WI: FF lives, Hungary secedes late 1917 following Ausgleich breakdown, Croat insurrection

The scenario assumes a repeat of the 1903-1906 crisis, but with the addition that the Croat parties openly lobby the Franz Joseph to weigh in on their side and either grant Croatia a seprate crown or transfer it to the Cisleithanian half of the monarchy (and unite it with Dalmatia and possibly Bosnia and Slovenia to boot).

A popular insurrection backed by the Domobranstvo proves beyond the abillity of civil police to contain and Budapest either seeks to deploy the Honved to restore order or demands that Vienna deploy the KuK to do the same. Either way, FF cannot resist the temptation to stick it to the Magyars (and in any event faces unpalatable alternatives) and ends up backing the Croats and alienating the pro-Habsburg parties in Budapest. Slovaks, Romanians, Banat Serbs and Banat/Burgesland Germans petition FF to back them in seperation from Hungary as ended up doing de-facto for the Croats. The Hungarian parlimant, terrified that FF is set on breaking up Hungary, and possibly egged on by the *entente powers, votes to secede. Russia, France, and Italy see fit to recognize Hungarian secession and enter into negotiations for a millitary alliance with it.

In this scenario, assuming that AH's international situatuation continues to plummet in the pre crisis period (With Italy not renewing the triple alliance in 1917 and King Carol of Rumania and his pro-German policy being buried in 1914), does Germany:
a. Stand by its ally through hell and high water and warn that any attempt by any party to interfere in FFs spanking of Hungary will result in war with Germany?

b. Likewise, but only in regards to Russian interference?

c. Try to get FF to recognize Hungarian independence in return for German gurantee of his rump empire (and Hungarian acccession to a revised Triple Alliance)?

d. Realize AH is a corpse and begin to seek diplomatically palatable ways to carve it up to Germany's best advantage?

If "a", then does Germany desperately go for Schlieffen? Launch a premptive attack on Russia's mobilizing armies while remaining on the defensive in the West? Avoid offensive operations against either major power and instead support AH in crushing Hungary (and Serbia) and repelling a Russian invasion of Galicia? What is the mindset of Germany's Civilian and Millitary leadership (I'm assuming Falkenhyven rather than Moltke would be in charge by 1917) as they contemplate the unpalatable alternatives?

If "d", would Germany seek outright annexation of portions of Cisleithania with all the attendent internal political complications that would entails (Catholic and Czech/Slovene representation in the Reichstag) or seek to transform rump Austria into an outright protectorate/s (Customs union, German control of foreign policy and millitary)? What pretext does it use to take over, how much resistance will FF put up, and what kind of support can Germany expect from ethnic Austrian Germans and/or Habsburg officials and millitary leaders if FF does not reach an accomadation with German takeover? How much of Cisleithania is Russia-France (and Italy) prepared to let Germany swallow and how little would lead Germany to roll the dice choose "a"?
 
So, does Hungary proclaim itself a Republic or do they proclaim a low-level noble as their King?

I think the standard practice would be to invite a scion of a "Ruling House" (probably a minor German one, or even a cadet Honzelhonnan branch for diplomatic purposes if they want to negate German support for the Habsburgs) to hold the throne. But that is only tangentially relevant to the geopolitical considerations and decision making processes of Germany in such a scenario which is what I am interested in.
 
I think the standard practice would be to invite a scion of a "Ruling House" (probably a minor German one, or even a cadet Honzelhonnan branch for diplomatic purposes if they want to negate German support for the Habsburgs) to hold the throne. But that is only tangentially relevant to the geopolitical considerations and decision making processes of Germany in such a scenario which is what I am interested in.

It isn't irrelevant, far from it. Allowing a German prince to hold such a throne would be enormously alienating - a clear show of disrespect.
 
Doesn't FF just proclaim martial law in Budapest and arrest the deputies who voted for secession?

It's a combination of factors. For one thing the crisis breaks out as soon as FJ dies, and, critically, BEFORE FF is crowned King of Hungary (which means Hungarian Honved and KuK commanders are even less inclined to obey him over their own parlimant).
By the time that:
1. FF has control over the levers of government in Vienna
2. The Hungarians give him a pretext to overcome obstructionism within his own government (especially by the FJ loyalist faction which he has not had a chance to purge)
3. German mediation efforts fail;
it is too late for martial law + arrest.

