WI: Force Z sights 7th Cruiser Squadron

IJN doctrine was very much in the British mould - the RN taught the IJN about night fighting and torpedoes, for example. I would fully expect the British destroyers to attack the Japanese cruisers with torpedoes.

The Admiralty staff history - the source of that map, which I really should have checked in the first place - puts it at 15 miles, and notes that 'had the two forces maintained their original courses a quarter of an hour longer, Matapan might well have been repeated or Savo Island anticipated, according to which sighted the other first.'


Ultimately, any night surface action is going to be followed up by an air strike by the forces that historically accounted for PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE. It's difficult to imagine them faring better after intense action - so the question is how much they take with them.

How the IJN then copes with a significant part of their cruiser force chewed up is where it gets interesting.


I agree 'but' what would Adm Tom Phillips have done post this late evening surface engagement?

Knowing that surprise was lost and that he was badly out numbered - would he not return to Singers and await reinforcments which he knew were days away from arriving?

OTL he was caught still mincing around looking for the landing fleet - another 6 hours of heading South South West instead puts him over 100 (150?) miles closer to home by sun up.
 
I agree 'but' what would Adm Tom Phillips have done post this late evening surface engagement?

Knowing that surprise was lost and that he was badly out numbered - would he not return to Singers and await reinforcments which he knew were days away from arriving?
OTL, that's exactly what he did - turned for home at 2015 on the grounds that surprise was lost, received a report at 2335 of a second set of landings around Kuantan, and judged he was far enough from Japanese air bases and in an unexpected position so that surprise would be achieved.

TTL, per Matt Wiser's comments, Kurita will attempt to draw the British north-east, a game Philips is unlikely to play. A brief surface engagement will ensue, with each side attempting to disengage and fall back on support without being trailed. Given the disparity of force, this is probably going to end in two or three Japanese ships sunk, though any hits on REPULSE will tell given her light armour.

After their disengagement, the British ships will be known to be heading south, probably with some damage. A return to Singapore does seem probable under those circumstances, with Kurita falling back on the Japanese battleships. By the morning, they're still in range of Japanese air attack - the TENEDOS was detached from the force at 1835, about an hour before the tentative surface engagement, and was attacked by a flight that got separated from the main force.

With the ships damaged and retreating southwards after the surface action, I think it's likely that the signal requesting air cover is sent more quickly. OTL, the TENEDOS was attacked at about 0950, the main force was being shadowed from 1020, and the air attack began shortly after 1100. Fighter support wasn't requested until 1158, with aircraft showing up at 1315. TTL, with the ships expecting action, assume the signal is sent immediately the attack begins, shaving an hour off, and the closer proximity to Singapore reduces flight time by about half an hour; this is consistent with being 100 to 150 miles closer.

Assuming the air attack is as OTL, that puts the fighters on the scene just after the first torpedo attack. This was the wave that hit PRINCE OF WALES's shaft, pretty much the definition of a Golden BB. The total of two torpedo hits is likely to remain, but with less damage. Subsequent waves will be disrupted by fighters, and probably ineffective, especially if PRINCE OF WALES and her AA battery remain in action. The Buffalo was a particularly rubbish fighter, but the G3M and G4M were particularly vulnerable bombers, and it doesn't take much to throw off the aim of torpedo bombers. Losses amongst the Japanese bombers will be correspondingly higher, though there's only so much a few fighters can do.

End result is PRINCE OF WALES torpedoed twice and possible damage to REPULSE from 8-inch shellfire, in exchange for two or three Japanese cruisers sunk and significant losses amongst the attacking bombers. PRINCE OF WALES will need dry docking - probably an emergency patch job at Singapore before heading to Trincomalee. She'll probably return to Europe after repairs, joining the vigil against Tirpitz. This frees up an American fast battleship for the Pacific, which may be useful in the Solomon Islands. REPULSE, if not too badly damaged, will be repaired at Singapore. She'll probably be refitted with much more AA armament and return to the Indian Ocean as a fast carrier escort.

