WI: Emir Abdelkader's Algerian state survives?

Abdelkader El Dzejairi (1808-1883) was an North African religious and military chief that, for around a decade, forged an independent state in what is now western Algeria, in resistance to French colonial encroachment. He managed to defeat the French in numerous occasions, including situations in which his forces were outnumbered, through clever use of terrain and guerrilla tactics, until his voluntary surrender in 1847 due to lack of support from the Moroccan sultan. Upon and after his arrest and deportation to the Ottoman Empire, Abdelkader became a bit of a celebrity.
So, i ask: was there a way for Abdelkader's state to survive? How?
In the scenario where his emirate does survive, how will it develop from there on in? Will it become a Moroccan ally or sattelite?
How does this affect French expansion into Africa overall?
 
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While not impossible for Abdelkader's state to survive, it would be essentially as a French integrated client (which was more or less the idea of Tafna Treaty), admitting French occupation t of his coastal (then immediate) territory trough military conquest and civilian settlement (that the French Army might be less opposed to ITTL).
French army went IOTL trough a particularly ruthless anti-guerilla warfare based on destruction of Algerian presence and forces whenever they could which included killing civilians. It was brutal, but really efficient : if Abdelkader still oppose French encroachment in Algeria, then in spite of his qualities and skills, he would be defeated and any post-Tafna treaty as much respected than Tafna or Oran treaties, meaning it wouldn't be.

The only thing I could see that would delay French advance would be an earlier Revolution and IInd Republic.
 
The Oriental Crisis goes hot with France backing Egypt to the hilt. Since she's opposed by virtually every other European Power, her hard line is seen as particularly threatening by Britain who sees it alongside the Algerian adventure as a gambit by the French to establish naval dominance of the Med. via total control of North Africa. The Ottoman-Egyptian war expands into The Great Eastern Crisis, with Austria, Prussia, and Britain backing the Ottomans and dealing defeats to the French in Italy, A-L, and in the western Med., cutting off the French forces in Algeria. The Ottomans successful reclaim their territories in Syria and push on towards Cairo, bringing Ali to negotiations and the French coming to the table highly bloodied. Dezjairi is appointed Bey of Algiers by the Sultan as a matter of practical reality, and is allowed to run the nation more or less unrestricted.
 

raharris1973

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The Oriental Crisis goes hot with France backing Egypt to the hilt. Since she's opposed by virtually every other European Power, her hard line is seen as particularly threatening by Britain who sees it alongside the Algerian adventure as a gambit by the French to establish naval dominance of the Med. via total control of North Africa. The Ottoman-Egyptian war expands into The Great Eastern Crisis, with Austria, Prussia, and Britain backing the Ottomans and dealing defeats to the French in Italy, A-L, and in the western Med., cutting off the French forces in Algeria. The Ottomans successful reclaim their territories in Syria and push on towards Cairo, bringing Ali to negotiations and the French coming to the table highly bloodied. Dezjairi is appointed Bey of Algiers by the Sultan as a matter of practical reality, and is allowed to run the nation more or less unrestricted.

Let's do this!
 

raharris1973

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??? Explain

A timeline/scenario where the Great Eastern Crisis morphs into a 19th century version of WWII with France playing Germany's role of grossly recidivist aggressor (treating the Napoleonic Wars as a 19th c. "WWI", with an interwar period between that is not even a full generation, like in the 20th century).
 
A timeline/scenario where the Great Eastern Crisis morphs into a 19th century version of WWII with France playing Germany's role of grossly recidivist aggressor (treating the Napoleonic Wars as a 19th c. "WWI", with an interwar period between that is not even a full generation, like in the 20th century).

Unlikely, given its everybody against France in a system where the French have nowhere near their Napoleonic levels of advantage. This would likely be like most European wars of the era; short, sharp, and with moderate peace terms
 

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Unlikely, given its everybody against France in a system where the French have nowhere near their Napoleonic levels of advantage. This would likely be like most European wars of the era; short, sharp, and with moderate peace terms

France attacks the Rhine and Alps a mere 25 years after the last war ended, and the European powers don't end up thinking territorial leniency was a bad idea in 1815?
 

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short, sharp, and with moderate peace terms

At only three years, the 3rd Punic War was relatively short and sharp, but the peace terms were anything but moderate.