Hungary is too millitarized (due to ethnic warfare within Hungary against Croats, Slovaks, etc), Hungarian society too mobilized (Due to FFs mistakes in handling the Croat and pursuant crisis), and KuK units stationed within Hungary proper too unreliable to get the job done. It requires "Invasion" by Ethnic German and Croat regiments, and they are laregly pinned down facing a mobilizing Italy and Serbia. In addition they would have to walk to Budapest (Since Hungarian railway workers would strike/sabotage the railways), overcoming a fairly intact Honved organization bolstered by Magyar millitas, millitarized police, volunteers and defectors from ethnic Hungarian KuK regiments (or even entire defecting units).

Furthermore, the precedent of de-facto backing Croat defection from Hungary has resulted in Germans in Bohemia, and Ruthenians in Galicia to demand the same, resulting in low grade Czech-German and Pole-Ukrainian conflict. And of course, Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia proper are not exactly enthused about being part of a greater Croatia, resulting in unrest there as well. Think Nagorno Karabach. The KuK can handle this, of course, just as it handled earlier German-Czech conflict (by calling in Bosniaks to put it down) - but the various internal conflicts and resultant strikes are plaing hell with mobilization.

To be clear:
a. even with Italy and Serbia weighing in, and even with all these secondary conflicts, FF could probably still supress the Hungarian insurrection given enough time, while holding off Serbia and Italy. But he could not hope to do this and ALSO offer any challenge to a Russian invasion of Galicia. Which basically means, to return to the questionat hand, is that Germany would have to fight Russia and France alone if it were to offer support to AH in it's hour of need.

b. I do not view a Hungarian secession in 1917 as the most likely scenario in case OTL's WWI is avoided. A series of unresolved crisises, leading to ongoing paralyzation of government in CisLeithania, frusturated attempts at Reform and Hungarian obstructionism rather than secession seems to me more likely, with the Habsburgs limping along into the 1920s, or even 1930s, before the situation collapses. However, this is the scenario I wish to explore in this thought experiment.

Accordingly, for the sake of further discussion, I ask that you all accept it as a given and focus on German decision making processes in the crisis (other than hysteric paralysis with the elimination of their sole ally from the shorrt term millitary balance of power in Europe while France and Russia are mobilizing. They need to make a decision one way or the other).

It isn't irrelevant, far from it. Allowing a German prince to hold such a throne would be enormously alienating - a clear show of disrespect.

It was what Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania did - and they had a greater religous barriers to overcome. Their rulers ended up converting their children to orthodoxy and nativizing. I would agree that playing to the Hungarian national sentiment and crowning a native noble would play better to the nationalist crowd but if the issue of Hungarian independnece is settled diplomatically, without Germany alienating Hungarian public opinion by opposing independence (or even if it opposes independence, wins the resulting war, but decides that reimposing Habsburg rule is too much of a burden) a German monarch on the Hungarian throne would, I suspect, be accepted. Unless he alientated his subjects the way the first Monarch's of Greece and Bulgraia did, he would likely found a dynasty which would be regarded as Hungarian. Also, an external candidate has the advantage of not being associated with any internal faction. If Germany backs the Habsburgs and loses the war, I guess the Hungarians would probably seek a Italian Monarch, or else go shopping in Scandinavia, the Lowlands and Iberia.

For the sake of this scenario, however, this is irrelevant. The Hungarians aren't going to offer a crown to anyone before independence is secured. I think the most likely outcome is a regency council (collective dictatorship by any other name for the duration of the war). A declaration of a Republic would seem to me unacceptable to Hungary's ruling elites as well as likely ensure that Russia does not back Hungarian independence, which means no Hungarian independence.
 
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It's a combination of factors. For one thing the crisis breaks out as soon as FJ dies, and, critically, BEFORE FF is crowned King of Hungary (which means Hungarian Honved and KuK commanders are even less inclined to obey him over their own parlimant).

You mean the KuK commanders who were so disinclined to listen to the Hungarian Diet that they listed, as their official reason for entering the common army as 'insufficient mastery of the Hungarian language' in spite of being native Hungarians? I think you severely overestimate the willingness of everyone not part of the Hungarian elite to support their little rebellion.

Hungary is too millitarized (due to ethnic warfare within Hungary against Croats, Slovaks, etc), Hungarian society too mobilized (Due to FFs mistakes in handling the Croat and pursuant crisis), and KuK units stationed within Hungary proper too unreliable to get the job done. It requires "Invasion" by Ethnic German and Croat regiments, and they are laregly pinned down facing a mobilizing Italy and Serbia. In addition they would have to walk to Budapest (Since Hungarian railway workers would strike/sabotage the railways), overcoming a fairly intact Honved organization bolstered by Magyar millitas, millitarized police, volunteers and defectors from ethnic Hungarian KuK regiments (or even entire defecting units).

