What if Eisenhower doesn't publicly condemn or maybe even just keeps quiet about british actions in egypt in 1956? According to wikipedia, eisenhower later admitted that he regretted his actions during the suez crisis.
WI: Eisenhower supports British intervention in the suez crisis
- Thread starter idontlikesand
- Start date
CthulhuFhtagn
Banned
If the US gives its full support, then the Franco-British plan probably succeeds. Israel wins the war, both Egypt and Israel withdraw ten miles back from the Suez Canal. Eden and Mollet (Mulliet?Mullet? The French guy) don't resign.
The US has now incurred the permanent hatred of Egypt, which will be pro-Soviet from now until Nasser is overthrown in a Western-backed coup. Franco-American relations aren't wrecked, which is good news for NATO. With the US and UK working together more closely in the Middle East, the coup in Iraq can be avoided, and the Baghdad Pact survives.
This is all horrible news for the USSR, which now faces a giant, US-aligned ring of countries on its borders (NATO-Baghdad-SEATO-Japan/Korea).
The US has now incurred the permanent hatred of Egypt, which will be pro-Soviet from now until Nasser is overthrown in a Western-backed coup. Franco-American relations aren't wrecked, which is good news for NATO. With the US and UK working together more closely in the Middle East, the coup in Iraq can be avoided, and the Baghdad Pact survives.
This is all horrible news for the USSR, which now faces a giant, US-aligned ring of countries on its borders (NATO-Baghdad-SEATO-Japan/Korea).
Last edited:
See my rebuttal to the "everything will be great for the West, Nasser will fall" line of reasoning in soc.history.what-if some years ago:
***
A few comments on some issues raised by your posts:
(1) The loyalty of the military: This was a matter of the highest
priority for Nasser:
"With the dissolution and proscription of the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood],
the elimination of General Naguib and the virtual suppression of all
organised party opposition, the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council]
emerged, at the end of 1954, as the undisputed ruling elite--the political
directorate--of Egypt....Within the RCC and the lesser ranks of the Free
Officers, personal loyalty to Nasser soon became the condition for
political survival. Those who initially harboured independent political
views were either relegated to unimportant sinecures or dismissed.
Colonels Ahmad Shawqi and Lufti Wakid of Infantry, for example, were
ejected early on for their leftist tendencies. Kahlid Mohieddin paid the
price for his defection during the Nasser-Naguib rift and for his
Communist leanings with exile to Europe. Muslim Brother Abdul Rauf was
expelled from the Free Officers' executive...
"The combination of his early purges and the defeat of Naguib [in 1954] in
effect put Nasser on the road to controlling the armed forces. Without
Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, however, he might not have
succeeded,..With his central role as Nasser's surrogate in controlling the
armed forces, Amer had a free hand in discharging his task. He appointed
to command and other key posts officers loyal to him who, in turn,
appointed to lesser positions under their command officers loyal to
them..."
P. J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation* (1978), pp. 158-160. Putting
loyalty before military competence had obvious military disadvantages that
would ultimately prove disastrous--but it was also admirably calculated to
"render the officer corps coup-proof" (Vatikotis, p. 161) and thus assure
Nasser's survival.
(Nasser apparently didn't even fully trust his old friend Amer, by the
way--and indeed a rift did occur between the two men many years later--
and, just to be safe, kept direct contacts with some of Amer's
subordinates. But there is no doubt that in 1956 Amer and the people he
appointed to key positions were Nasser loyalists.)
Of course many Egyptian officers had once been associated with Naguib--so
had Nasser himself! But by 1956, those who had sided with Naguib over
Nasser in 1954 or were even suspected of having done so had long been
ousted from important positions. (And if some senior officer did have
some private reservations about Nasser, such an officer could not make a
coup by himself--and could certainly not count on the support of the
younger officers.)
(2) Nasser's popularity: This is one reason that even a secretly anti-
Nasserist officer who had somehow survived the purges of Naguibists and
others might hesitate before trying to start a coup. The attacks on the
privileged classes, the land reform, the emergence of Nasser as a Third
World leader at Bandung and especially his nationalization of the Canal
had made him very popular with the public. Even among some who might have
had reservations about him, there was a sense that he was the only
alternative to the corrupt pre-1952 parties, the assassination-prone
Muslim Brotherhood, and the godless Communists.
(It is of course impossible to absolutely prove the popularity of a leader
in a state without free elections. Maybe the people who manifested
incredible enthusiasm for Nasser in huge demonstrations in 1956 secretly
hated him. All I can say is that this does not seem to have been the
conclusion of observers of Egypt at the time, including some quite hostile
to Nasser.)
Nor is there any evidence that the Anglo-Franco-Israeli invasion
diminished Nasser's popularity or shattered the Egyptian public's morale--
or even that it would have done so had Ike not opposed the invasion. It is
true that at first Nasser had his doubts: "His first thought was whether
the morale of the Egyptian public might crack under the British bombing.