Not that this is an anti-French wish fulfillment fantasy or anything like that.
 
At only three years, the 3rd Punic War was relatively short and sharp, but the peace terms were anything but moderate.

Not that this is an anti-French wish fulfillment fantasy or anything like that.
I'm afraid the situation at hand is not much like the 2nd century BCE: Rome attacked Carthage out of naked aggression, because they desired North African lands. I'm not sure the anti-French/Egyptian coalition would want to weaken France so much.
 
At only three years, the 3rd Punic War was relatively short and sharp, but the peace terms were anything but moderate.

Not that this is an anti-French wish fulfillment fantasy or anything like that.

I'm afraid the situation at hand is not much like the 2nd century BCE: Rome attacked Carthage out of naked aggression, because they desired North African lands. I'm not sure the anti-French/Egyptian coalition would want to weaken France so much.

Add that to the fact it was the end of a series of conflicts in the broader, centuries long rivalry between Rome and Carthage, similar to the Napoleonic Wars in the extent that they blended together into one broader "Clash of Civilizations". Indeed, it was the desire to avoid such a continent-draining and destroying clash so soon after the last one that kept Metternich's philosophy in vouge during the 19th century (Preventing radical swings in power balance). Only if France was bloody-minded in an attempt to secure hegemony would the other powers feel justified in carving it back to the point it could no longer do so.
 

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Add that to the fact it was the end of a series of conflicts in the broader, centuries long rivalry between Rome and Carthage, similar to the Napoleonic Wars in the extent that they blended together into one broader "Clash of Civilizations". Indeed, it was the desire to avoid such a continent-draining and destroying clash so soon after the last one that kept Metternich's philosophy in vouge during the 19th century (Preventing radical swings in power balance). Only if France was bloody-minded in an attempt to secure hegemony would the other powers feel justified in carving it back to the point it could no longer do so.

How bloody-minded would German states and Russia and Britain consider a French invasion to the Rhine or over it? Because that's what Adolphe Thiers advocated, under the pretext of siding with Muhammad Ali, and against the Ottoman Sultan and the other major European powers.
 
Because that's what Adolphe Thiers advocated, under the pretext of siding with Muhammad Ali, and against the Ottoman Sultan and the other major European powers.
Thiers' proposal, which was considered poor enough already to be supported by a total of one in the government, namely Adolphe Thiers.
Long story short, Thiers wanted to play tin soldiers to make up for his "diplomatic Waterloo" of the London Conference, and as some representatives began to argue for an intervention against Germans states because of England (it makes more or less sense in context), then Thiers joined the bandwagon of national poets, representatives and newspapers to make up for his incompetence : one day arguing for French Rhine, the other for taking back Savoy, while others preconised to annex Belgium. Note that he already tried to pull a jingo in his previous government by proposing an intervention in Spain.
Because it was moronic to begin with, and while the idea to attack someone, anyone, because of Vienna Congress was supported by a part of the public opinion, Thiers was sacked without too much afterthought.

Unless everyone with a modicum of power suddenly lost their collective sense and became extension of Thiers' will, it doesn't have much chances to be actually considered.
 
How bloody-minded would German states and Russia and Britain consider a French invasion to the Rhine or over it? Because that's what Adolphe Thiers advocated, under the pretext of siding with Muhammad Ali, and against the Ottoman Sultan and the other major European powers.

More bloody minded than it realistically is going to be. You're suggesting France taking a course of action she has no real motivation to take given the obvious consequences. Nappy III at least had the pressure of public opinion and internal political reasons as well of the expectation of only having to fight the German states, and Nappy I was going to have to fight all of Europe anyways during the 100 Days and so decided to maximize his odds by getting the fight off French soil and catching his enemies separated.
 
Though, thinking it over I suppose you could see a broader war break out as a kind of cascade if the Ottoman-Egyptan war turns in Turkey's direction. Say, the Ottoman listen to von Molke's advice and withdraw to face Ibrahim Pasha at a fortified position, decimating the Egyptian army and deciding to push to displace Muhammad Ali's rebellious regeime. If Egypt turns to France with an offer of alluance/vassalage for protection, and the French assume a situation similar to the intervention in the Greek War of Independence...
 
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