages of 18 and 60. Napoleon claimed in the French press that the British prisoners that he had taken amounted to 10,000, but French documents compiled in Paris a few months later show that the numbers were 1,181. It was not until the Abdication of Napoleon in 1814 that these British prisoners were allowed to return home.
Addington proved an ineffective prime minister in wartime, and was replaced on 10 May 1804 with William Pitt, who started the Third Coalition. Pitt has been alleged to be behind assassination attempts at the Bonaparte's life (by Cadoudal and Pichegru).
Napoleon, now emperor, assembled armies on the coast of France to invade the British Isles, but Austria and Russia, the United Kingdom's allies, were preparing to invade France. The French armies were christened La Grande Armée and secretly left the coast to march against Austria and Russia before their armies could combine. It defeated Austria at Ulm the day before the Battle of Trafalgar, and France effectively destroyed the Third Coalition thanks to Napoléon's victory at the Battle of Austerlitz. In 1806, Britain re-took the Cape Colony from the Batavian Republic, which Napoleon abolished later that year in favour of the 'Kingdom of Holland', ruled by his brother Louis.

I agree that it is a totally different thing if the war between France and Britain resumes. Then the US would be able to rely on a isolated Louisanna and may even be able to use the sea to supply forces for an attack on the region. Presuming Napoleon hadn't strongly reinforced the region because of his desire to maintain it, which would be pretty reckless if he expected war with Britain to resume, it would then probably fall. [Although it could take several years of very hard fighting].

The US already has a fair chance at isolating Louisiana, since Jefferson has upped the fleet and Napoleon can't send his biggest hitters into the area over concerns with Britain. Assuming that the thing is a surprise attack, the US would have a fair chance of grabbing it before any news got to France. Then they have time to invest into fortifications/field works as Napoleon learns of the information, gathers his forces if he decides to, sail them towards New Orleans, and begins a counter attack. During this time men and masses of supplies could be shipped to New Orleans, field works prepared, and other preparations for a possible seige.

Several years of hard fighting? Outside a city of only a couple thousand (if that) beside a swamp? And Napoleon's going to go through the cost of heavily fortifying and supplying a city that brings no revenue, when he's losing control of what does bring revenue in the Caribbean?

False! What PODs are you referring to here? The only thing I can think of is that, as an alternative to Napoleon changing his tune, I suggested possibly that a year or so before the time in question it might have been another general who was chosen to have led the coup against the directorate.

Considering how the entire debate upto this time has been based on Napoleon being the leader of France, the French Revolution occuring as it has, the Americans being as it was and not some Ameriwank with the US controlling Canada, and so on, I'm going to ignore this. Especially since this is the first time you've suggested Napoleon NOT being the decision maker.

The point I am making is that if France doesn't want to sell and doesn't get involved with a new war with Britain then the US has the proverbial cat in hell's chance of conquering the region.

Napoleon may not want to get involved with Britain: Britain at this point definately wants to get involved with Napoleon. Napoleon still has to consider any doublecross/action by Britain as he pursues ANOTHER war in the Americas (where he is constantly having bad luck) over territory (a city, really) who only the Americans consider valuable; the US doesn't and can very reasonably expect aid/trade with Britain. Napoleon can not afford to invest too much of his energy on a sideshow at the risk of the European game of diplomacy and intrigue; the US has no such fear. Napoleon has, by your count, 10 ship-of-the-line that he can't send all to the Americas for fear of British interferance; the US shipbuilding industry produces some of the best ships in the world, already has a first class merchant marine to rely on across the oceans, and is very likely to receive support from Britain (who will have an easy and safe way to poke an stick in France's eye). Napoleon has to worry about American action in the rebellious but precious Caribbean colonies as well as any other action; the US only has one key goal and has the chance to form a profitable connection connection in the Caribbean. Napoleon has to defend his claims to an entire empty region as well as attack the US to "win"; the US only needs to get one small city to win the whole thing. Napoleon will have a massive supply/communication line open to privateers and the small-but-growing US navy while not being able to deploy all of his own navy; the US has a much sounder sea route and can focus nearly its entire (growable) navy to the conflict. Napoleon is fighting for an unprofitable empty land while his precious Caribbean colonies are being lost; the US has only one key thing to fight for. Napoleon is constantly going to have to look over his shoulders at the British; if anything Britain and any other power concerned about Napoleon will be aiding the US.