When from his house Nasser heard the Canberra jets and the bombs exploding
on the outskirts of Cairo, at the Al Maza airfield, he drove out through
the streets of the blacked-out capital to the Presidency to get the feel
of the city. He was reassured by the crowds who shouted to him, 'We shall
fight, we shall fight.' He felt he could count on popular support in
organizing Egyptian resistance....When he heard that a group of former
politicians and leading businessmen were considering coming as a
deputation to urge him to compromise with the Anglo-French demands, he
threatened that anyone who came to talk of surrender would be shot on the
spot in the presidency garden." Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political
Biography,* pp. 229-30.
You may say that it is easy for crowds to chant defiant slogans at first,
but that this could soon change. But apart from all the evidence from
history of the usual insufficiency of bombing by itself to break national
morale, I will explain in (3) how the particular *kind* of bombing done by
the British was especially unlikely to do so. (Nor do I see the fact that
some businessmen and ex-politicians at first urged Nasser to consider a
compromise a sign of weakness. The old politicians and their allies in
the business community do not exactly seem to have been popular with the
Egyptian people...)
(3) Egypt's military weakness: You make much of this. But it is
something of which Nasser himself was aware, and which he had a strategy
to overcome (and a strategy, incidentally, that did *not* count on Soviet
or American intervention):
"Nasser saw Egyptian civilians as a weapon of last resort. Although he
preferred using properly trained and equipped military forces, if
circumstances deteriorated he planned to transform non-combatants into
combatants. In this scenario, Egypt would wage a 'people's war' against
invaders. Troops were to jettison all military trappings--uniforms and
the like--except their weapons, and disperse incognito into the
population. They would then lead civilians in resisting Anglo-French
occupation.
"For Nasser, the advantage of a 'people's war' was the obliteration of
lines demarcating military and civilian spheres. With this distinction
blurred, British and French soldiers faced dilemmas: who is our enemy,
and under what circumstances are we to use deadly force? Nasser understood
the delicate political nature of allied operations in Egypt and the
intense public scrutiny they entailed; these conditions exacerbated for
Britain and France thorny questions regarding proper rules of engagement.
"If British and French troops aggressively countered the popular
insurgency, many civilians, even those not involved in the 'people's
war,' would die. High civilian casualties would increase pressure in
Britain, France, and abroad to cease hostilities and withdraw from Egypt.
Moreover, such casualties would persuade more Egyptians to resist
occupation, again expanding the conflict in Egypt's favor.
"Alternatively, if Britain and France cautiously countered the 'people's
war,'Egyptian partisans could attack with near impunity by hiding among
crowds of apparent non-combatants. The resulting British and French
casualties might provide the impetus for those countries to abandon
Egypt. Essentially Nasser hoped to replicate in microcosm the asymmetric
strategy of the Algerian revolution, still in its preliminary phase at the
time of the Suez Crisis, but nonetheless showing promise as a way for a
militarily inferior state to vanquish its more powerful adversary." Derk
Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956*, pp. 87-8
As Varble notes (pp. 88-90), brief as the Suez fighting was, Nasser was
already beginning to implement this strategy, and it was already starting
to slow down the Allied forces before the cease-fire :
"When British and French warplanes attacked Egypt on 31 October, 1956,
Nasser implemented this philosophy. Realizing that an invasion was
imminent, he directed all Egyptians, soldiers and civilians, to resist
Britain and France. Expecting those nations to attack Port Said, he
distributed assault rifles and grenades, instructing recipients to use
them to harass occupying forces at every opportunity.
"Most Egyptian civilians were unfamiliar with sophisticated military
technology, limiting somewhat their effectiveness as partisans. However,
civilians could easily master basic munitions such as grenades. On 5
November several weapons shipments arrived via rail in Port Said; pallets
of grenades, Czech assault rifles, and other devices were available on
street corners, offered to anyone hoping to resist the imminent invasion.
"Probably just a small percentage of Port Said's civilians participated in
hostilities. Nonetheless their 'people's war' had significance.
Relentless sniping forced Royal Marines to seek armored protection when
moving along city streets, hindering their advance. Armed civilians
concealed themselves inside Port Said's buildings; the threat they posed
slowed the progress of soldiers engaged in clearing operations. These
delays prevented a rapid allied breakout from Port Said. When the 7
November UN ceasefire took effect, British and French troops had not
reached al-Qantarah, the next city south of Port Said. After the
ceasefire, Egyptian insurgents continued resisting occupation. They sniped
and threw grenades at patrolling soldiers, inflicting a few casualties at
a time and providing an additional motive for Britain and France to leave
Egypt.
