WI: Fall Gelb not modified?

Since there's already a thread on a better German performance at Dunkirk...;)

Doubtless many here know about the aircraft crash that led to von Manstein's modified plan to invade France through the Ardennes. So what happens if the aircraft never crashes? Or if it's known the planning documents are destroyed? How much better can (do) the WAllies do when the panzern come calling?
 
Well, it is what the French were expecting and planned for. Now, the German advantages of initiative and speed would still come into play, and just because the Germans would be attacking into the teeth of the French forces wouldn't immediately erase all the problems the French military of 1940 labored under.

French doctrine of 1940 didn't buy into the concept of successive defensive lines, even though the terrain along the border would be ideal for it. Instead they saw one line, continually plugged and reforming as it was pushed. In the context of WW2, this is a weakness. That being the case, the French will still deploy one powerful line of troops on their planned defense line.

When the Germans attack, their advantages in skill, and the basic advantage of the attacker in picking his target will allow them to concentrate overwhelming firepower on the French earthworks.

The French will then commit reserves, both laterally from other forces on the line, and from their central reserve. We know, from the historical Battle of France that these reserves will be moved into locations dangerously close to the front, but will also move into position at a much slower pace than the Germans can respond. Historically the Germans broke through the French defenses and then almost dismissively overran the still deploying reserves immediately behind the front lines. A lot depends on on how fast the Germans can penetrate the main French defenses in their main attack sectors, but looking at the speed of French deployments vs the speed of the Germans penetrating French lines suggests the advantage lies with the Germans here. It's unlikely they'll catch the French reserves quite as flat footed, but it'll still be a more fluid battle before the French are fully ready where the Germans will have the advantage. This becomes even more so since the Germans will launch several spoiling attacks and try and get the French to send reserves to multiple locations besides their main attack sector(s).

If the Germans smash the reserves sent to plug the gaps the French will try and reform the line rather than aggressively counter attacking with large forces, which inevitably means the Germans will advance, moving the main fight beyond the Line. If the French had a more offensive doctrine, bypassed portions of the Line could present a real problem for the Germans, but since the forces there will be static they quickly lose importance to the continuing fight. The problem for the Germans here though is the French front is stronger, the German advance will be slower, and Gamelin will just have more troops to throw at them. Despite the basic flaws in their method of fighting, the French probably will be able to pull a new line together further west, and hold the Germans again. By now the elite German troops leading the assault will be exhausted, with losses, and things will just start to slow down more. The Germans actually only had a small number of elite panzer divisions, and there's only so much you can ask of even the best soldiers.

Eventually the whole thing will grind to a halt, with the Germans having expended an heroic effort to overrun Belgium and even get across the border into France itself, giving Gamelin's forces a real drubbing in the process, but ultimately unable to actually get the breakthrough they really need.
 
Well, it is what the French were expecting and planned for. Now, the German advantages of initiative and speed would still come into play, and just because the Germans would be attacking into the teeth of the French forces wouldn't immediately erase all the problems the French military of 1940 labored under.

French doctrine of 1940 didn't buy into the concept of successive defensive lines, even though the terrain along the border would be ideal for it. Instead they saw one line, continually plugged and reforming as it was pushed. In the context of WW2, this is a weakness. That being the case, the French will still deploy one powerful line of troops on their planned defense line.

When the Germans attack, their advantages in skill, and the basic advantage of the attacker in picking his target will allow them to concentrate overwhelming firepower on the French earthworks.

The French will then commit reserves, both laterally from other forces on the line, and from their central reserve. We know, from the historical Battle of France that these reserves will be moved into locations dangerously close to the front, but will also move into position at a much slower pace than the Germans can respond. Historically the Germans broke through the French defenses and then almost dismissively overran the still deploying reserves immediately behind the front lines. A lot depends on on how fast the Germans can penetrate the main French defenses in their main attack sectors, but looking at the speed of French deployments vs the speed of the Germans penetrating French lines suggests the advantage lies with the Germans here. It's unlikely they'll catch the French reserves quite as flat footed, but it'll still be a more fluid battle before the French are fully ready where the Germans will have the advantage. This becomes even more so since the Germans will launch several spoiling attacks and try and get the French to send reserves to multiple locations besides their main attack sector(s).