Any Hungarian revolution in Austria-Hungary turns out to be a joke. The common army and the Austrian Landwehr far outstrip the Honved's capability - they did so in 1914, when they were in the middle of a reform cycle, while the Honved continued to languish deprived of funding for artillery and machine-guns. By 1917, the Honved would be, if anything, worse.

Not to mention that any plans for the suppression of the Hungarians called for universal suffrage by decree to be implemented in the first hours - and considering the Hungarian landed aristocracy was the only one to actually have voting rights - I'm not entirely convinced that they'd have the wide-reaching public support you postulate. Especially when we take into account how rapidly communist revolutionary ideas spread in Hungary IOTL.
 
You mean the KuK commanders who were so disinclined to listen to the Hungarian Diet that they listed, as their official reason for entering the common army as 'insufficient mastery of the Hungarian language' in spite of being native Hungarians? I think you severely overestimate the willingness of everyone not part of the Hungarian elite to support their little rebellion.

There were surely such "Habsburgian" or purely millitary caste identity officers. There were surely others who, while being nationalist Hungarians (correctly) saw their Hungarian participation the monarchy as being in Hungary's best interest. That was surely the case in other multiethnic Empires as well. And yet, when things begin falling apart, and ethnic warfare begins, people have a tendency to cling together. This scenario postulates that FF spits in the face of the Hungarian nation and the constitution (As most Hungarians, even pro-habsburg, would see it) by backing Croatian secession - and that this spurs ethnic conflict in areas of Hungary (Transylvania, the Banat, Slovakia) where ethnic Hungarians actually make up a significant portion of the population.

Under such circumstances, when the choice is between being perceiving oneself as being an accesory to the partiioning of Hungary and placing Hungarians under the rule of local Slavic/ROmanian/ German majorities, I do not think most Hungarian officers would be inclined to follow orders to arrest their parlimant members. FJ, at any rate, did not think so during the 1906 crisis - as plan Ungarn reveals. Hungarian majority units were considered "unreliable" in the crisis and were not to be used in supressing the independence party. Only German and Croat ethnic units were to be used.

Any Hungarian revolution in Austria-Hungary turns out to be a joke. The common army and the Austrian Landwehr far outstrip the Honved's capability - they did so in 1914, when they were in the middle of a reform cycle, while the Honved continued to languish deprived of funding for artillery and machine-guns. By 1917, the Honved would be, if anything, worse.

There is no doubt that the full strength of the KuK far outstrips that of the Honved. As I pointed out, however, the question is whether:
a. That full strengh can in fact be deployed.
b. whether the deployable strength is sufficient to break budapest BEFORE the international situation results in total war.
c. what strength would be avaliable to AH to combat its external enemies if Hungary is either in rebellion or under martial law.

Hungary supplied roughly half of the AH recruits OTL during WWI. Even if it is put down relatively rapidly and painlessly it will not supply them TTL.

(As an aside, any SUCCESSFUL supression of Hungarian secession in the context of a Europe wide war would, unless the Central Powers were clearly winning, probably result in Romania invading Transylvania. The Kuk would have spent blood and treasure smashing down the Hungarian secessionists and alienating them in the process only to face Romanian Irrendentists)

Not to mention that any plans for the suppression of the Hungarians called for universal suffrage by decree to be implemented in the first hours - and considering the Hungarian landed aristocracy was the only one to actually have voting rights - I'm not entirely convinced that they'd have the wide-reaching public support you postulate. Especially when we take into account how rapidly communist revolutionary ideas spread in Hungary IOTL.

You are speaking of the threat used to quell the indepence party in 1906. But the lesson to be learned from this is that this threat was never deployed. If deploying it was so easy, why was it not discharged in 1906 or at any point prior to 1914? It was useful for Vienna to keep the Budapest government based on a very narrow franchise and therefore short of legitimacy. Unleashing Universal suffarage would have left ethnic hungarians in control of the parlimant in budapest (even without the gerrymandering they surely would have employed) and made them more of a threat, not less, to the unity of the Monarchy.

That was precisely why the independence party also wished to widen the franchise- but in a diffirent manner than Vienna (in other words, property and education/language based franchise for around 50% of the population, primarily Magyars), something which Vienna effectively vetoed. Presumably, some similiar motion would be passed if push came to shove as in this scenario. While minorities would have remained largely excluded and alienated, ethnic Magyars (and Hungarian Jews and many Germans in central Hungary) would not have.