"For Nasser, the Egyptian people had an unambiguous role: resist invading
forces, delay their advance, and swing world opinion into line behind
Egypt. In Anglo-French strategy, by contrast, Egyptian civilians
constituted a paradox. In some ways, the allies, especially the British,
sought to minimize the suffering of the Egyptian people. Indeed, concern
over potential non-combatant casualties forced Eden to abandon
Alexandria as a bridgehead for invasion. While planning the Egyptian
campaign, Mountbatten and other British leaders fretted that attacking
cities would stigmatize them as 'murderers and baby killers' and
injure Britain internationally. During Revise Phase I, in which bombers
struck airfields, Eden repeatedly modified target lists to avoid hitting
civilians, Just before British and French forces stormed Port Said, the
cabinet limited bomb and gun size for aerial and naval bombardment despite
their knowledge that such restrictions might increase British losses.
Although some military commanders disregarded these stipulations, the
restrictions illustrate palpable British concern--political, moral, or
otherwise--at the highest level for non-combatant safety.
"Yet the very success of Revise rested on terrorizing Egypt's civilian
population. Phase II, which Keightly hoped would form the crux of allied
military operations by forcing a regime change in Egypt, attempted to
coerce Egyptians through a bombing offensive. RAF planners who designed
the 'aero-psychological' campaign had full confidence that disrupting
daily life would compel Egypt's people to topple Nasser. Airstrikes
against communications and transportation networks were to be the
mechanism for paralyzing Egyptian society.
"Perhaps recognizing the contradictions in British strategy, and at last
understanding the political repercussions of a terror bombing campaign,
Eden eliminated many of Phase II's more aggressive tactics. Aircrew
resistance and technical challenges undercut other aspects of the aerial
offensive. However, many bombs still fell on Egypt, inflicting scores,
perhaps hundreds, of civilian casualties in Cairo and adjoining areas.
British pilots, operating unfamiliar weapons systems and steeped in an
'area bombing' culture rather than in precision tactics, often placed
ordnance on unintended targets, killing or wounding non-combatants.
International pressure *and an awareness that Phase II served to rally,
not destroy, Egyptian morale* led Keightly to cancel Phase II soon after
its awkward inception.." [my emphasis--DT]
Varble concludes (p. 92) that
"Strategic bombing was the least successful of the aerial missions.
Revise Phase II and its aero-psychological ambitions proved an abject
disappointment...[Eden] failed to grasp how the world might respond to the
sight of British planes raining bombs on Cairo. Also, RAF weapons and
skills were unsuited to the task at hand--disrupting the Egyptian economy
and damaging morale while inflicting minimal civilian casualties. The RAF
had no tradition of pinpoint bombing, and in an era before precision-
guided munitions high-altitude night attacks against specific targets were
were quite difficult. Under these conditions, ordnance dispersed, as
happened during Revise Phase I Canberra and Valiant raids on Egyptian
airfields. In the end, relatively few bombs fell, and those that did
mostly missed, leaving the Egyptian air force intact and Egyptian morale
strong.."
(4) With respect to the argument that time would work against Nasser, I
believe that the exact opposite is the truth. Precisely because it was so
obvious that the objective of the Allies was to bring down Nasser, the
Egyptians could score a moral victory simply by leaving Nasser in power,
and they knew that. With each day Nasser survived, there would be more
and more internal dissent in the West, more and more Allied casualties,
while meanwhile the Suez Canal--the safeguarding of which was the
ostensible object of the operation--would remain closed, and the oil
situation in the West would become worse, not only because of the Canal's
closure but because of the destruction of regional pipelines in Syria.
The Egyptians, too, would suffer casualties, but these would be less
likely to lead to a crack in national unity than in the West--after all,
it was their own country that was being attacked. If the Allies tried to
continue bombing in an attempt to break morale, this would give them the
worst of both worlds--the bombing would inflict enough civilian casualties
to outrage not only Egyptian but world opinion, while being too imprecise
to cripple the Egyptian economy, and not indiscriminate enough to really
terrorize the Egyptian public.
An Egyptian writer noted after the Six Day War that Nasser survived the
loss of that war because, paradoxically, the Egyptians regarded keeping
the man who lost the war in power a kind of "victory" or at least their
best substitute for victory. If that was true in 1967, it would be far
more true in 1956-7 when driving Nasser from power *was* the main motive
of the war, and keeping him in power really *would* therefore be a victory
for Egypt. (Of course Nasser in 1967 was not the only proof that you can
lose a war in the Middle East and still keep power; Saddam Hussein lost
two wars, but it was only when the US and its allies were willing to go
occupy Iraq and go after him physically that he lost his power and
ultimately his life. The UK and France had no stomach for such an
occupation in Egypt in 1956-7. They thought it would not be necessary,
because they thought a limited war would get the Egyptian people to oust
Nasser for them. This sort of attitude is easy to discern and almost
invariably backfires. It may work *if* the leader is really unpopular,
but that was not true of Nasser.)