The Japanese losses will weaken them at Sunda Strait (though not Java Sea), but it's unlikely that makes much difference. They will also be weaker for the Indian Ocean Raid, during the course of which the 7th Cruiser Division was quite effective against British merchant shipping. After that, my crystal ball gets hazy.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Minor correction - the main belt of Repulse by this point was 9". The Japanese 8" gun had to be within 10,000 yards to penetrate that, and at that point Repulse is going to be firing shells that go in one side and - assuming a fuze failure - out the other leaving a comically shell shaped hole.
 
What does an engagement then do for the movement of the invasion convoys assuming PoW or Repulse are still afloat but damaged?
 
What does an engagement then do for the movement of the invasion convoys assuming PoW or Repulse are still afloat but damaged?

My personal take would be that they (the IJN commanders) Bottle it

They did it several times during the war - a great example was when they won a Tactical Victory at Coral Sea and then handed the USN a Strategic Victory by turning the invasion fleet around and retreating (which is what the USN was trying to Acheive!).

I can see the same thing happening here - the IJN Commanders faced with one of the worlds most modern battleships loose near their invasion convoy + fog of war regarding any damage inflicted on Force Z or its actual wereabouts (until discovered the next day by Aircraft) - etc would very likely bottle it here as well IMO - the invasion fleet does an about turn late that evening and returns to French Indochina while the 2nd Fleet and surviving Crusiers fall back to cover it.

The upshot the sea invasion of Malaya is aborted and ultimately delayed by 1 or 2 weeks (depending on what subsequantly happens to Force Z).
 

nbcman

Donor
My personal take would be that they (the IJN commanders) Bottle it

They did it several times during the war - a great example was when they won a Tactical Victory at Coral Sea and then handed the USN a Strategic Victory by turning the invasion fleet around and retreating (which is what the USN was trying to Acheive!).

I can see the same thing happening here - the IJN Commanders faced with one of the worlds most modern battleships loose near their invasion convoy + fog of war regarding any damage inflicted on Force Z or its actual wereabouts (until discovered the next day by Aircraft) - etc would very likely bottle it here as well IMO - the invasion fleet does an about turn late that evening and returns to French Indochina while the 2nd Fleet and surviving Crusiers fall back to cover it.

The upshot the sea invasion of Malaya is aborted and ultimately delayed by 1 or 2 weeks (depending on what subsequantly happens to Force Z).

Except the Japanese landings already occurred in the early morning of 8 December while the potential engagement with Force Z doesn't happen until the evening of 9 December. The Japanese detected Force Z around 0600 on 9 December and they didn't stop their landings until after the sub I-65 reported Force Z at about 1315 on the 9th. Once Force Z was neutralized either after a night battle or after air attack on the 10th (as OTL), the invasion would resume exactly as what happened IOTL.
 
Except the Japanese landings already occurred in the early morning of 8 December while the potential engagement with Force Z doesn't happen until the evening of 9 December. The Japanese detected Force Z around 0600 on 9 December and they didn't stop their landings until after the sub I-65 reported Force Z at about 1315 on the 9th. Once Force Z was neutralized either after a night battle or after air attack on the 10th (as OTL), the invasion would resume exactly as what happened IOTL.

Yes of course

Still I imagine that an awful lot of kit was still to be unloaded and had the action happened as per the OPs suggestion then its a lot closer than any of the Overflights or subs had spotted Force previously on either the 9th or 10th and this might force a rethink.

Troops can fight without bog roll but not with out Mortar rounds and rice

My own timeline has Force Z plus leaving a day earlier with the word spread in Singers that it was heading south to meet up with a Troop convoy but instead turns north after several hours - trips a Sub in the late afternoon of the 8th (about 150 miles south east of Khoto Bara - or 6 hours steaming as the Modern Battleship sails) which forces 2nd fleet and other formations to head south West ASAP - where we have our clash at about 20:00 hrs/8th 20 miles east of the Perhentian Islands.
 
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