WI: France gets involved in the winter war?

On the 29th of Feb 1940 (I guess it was a leap year), France promised Finland 50,000 troops and 100 bombers if Finland refused to surrender.

IOTL, Norway and Sweden did not give permission to the Wallies to bring forces in, so the promise was meaningless.

WI Norway and Sweden allowed for the transfer of men? Perhaps the POD is that Germany attacked France in Nov 1939 and were bogged down. This as a result gives the Wallies free reign in Scandanavia and the Russians, perhaps waiting for the German collapse in coming months, put more men in Poland, effectively sapping Russian strength.

Further, the Finns have more ammo, as Norway and Sweden open themselves up to the Wallies, allowing the Finns to hold out longer at the Mannerheim Line.

The result is that by the time the Russians establish bridgeheads near Vipuri by crossing the frozen waters (delayed 2 weeks by increased Finn ammo and less Russian forces), the spring thaw makes these positions collapse.

At this point the Mannerheim Line collapses, but the second, lesser built up line now has 50,000 French soldiers there to help the Finns. Let's say at this point we are in late March.

What happens next? Feel free to speculate how this may affect the war with Germany, and if the USSR essentially becomes a full-blown co-belligerent with Germany.
 

Deimos

Banned
How fast can these soldiers be transported to Finland and how fast can they get to Finland via land routes? Keep in mind that Operation Weseruebung occured on the 9th of April the same year - not even 1.5 months after the French offer. If word of such an agreement got out, Norway and Sweden would not only give up their neutrality towards the Soviet Union but probably also towards Germany because an Anglo/French presence would probably also hinder the much needed iron exports Germany received from Sweden via Norway.
Alternatively, if the Allies suceed with this plan Germany can close off the Baltic Sea via Denmark and then major population centres in Norway and Sweden can be attacked by the Kriegsmarine or the Soviet navy. How are the Scandinavian countries convinced to go through with this in the face of such danger?
 
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How fast can these soldiers be transported to Finland and how fast can they get to Finland via land routes? Keep in mind that Operation Weseruebung occured on the 9th of April the same year - not even 1.5 months after the French offer. If word of such an agreement got out, Norway and Sweden would not only give up their neutrality towards the Soviet Union but probably also towards Germany because an Anglo/French presence would probably also hinder the much needed iron exports Germany received from Sweden via Norway.
Alternatively, if the Allies suceed with this plan Germany can close off the Baltic Sea via Denmark and then major population centres in Norway and Sweden can be attacked by the Kriegsmarine or the Soviet navy. How are the Scandinavian countries convinced to go through with this in the face of such danger?

POD is a failed German invasion of the Low Countries in Nov 1939. Germany is in dire straits and Norway and Finland simply cannot stop the Wallies, it's sort of a coerced relationship like Germany and Bulgaria OTL. The Germans cannot take Norway in this scenerio, they are bogged down in the west.
 
POD is a failed German invasion of the Low Countries in Nov 1939. Germany is in dire straits and Norway and Finland simply cannot stop the Wallies, it's sort of a coerced relationship like Germany and Bulgaria OTL. The Germans cannot take Norway in this scenerio, they are bogged down in the west.

IOTL, Sweden told Finland (repeatedly) at the time that if the Allies send troops to Swedish soil without Stockholm's say-so, they will be opposed with military force. And this, among the Finnish well-founded suspicion that the Allied troops that would actually reach Finland would be too little and too late, was what stopped Finland from sending the Allies an official plea for help, the figleaf that would have provided them the casus belli against the USSR. The Finnish government did not want to drag the neutral Swedes into the war against their wishes and so the Allied help was rejected. I see nothing in your scenario so far that would change the Finno-Swedo-Anglo-French relations playing out in the very same way they did IOTL.

What you need is a way the Allies can butter up the Swedish in time to gain their assent (and that of the Norwegians, but that is a smaller problem) despite their heavy, traditional, verging-on-obsession commitment to neutrality. Especially, you need for them to not suspect, like they did IOTL, that the Allied goal is just to take control of the Swedish iron ore mines in the guise of helping Finland, which was the OTL Allied rationale behind the very operation.

You would also need for London and Paris to have the foresight to plan an intervention in the Winter War several months before the war actually starts, and have troops and ships ready to move in mid-December 1939 at the latest to convince Mannerheim and the Finnish president and cabinet that they will arrive at the front in time. As we know, the Finns never expected to be able to withstand the Soviet attack as long as they did, and prior to the war Mannerheim himself would have only given the Finnish army just weeks or two months at a maximum before the lines would collapse. The Allied aid needs to be very fast indeed so it will show up at the front in time to make a difference, and before Stalin will send peace terms the Finns can accept, like IOTL.
 