If the Germans smash the reserves sent to plug the gaps the French will try and reform the line rather than aggressively counter attacking with large forces, which inevitably means the Germans will advance, moving the main fight beyond the Line. If the French had a more offensive doctrine, bypassed portions of the Line could present a real problem for the Germans, but since the forces there will be static they quickly lose importance to the continuing fight. The problem for the Germans here though is the French front is stronger, the German advance will be slower, and Gamelin will just have more troops to throw at them. Despite the basic flaws in their method of fighting, the French probably will be able to pull a new line together further west, and hold the Germans again. By now the elite German troops leading the assault will be exhausted, with losses, and things will just start to slow down more. The Germans actually only had a small number of elite panzer divisions, and there's only so much you can ask of even the best soldiers.

Eventually the whole thing will grind to a halt, with the Germans having expended an heroic effort to overrun Belgium and even get across the border into France itself, giving Gamelin's forces a real drubbing in the process, but ultimately unable to actually get the breakthrough they really need.
That's about what I expected. It's good to see my judgment isn't completely wrong.:p

OTOH, no real surprises...:(
 
...

Doubtless many here know about the aircraft crash that led to von Manstein's modified plan to invade France through the Ardennes. So what happens if the aircraft never crashes? Or if it's known the planning documents are destroyed? How much better can (do) the WAllies do when the panzern come calling?

As per the other comments the Allies do a bit better. however I'd refer you to Mays book 'Strange Victory'. He analyzes the development of the German manuver & from German sources produces a somewhat different narrative. Core point in Mays version is the repeated testing of the German plans in map & field exercises. Those exercises or war games repeatedly predicted a failure to acheive decisive results, including Mansteins original plan of December 1939 and the subsequent itterations of it. Halder did accept that placing the main attack through the Ardennes gave better results, but those were still far short of the sort of victory German needed.

Here is where it gets even stickier. In a March 1940 map exercise the Geman intelligence officer responsible for 'Enemy Forces West' proposed that the French commanders would be slower to make decisions than the German had expected. When the French response was slowed in the exercise by 24 hours the result came out closer to what was needed. In the eyes of most German Army & Army Group commanders this proved little since there was no firm evidence the French would be so fatally slow. Hence the lack of confidence by so many German leaders from Army command upwards through Rundsteadt, Halder, & Hitler.
 
Despite the basic flaws in their method of fighting, the French probably will be able to pull a new line together further west, and hold the Germans again.


I'm pretty skeptical, given their OTL performance, of the French ability to rally forces quickly enough to contain a German breakthrough that had already taken place, especially given OTL's conditions of Luftwaffe aerial superiority and clogged up Belgian roads.

IMO, their best hope is to keep their line intact. If the Germans manage to force a hole between two allied formations big enough for their main Panzer force to slip through, it's all over for Gamelin.

Looking at how they fared at Gembloux and Hannut, where they commited some of their best forces expecting the German Schwerpunkt, but instead fought (and kinda lost) against what was basically a diversion, things are looking pretty grim for the WAllies, should the Germans show up at the same battles with 8 times as many panzers.
 
Carl Schwamberger said:
As per the other comments the Allies do a bit better. however I'd refer you to Mays book 'Strange Victory'. He analyzes the development of the German manuver & from German sources produces a somewhat different narrative. Core point in Mays version is the repeated testing of the German plans in map & field exercises. Those exercises or war games repeatedly predicted a failure to acheive decisive results, including Mansteins original plan of December 1939 and the subsequent itterations of it. Halder did accept that placing the main attack through the Ardennes gave better results, but those were still far short of the sort of victory German needed.

Here is where it gets even stickier. In a March 1940 map exercise the Geman intelligence officer responsible for 'Enemy Forces West' proposed that the French commanders would be slower to make decisions than the German had expected. When the French response was slowed in the exercise by 24 hours the result came out closer to what was needed. In the eyes of most German Army & Army Group commanders this proved little since there was no firm evidence the French would be so fatally slow. Hence the lack of confidence by so many German leaders from Army command upwards through Rundsteadt, Halder, & Hitler.
Obviously, the Germans could not imagine a 3-day turnaround time.:eek::rolleyes: Which would put the response so much nearer German victory conditions...