Furthermore, a true split-up of Hungary, or even placing effective county-level government in the hands of local ethnic minorities would also have threatened the unity of the monarchy, for it would have left ethnic serbs and Rumanians in control of local administration adjacently to their irrendentist nation states. Having restricted Hungarian elites rule "Hungary" was, if not the only way for Vienna for Vienna to retain control, the most convenient one- provided the areas of disagreement with their de-facto collaborators could be papered over. This scenario posits that this ceases to be a possibility due to a "perfect storm".

The bottom line is that while the monarchy had many tools to put down an attempted secession, and Hungary's ruling elite had many inducements to remain in the monarchy and retain their privilleges, FF ITTL is left without many of these tools, and implicitly threatens the elite with loss of privilleges even if they stay loyal. Under such circumstances some for of secession seems to me likely, and it's success is primarily dependent on the balance of power between the great powers, not the diffirent components of AH.

Having said all this, can we please accept the scenario as given and discuss the plausible options Germany in particular, and the Great Powers more generally, might have in reacting to it?
 
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The basic premise sounds quite realistic, but I think there are some details that I think need to be ironed out.

For one:

Slovaks, Romanians, Banat Serbs and Banat/Burgesland Germans petition FF to back them in seperation from Hungary as ended up doing de-facto for the Croats. The Hungarian parlimant, terrified that FF is set on breaking up Hungary, and possibly egged on by the *entente powers, votes to secede.

This hypothetical grand coalition against Hungary simply won't happen.

Slovaks and Romanians might go with FF in the crisis, but even in those communities won't support him 100%. Many Romanians will definitely try to take a third option (complete separation from the monarchy and union with Romania). And a minority of Slovaks may back Hungary.

As for Serbs, there is 0 chance they'd side with FF, let alone petition him for anything. In the event of any kind of crisis between FF and Hungary, Serbs will side with the Hungarians - that, or go their own way. And that goes for all ethnic Serbs across the monarchy, not just the ones in Banat. Serbs in the Croatian crownland (who, at the time, made up 25% of the population) will present a major stumbling block to the Croats' hypothetical pro-Vienna revolt.

Germans in Hungary were generally loyal to the idea of a Hungarian nation, many of them were rapidly assimilating and some of the biggest Hungarian nationalists around were actually of German origin. So they won't be propping up an anti-Hungarian coalition either.

In other words, the balance of power might still be leaning towards FF's side, but it's not overwhelmingly on his side. It won't be a quick and easy curbstomp of the Hungarian separatists.


Now, on to Germany's reaction. Crucially, Germany thought Dualism was the best thing since sliced bread and greatly respected the Hungarian ruling elites. Berlin would see FF's actions as downright idiotic, and as a gross lack of respect for Berlin's own preferences.

So I'd say option C) is very likely. D) is not too far off, either. You'd have a situation where FF's very name evinces eye-rolling and spitting in German ruling circles...and the idea of a German-managed partition presents many potential advantages. Hungary can be kept in the Triple Alliance. The Austrian and Czech lands can be annexed to Germany - or, if they stay nominally independent, turned into an appendage of the German state. Italy and Romania can be lured back to a pro-German course through territorial concessions. Even Serbia might be neutralized.

Of course, it's also possible that Germany would swallow the bitter pill and decide to back FF. But like I said, there would be much eye-rolling, and spitting, and gnashing of teeth.
 

Anchises

Banned
Just for Germany:

ITTL they estimated that Russia in 1917 was too strong for the Schlieffenplan. And even in German circles A-H was often called the "assortment of decaying nations around the Danube".

The question is if Kaiser Wilhelm's personal friendship to FF would override diplomatic/strategic necessities. The sensible thing would be to accept rump Austria, while satisfying Russian and Italian demands. This would basically give Germany a free hand in the West.
 
Hungary is too millitarized (due to ethnic warfare within Hungary against Croats, Slovaks, etc), Hungarian society too mobilized (Due to FFs mistakes in handling the Croat and pursuant crisis), and KuK units stationed within Hungary proper too unreliable to get the job done.


Did the KuK units in Hungary consist primarily of Hungarian soldiers?
 
The new King of Hungary would likely be the then-Count Palatine, a scion of the Hapsburg Lorraine dynasty.
 
Did the KuK units in Hungary consist primarily of Hungarian soldiers?

