WI: Failed invasion of Norway

The French fought like Hell on Earth AFTER the cream of their army had been lost in Belgium. You can blame that disaster on their senior military leadership. It was simply, in France itself, a matter of defending in relatively clear terrain.
Plus facing air superiority, better training, blitzkrieg warfare, better tanks (French tanks were tougher but had practicality issues), and facing internal political dissension.

Read Will Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Republic".:(

Oh, and after the Commune, no way do the French allow a battle in Paris.

More than that, it was a matter of the gamble of moving what reserves they had into a strike in Belgium that they had every rational reason to suspect would in fact be the German plan of operations. That's the kind of thing where in success it's brilliant audacity, in failure it's a sign of incompetent blunderers who didn't know what they were doing. Well, OTL was a failure and thus.....
 
The trouble with holding Norway is keeping it supplied. Convoys will need an exeptionaly heavy escort as they will face not only Uboats, but airstrikes from Denmark and sorties by the Kriegsmarine heavy units. If the KM came out en mass they could slaughter the convoys, though if the Home Fleet could get between them and Germany a second Battle of Jutland should be a decisive British victory. The thing is though once the BEF is driven from France losing most of it's equipment the government will be under great presure to bring those troops home to counter any invasion.
 
The trouble with holding Norway is keeping it supplied. Convoys will need an exeptionaly heavy escort as they will face not only Uboats, but airstrikes from Denmark and sorties by the Kriegsmarine heavy units. If the KM came out en mass they could slaughter the convoys, though if the Home Fleet could get between them and Germany a second Battle of Jutland should be a decisive British victory. The thing is though once the BEF is driven from France losing most of it's equipment the government will be under great presure to bring those troops home to counter any invasion.

Shipping lanes to Oslo would definitely blocked by the luftwaffe, but it is not the only harbour in Norway. Distance from Aalborg (northern Denmark) to Trondheim is similar as Dunkerque to Glasgow so coordinating air strikes against convoys there would be quite difficult. U-boats would of course be a pain, but submarine and air bases in Norway would make surface raider operations near the coastline challenging.
 
task force 5 being successful makes the campaign essentially over; the allies reinforcing once the germans hold oslo is only putting more men in harms way; germany has a safe secure reinforcement path; the allies have a long one outside the range of fighter cover which will be harassed by uboats and bombers going into small remote ports

There's no question that Norway wins or loses with Oslo. It's the only really major port in the country. But if the Norwegians had been fully mobilized and deployed for battle (including for facing paratroopers), and had they not faced internal treason (with Fascists announcing that Norway had already surrendered, leaving the military situation confused), that operation would have failed. Meaning ALL German operations in Norway would ultimately fail.

Once the MOBILIZED Norwegian Army has secured the ports, it's over.
 
The trouble with holding Norway is keeping it supplied. Convoys will need an exeptionaly heavy escort as they will face not only Uboats, but airstrikes from Denmark and sorties by the Kriegsmarine heavy units. If the KM came out en mass they could slaughter the convoys, though if the Home Fleet could get between them and Germany a second Battle of Jutland should be a decisive British victory. The thing is though once the BEF is driven from France losing most of it's equipment the government will be under great presure to bring those troops home to counter any invasion.

With Norway still in the war and it's military and rail system operational, Trondheim would be enough to keep the country supplied by sea. There is a rail line going from that city that runs throughout the rest of the southern third of the country into Sweden, which runs to Narvik, and by a single line along the Baltic shores into Finland. Surely that port is outside Me-109 fighter range, yes?

Then you don't need much of an RAF presence to keep the unescorted Luftwaffe at bay. We're not talking the Murmansk Convoys, after all. In fact, quite the opposite. And if the Germans are sending their U-Boats to attack convoys going into Norway, that's less into the Atlantic.

EDIT: Oops! Missed seyak's post.:eek:
 
This would make a Bismarck style breakout that much harder, since more allied air-patrols would be flown, and the Germans would have to stay far enough out to sea so as not to be spotted from the shore.
 
