WI Fascist Russia

The longer term programme would have been the modernisation of Russian agriculture and industry. Without the threat of international communism western investment would have been likely. Development of Russian industry would have been at least as advanced by the end of the 1930s as in the OTL USSR.

Why? Poland, for instance, had access to Western capital, yet did poorly compared to the USSR.

3. Regarding Poland the ambition of German and Russia nationalists was its abolition (eg Seekt memorandum 1922) and a common German / Russian border re-established. Were there Nationalist governments in both countries some sort of division of the borderlands would have been very likely (whether this mean Poland or Poland, Ukraine, White Russia, etc).
4. Subsequent relations. Even under Hitler, part of the justification for lebensraum was political (USSR=communist) and anti-semitic (Communists=Jews), as well as nationalistic and ethnic. Even if Hitler still advocated it, would it be as attractive versus a non-communist Russia? In other words even with Hitler's unlikely leadership Russia and Nazi Germany might not come into conflict.
Any thoughts?

Why would Russia need to ally with Germany at all? As a not-Communist state, it isn't an international pariah, after all.
 
Without Russia going red, there would be no pretext for the West to recognize or help Finland, Poland and the Baltics to become independent, but if it does anyway Russia would feel betrayed by the west with no doubt. If that Russia is a rabid, nationalistic Russia, it's going to be a big problem. Also, this Russia is very unlikely to let Turkey go with the territories gained at Laussane, and will demand "her" Armenia and "her" Straits, as she was promised during WW1. In this scenario I can see Russia cooperating with a Nazi-like Germany to the extent the USSR did or more, if only to stab each other in the back at some point.
 
Why? Poland, for instance, had access to Western capital, yet did poorly compared to the USSR.

Why would Russia need to ally with Germany at all? As a not-Communist state, it isn't an international pariah, after all.

Re 1. My reasoning here is that the agriculture and industry of the USSR - already damaged by war - was further devastated by a protracted civil war and by War Communism and secondly by the brutal implementation of collectivisation. Agricultural production only reached 1913 levels in the early years of the NEP (by 1926); even then grain exports were only 25% of pre-war levels. Production was hit back again by collectivisation and did not again attain 1913 levels until the late 1930s. Industrial growth was poor in the 1920s because agricultural stagnation did not provide the means to invest. In the 1930s industrial growth is estimated as an impressive 5-6% a year but had the 1920s not been wasted, lower annual growth could have left Russia more industrially advanced as well. Finally the partial elimination of the middle class and purges in the 1930s had a serious impact on the expertise the USSR was able to utilise for growth.
I'm not sure why Poland was unable to match the USSR's growth but, for the reasons above, can not see why Russia, post war, should not be able to continue and develop the capitalitst-backed industrialisation and modernisation that was increasingly evident pre-war.

Re 2. I'm not sure I agree:

  1. The allies were determined to create a Polish state - substantially out of Russian territory (see Fourteen Points, 8 Jan 1918). Even a reduced Polish state (perhaps utilising the Curzon Line as its eventual eastern frontier) would still be anathema to the Russians. On the other hand France saw itself as Poland's champion; this would sow antagonism between Russia and the west. If Poland was able to take advantage of Russia's temporary weakness in a similar way to 1919/1920 this antagonism would only grow.
  2. The status of other states post war such as Ukraine, the Baltic States, Finland, Georgia, etc. would also be problematic. At least Finland and the Baltic states would have a high likelihood of allied support as Brest Litovsk (or whatever was created ITTL) collapsed but the ethnic groups concerned sought to take advantage of the independence from Russia they were given.
  3. Without fear of the USSR liberal western Europe would be very happy to be antagonistic towards a Nationalist state in Russia. Liberalism is often more critical of right wing infringments of human rights than left wing ones.
My feeling, therefore, is that the aftermath of the First World War would leave Germany and Russia in a similar position to that in OTL: both deeply unhappy with the post war set up.
I am not saying they would need to be allies but they would share an interest in the destruction of Poland (and other Eastern European creations) that would be likely to develop as it did OTL in Rapallo, 1922 and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939.
 
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Except this isn't true. The Soviet Union put great weight on minority rights and women's rights.

How seriously they were treated, well. In the case of women it's hard to deny that the USSR was a huge improvement for women than the Soviet Union.

Tell that to the Ukrainians. The Soviet leadership claimed they cared about a lot of things but but talk is cheap.
 
Tell that to the Ukrainians. The Soviet leadership claimed they cared about a lot of things but but talk is cheap.

While true, I don't think this really addresses the point that rights for Jews and women did take huge steps forward in Soviet times.
 