Essentially, the millitary system of the time was based on standing garrisons forming the nuclei of territorially based reserve formations. Since standing army recruits, upon release, generally returned to heir home farm this meant that in practise most recruits were attached to territorial garrisons that were near their homes, in order to ensure unit continuity. Of course, frontier regions had a higher concentration of regular army garrisons, and AH and Russia, as multiethnic empires, made some effort to counter the tendency to serving in the home province garrison would not be followed 100% in regard to troublesome national minorities (primarily Poles in hte case of Russia, South Slavs and Romanians in the case of AH). However, Magyars, as far as I could see, were not given this "special treatment" by the KuK from the 1880s onwards, and almost all regiments in garrisoned in the Hungarian heartland had Magyar as their primary regimental language.

Just for Germany:

ITTL they estimated that Russia in 1917 was too strong for the Schlieffenplan. And even in German circles A-H was often called the "assortment of decaying nations around the Danube".

The German General Staff did asses, *in 1912*, that Russia would be capable of rapid mobilization AND massively expand it's forces by 1917. Their conclusion however, was not precisely that Russia could not be beat, but that it could not be beat in a short war (ie; utilizing the Schlieffen Plan)- which was the only type they were prepared to consider. If the alternative is permanent subordination to Russian goodwil, they might be prepared to chance a long war - if they fought they could win it, or if they found any other course of action intolerable. millitary, and civil, leadership, has not historically always acted rationally in this respect.

I would note that the German General staff erred in this assesment. On the one hand, Russia was able to mobilize far more quickly in 1914 than the German General staff assumed it would, launching a numerically credible invasion of East Prussia and East Galicia within 10 days of mobilization in support of their allies and arguably burying the Schliffen plan. OTOH, their performance vs the Germans sucked wet dogshit, not only in 1914, but also in 1916, after they should have been past their learning curve. So it is by no means clear that Germany could not defeat Russia in a head-on clash in 1917, even if they are fighting alone, with one hand tied behind their back facing France defensively. Of course, if they Choose to gamble on Schliffen and write off everything East of the Oder (in their own minds, not neccesarily in reality) while they take Paris, The war may well be over within a few months.

The question is if Kaiser Wilhelm's personal friendship to FF would override diplomatic/strategic necessities. The sensible thing would be to accept rump Austria, while satisfying Russian and Italian demands. This would basically give Germany a free hand in the West.

Italian demands would essentially be the left bank of the Isonozo, Istiria and Trieste. The latter is an economic sucker punch to rump Austria- it is one of the four primary gateways to Southeastern Europe. Italy would also however seek Dalmatia and perhaps South Tyrol- if FF cedes the former any Croat loyalty to the monarchy goes out the window, and if he cedes South Tyrol ethnic Germans in Austria (and germany as well) will be outraged. FF's throne does not look too stable at that point.

Still, Italy's demands can be satisfied in a way that transforms Italy into a dependent ally against France.

Russia's demands, however, cannot, or not fully. In addition for Bosnia or parts thereof to the Serbs (more trouble for FF with the Croats) They will want Galicia and Bukovina (north Bukovina to keep, south Bukovina to trade to Rumania for concessions) which means coming to an accomodation of sorts with Polish national sentiment. That in turn means trouble for the Germans in Posen. Russia mooted several times prior to 1914 restoring the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. It was not merely Nicholas II's obstructionism, or the fear of encouraging demands for autonomy from other subject nationalities. It was also the knowledge that this would be tantramount to a declaration of permanent hostility against the other partioning powers.

In any Event, Russia will never permit Germany a free hand in the West. At best, if Germany, as AJP Taylor describes Russia's WWI war aims "Leaves Russia alone to do away with Austria", Germany can hope for a return to the pre Berlin congress friendly attitude of Russia and perhaps an anti-British alliance. But the dual alliance is too firmly entrenched in Russia's diplomatic culture by this point to ditch. Russia may not back a war of revanche, may even offer reinsurance treaties to that effect in return for a satisfactory partioning of Austria, but it will always keep the French alliance as a way of constraining German power- and post Bjorko, Germany will have no hope of any other outcome.

Given the trend of faster Russian industrial and demographic development, and the growing density and carrying capacities of its railways (The millitary role of Motor transport in 1917 will not be apparant but it will increasingly reduce Russia's disadvantage in concentrating it's forces and supplying them), doing away with AH deprives Germany of a key counter to Russian power in a way that they have no gurantee can be replaced by Hungary (whose sepratists tended to want out of Great Power politics and might prefer a neautralist Russo-German stance) or Italy (Who even in the heyday of the Triple Alliance never seriously contemplated sending troops to fight Russia). Nor is there any Gurantee that a rump Austria betrayed by Germany would be interested in bunding itself into an alliance with it, or honor it in case of a future conflict (Which lmakes annexation more attractive - but has its own internal problems, and it is by no means clear that the entente will sanction a non voluntary takeover, particularly of "Non German" lands - which may include any part of Bohemia and Moravia as Russia and France define it).