(5) With regard to your claim that whoever seized power from Nasser would
then accept Allied terms identical in substance to the ones that the
British and French made in their October 30 ultimatum (and which as
anticipated Nasser rejected and the Israelis accepted) and declare
victory: *Nobody* in Egypt would think this was victory or even a
compromise. Nasser ousted, the canal re-opened but under Anglo-French
control, Israel in control of most of Sinai--this would be such an obvious
and terrible defeat that any Egyptian leader who dared to agree to it
would be torn to pieces by an enraged mob--and I mean that literally, not
metaphorically (consider the fate of Nuri es-Said in Iraq in 1958).
If the Western powers were willing to allow Egypt control of the Canal,
then maybe the new rulers could claim they at least got a compromise. But
Britain and France were not willing to have *any* Egyptian government
control the canal. (After all, even a "friendly" government could change
its nature or be overthrown at any time.) Even if the British and French
got the Israelis to withdraw from most of Sinai, that would not be enough.
To Egyptians, Israel was merely a tool of Western imperialism (there were
various reasons for this belief, not the least of which was the widespread
stereotype in the Arab world that Jews lacked the military virtues, so if
Israel scored military victories it was obviously only because Western
imperialism was backing it) and the Sinai operation merely a pretext for
seizure of the Canal.
What would outrage the Egyptians about such a coup and surrender, is that
it would be from their viewpoint an *unnecessary* surrender, not because
of anticipation of Soviet or American aid, but because of a belief that
they could wear down the British and French--a belief that I happen to
think had a good deal to be said for it. The Suez operation was
controversial in Britain even before Ike indicated his disapproval, and
would become more so the more it became apparent that a quick victory was
not in sight.
(6) Soviet aid: I do not think that either Bulganin's implicit threats to
nuke London, Paris, and Tel Aviv or the Soviet media's threats about
Soviet "volunteers" should be taken too seriously. But I do think the
Soviets would send aid to Egypt, both economic and military. Even on the
dubious assumption that the British and French are going to impose a total
air and naval blockade on Egypt, such aid could get in through Libya--if
King Idris would be unwilling to let it through, he would face overthrow
more than a decade before he did in OTL. An all-out blockade of both
Egypt and Libya, covering not only military supplies but even food and
medicine, would be an escalation that I doubt the British and French would
be willing to go through with, or that the US would be willing to support
even if it did not condemn the original Suez operation. For one thing, it
might mean the overthrow of some of the remaining pro-Western governments
in the Middle East, such as Iraq (which of course was to happen within two
years anyway). In any event, doing what they could to help Egypt short of
using nukes or sending troops would be a low-risk proposition for the
Soviets--the US would be no more likely to start a world war over it than
it was over Hungary.
Once again, it is important to remember that the British and French were
*not* counting on an all-out war with Egypt. Hence their need to pretend
that they were merely responding to the dangers posed by the Israeli-
Egyptian war to the Canal; hence the wishful thinking that limited
seizures of territory along the Canal combined with some bombing could
quickly bring down Nasser. This is why I believe the operation would have
been a failure even if the US had not opposed it: When you have a goal
(overthrow of Nasser) and are not willing or able to go all-out in pursuit
of that goal, your enemy senses that fact and takes advantage of it.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/sS7S56AIe60/JwI0qGdmXvIJ
***
A few comments on some issues raised by your posts:
(1) The loyalty of the military: This was a matter of the highest
priority for Nasser:
"With the dissolution and proscription of the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood],
the elimination of General Naguib and the virtual suppression of all
organised party opposition, the RCC [Revolutionary Command Council]
emerged, at the end of 1954, as the undisputed ruling elite--the political
directorate--of Egypt....Within the RCC and the lesser ranks of the Free
Officers, personal loyalty to Nasser soon became the condition for
political survival. Those who initially harboured independent political
views were either relegated to unimportant sinecures or dismissed.
Colonels Ahmad Shawqi and Lufti Wakid of Infantry, for example, were
ejected early on for their leftist tendencies. Kahlid Mohieddin paid the
price for his defection during the Nasser-Naguib rift and for his
Communist leanings with exile to Europe. Muslim Brother Abdul Rauf was
expelled from the Free Officers' executive...
"The combination of his early purges and the defeat of Naguib [in 1954] in
effect put Nasser on the road to controlling the armed forces. Without
Field Marshall Abdel Hakim Amer, however, he might not have
succeeded,..With his central role as Nasser's surrogate in controlling the
armed forces, Amer had a free hand in discharging his task. He appointed
to command and other key posts officers loyal to him who, in turn,
appointed to lesser positions under their command officers loyal to
them..."
P. J. Vatikiotis, *Nasser and his Generation* (1978), pp. 158-160. Putting
loyalty before military competence had obvious military disadvantages that
would ultimately prove disastrous--but it was also admirably calculated to
"render the officer corps coup-proof" (Vatikotis, p. 161) and thus assure
Nasser's survival.