Re 1. My reasoning here is that the agriculture and industry of the USSR - already damaged by war - was further devastated by a protracted civil war and by War Communism and secondly by the brutal implementation of collectivisation. Agricultural production only reached 1913 levels in the early years of the NEP (by 1926); even then grain exports were only 25% of pre-war levels.

Okay, a few points. First, this still compares fairly favorably to Poland, starting from a lower base; the Civil War was worse than what Poland went through, after all.

(Where are those numbers from, BTW? I've seen them before and IIRC they include all of 1913 Russia vs. the Soviet Union, which was obviously smaller).

Moreover, in Poland too grain production didn't fare too well postwar; per capita grain production declined in former German Poland, for instance. And the fact that less grain was being exported is in some ways good, no? It's being eaten by the peasants.


Industrial growth was poor in the 1920s because agricultural stagnation did not provide the means to invest.

Again, compare to the rest of Eastern Europe, which also did poorly; as of 1929 Poland still hadn't reached the 1913 levels; Czechoslovakia had, but painfully; Hungary hadn't, IIRC.

Suddenly Russia looks better, eh?

In the 1930s industrial growth is estimated as an impressive 5-6% a year but had the 1920s not been wasted, lower annual growth could have left Russia more industrially advanced as well.

But your Russia would be left with crippling debts from WW1 and beforehand that the USSR never paid.

I'm not sure why Poland was unable to match the USSR's growth but, for the reasons above, can not see why Russia, post war, should not be able to continue and develop the capitalitst-backed industrialisation and modernisation that was increasingly evident pre-war.

I welcome to persuasion as to why Poland and Hungary are not the appropriate samples.

(For an even darker view, check out From Farm to Factory, which asks if the Tsarist Boom could've continued.

[*]The allies were determined to create a Polish state - substantially out of Russian territory (see Fourteen Points, 8 Jan 1918). Even a reduced Polish state (perhaps utilising the Curzon Line as its eventual eastern frontier) would still be anathema to the Russians. On the other hand France saw itself as Poland's champion; this would sow antagonism between Russia and the west.

But this is suicidal and frankly doesn't mesh w/ Poincare and the rest. Russia is obviously a better ally than Poland would be, so why go for Poland?

[*]Without fear of the USSR liberal western Europe would be very happy to be antagonistic towards a Nationalist state in Russia. Liberalism is often more critical of right wing infringments of human rights than left wing ones.

But the conservatives tolerate fascism so long as they shoot Jews and Socialists.
 
Okay, a few points. First, this still compares fairly favorably to Poland, starting from a lower base; the Civil War was worse than what Poland went through, after all.

(Where are those numbers from, BTW? I've seen them before and IIRC they include all of 1913 Russia vs. the Soviet Union, which was obviously smaller).

Moreover, in Poland too grain production didn't fare too well postwar; per capita grain production declined in former German Poland, for instance. And the fact that less grain was being exported is in some ways good, no? It's being eaten by the peasants.

Again, compare to the rest of Eastern Europe, which also did poorly; as of 1929 Poland still hadn't reached the 1913 levels; Czechoslovakia had, but painfully; Hungary hadn't, IIRC.

Suddenly Russia looks better, eh?

I would contend some of this.
1. Poland had been the battleground of the Eastern front in WW1, with armies both advancing and withdrawing across her eventually territory, which was formed essentially arbitrarilly by the fortunes of war. I am not convinced the Russian civil war was as bad, or atleast not universally so. I think claiming that Poland had a better starting position industrially compared with cities such as Moscow or St Petersburg is just patently false.

2. The big one. The collapse of the Empires left an Eastern Europe which was infrastructually a nonsense. The greatest dissolution occurred in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This effectively took what was once one administrative area and replaced it with Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia with further sections going to Italy, Romania and a newly independent Poland. It is unsurprising that many of these states were politically weak and economically inefficient. The borders formed using Wilson’s argument of self determination barely fit nationalities and completely ignored economic realities. As a result of this Czechoslovakia for example acquired most of the old Empire’s industry meanwhile Austria had an Imperial capital with far overblown institutions which were no longer necessary. Hungary had a budding industry but was now cut off from necessary raw resources. Furthermore Hungary had possessed an effective transport system but much of this now passed to Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade. Yugoslavia inherited five different railway systems with four different gauges; each system served different centres so they were practically unconnected to each other. It took the better part of a decade to unite these systems . Poland is another example. The state was constructed from areas which had previously been under three different empires and so each area had different institutions and legislations combined with obsolete logistical links with old imperial capitals.