What all this means is that doing away with AH leaves Germany apparantly dependent on Russian goodwill ("apparantly" because Russian millitary capabilities remain abyssal, far worse than Germany estimates. It is by no means clear to me that Germany will necessarily lose a war if it chooses to fight and avoids marching through Belgium) right now, just as they were in the post Napoleonic world, rather in some nebulous future. That is a grim dictate which Germany's decision makers will find hard to swallow, just as Britain found complete vulnerability to the U.S, and dependence on its goodwill hard to swallow. The diffirence being, of course, that Britain had several generations, and two wars in which the U.S supported them to get used to the idea.

This hypothetical grand coalition against Hungary simply won't happen.

What I described is less of a Grand coalition against Hungary and more of a pit filled with pitbulls, each circling the two biggest mutts and manuvering for advantage as spectators egg them on, and offer inducements to achieve a given configuration suiting their bets. In other words, depending on cicumstances, a given faction within a given nationality might switch support from Vienna to Budapest or vice versa, while seeking external backing from Rome, Moscow or Berlin, all in an attempt to gain advantage. If the Empire (Or Hungary) seems strong they will manuver for a better place within it. If weak - for a chance to break away and secure territory. If fallen - to defend or attack competing nationalities. And of course the relative balance of power between factions in a given nationality will change as well as circumstances do.

Many Romanians will definitely try to take a third option (complete separation from the monarchy and union with Romania).

The question is whether Romania is prepared to openly back Transylvanian rebels if Russia says "Niet" and Bulgaria growls at it from the South. I think the answer is that it isn't. Supplying weapons and allowing volunteers across the border, yes. Invasion, no. Not unless FF takes Budapest and Russia writes the Hungarians off in the context of a war it still seems to be winning (or which AH seems to be losing, which is not quite the same thing).

However, from an objective point of view a ROmanian who is reblling in favor of Bucharest or Vienna is all the same to Budapest- it's the threat to the Hungarian nation and a resource drag.

And a minority of Slovaks may back Hungary.

The point is that some ethnic conflict will take place, and that FF will be blamed for ALL of it by nationalist Hungarians unless he openly disavows those protesting Maygarization. WHich he won't, unless Magyar nationalists make concessions favoring. Which they won;t because they don't trust him -especially after Croatia. I do not see these clashes/uprising as being millitarly significant in regards to Hungary's survivability in and of themselves. They will be significant (especially in the Banat and Burgenland) in regards to constraining negotiations and attempts at compromise between Vienna and Berlin.

As for Serbs, there is 0 chance they'd side with FF, let alone petition him for anything. In the event of any kind of crisis between FF and Hungary, Serbs will side with the Hungarians - that, or go their own way. And that goes for all ethnic Serbs across the monarchy, not just the ones in Banat. Serbs in the Croatian crownland (who, at the time, made up 25% of the population) will present a major stumbling block to the Croats' hypothetical pro-Vienna revolt.

Here I will dispute you. Hungary was able to play divide and rule with the Serbs in Croatia and the Banat for a long time, but even in 1906 that policy was petering out and the dominant Serba and Croat factions within Croatia, the Banat and Dalmatia were pro serbo-croat collaboration (even if tactical). That does not mean that Serbs and Croats won't clash once FF ends up backing the secession of Croatia from Hungary (and merger with Dalmatia)- but those who clash with the idea of a Croat dominated kingdom within Austria will be looking to Belgrade, not Budapest.

Germans in Hungary were generally loyal to the idea of a Hungarian nation, many of them were rapidly assimilating and some of the biggest Hungarian nationalists around were actually of German origin. So they won't be propping up an anti-Hungarian coalition either.

It depends where. In inner Hungary Germans seemed to have generally subscribed to the Idea of a Hungarian nation and were in the process of assimilation post 1867. In Burgenland, the Banat and the Saxon region in Transylvania this does not appear to be the case (unless you rely on Wikipedia).

In other words, the balance of power might still be leaning towards FF's side, but it's not overwhelmingly on his side. It won't be a quick and easy curbstomp of the Hungarian separatists.

Disputes about sentiment aside the overwhelming issue is one of millitary organization and freedom of action. FF enjoys an organized army and the mechanism of conscription. The Hungarian palimant does not. organizing an army out of the Honved, volunteers and defecting individuals/units takes time. And of course- in a prolonged war Hungary's lack of heavy industry will tell against it. So I would argue that even if Hungary's minorities are not supportive of FF, it is a curbstomp - if the the international situation + situation in rest of the Empire allows him to deploy his army freely. In this scenario, it does not.