I really doubt Stalin would allow his red army to engage the western allies at the time. It was more in his character to bully much smaller states (Baltic states, Romania and Finland) or back-stab the more potent ones (Poland, Japan). The risk of western interference was one of the major reasons he decided to stop the Winter War short and accept only territorial changes instead of occupation of Finland.

The more likely it was that the Wallies take part in Winter War (be it in Finland, Caucasian oilfields or perhaps naval blockade by RN), the sooner the war ends and less territory Finns need to give up.

Let's remember that before the fall of France Wallies appeared to be much stronger than Germany. More population, more industry and unlimited access to raw materials around the globe.
 
I really doubt Stalin would allow his red army to engage the western allies at the time. It was more in his character to bully much smaller states (Baltic states, Romania and Finland) or back-stab the more potent ones (Poland, Japan). The risk of western interference was one of the major reasons he decided to stop the Winter War short and accept only territorial changes instead of occupation of Finland.

The more likely it was that the Wallies take part in Winter War (be it in Finland, Caucasian oilfields or perhaps naval blockade by RN), the sooner the war ends and less territory Finns need to give up.

Let's remember that before the fall of France Wallies appeared to be much stronger than Germany. More population, more industry and unlimited access to raw materials around the globe.

So, ironically, Stalin stops short of where he did OTL because that's where the first French troops were and signs probably a similar peace? The Wallies would not demand that the USSR withdraw from territorial gains in Finland at the risk of getting into a hot war with them, right?
 
IOTL, Sweden told Finland (repeatedly) at the time that if the Allies send troops to Swedish soil without Stockholm's say-so, they will be opposed with military force. And this, among the Finnish well-founded suspicion that the Allied troops that would actually reach Finland would be too little and too late, was what stopped Finland from sending the Allies an official plea for help, the figleaf that would have provided them the casus belli against the USSR. The Finnish government did not want to drag the neutral Swedes into the war against their wishes and so the Allied help was rejected. I see nothing in your scenario so far that would change the Finno-Swedo-Anglo-French relations playing out in the very same way they did IOTL.

What you need is a way the Allies can butter up the Swedish in time to gain their assent (and that of the Norwegians, but that is a smaller problem) despite their heavy, traditional, verging-on-obsession commitment to neutrality. Especially, you need for them to not suspect, like they did IOTL, that the Allied goal is just to take control of the Swedish iron ore mines in the guise of helping Finland, which was the OTL Allied rationale behind the very operation.

You would also need for London and Paris to have the foresight to plan an intervention in the Winter War several months before the war actually starts, and have troops and ships ready to move in mid-December 1939 at the latest to convince Mannerheim and the Finnish president and cabinet that they will arrive at the front in time. As we know, the Finns never expected to be able to withstand the Soviet attack as long as they did, and prior to the war Mannerheim himself would have only given the Finnish army just weeks or two months at a maximum before the lines would collapse. The Allied aid needs to be very fast indeed so it will show up at the front in time to make a difference, and before Stalin will send peace terms the Finns can accept, like IOTL.

The French gave a troop guarentee IOTL. The butterflies of a failed German attack in Nov 1939 ITTL gives the Wallies more confidence and initiative, so the Swedes and Norwegians essentially cave so as to avoid outright occupation (which the Wallies attempted in Norway OTL.)
 
Could the French not use Petsamo instead, bypassing Norway and Sweden?

There were plans for that, I think it was specifically planned for French troops to be shipped to Finland through Petsamo. The problem is that in winter time the logistics of getting any significant amounts of troops (and especially their heavy equipment) to Southern Finland via Petsamo would be very difficult. It is a small port, and the only connection south is a single gravel road about 550 km to the northernmost railhead at Rovaniemi. And the winter of 1939-40 was worse than average, as many a Red Army soldier found out even on the Karelian isthmus, well over 1000 km more south.

It could be doable for limited numbers of motorized troops with light weapons and equipment I guess, in the right circumstances. But such an operation requires early planning and swift execution. It would not help that IOTL the Red Army attacked Petsamo early in the Winter War with a force (the 14th Army) that included three divisions (thought not all took part in the attack). The Finns lost the area in practical terms by mid-December 1939 and the Soviets kept Petsamo occupied through most of the war. So it might well be that the Allies would first need to take the humble little port (that was partly destroyed by the withdrawing Finnish troops) in an amphibious operation on the Arctic Sea coast in temperatures below -30 Celsius, with no actual daylight and only about 5 hours of twilight - a job I would not wish on my worst enemy - before they can even begin to use it for unloading troops and equipment for their long journey south.
 
