All across Europe, local fascist parties collaborated with the Nazis in their respective countries. In the end, their collaboration destroyed their movements after the war. Only the Communists took up the mantle of anti-fascist resistance, thus becoming lionized to this day while the fascists became utterly hated.
What if those same fascist movements refused to work with the Nazis and went on a resistance campaign against them like true nationalists?
Well aside from the Austrian Fatherland Front, there were a few others. Poland's National Radical Camp had its own resistance groups. n Belgium, the Secret Army (the largest of the various Belgian resistance movements!) and the National Royalist Movement (not to be confused with the Rexists, though it was founded by former Rexists) were both very far right and authoritarian in the leanings. Then we get into smaller groups, like the Alliance intelligence network in France which was founded by a number of far right individuals (including some from La Cagoule, an almost comically far right terrorist organization), or the Styrian Chetniks (the one Chetnik organization that never collaborated and consistently fought the Nazis.
A major problem many far right resistance groups faced was fragmentation of their pre-war base. Some resisted, some collaborated, those who collaborated easily infiltrated and brought about the end of the far right resistances.
the PCF (organized resistance post-invasion but pre-Barbarossa)
To an extent. The PCF's first instincts following the fall of France were to collaborate, they even petitioned b the German occupation authorities for the right to re-establish
L'Humanite (their news paper which had been shut down by during the war by the Daladier government) offering to use it to encourage collaboration. The Germans didn't take them up on the offer, and despite this
L'Humanite encouraged collaboration anyways at points during its period of clandestine publication.
It is true that members of the PCF engaged in resistance as early as mid-1940s, however these were the initiatives of individuals and/or local branches rather than coordinated efforts by the party. Over the course of late 1940 and early 1941 the party underwent an evolution of sorts;
L'Humanite's clandestine articles became more critical of the abuses suffered at the hands of the occupiers, the party leadership increasingly turned a blind eye to the initiatives of local leaders, and it even issued some directives to begin secretly stockpiling weapons. However, it was only after the invasion of the USSR that the PCF threw its institutional weight behind the resistance, and indeed
L'Humanite's first clandestine calls for violence against the invader only come after Barbarossa commenced.
If you can access it I'd recommend the article
Between the Junes: The French Communists from the Collapse of France to the Invasion of Russia by David Wingeate Pike.