Now, on to Germany's reaction. Crucially, Germany thought Dualism was the best thing since sliced bread and greatly respected the Hungarian ruling elites. Berlin would see FF's actions as downright idiotic, and as a gross lack of respect for Berlin's own preferences.
Exactly - that is my take as well.

So I'd say option C) is very likely.

The question therfore is whether Hungary would be prepared to sign on to the revived Triple Alliance in return for German guranteees of holding Vienna off - and whether Cisleithania can hang together and/or face off even Italy and Serbia alone once the loss of prestige rocks the legitimacy of the monarchy and triggers secondary Czech-German, Ukrainian-Pole, German-Slovene and Croat-Slovene-Bosniak-Serb conflict over the future (federal?) shape of the rump Monarchy.

D) is not too far off, either. You'd have a situation where FF's very name evinces eye-rolling and spitting in German ruling circles...and the idea of a German-managed partition presents many potential advantages. Hungary can be kept in the Triple Alliance.

Can it? That is the question. Hungary would want gurantees from a Great Power until it can organize it's own armies to see off Serbia and Romania. But once it's organized it can deter them without Great Power support. It would really only need to be in the Triple alliance to prevent a Habsburg (if CisLeithania hangs together) reconquest. And unlike AH, which had great power ambitions in the Balkans which clashed with that of Russia, I can't see and independent Hungary being concerned with Russian schemes in the Dardanelles. So would Hungary really sign on to a semi-permanent alliance with Germany the way AH did? Would Germany expect it to?

The Austrian and Czech lands can be annexed to Germany

I can;t see Russia, Or even France and Italy for that matter, counterancing direct annexation of the Czech lands. Continued rump Austrian control of Bohemia, yes. Pan-german Empire control - no. It would empower Germany too much, and the Czech would resist sufficiently to make it an international issue. Perhaps the Sudetans might be where the compromise is drawn.

- or, if they stay nominally independent, turned into an appendage of the German state.

The question is how. FF is not going to be happy about being "stabbed in the back" by Berlin. He will seek greater freedom of action, not less. How can Berlin ensure he does as he is told, without risking that he will seek asssistance in preserving his remaining independence from Russia-France? Diplomatic turnarounds happen. To be sure Ethnic German sentiment, and that of many of the (ethnic German) millitary officers and officials will favor close collaboration with Germany. But the remaining slav's who will still be a slight majority (if a full carveup of CisLithenia took place), will oppose such subordination.

My sense is that Germany will be pushed into a second dilemma- does it cash in on what Russia, Italy and France are prepared to let it have (OTL Austria + maybe Sudetans) and leave a rump Czechia as a economic sattelite and a millitary thorn, or does it seek to subordinate a Bohemian-Austrian-Croat Empire whose Emperor has his own mind.

Of course, it's also possible that Germany would swallow the bitter pill and decide to back FF. But like I said, there would be much eye-rolling, and spitting, and gnashing of teeth.

My take as well. Which would presumably correlate with greater willingness to seek D) in the context of a compromise peace if the war stalemates.

The new King of Hungary would likely be the then-Count Palatine, a scion of the Hapsburg Lorraine dynasty.

The only way I can see this happening is if the divorce is semi-amicable/mediated by Germany with Hungary remaining part of Triple Alliance
 
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I would think that Hungary, in a bid to try to hold on to everything, would go for the Hapsburg candidacy.
 
I think that A is the most likely scenario here. Germany will probably be afraid of establishing a precedent in favor of secession since it could be used in other territories in both Germany and Austria-Hungary. For instance, Posen and the Polish Corridor might declare independence from Germany--as might Alsace-Lorraine and northern Schleswig. I strongly doubt that Germany would have ever tolerated secession from either Germany or Austria-Hungary.
 

trajen777

Banned
So several things
1 gb by 16 with a wavering ah, russia becoming more aggressive, the naval race w germany pretty much over by 09, and more fearful of Russia would have pulled out of of entende. Gb migh have been more open to a german alliance.
2 ah moderation of its divisional and corp artillary by 16 was very impressive. It would have been equal to german divisional firepower. Esp heavy on howitzers. This by itself would have been a massive advantage vs Hungary, Italy or Russia.
3. Germany would have needed to keep Russia out of the Balkans, while open to slicking up ah.
4 if war germany holds in the west , hammers russia in the east, and italy stays neutral. Bulgaria and Romania support cp. germany diminishes french imports, keeps sea lanes open, gb either German Allie or supports germany.
5 if peaceful (no gb in entende ) then Russia and France backs off, Hungary independent but much smaller, and germany gets chz, austria, and the adriatic provinces.
6 a middle europa germany allied to gb and prob italy, vs a weaker France ( gives up on opposing germany ) and a Russia by itself
 
So several things
1 gb by 16 with a wavering ah, russia becoming more aggressive, the naval race w germany pretty much over by 09, and more fearful of Russia would have pulled out of of entende. Gb migh have been more open to a german alliance.