The French could not get a break at all.:rolleyes:
 
I'm pretty skeptical, given their OTL performance, of the French ability to rally forces quickly enough to contain a German breakthrough that had already taken place, especially given OTL's conditions of Luftwaffe aerial superiority and clogged up Belgian roads.

IMO, their best hope is to keep their line intact. If the Germans manage to force a hole between two allied formations big enough for their main Panzer force to slip through, it's all over for Gamelin.

Looking at how they fared at Gembloux and Hannut, where they commited some of their best forces expecting the German Schwerpunkt, but instead fought (and kinda lost) against what was basically a diversion, things are looking pretty grim for the WAllies, should the Germans show up at the same battles with 8 times as many panzers.

I tend to be skeptical as well. We might add as well that this kind of plan puts a lot more of the Luftwaffe assets on the forces on the move on congested Belgian roads. There could well be a much more chopped up opposition (as Luftwaffe would focus on troops in the way of the Schwerpunkt) facing 8 times the panzers and what then.
The slow French reaction time would now prove disastrous once again.
 
I'm pretty skeptical, given their OTL performance, of the French ability to rally forces quickly enough to contain a German breakthrough that had already taken place,

The German's breakthrough force is also their exploitation force and it is relatively small. If the panzers spend a pro-longed amount of their time and energy (not to mention expend much of their supplies and take a bunch of casualties) just creating a breakthrough then they will become too exhausted for a proper exploitation which will enable the French to successfully withdraw.

especially given OTL's conditions of Luftwaffe aerial superiority and clogged up Belgian roads.
Neither of which were able to prevent the French's first-rate forces from deploying or (later) withdrawing* and giving a good show of themselves against the Germans in central Belgium IOTL.

IOTL, the German's threw their strongest forces against the point of the line held by the weakest French forces. In such a circumstances, a rapid and relatively painless breakthrough can easily be expected.

ITTL, the Germans are tossing their strongest forces against the French's strongest forces. The correlation of forces is hence radically different. And thus so will the outcome.

Looking at how they fared at Gembloux and Hannut,where they commited some of their best forces expecting the German Schwerpunkt, but instead fought (and kinda lost) against what was basically a diversion
You mean the Hannut where they successfully completed all of their objectives and the Gembloux where they successfully held the line until compelled to withdrawal by the fact a separate German force had unexpectedly advanced across their LOC? Such a loss indeed. :rolleyes:
 
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So... What kind of result are we talking? The Germans take more of France quicker than OTL, but it becomes a war of attrition? Or could Metropolitan France still fall?
 
So... What kind of result are we talking? The Germans take more of France quicker than OTL, but it becomes a war of attrition?

It's actually really more of a World War 1 repeat: the Germans overrun the low countries, grab a decently-sized slice of France near Belgium, and give the French army something of a beating before getting stopped and sucked into a war of attrition. Rather more then what the Germans were expecting with the original plan (they only thought they would be able to overrun the low countries), but somewhat less then what they need to avoid the Anglo-French from overwhelming them.

Or could Metropolitan France still fall?
Still a possible outcome, but vastly less likely. If it does happen, it would also come at greater cost to the Germans and over a longer period of time.
 
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The German's breakthrough force is also their exploitation force and it is relatively small. If the panzers spend a pro-longed amount of their time and energy (not to mention expend much of their supplies and take a bunch of casualties) just creating a breakthrough then they will become too exhausted for a proper exploitation which will enable the French to successfully withdraw.

...

Relating to this a few numbers:

1. Rommel in his memoir published by his son noted how he had just 25 tanks remaining with the 7th Pz Div when it reached the coast. This was from a original TO/TE strength of 220. The balance were either destroyed in combat, suffering from catastrophic breakdowns, or were being repaired and attempting to catch up.

2. This was typical of the German Armored divisions. In two weeks from 10 May to 25 May they typically left 60% to 90% of their tanks along the road or battlefields.

3. When the offensive was resumed in June recovered tanks brought the average tank regiment strength back up to around 50%. Many of the repairs were hasty or temporary field repairs and losses from breakdowns increased as repairs failed and other worn parts failed. Note that even with the experience of the 1939 & 1940 campaigns plus intervening training the tank loss rates in the first three months of the Barbarossa campaign were not a lot less.
 
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