(Nasser apparently didn't even fully trust his old friend Amer, by the
way--and indeed a rift did occur between the two men many years later--
and, just to be safe, kept direct contacts with some of Amer's
subordinates. But there is no doubt that in 1956 Amer and the people he
appointed to key positions were Nasser loyalists.)
Of course many Egyptian officers had once been associated with Naguib--so
had Nasser himself! But by 1956, those who had sided with Naguib over
Nasser in 1954 or were even suspected of having done so had long been
ousted from important positions. (And if some senior officer did have
some private reservations about Nasser, such an officer could not make a
coup by himself--and could certainly not count on the support of the
younger officers.)
(2) Nasser's popularity: This is one reason that even a secretly anti-
Nasserist officer who had somehow survived the purges of Naguibists and
others might hesitate before trying to start a coup. The attacks on the
privileged classes, the land reform, the emergence of Nasser as a Third
World leader at Bandung and especially his nationalization of the Canal
had made him very popular with the public. Even among some who might have
had reservations about him, there was a sense that he was the only
alternative to the corrupt pre-1952 parties, the assassination-prone
Muslim Brotherhood, and the godless Communists.
(It is of course impossible to absolutely prove the popularity of a leader
in a state without free elections. Maybe the people who manifested
incredible enthusiasm for Nasser in huge demonstrations in 1956 secretly
hated him. All I can say is that this does not seem to have been the
conclusion of observers of Egypt at the time, including some quite hostile
to Nasser.)
Nor is there any evidence that the Anglo-Franco-Israeli invasion
diminished Nasser's popularity or shattered the Egyptian public's morale--
or even that it would have done so had Ike not opposed the invasion. It is
true that at first Nasser had his doubts: "His first thought was whether
the morale of the Egyptian public might crack under the British bombing.
When from his house Nasser heard the Canberra jets and the bombs exploding
on the outskirts of Cairo, at the Al Maza airfield, he drove out through
the streets of the blacked-out capital to the Presidency to get the feel
of the city. He was reassured by the crowds who shouted to him, 'We shall
fight, we shall fight.' He felt he could count on popular support in
organizing Egyptian resistance....When he heard that a group of former
politicians and leading businessmen were considering coming as a
deputation to urge him to compromise with the Anglo-French demands, he
threatened that anyone who came to talk of surrender would be shot on the
spot in the presidency garden." Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political
Biography,* pp. 229-30.
You may say that it is easy for crowds to chant defiant slogans at first,
but that this could soon change. But apart from all the evidence from
history of the usual insufficiency of bombing by itself to break national
morale, I will explain in (3) how the particular *kind* of bombing done by
the British was especially unlikely to do so. (Nor do I see the fact that
some businessmen and ex-politicians at first urged Nasser to consider a
compromise a sign of weakness. The old politicians and their allies in
the business community do not exactly seem to have been popular with the
Egyptian people...)
(3) Egypt's military weakness: You make much of this. But it is
something of which Nasser himself was aware, and which he had a strategy
to overcome (and a strategy, incidentally, that did *not* count on Soviet
or American intervention):
"Nasser saw Egyptian civilians as a weapon of last resort. Although he
preferred using properly trained and equipped military forces, if
circumstances deteriorated he planned to transform non-combatants into
combatants. In this scenario, Egypt would wage a 'people's war' against
invaders. Troops were to jettison all military trappings--uniforms and
the like--except their weapons, and disperse incognito into the
population. They would then lead civilians in resisting Anglo-French
occupation.
"For Nasser, the advantage of a 'people's war' was the obliteration of
lines demarcating military and civilian spheres. With this distinction
blurred, British and French soldiers faced dilemmas: who is our enemy,
and under what circumstances are we to use deadly force? Nasser understood
the delicate political nature of allied operations in Egypt and the
intense public scrutiny they entailed; these conditions exacerbated for
Britain and France thorny questions regarding proper rules of engagement.
"If British and French troops aggressively countered the popular
insurgency, many civilians, even those not involved in the 'people's
war,' would die. High civilian casualties would increase pressure in
Britain, France, and abroad to cease hostilities and withdraw from Egypt.
Moreover, such casualties would persuade more Egyptians to resist
occupation, again expanding the conflict in Egypt's favor.