Even more than in our ongoing discussion on a possible war on the Oregon border that would be a case of the US adopting Japan 41 tactics.

The Oregon War thread was always more of an ASB plausibility what if. Everyone admited that Britain was secure enough to devote the resources to end the war, while most doubted the war would last long either way. Also, the Grand Strategies between a preemptive attack on New Orleans and Japan's own (accidental) surprise attack are completely different. One relied on getting enough of a buffer area to draw out a superior nation to the bargaining table, where concessions would be made. The other would rely on the idea of fait accompli over a worthless backwater when the bigger nation has its attention diverted many which ways. And considering how every war is, in a sense, a surprise attack...

Especially since an imperial France at this time would probably be far less generous than Britain in the 1840s' to an attacking US.

Because, as every wise leader knows, there's so much you can pry out of a small nation who boarders an empty territory. Especially since said country, by nature of distance from France, is almost immediately going to ally with Britain. And driving potential neutrals into the enemy camp is such a smart idea. Gentle peace wasn't a solely British tactic, you know. And the US and France still hold strong bonds for being sibling republics.

France at the time is just too powerful, as well as far too militant for the US to suceed in anything so insane.

France at this time can't even keep the profitable possessions she does have, is preparing for a war with Britain, and is short on cash. In some cases, immediate profit does outweigh long-range potential. This is the case for France.

 

[King Gorilla]

Can France at this time conduct a transatlantic war with the existence of a hostile britain against a maritime against an entrenched enemy (provided of course that the US hasn't taken New Orleans by the time a relief force arrives)? The US got a lucky stalemate out of Britain in the war of 1812 with Britain relying largely on its overwelming navel superiority for its eventual victory. France had a much weaker navy than britain not to mention have an inferior navel tradition. Having the best army in Europe doesn't mean much if you cannot land and organize it.

 

[stevep]

Can France at this time conduct a transatlantic war with the existence of a hostile britain against a maritime against an entrenched enemy (provided of course that the US hasn't taken New Orleans by the time a relief force arrives)? The US got a lucky stalemate out of Britain in the war of 1812 with Britain relying largely on its overwelming navel superiority for its eventual victory. France had a much weaker navy than britain not to mention have an inferior navel tradition. Having the best army in Europe doesn't mean much if you cannot land and organize it.

King Gorilla

The point I have been arguing with Dean is that if, as the original suggestion says France refuses to sell. As I have agreed then presuming renewed hostility with Britain the position is hopeless for Louisiana in the long run although if reinforced between the Americans attack and well led it could be very difficult for Americans to take.

However, as I have said, if war doesn't resume between Britain and France than the US doesn't have a cat in hells chance. Even the 10 SOL that Dean mentions - not sure where he gets that figure from although somehow he attributes it to me? - a small proportion of the French fleet, is enough to stop any sea approach, which means they have to struggle overland. In the face of even a small French army - small say being less than 20k - let alone any Indians allies, that is going to be a hell of a task.

Simply, if the US can't rely on Britain to cut links to France then France has far too much of everything to make any American attack possible.

Steve

 

[Dean_the_Young]

The point I have been arguing with Dean is that if, as the original suggestion says France refuses to sell. As I have agreed then presuming renewed hostility with Britain the position is hopeless for Louisiana in the long run although if reinforced between the Americans attack and well led it could be very difficult for Americans to take.

Pretty much a given, considering the political climate of the time.

However, as I have said, if war doesn't resume between Britain and France than the US doesn't have a cat in hells chance. Even the 10 SOL that Dean mentions - not sure where he gets that figure from although somehow he attributes it to me? - a small proportion of the French fleet, is enough to stop any sea approach,

Except, that the US has a decent (if small) fleet of its own, and in most of its early wars had good luck using a merchant marine to supplement its forces. Assuming France will have the victorious navy because it's a greater power isn't enough. The americans of the time have a strong naval tradition; oceanic trade is the buisness. France, if the results of its future wars are anything to go by, does not.

In the face of even a small French army - small say being less than 20k - let alone any Indians allies, that is going to be a hell of a task.