This would make a Bismarck style breakout that much harder, since more allied air-patrols would be flown, and the Germans would have to stay far enough out to sea so as not to be spotted from the shore.

Not to mention harder to hide in those Norwegian fjords with Norwegian and British artillery shooting at them.:D
 
Not to mention harder to hide in those Norwegian fjords with Norwegian and British artillery shooting at them.:D
Not just artillery either, with very limited air-cover from the Luftwaffe the British can hit them much easier with Swordfish and other outdated but plentiful aircraft. Also, the benefit of not having to garrison Norway will be at least partially lost in having to heavily garrison Denmark.
 
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Not just artillery either, with very limited air-cover from the Luftwaffe the British can hit them much easier with Swordfish and other outdated but plentiful aircraft.(1) Also, the benefit of not having to garrison Norway will be at least partially lost in having to heavily garrison Denmark.(2)

1) Yeah, it's called "Extraordinary Air/Sea Interdiction." When the other side has zero air assets to bring to bear, you can send out your own tactical air assets without gunners, their weapons and ammunition. Saving a whole lot of weight for more fuel and bombs. Plus no need to wait around for unnecessary fighter escorts. If the enemy is close by, it can also mean multiple sorties in a single day, multiplying your force strike ability by leaps and bounds. Think Bismarck (weak example). Think Repulse and Prince of Wales (good example). Think Yamato (incredible example).

2) Not really. The tactical and logistical barriers to a "Danish Overlord" are extreme.
 
2) Not really. The tactical and logistical barriers to a "Danish Overlord" are extreme.
It'd be a lot easier to deceive the Germans over Fortitude North though, because the allies would now be in a better position (from the German PoV) to pull the operation off than they were OTL, especially if they were able to talk Sweden on board.
 
It'd be a lot easier to deceive the Germans over Fortitude North though, because the allies would now be in a better position (from the German PoV) to pull the operation off than they were OTL, especially if they were able to talk Sweden on board.

The nature of the flats around the Danish ports and approaches to Northwestern Germany (not to mention the length of the LOCs compared to the English Channel) mean that its probably just more steel and concrete for an Atlantic Wall extension into Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven. The approaches to those ports, in a strictly military/amphibious sense, are a bitch.

And even if Denmark was liberated (?) the Germans could easily pull back to Schleswig-Holstein and seal off the Danish peninsula. Strategic Dead End. The Allies didn't have the landing craft to waste.

Albert Speer mentions in his memoir about voicing his concern about the possibility of Germany being invaded directly from the sea, until the above points about German shore geography were made clear to him by the Kriegsmarine.

Still, with "No Retreat" Hitler, you never know. Maybe a couple of panzer divisions DO get sent to the Atlantic Danish shoreline...
 
The nature of the flats around the Danish ports and approaches to Northwestern Germany (not to mention the length of the LOCs compared to the English Channel) mean that its probably just more steel and concrete for an Atlantic Wall extension into Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven.
And thus, away from areas where the stuff is actually needed, ie Normandy.

The approaches to those ports, in a strictly military/amphibious sense, are a bitch.
Accepted, but with the allies that much closer Fortitude North will be easier to push onto Hitler. Also if they can appeared to have talked Sweden in, they can get a very good shot at Copenhagen and the rest of Zealand, not so important in itself as would be Øresund.

And even if Denmark was liberated (?) the Germans could easily pull back to Schleswig-Holstein and seal off the Danish peninsula. Strategic Dead End. The Allies didn't have the landing craft to waste.
I said Fortitude North, not Friesian Islands, The allies would have no intention of actually carrying out a landing, just apparently preparing for one.
 
And even if Denmark was liberated (?) the Germans could easily pull back to Schleswig-Holstein and seal off the Danish peninsula. Strategic Dead End. The Allies didn't have the landing craft to waste.

An Allied controlled Denmark means however that a large chunk of German is within striking range of allied medium bombers and fighters. The air war would look tottaly different.

Furthermore the Germans would face serious difficulties keeping the Baltic open to their vessels, which in turn would increase their logistic problems in the Eastern Front.
 
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