"Alternatively, if Britain and France cautiously countered the 'people's
war,'Egyptian partisans could attack with near impunity by hiding among
crowds of apparent non-combatants. The resulting British and French
casualties might provide the impetus for those countries to abandon
Egypt. Essentially Nasser hoped to replicate in microcosm the asymmetric
strategy of the Algerian revolution, still in its preliminary phase at the
time of the Suez Crisis, but nonetheless showing promise as a way for a
militarily inferior state to vanquish its more powerful adversary." Derk
Varble, *The Suez Crisis 1956*, pp. 87-8
As Varble notes (pp. 88-90), brief as the Suez fighting was, Nasser was
already beginning to implement this strategy, and it was already starting
to slow down the Allied forces before the cease-fire :
"When British and French warplanes attacked Egypt on 31 October, 1956,
Nasser implemented this philosophy. Realizing that an invasion was
imminent, he directed all Egyptians, soldiers and civilians, to resist
Britain and France. Expecting those nations to attack Port Said, he
distributed assault rifles and grenades, instructing recipients to use
them to harass occupying forces at every opportunity.
"Most Egyptian civilians were unfamiliar with sophisticated military
technology, limiting somewhat their effectiveness as partisans. However,
civilians could easily master basic munitions such as grenades. On 5
November several weapons shipments arrived via rail in Port Said; pallets
of grenades, Czech assault rifles, and other devices were available on
street corners, offered to anyone hoping to resist the imminent invasion.
"Probably just a small percentage of Port Said's civilians participated in
hostilities. Nonetheless their 'people's war' had significance.
Relentless sniping forced Royal Marines to seek armored protection when
moving along city streets, hindering their advance. Armed civilians
concealed themselves inside Port Said's buildings; the threat they posed
slowed the progress of soldiers engaged in clearing operations. These
delays prevented a rapid allied breakout from Port Said. When the 7
November UN ceasefire took effect, British and French troops had not
reached al-Qantarah, the next city south of Port Said. After the
ceasefire, Egyptian insurgents continued resisting occupation. They sniped
and threw grenades at patrolling soldiers, inflicting a few casualties at
a time and providing an additional motive for Britain and France to leave
Egypt.
"For Nasser, the Egyptian people had an unambiguous role: resist invading
forces, delay their advance, and swing world opinion into line behind
Egypt. In Anglo-French strategy, by contrast, Egyptian civilians
constituted a paradox. In some ways, the allies, especially the British,
sought to minimize the suffering of the Egyptian people. Indeed, concern
over potential non-combatant casualties forced Eden to abandon
Alexandria as a bridgehead for invasion. While planning the Egyptian
campaign, Mountbatten and other British leaders fretted that attacking
cities would stigmatize them as 'murderers and baby killers' and
injure Britain internationally. During Revise Phase I, in which bombers
struck airfields, Eden repeatedly modified target lists to avoid hitting
civilians, Just before British and French forces stormed Port Said, the
cabinet limited bomb and gun size for aerial and naval bombardment despite
their knowledge that such restrictions might increase British losses.
Although some military commanders disregarded these stipulations, the
restrictions illustrate palpable British concern--political, moral, or
otherwise--at the highest level for non-combatant safety.
"Yet the very success of Revise rested on terrorizing Egypt's civilian
population. Phase II, which Keightly hoped would form the crux of allied
military operations by forcing a regime change in Egypt, attempted to
coerce Egyptians through a bombing offensive. RAF planners who designed
the 'aero-psychological' campaign had full confidence that disrupting
daily life would compel Egypt's people to topple Nasser. Airstrikes
against communications and transportation networks were to be the
mechanism for paralyzing Egyptian society.
"Perhaps recognizing the contradictions in British strategy, and at last
understanding the political repercussions of a terror bombing campaign,
Eden eliminated many of Phase II's more aggressive tactics. Aircrew
resistance and technical challenges undercut other aspects of the aerial
offensive. However, many bombs still fell on Egypt, inflicting scores,
perhaps hundreds, of civilian casualties in Cairo and adjoining areas.
British pilots, operating unfamiliar weapons systems and steeped in an
'area bombing' culture rather than in precision tactics, often placed
ordnance on unintended targets, killing or wounding non-combatants.
International pressure *and an awareness that Phase II served to rally,
not destroy, Egyptian morale* led Keightly to cancel Phase II soon after
its awkward inception.." [my emphasis--DT]
Varble concludes (p. 92) that
"Strategic bombing was the least successful of the aerial missions.
Revise Phase II and its aero-psychological ambitions proved an abject
disappointment...[Eden] failed to grasp how the world might respond to the
sight of British planes raining bombs on Cairo. Also, RAF weapons and
skills were unsuited to the task at hand--disrupting the Egyptian economy
and damaging morale while inflicting minimal civilian casualties. The RAF
had no tradition of pinpoint bombing, and in an era before precision-
guided munitions high-altitude night attacks against specific targets were
were quite difficult. Under these conditions, ordnance dispersed, as
happened during Revise Phase I Canberra and Valiant raids on Egyptian
airfields. In the end, relatively few bombs fell, and those that did
mostly missed, leaving the Egyptian air force intact and Egyptian morale
strong.."
