But this is suicidal and frankly doesn't mesh w/ Poincare and the rest. Russia is obviously a better ally than Poland would be, so why go for Poland?
I agree that this is at the heart of the discussion; Russia's relations with the rest of Europe at the end (or in the years immediately after the end) of the Great War are crucial. You claim that France would see Russia as a better ally than Poland - for reasons of size / power but I'm not so sure.
- Tradition of Franco-Polish friendship from the time of Napoleon.
- Reinforcement of this tradition through the wartime 'Blue Army'.
- Support given to the Polish National Committee including in September 1917, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, its recognition by Poincare and the French government as the legitimate government of Poland.
- [French considerations (particularly from Painlevé, Briand and Caillaux), in mid/late 1917, that a compromise peace with Germany would mean concessions to Germany in the east demonstrating a willingness to sacrifice Russian interests.]
Beyond French pro-Polish activity there is, of course, the Fourteen Points (8 Jan 1918) which drew on earlier war aspirations and which were drafted at about the time of the Bolshevik Revolution and announced at a time when its survival was by no mean certain. (To clarify I wish to suggest that the Bolshevik Revolutiuon may have influenced the Fourteen Points but did not determine them.)
This suggests that the allies, including Poincare, were determined to see an independent Poland. The consequences respecting relations with Russia would not be positive leaving Russia, as I have suggested, in a similar position to the USSR regarding its long term attitudes towards the post-war
settlement.
In addition to this evidence that France and the allies were set on the creation of Poland before the revolution was secure there are three other factors that would, most likely, leave France supporting Poland.
- One difficulty: Self determination as espoused by Wilson in the Fourteen Points - validating the war in the eyes of liberal opinion on both sides of the Atlantic - would be utterly contradicted by allied championship of Russia's restoration of domination over Poland and any other 'nations' in Eastern Europe that received 'national independence' (from Russia at least) at the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. How could the allies square these liberal ideals with a restored Russian empire? Could they really renege on promises to Polish nationalists and to public opinion in the climate of 1918 (as regards nationalities rather than ideology as the Bolsheviks ITTL have been crushed)? The only compromise would be some glorified Congress Poland augmented by parts of Prussia and Galicia but remaining under Russian suzerainity - unacceptable to Polish and in itself a worrying increase in Russian power.
- One decision. The policy decision for France would be about how reliable an ally Russia would be. France's 1894 alliance with Russia stemmed from Germany's decision that Austria Hungary was a more steady ally and more dangerous adversary than Russia. Without Austria Hungary the traditionally positive relations between Prussia (now Germany) and Russia might be more natural. Secondly were France to achieve her ambitions to crush Germany's military threat without restoring Poland then France is faced by Russia as the only serious rival for continental leadership. This could well persuade France that Poland's friendship would be an important counterbalance.
- Fait acompli. Finally, whatever France's ideal solution Poland is certain to come into existence as an entity during 1918: Polish people, politicians and regiments would ensure this happens whether, initially, under CP domination or, as the war ends, independently. France's decision is therefore whether to challenge or even fight against a fait acompli and in doing so lose the friendship of its traditional ally Poland, or to accept it and then work out the consequences with Russia. The logic of this would push France into championing a big Poland as per 1919/1920.