If France happens to have 20,000 troops just laying around waiting to be used, they're going to employ them where they get the most utils for the value of the troops. Reestablishing control over the Caribbean colonies, which had massive utils for their revenue ability, would be a good example of utils for value. Or protecting valuable allies/colonies in Europe, to insure that they aren't lost. Or even preparing the troops for the next war, a show of strength to warn off the British.

All of those are going to have higher utils for the Army than deploying them to a place that provides no utils of value, and is almost negative utils on its own. Adding in the extra costs of deploying, supplying, and fighting the troops, and such a campaign will have negative utils.


As for Indian allies, they were rarely good unless they were well supplied and trained. The classic American weapon is a gun; the classic indian weapon is an axe. See the difference? Sure, Napoleon could bite even more costs and send more weapons to arm the natives, but (1) they wouldn't be well trained and (2) they would still be inefficient soldiers. The Europeans and Americans fought for victory and to kill the enemy; indians fought for personal glory. A generalization, but not so far from the truth.

Simply, if the US can't rely on Britain to cut links to France then France has far too much of everything to make any American attack possible.

The US has can use their entire navy, and all of the merchant marine. And we didn't embaress ourselves during the undeclared naval war with France earlier either. And since any move France makes will be watched and considered by Britain, the "far too much" becomes significantly less.

 

[raharris1973]

Then why for fuck's sake did he ask the Spanish for

the territory back? Couldn't he have asked for something closer or more defensible.

Also, in OTL, did the French even have time to send a garrison or administrators? OR was it still the Spanish on the ground.


Let's do a new PoD: Spain keeps Louisiana.

In that case, when does the easy peasy American war to take it over happen?

 

[Dean_the_Young]

Then why the fuck did he ask for the territory back? Couldn't he have asked for something closer or more defensible.

Probably because this was what Napoleon felt he could squeez out of Spain. This falls more into the realm of European politics, which I'm ignorrant of, such as why France gave Spain territory in the first place. However, wiki does say that the treaty was somewhat coerced.

Plus, I would assume this was before Napoleon started losing his other Carribean colonies. He probably did have hopes for a New World Empire, but as he was losing thousands of troops for no gain just to lose the Caribbean, Louisiana lost its value.

A matter of "it seemed like a good decision at the time", with a "who could have guessed that would happen" a bit latter.

Also, in OTL, did the French even have time to send a garrison or administrators? OR was it still the Spanish on the ground.

Control was "officially" reverted to France about 3 weeks before control was reverted, though do to the "secret" nature of the treaty the spanish flag was flown to the day of the transfer. The day of the transfer is the one time the city was under three governments in the same day (Spanish, French, American).

I believe that the composition of New Orleans was that it was mainly French colonists/residents, but Spanish officials. One of the criticisms of the Louisiana Purchase was that some feared it was paying France for the privilage of war with Spain.

Let's do a new PoD: Spain keeps Louisiana.

Is this a PoD where Spain never weakens to the point of being able to have its arm twisted by Napoleon? Or is it merely that the Spanish govt. decides to rile the giant to their east and say "no"?

Considerin what happened OTL, Spain could quickly be occupied with France on the continent and not be able to respond to an opportunistic American force. A de facto accomplished by the time Spain could do anything, and Spain would have worries much closer to home than a French city and empty land.

Heck, if war comes between France and Spain over the refusal to ceed the territory, then the US could "offer" needed money to Spain in exchange for the city. Spain would be in need of stuff to resist Napoleon, and New Orleans is far away from profitable Spanish interests...

In that case, when does the easy peasy American war to take it over happen?

Who ever said it would be "easy peasy"? Don't put words in my mouth.

What someone implied was that any US-French conflict over New Orleans would be a cakewalk for France because it could bring its much larger weight against the US. And I responded by pointing out that France was preparing for war against Britain (and the reverse), that France had other colonies to protect, was already considering just giving up New Orleans because they had already lost the money-making Caribbean, and that the US would likely have British assistance.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

This fantasy of a French Empire centered on New Orleans is impossible to achieve. Once Napoleon trashes the 'Treaty' of Amiens there is no ending the war with Great Britain barring either London or Paris going down. Prior to that, London will be only too thrilled to see much of the French fleet and tens of thousands of French soldiers at the end of a long supply line which the RN can cut at leisure, not to mention turning the US from a potential threat to Canada into a useful ally.