The USSR did not suffer these problems to anything like the same extent.
 

Stalker

Banned
Liberal democracies with government restrictions on unrestrained capitalism?
It's the matter of definition then. Social rights and protection of labour are the same issues in western liberal democracies and what is usually meant by the word "socialism". And those European countries were mainly shaped by social democrates in afterwar period. I remind you that Bolshies are just Lenin's deviation of the general trend of social democratic movement. Martov's Menshevicks were typical European SDs.
 
I would contend some of this.
1. Poland had been the battleground of the Eastern front in WW1, with armies both advancing and withdrawing across her eventually territory, which was formed essentially arbitrarilly by the fortunes of war. I am not convinced the Russian civil war was as bad, or atleast not universally so. I think claiming that Poland had a better starting position industrially compared with cities such as Moscow or St Petersburg is just patently false.

2. The big one. The collapse of the Empires left an Eastern Europe which was infrastructually a nonsense. The greatest dissolution occurred in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. This effectively took what was once one administrative area and replaced it with Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia with further sections going to Italy, Romania and a newly independent Poland. It is unsurprising that many of these states were politically weak and economically inefficient. The borders formed using Wilson’s argument of self determination barely fit nationalities and completely ignored economic realities. As a result of this Czechoslovakia for example acquired most of the old Empire’s industry meanwhile Austria had an Imperial capital with far overblown institutions which were no longer necessary. Hungary had a budding industry but was now cut off from necessary raw resources. Furthermore Hungary had possessed an effective transport system but much of this now passed to Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade. Yugoslavia inherited five different railway systems with four different gauges; each system served different centres so they were practically unconnected to each other. It took the better part of a decade to unite these systems . Poland is another example. The state was constructed from areas which had previously been under three different empires and so each area had different institutions and legislations combined with obsolete logistical links with old imperial capitals.

The USSR did not suffer these problems to anything like the same extent.

Good points.
There's no doubt that the USSR gave itself some advantages compared to other (capitalist) regimes. These included abrogation of WWI and pre-war debts, isolation from capitalist economic cycles (particularly Great Depression) and brutal utilisation of human labour to achieve ends.
On the other hand a 'Fascist' regime of the sort being discussed could have other potential advantages:

  • less devastating civil war upon which to re-build;
  • absence of damaging impact of War Communism which devastated USSR agriculture and industry before the partial NEP recovery;
  • continued bourgeois expertise / later absence of purges of experts;
  • foreign investment and trade;
  • negotiated debt reduction, etc.;
  • absence of damaging impact of collectivization;
  • no doubt illiberal utilisation of human labour;
  • potential 'Fascism in One Country' / Autarky to overcome excesses of the Great Depression.
The extent to which a 'Fascist' Russia would be able to benefit from these would, however, depend - among other things - on its relations at and after the end of the Great War.
 
But this is suicidal and frankly doesn't mesh w/ Poincare and the rest. Russia is obviously a better ally than Poland would be, so why go for Poland?

I agree that this is at the heart of the discussion; Russia's relations with the rest of Europe at the end (or in the years immediately after the end) of the Great War are crucial. You claim that France would see Russia as a better ally than Poland - for reasons of size / power but I'm not so sure.

  1. Tradition of Franco-Polish friendship from the time of Napoleon.
  2. Reinforcement of this tradition through the wartime 'Blue Army'.
  3. Support given to the Polish National Committee including in September 1917, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, its recognition by Poincare and the French government as the legitimate government of Poland.
  4. [French considerations (particularly from Painlevé, Briand and Caillaux), in mid/late 1917, that a compromise peace with Germany would mean concessions to Germany in the east demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice Russian interests.]
Beyond French pro-Polish activity there is, of course, the Fourteen Points (8 Jan 1918) which drew on earlier war aspirations and which were drafted at about the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and announced at a time when its survival was by no mean certain. (To clarify I wish to suggest that the Bolshevik Revolutiuon may have influenced the Fourteen Points but did not determine them.)
This suggests that the allies, including Poincare, were determined to see an independent Poland. The consequences respecting relations with Russia would not be positive leaving Russia, as I have suggested, in a similar position to the USSR regarding its long term attitudes towards the post-war settlement.
In addition to this evidence that France and the allies were set on the creation of Poland before the revolution was secure there are three other factors that would, most likely, leave France supporting Poland.