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I'm surprised no one is taking the issue on, the OP is about a real offer France made to Finland, and there had to be some semblance of realism that Finland actually rejected peace overtures they were being offered with the USSR for two weeks because of it. I don't think that it is completely impossible that a more formidable Wallies can strongarm Scandinavia into allowing the French passage into Finland.
 
I'm surprised no one is taking the issue on, the OP is about a real offer France made to Finland, and there had to be some semblance of realism that Finland actually rejected peace overtures they were being offered with the USSR for two weeks because of it. I don't think that it is completely impossible that a more formidable Wallies can strongarm Scandinavia into allowing the French passage into Finland.

Well, I pointed out above how you could make the scenario more plausible. I'll take another stab at it. First, you'd need to spell out exactly how the Allies manage to strongarm the Norwegians and especially the Swedish to accept the intervention - to de facto join the Allies, as the Nordic governments would see it. The Swedish government was quite vehement in trying to hold on to neutrality and to keep the nation out of the war, and in February 1940, say, Swedish Foreign Minister Günther would counsel the Finnish government to make peace with the USSR with almost any terms just to make the war end. He was looking out for the Swedish interest, which did not include an active war in the Nordic area.

Günther had been preceded as Swedish Foreign Minister by Rickard Sandler, who had been forced to leave his post in late 1939 because he had openly advocated that Sweden should support Finland against the USSR. The lesson there is that the Swedish government really, really wanted to stay away from the war in early 1940. Germany being bogged down in France would not change this, as Germany would also try to heavily influence Stockholm diplomatically, and in military terms Germany was still the number one potential threat to Sweden.

Also, and this is my other point, the plans for the intervention need to exist earlier and the Allies would need to have a consistent, realistic plan for the ways and means of sending serious amounts of men and weapons to Finland, preferably in December 1939 or by January 1940. Only this way they could truly convince Mannerhem and the Finnish political leadership that this help is a real possibility and that the troops will get to the front in time to be a real help.

Achieve these two things (which are in no way easy) instead of basically handwaving them, and I will be ready to call the scenario a plausible one.
 
Well, I pointed out above how you could make the scenario more plausible. I'll take another stab at it. First, you'd need to spell out exactly how the Allies manage to strongarm the Norwegians and especially the Swedish to accept the intervention - to de facto join the Allies, as the Nordic governments would see it. The Swedish government was quite vehement in trying to hold on to neutrality and to keep the nation out of the war, and in February 1940, say, Swedish Foreign Minister Günther would counsel the Finnish government to make peace with the USSR with almost any terms just to make the war end. He was looking out for the Swedish interest, which did not include an active war in the Nordic area.

Günther had been preceded as Swedish Foreign Minister by Rickard Sandler, who had been forced to leave his post in late 1939 because he had openly advocated that Sweden should support Finland against the USSR. The lesson there is that the Swedish government really, really wanted to stay away from the war in early 1940. Germany being bogged down in France would not change this, as Germany would also try to heavily influence Stockholm diplomatically, and in military terms Germany was still the number one potential threat to Sweden.

Also, and this is my other point, the plans for the intervention need to exist earlier and the Allies would need to have a consistent, realistic plan for the ways and means of sending serious amounts of men and weapons to Finland, preferably in December 1939 or by January 1940. Only this way they could truly convince Mannerhem and the Finnish political leadership that this help is a real possibility and that the troops will get to the front in time to be a real help.

Achieve these two things (which are in no way easy) instead of basically handwaving them, and I will be ready to call the scenario a plausible one.

Are these things possible if Germany is stalled in Belgium and the British begin occupying Norwegian ports in Nov 1939?
 

Driftless

Donor
Are these things possible if Germany is stalled in Belgium and the British begin occupying Norwegian ports in Nov 1939?

The Norwegians had traditionally good relations with the British, and normal economic & political interaction with the French, but the only way I see them accepting allied troops, was with a prior German invasion - as happened OTL. IIRC, the Norwegian base commander at Narvik was a Quisling supporter, who rolled over the garrison very quickly to the Germans - he might not do that for an allied invasion. Also, IIRC, Gen'l Fleischer had the bulk of the 6th division up closer to the border with Finland - just in case the Soviets came further west. I think he fights whoever invades Norway, unless his orders from the Norwegian leadership tell him otherwise.

Conversely, the Swedes had traditionally good economic and diplomatic relations with Germany, even if a large portion of the populace & politician might not be enamored with the Nazi's. I think it's a push to come with a dire scenario where the Swedes accept any foreign forces in-country, as well.
 
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