(4) With respect to the argument that time would work against Nasser, I
believe that the exact opposite is the truth. Precisely because it was so
obvious that the objective of the Allies was to bring down Nasser, the
Egyptians could score a moral victory simply by leaving Nasser in power,
and they knew that. With each day Nasser survived, there would be more
and more internal dissent in the West, more and more Allied casualties,
while meanwhile the Suez Canal--the safeguarding of which was the
ostensible object of the operation--would remain closed, and the oil
situation in the West would become worse, not only because of the Canal's
closure but because of the destruction of regional pipelines in Syria.
The Egyptians, too, would suffer casualties, but these would be less
likely to lead to a crack in national unity than in the West--after all,
it was their own country that was being attacked. If the Allies tried to
continue bombing in an attempt to break morale, this would give them the
worst of both worlds--the bombing would inflict enough civilian casualties
to outrage not only Egyptian but world opinion, while being too imprecise
to cripple the Egyptian economy, and not indiscriminate enough to really
terrorize the Egyptian public.
An Egyptian writer noted after the Six Day War that Nasser survived the
loss of that war because, paradoxically, the Egyptians regarded keeping
the man who lost the war in power a kind of "victory" or at least their
best substitute for victory. If that was true in 1967, it would be far
more true in 1956-7 when driving Nasser from power *was* the main motive
of the war, and keeping him in power really *would* therefore be a victory
for Egypt. (Of course Nasser in 1967 was not the only proof that you can
lose a war in the Middle East and still keep power; Saddam Hussein lost
two wars, but it was only when the US and its allies were willing to go
occupy Iraq and go after him physically that he lost his power and
ultimately his life. The UK and France had no stomach for such an
occupation in Egypt in 1956-7. They thought it would not be necessary,
because they thought a limited war would get the Egyptian people to oust
Nasser for them. This sort of attitude is easy to discern and almost
invariably backfires. It may work *if* the leader is really unpopular,
but that was not true of Nasser.)
(5) With regard to your claim that whoever seized power from Nasser would
then accept Allied terms identical in substance to the ones that the
British and French made in their October 30 ultimatum (and which as
anticipated Nasser rejected and the Israelis accepted) and declare
victory: *Nobody* in Egypt would think this was victory or even a
compromise. Nasser ousted, the canal re-opened but under Anglo-French
control, Israel in control of most of Sinai--this would be such an obvious
and terrible defeat that any Egyptian leader who dared to agree to it
would be torn to pieces by an enraged mob--and I mean that literally, not
metaphorically (consider the fate of Nuri es-Said in Iraq in 1958).
If the Western powers were willing to allow Egypt control of the Canal,
then maybe the new rulers could claim they at least got a compromise. But
Britain and France were not willing to have *any* Egyptian government
control the canal. (After all, even a "friendly" government could change
its nature or be overthrown at any time.) Even if the British and French
got the Israelis to withdraw from most of Sinai, that would not be enough.
To Egyptians, Israel was merely a tool of Western imperialism (there were
various reasons for this belief, not the least of which was the widespread
stereotype in the Arab world that Jews lacked the military virtues, so if
Israel scored military victories it was obviously only because Western
imperialism was backing it) and the Sinai operation merely a pretext for
seizure of the Canal.
What would outrage the Egyptians about such a coup and surrender, is that
it would be from their viewpoint an *unnecessary* surrender, not because
of anticipation of Soviet or American aid, but because of a belief that
they could wear down the British and French--a belief that I happen to
think had a good deal to be said for it. The Suez operation was
controversial in Britain even before Ike indicated his disapproval, and
would become more so the more it became apparent that a quick victory was
not in sight.
(6) Soviet aid: I do not think that either Bulganin's implicit threats to
nuke London, Paris, and Tel Aviv or the Soviet media's threats about
Soviet "volunteers" should be taken too seriously. But I do think the
Soviets would send aid to Egypt, both economic and military. Even on the
dubious assumption that the British and French are going to impose a total
air and naval blockade on Egypt, such aid could get in through Libya--if
King Idris would be unwilling to let it through, he would face overthrow
more than a decade before he did in OTL. An all-out blockade of both
Egypt and Libya, covering not only military supplies but even food and
medicine, would be an escalation that I doubt the British and French would
be willing to go through with, or that the US would be willing to support
even if it did not condemn the original Suez operation. For one thing, it
might mean the overthrow of some of the remaining pro-Western governments
in the Middle East, such as Iraq (which of course was to happen within two
years anyway). In any event, doing what they could to help Egypt short of
using nukes or sending troops would be a low-risk proposition for the
Soviets--the US would be no more likely to start a world war over it than
it was over Hungary.