Nothing will cause the extremely limited number of Indians in the SE United States to become more numerous. 10,000 dead would be a minor battle in Europe. To the Indians it would be several, not one, tribes effectively wiped out.

Also why has no one pointed out that 50,000 French soldiers couldn't cope with Haiti? Not a good example of Napoleon's forces overseas. Now, since the US was able to field an army of nearly 65,000 by 1815...

 

[Darkling]

Also why has no one pointed out that 50,000 French soldiers couldn't cope with Haiti?

Fighting yellow fever and a guerilla insurgency is a far different proposition to fighting the US in stand up battles.

Not a good example of Napoleon's forces overseas. Now, since the US was able to field an army of nearly 65,000 by 1815...

On paper, it was considerably less when we take into account those that were actually signed up and even fewer still when we take account of the higher number of ineffectives.

The US also has the problem of it's supply lines but the whole thing is a bit of a useless dead end away since it is highly unlikely Napoleon is going to do something so stupid.

 

[Alratan]

Also why has no one pointed out that 50,000 French soldiers couldn't cope with Haiti? Not a good example of Napoleon's forces overseas. Now, since the US was able to field an army of nearly 65,000 by 1815...

To be fair, the reason they couldn't cope with Haiti is that half of them, including their commander, died of Yellow Fever, and they were facing guerrilla warfare in a territory far more densely populated than most of the US, against an enemy that was literally, rather than figuratively, fighting for its freedom.

I wouldn't expect the US to do anything like as well against the Haitians.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

Right...

15+ times the population, a rising and highly effective fleet, a standing army which in 1815 nearly outnumbered Haiti's entire male population of military age, a vastly more effective economic and industrial base and the support of the British Empire couldn't possibly do as well as the Haitians.

Not to mention yellow fever, malaria and other diseases in and around New Orleans.


Darkling, of course, summed it up perfectly. Since there is no chance of England allowing Napoleon free reign in Europe, there is no chance of this situation taking place.

 

[stevep]

What someone implied was that any US-French conflict over New Orleans would be a cakewalk for France because it could bring its much larger weight against the US.

Actually, what I said, repeatedly but Dean wasn't listening, was that if Napoleon avoided a new clash with Britain then the US had no chance of seizing the port against the far more formidable French forces available. I never said it would be a cakewalk, but rejected the idea that the Americans, with everything against them, had any real chance of success.

I also said, several times, that if France did get into a war against Britain the position was hopeless although the French could probably give the US forces a hell of a fight. If say the army sent to Haiti has been sent direct to Louisiana instead and was anything like decently led.

Steve

 

[Dean_the_Young]

Actually, what I said, repeatedly but Dean wasn't listening, was that if Napoleon avoided a new clash with Britain

And as I and others have said, repeatedly but Stevep wasn't listening, was that by the time this situation came to be an issue, avoiding war between Britain and France <with Napoleon still on board> approaches ASB.



Edit: Forgot to include the part about Napoleon, and the ironic .

 

[Thande]

And as I and others have said, repeatedly but Stevep wasn't listening, was that by the time this situation came to be an issue, avoiding war between Britain and France approaches ASB.

Not necessarily. The Peace of Amiens of 1802 could have held, particularly if Nappy died and someone more conservative took over.

Say that an Anglo-French persists until at least 1805. The French (as OTL) send forces to try and retake Haiti from 1802 onwards, and will probably send a republican garrison to New Orleans too. Easy enough to work up an American urge to conquer Louisiana, particularly if the French Navy is impressing US sailors like the RN did in OTL.

The US invades Louisiana and the British re-enter the war, using this as an opportunity to catch the French fleet in the open in the West Indies, rather than having it bottled up in French ports all the time like it was in OTL. Probably not a total war - Britain won't make descents against continental France, just force the French out of North American affairs (with American help), the way they already have in India.

End result - American Louisiana (and possibly Haiti), and, more significantly in the long run, a strong Anglo-American alliance with no 1812 to sour the rapproachment.