WI Eisenhammer 1941 - Destroy Soviet Electric Grid pre-Barbarossa

What if on 14th of February 1941 the electric power plants in the major population and industrial centers in the western Soviet Union are destroyed by a German false flag sabotage campaign?


In the middle of Winter in February the lights go out throughout the western Soviet Union. Municipal water system pumps stop and city water pressure quickly drops to zero. Radio, telegraph and telephones go dead. Industrial activity ceases. Rail transport is crippled due to loss of signaling communications. Food stops being delivered to city warehouses and distribution centers. And so on...

The German saboteurs in early 1941 would have detailed info, floor plans and schematics of the Soviet electric grid and power plants. Siemens was involved in upgrading the Soviet power systems in the 1920's and early 1930s. German companies (especially Siemens) provided major ongoing technical assistance to upgrade and expand the Soviet power plants and grid during the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement period starting in early 1940. The Agreement included German manufacture and export to the Soviet Union of electric turbines and other major grid infrastructure.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)

How might the loss of electric power impact the functioning, morale and stability of the Soviet government, security services, military, industry and general populace?
How much might the collapse of the western Soviet Union electric grid weaken the Soviet Union prior to the launching of Barbarossa in June 1941?
 
I have doubts that they could manage a real lasting sabotage campaign against Stalin, and doing that in February 1941 could have nasty butterflies for the Germans regarding their preparations for Barbarossa proper. Granted, I don't know if a few months would make that much difference, but if it leads to a close-run battle going the other way, then it'd be a giant boon to the USSR militarily and economically.
 
And how would this have happened under the NKVD's nose just like that? The record of Abweher infiltration against the Soviet Union was abysmal. It was the only clear qualitative advantage the Soviets had before Operation Barbarossa.
 
I'm thinking there's at least three fascinating fundamental questions that must be satisfactorily answered before the February sabotage campaign would be implemented:

• How severe and lasting would the subsequent impacts be on Soviet government, security services, military, industry and general population between mid-February and launch of Barbarossa?
• Are there practical and acceptably low-risk ways to place the demolitions in the power plants to destroy the massive turbines?
• Can the sabotage be a false flag operation that doesn't implicate Germany?
 
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Deleted member 97083

And how would this have happened under the NKVD's nose just like that? The record of Abweher infiltration against the Soviet Union was abysmal. It was the only clear qualitative advantage the Soviets had before Operation Barbarossa.
Was it better or worse than also ineffective performance against the British? Why was the Abwehr so incompetent, anyway?
 
Was it better or worse than also ineffective performance against the British?

Slightly better, in that German intelligence was able to pull off some operations in the immediate frontier region shortly before the war. Their attempts at in-depth penetration were total cock-ups though.

Why was the Abwehr so incompetent, anyway?

A bunch of reasons. There's the rather obvious one that it's head, Admiral Canaris, was a man who detested Hitler and all he stood for and occasionally worked to undermine him, such as secretly telling Franco Germany was doomed and to stay the hell out of WWII. The Abwehr had some notable successes before the war in the late 30's but once the war began it mostly drifted rudderless under Canaris' listless direction until the Fuhrer summarily fired the Admiral and abolished the organization after Canaris back talked him during a Hitlerant.

Beyond that, another part of the problem was the German Military didn't consider the position of the intelligence officer very glamorous, and intelligence staff officers tended to be lower ranking and less talented. German intelligence procedures subjugated the intelligence officer to the views of the operations staff, which created an atmosphere of "group think." Generals tend to be very strong willed people and like many strong willed people there's always a danger that they'll view the world as they want it to be and not as it actually is. Ideally the intelligence officer should have the ability to call the commander on his bullshit when he's getting a little too "faith based" in his rosy assumptions about the enemy. The German intelligence arrangement prevented this because it made the enemy assessment explicitly the job of the commander and his operations staff, with the intelligence staff essentially working to confirm assumptions the commander had already made.

The Germans also suffered from a failure to commit sufficient resources to the task, a lack of talent, and the intentionally factious nature of the Nazi bureaucracy which created several competing intelligence organizations, none of which were willing to share with each other. The Fascist ideology also created a lot of problems in developing accurate assessments, particularly when conclusions ran counter to Nazi dogma.