  1. One difficulty: Self determination as espoused by Wilson in the Fourteen Points - validating the war in the eyes of liberal opinion on both sides of the Atlantic - would be utterly contradicted by allied championship of Russia's restoration of domination over Poland and any other 'nations' in Eastern Europe that received 'national independence' (from Russia at least) at the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. How could the allies square these liberal ideals with a restored Russian empire? Could they really renege on promises to Polish nationalists and to public opinion in the climate of 1918 (as regards nationalities rather than ideology as the Bolsheviks ITTL have been crushed)? The only compromise would be some glorified Congress Poland augmented by parts of Prussia and Galicia but remaining under Russian suzerainity - unacceptable to Polish and in itself a worrying increase in Russian power.
  2. One decision. The policy decision for France would be about how reliable an ally Russia would be. France's 1894 alliance with Russia stemmed from Germany's decision that Austria Hungary was a more steady ally and more dangerous adversary than Russia. Without Austria Hungary the traditionally positive relations between Prussia (now Germany) and Russia might be more natural. Secondly were France to achieve her ambitions to crush Germany's military threat without restoring Poland then France is faced by Russia as the only serious rival for continental leadership. This could well persuade France that Poland's friendship would be an important counterbalance.
  3. Fait acompli. Finally, whatever France's ideal solution Poland is certain to come into existence as an entity during 1918: Polish people, politicians and regiments would ensure this happens whether, initially, under CP domination or, as the war ends, independently. France's decision is therefore whether to challenge or even fight against a fait acompli and in doing so lose the friendship of its traditional ally Poland, or to accept it and then work out the consequences with Russia. The logic of this would push France into championing a big Poland as per 1919/1920.
 
I would contend some of this.
1. Poland had been the battleground of the Eastern front in WW1, with armies both advancing and withdrawing across her eventually territory, which was formed essentially arbitrarilly by the fortunes of war. I am not convinced the Russian civil war was as bad, or atleast not universally so. I think claiming that Poland had a better starting position industrially compared with cities such as Moscow or St Petersburg is just patently false.

Why? By 1921, iron production was down to something like 5% of 1913 levels. Something like 20 million Russians died between 1913 and 1921; we have reports of cannibalism in major cities. I think you're really underestimating how bad the Russian Civil War was.

The borders formed using Wilson’s argument of self determination barely fit nationalities and completely ignored economic realities.

The USSR did not suffer these problems to anything like the same extent.

To the same extent? No, although they were there; witness the lost of its Baltic ports, except for Leningrad. But I think it's a bit convenient to blame all of Eaastern Europe's troubles on independence, and not on the collapse of the global commodity markets and the prewar free trade.

Another point for Lord Slingsby: IF industrialization in the 1920s was hindered by the fact that peasants weren't selling as much grain, why would they sell more in a free market?

Some decline in marketable grain was inevitable; smallholders simply do not sell as much as owners of estates.

One difficulty: Self determination as espoused by Wilson in the Fourteen Points - validating the war in the eyes of liberal opinion on both sides of the Atlantic - would be utterly contradicted by allied championship of Russia's restoration of domination over Poland and any other 'nations' in Eastern Europe that received 'national independence' (from Russia at least) at the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. How could the allies square these liberal ideals with a restored Russian empire? Could they really renege on promises to Polish nationalists and to public opinion in the climate of 1918 (as regards nationalities rather than ideology as the Bolsheviks ITTL have been crushed)?

Why not? Nobody cared about extending the 14 Points to Austrians or Arabs, after all. I admit that there may be a Polish lobby, but...

I need a more concrete POD for this to really address it, but I think that a Fascist state might do better in 1920 too.


Without Austria Hungary the traditionally positive relations between Prussia (now Germany) and Russia might be more natural. Secondly were France to achieve her ambitions to crush Germany's military threat without restoring Poland then France is faced by Russia as the only serious rival for continental leadership.

Reparations alone will poison German-Russian relations.
 
Another point for Lord Slingsby: IF industrialization in the 1920s was hindered by the fact that peasants weren't selling as much grain, why would they sell more in a free market?

The problem was that while agriculture recovered reasonably under the NEP there was simply very little to buy with the proceeds of sale of grain. Instead the peasants kept it and enjoyed a fuller diet than usual. So while in the mid to late 1920s the peasants had a reasonably good time, it did little or nothing to assist the USSR's development. It was this that led to late 1920s grain requisitioning and subsequently collectivization. [The problem Stalin faced in the late 1920s was a need/desire for modernisation to improve Russia's strength and self esteem (and to produce the industrail proletariat central to the Marxist analysis of historical progress). However without international capital, modernisation was dependent on agriculture. Stalin needed to break the power of the peasantry to achieve his goals.] Where this would have been different under a 'Fascist' regime - especially without the extent of damage caused in the Russian Civil War to which you rightly refer and also without War Communism - is that international capital would have invested in Russia causing greater growth in industrial sectors giving peasants something to purchase.