Agreed that Britain likely drops out of the Entente by 1917 but a German alliance that early would've probably been unlikely. The memories of the Anglo-German naval tensions and Kaiser Bill's blunders were still too recent.

2 ah moderation of its divisional and corp artillary by 16 was very impressive. It would have been equal to german divisional firepower. Esp heavy on howitzers. This by itself would have been a massive advantage vs Hungary, Italy or Russia.

Nice info!

3. Germany would have needed to keep Russia out of the Balkans, while open to slicking up ah.

Slicking up?

4 if war germany holds in the west , hammers russia in the east, and italy stays neutral. Bulgaria and Romania support cp. germany diminishes french imports, keeps sea lanes open, gb either German Allie or supports germany.

GB is probably neutral in this TL's WWI.

5 if peaceful (no gb in entende ) then Russia and France backs off, Hungary independent but much smaller, and germany gets chz, austria, and the adriatic provinces.

I doubt that it would be peaceful and I doubt that Germany actually wants these territories.

6 a middle europa germany allied to gb and prob italy, vs a weaker France ( gives up on opposing germany ) and a Russia by itself

I doubt that France would give up its opposition to Germany due to its desire to get Alsace-Lorraine back.

Also, overall, I'd expect a German victory in this TL's WWI. The only question is just how decisive it will be.
 
What's keeping Hungary from being gobbled up by Russia in its never ending quest for pan-slavism and mediterranean harbors? Surely not Germany - Hungary is not the hill they'd wish to die on.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
If anything Germany would race down to try to save the Danubian monarchy from collapsing, alot of German foreign policy and security relied on the Habsburgs being around as the only Great Power ally Germany thought they really could trust (also Pan- Germanism).
 
It was what Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania did - and they had a greater religous barriers to overcome. Their rulers ended up converting their children to orthodoxy and nativizing. I would agree that playing to the Hungarian national sentiment and crowning a native noble would play better to the nationalist crowd but if the issue of Hungarian independnece is settled diplomatically, without Germany alienating Hungarian public opinion by opposing independence (or even if it opposes independence, wins the resulting war, but decides that reimposing Habsburg rule is too much of a burden) a German monarch on the Hungarian throne would, I suspect, be accepted. Unless he alientated his subjects the way the first Monarch's of Greece and Bulgraia did, he would likely found a dynasty which would be regarded as Hungarian. Also, an external candidate has the advantage of not being associated with any internal faction. If Germany backs the Habsburgs and loses the war, I guess the Hungarians would probably seek a Italian Monarch, or else go shopping in Scandinavia, the Lowlands and Iberia.

For the sake of this scenario, however, this is irrelevant. The Hungarians aren't going to offer a crown to anyone before independence is secured. I think the most likely outcome is a regency council (collective dictatorship by any other name for the duration of the war). A declaration of a Republic would seem to me unacceptable to Hungary's ruling elites as well as likely ensure that Russia does not back Hungarian independence, which means no Hungarian independence.

You claimed that inviting a German Prince would counter any support for the Habsburgs (as the hypotetic Nation has just declared independence and can still fear reprisals).

But for the (German-)Austrian people and the Habsburgs, if Germany agrees then it's a serious insult - basically saying 'we're okay with you being screwed up, so okay in fact we are openly throwing our support behind the Hungarians' (it'd be dumb to bisect an Ally and put one of your nobles in there, only to let him play 'sink or swim', no?)

Europe may still accept it, but it will cause serious opposition from Rump Habsburgs. There will probably be no Great War; France and Russia are not about to risk conflict over Hungary, and even if they are, England will have none of that and stay out; Germany would be less aggressive and very unlikely to stick to variations of that famous Plan.

I would expect a Hungary/Italy vs Austria/Serbia War, the first tacitly backed by Germany and Britain, the second backed by Russia and France, likely to end with a moderated settlement where Italy and Serbia make some gains, Hungarian indipendence is formalized (at that point, yes, Germany may drop the pretense and allow a German Prince) and Rump Habsburg is left to the likely loss of Galicia-Lodomeria and probable revolt of the Czech and Slovaks.
 
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