Once again, it is important to remember that the British and French were
*not* counting on an all-out war with Egypt. Hence their need to pretend
that they were merely responding to the dangers posed by the Israeli-
Egyptian war to the Canal; hence the wishful thinking that limited
seizures of territory along the Canal combined with some bombing could
quickly bring down Nasser. This is why I believe the operation would have
been a failure even if the US had not opposed it: When you have a goal
(overthrow of Nasser) and are not willing or able to go all-out in pursuit
of that goal, your enemy senses that fact and takes advantage of it.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/sS7S56AIe60/JwI0qGdmXvIJ
Mollet didn't resign over Suez, weirdly enough, given how resignation-prone French politicians were at the time.
Well, obviously this would destroy the relationship between the Arab World and the US (and the UK), the French had already accepted that with Algeria they'd never recover their influence.
If there's a proper invasion, then there's indeed always the possibility that Egypt enters further in the Soviet orbit to re-arm and prepare for an eventual conflict against the Israelis to recover the Suez channel immediacies and the Sinai.
Realpolitik
Banned
Another interesting possibly butterfly is Hungary in 1956. It's possible that there is a more active US in this regard if there is no "quid pro quo" with the USSR.
Considering how well our decision to support the British in Iran turned out, I'd expect a similar decision in Egypt would yield similar results. "Islamic Republic of Egypt," anyone?
the difference between egypt and iran was that iran was lead by an autocratic monarch who sidelined islam and was accused of westernizing the country.
If Israel keeps the Sinai to Straits of Tiran expect Israel to develop this area, finding oil. With this sort of strategic depth, plus the 20 mile buffer zone of the canal, Egypt becomes much less of a military threat, and you might actually see some sort of accommodation between Jordan and Israel. Expect a NATO base at Port Said, which will, to some extent, neutralize a Soviet presence in Egypt and I'm not sure how much more there could be unless you had Egypt join the Warsaw Pact. If the USSR does massively up its presence in Egypt, a joint Israel US/NATO base in the Sinai is not unreasonable.
While I agree you'll see more anti-Americanism in Egypt, the general tone was quite anti-west/anti-American. There will be more than one Arab country who will be glad to see Egypt taken down a peg or two, even if their celebrating will be discreet. Remember at this time you had monarchies in many Arab countries such as Iraq and Libya that are not monarchies now. All of them, and some others beside, were less than happy with the Egyptian view of themselves as the leaders of the Arab world.
Also, don't forget that for many Arab countries, "Godless Communism" was seen as just as evil or even more so than "western imperialism".
While I agree you'll see more anti-Americanism in Egypt, the general tone was quite anti-west/anti-American. There will be more than one Arab country who will be glad to see Egypt taken down a peg or two, even if their celebrating will be discreet. Remember at this time you had monarchies in many Arab countries such as Iraq and Libya that are not monarchies now. All of them, and some others beside, were less than happy with the Egyptian view of themselves as the leaders of the Arab world.
Also, don't forget that for many Arab countries, "Godless Communism" was seen as just as evil or even more so than "western imperialism".
This might have induced Guy Mollet to formalise his proposal for a Franco-British Union in the mould of the 1940 proposal agreed to by the British War Cabinet.
Instead of the Angevin empire defeating the Valois these later chances to make one country of the two has left the English to currently be buying western France one rural house and farm at a time in alliance with the Dutch, whilst the French are setting up home in London by the tens of thousands.
Instead of the Angevin empire defeating the Valois these later chances to make one country of the two has left the English to currently be buying western France one rural house and farm at a time in alliance with the Dutch, whilst the French are setting up home in London by the tens of thousands.
If Nasser and the secular Arab Nationalists are discredited by their defeat at the hands of the Western powers, then it's certainly possibly Egyptians will begin to gravitate towards the Muslim Brotherhood.
Nasser doesn't seem to have been discredited by his defeat in 1967 or Saddam Hussein by his defeat in 1991. At least not discredited enough to be overthrown.
Could a cold war 'Suez Wall' sort of situation have been sustained?
Well, the British also wanted to replace Nasser with someone more malleable, which is pretty much what they did in Iran when they got rid of Mossadegh.
green flag here we are
Any chance of a regency for Faud? The boy king won't be nearly as unpopular as his obese papa.
Any chance of a regency for Faud? The boy king won't be nearly as unpopular as his obese papa.
(1) Nasser was more successful than Mossadegh had been in repressing his internal opposition. Above all, he was a military man, and had purged the top ranks of the military of Naguib supporters.
(2) In Iran, there was the Shah to give a veneer of legality to the coup.
(3) In Egypt, the coup would have to be more-or-less *openly* at the behest of foreign powers who had been waging war against Egypt. This would make it very unpopular. In Iran, there was at least the semblance of it being an internal matter.
If the British and French want Nasser out, IMO they have to go after him physically, as the US did with Saddam Hussein in 1991. But this was something they were not willing to do. Instead, they thought (mistakenly IMO) that all-out war was unnecessary because their "limited" intervention would provoke a successful anti-Nasser coup. Instead, it just made him more of a nationalist hero--and would have done so regardless of what the US or USSR had done.