Why not? Nobody cared about extending the 14 Points to Austrians or Arabs, after all. I admit that there may be a Polish lobby, but...

Whatever the claims of the Austrians and Arabs, Poland had been a cause célèbre for 120 years and was at the centre of Wilson's 'peace initiatives' during 1916 and 1917. Even Sazonov, Imperial Russia's foreign minister, called - mid 1916 - for Polish autonomy as a response to the growing international pressure (and in fear that Germany & Austria would announce some such thing first). The pressure increased after Wilson's famous 'peace without victory' address 22 January 1917 which contained references to 'rights of self-determination for "unrepresented peoples" and his assertion that "statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland" which 'lent the Polish Question a worldwide recognition it had never previously enjoyed.' ( For your freedom and ours: the Polish Question in Wilson's peace initiatives, 1916-1917 Australian Journal of Politics and History, The, Dec, 2003 by Christopher G. Salisbury).
 
The problem was that while agriculture recovered reasonably under the NEP there was simply very little to buy with the proceeds of sale of grain. Instead the peasants kept it and enjoyed a fuller diet than usual.

Sorry, maybe I wasn't clear. My point is that even when the peasants, in theory, did have the option of buying more (Poland), they chose to eat it.

Moreovre, what are their options here? To industrialize, Russia will probably have high protective tariffs, no? If so, then something like the scissors crisis might occur anyway.

Where this would have been different under a 'Fascist' regime - especially without the extent of damage caused in the Russian Civil War to which you rightly refer and also without War Communism - is that international capital would have invested in Russia causing greater growth in industrial sectors giving peasants something to purchase.

This assumes that people will invest in Russia; it will be burdened by debts from the Great War and beforehand (this actually proved to be one of the big sticking points to investment in the 1920s USSR). So rather than invest, foreigners will invest in servicing the debt, rather than industrial development.

Exactly as happened in OTL Eastern Europe in the 1920s.

I think the other question is why would Fascist Russia want Poland beyond the Curzon line.

Anyway, I welcome to be persuaded why people will invest in Russian industry when they didn't in Yugoslav, Polish, and Bulgarian industry; why peasants don't simply eat more, as they did elsewhere; etc. And why Russia wouldn't end up in the same impasse as the rest of interwar Eastern Europe (aside from Czechoslovakia). But I don't see it.
 

Stalker

Banned
Tell that to the Ukrainians. The Soviet leadership claimed they cared about a lot of things but but talk is cheap.
OK, I am here. C'mon, tell me.:D
I might say that compared to Czar's period, Ukraine in Soviet time until mid 30s had experienced cultural renaissance, it had certain authonomy and it had its territory enlarged. Eastern Ukrainians are and have always been a different sort of Ukrainians, mainly pro-Russian and intermixed with the Russians due to those simple reasons that Novorussia was colonised after the annexation of Crimea when there was no more Tartar threat and thus those mainly ethnic Ukrainians were not the bearers of Ukrainian national idea that reached its peak during Khmelnitsky's rebellion.
Stalin then suppressed much of Ukrainian cultural development but I cannot say he wanted or was able to stop the process. And I cannot say Ukrainians in majority were that very enthusiastic meeting Wehrmacht in 1941 or Golodomor (Great Famine) was something that was genocide of Ukrainians because not only Ukrainians suffered from it but also Cossacks, Byelorussians and Russians in Lower Volga region.
 
I'm afraid I can't quite comment on the possibility of a Fascist Russia (I'm no expert on the chaotic situation that was post-WW1 Russia) However, I do wonder something, who would lead such a country? There was one general a baron von ?(I forget his name but to me it sounded german) who was an ultranationalist wasn't he?

Of course, if we're talking a really scary dictator I suggest Rasputin(Yes, I know he was hated almost universally by Russia, but the idea is just so much fun.) People thought Hitler was hard to assassinate? Try killing that guy!(attempts on said person have included:stabbed in stomach, poisoning of a cake he ate, shooting him multiple times, beating him, and finally wrapping him up in cloth and throwing him into a freezing river which he clawed his way half-way out of before dying of hypothermia, not drowning, hypo-freaking-thermia)

Excuse my rant, I just couldn't resist:p.

Actually, now that I think about it, I remember a TL on CTT that had the Tsarists winning out but a sort of fascist shadow government really controlling things. That would probably be a more realistic scenario, a puppet tsar(ina) and a ridiculously powerful fascist regent.
 
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