There are only two instances of German intelligence coup's in WW2. The first was naval codebreaking section, B-Dienst, which cracked several allied codes early in the war and provided significant assistance to the U-boat campaign. But ultimately B-Deinst couldn't keep up as it was never given anywhere near the support and resources of it's British counterparts at Bletchley Park and they were ultimately rendered impotent by improved allied codes. But prior to that point they had a good run. The other was Agent CICERO, who was the valet to Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British ambasador in Turkey. However, the valet was a poor uneducated Albanian thief, overtly greedy, and in it for the money. Partly because of Nazi racism towards Albanians, the RSHA never really trusted CICERO and so despite the accuracy of the reports they were considered secondary to other (actually compromised) agents and had far less effect on German decision making than they should have. Nevertheless, some of the information CICERO revealed did great damage to allied plans including sabotaging allied diplomatic overtures to Turkey for several months.
 
Here's one possible solution to my second question mentioned in a previous post:

• Are there practical and acceptably low-risk ways to place the demolitions in the power plants to destroy the massive turbines?

The German unit that might accomplish the false flag power plant sabotage is the Brandenburgers. Apparently Brandenburger unit members were capable of operating for weeks at a time in the Soviet Union prior to Barbarossa, routinely impersonating both workers and soldiers. I've so far found no evidence that any Brandenburger unit members operating in the Soviet Union prior to Barbarossa were detected or caught by the Soviets. I would expect that the Siemens technical assistance teams visiting Soviet power plants in 1940 and early 1941 would include Brandenburgers scouting the power plants in preparation for the subsequent February, 1941 sabotage campaign.
The quotes below about Brandenburger unit capabilities are from a wiki about them: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandenburgers

Brandenburg units were deployed as small commando outfits to penetrate into enemy territory and conduct both sabotage and anti-sabotage operations. Despite their demonstrated successes while incurring minimum casualties, many traditionally minded German officers still found their use abhorrent.[6] Most of the personnel were fluent in other languages, which allowed them, for example, to penetrate into the Netherlands in 1940 disguised as Dutch barge crews. In 1941, they preceded the invasion of Yugoslavia undercover as Serbian workers. Before Operation Barbarossa began, they were already operating in the Soviet Union as Russian workers and soldiers and even adorned themselves in Arab garments to conduct surveillance on Allied warships traversing between the Straits of Gibraltar and North Africa ahead of the Wehrmacht deployment there.[7] Correspondingly, Department II of the Abwehr, under which the Brandenburgers were subsumed, had a distinct sub-component for army, navy, and air force operations.[8]

Many of the Brandenburgers were misfits who could hardly be characterized as conventional soldiers, due in large part to the nature of their operations. They would mingle with enemy soldiers, secretly countermand orders, redirect military convoys, and disrupt communications—all the while collecting intelligence along the way.[7] Ahead of the primary invasion forces in the USSR, operatives from the Brandenburg Division seized bridges and strategically important installations in clandestine missions lasting for weeks before they linked up with advancing forces.[7]


Brandenburgers might travel from power plant to power plant placing bombs with timers, all set to explode days or weeks later simultaneously on February 14th, 1941. The Brandenburgers might also skillfully use disguises, and leave clues, that directed blame away from Germany, say towards Baltic state resistance fighters or dissident factions in the Soviet government, security services or military.
 
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Here's more about the Brandenburgers (from the Brandenburger wiki) and their history and capabilities operating clandestinely in the Soviet Union as sleeper agents and masquerading as NKVD. I'm becoming comfortable with the idea that the Brandenburgers could execute a successful false flag Soviet power plant sabotage campaign in February 1941.

Additional operations were demanded of the Brandernburgers as part of the opening phase for the June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union as they were the first to sweep across the border, destroying power facilities, cutting communication lines, spreading disinformation, and activating "sleeper" agents.[28]

In early August 1942, a Brandenburg unit of 62 Baltic and Sudeten Germans led by Adrian von Fölkersam penetrated farther into enemy territory than any other German unit. They had been ordered to seize and secure the vital Maikop oilfields. Disguised as NKVD men, and driving Soviet trucks, Fölkersam's unit passed through the Soviet front lines and moved deep into hostile territory. The Brandenburgers ran into a large group of Red Army soldiers fleeing from the front. Fölkersam saw an opportunity to use them to the unit's advantage. By persuading them to return to the Soviet cause, he was able to join with them and move almost at will through the Soviet lines.[31]
 

Deleted member 1487

Here's more about the Brandenburgers (from the Brandenburger wiki) and their history and capabilities operating clandestinely in the Soviet Union as sleeper agents and masquerading as NKVD. I'm becoming comfortable with the idea that the Brandenburgers could execute a successful false flag Soviet power plant sabotage campaign in February 1941.

Additional operations were demanded of the Brandernburgers as part of the opening phase for the June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union as they were the first to sweep across the border, destroying power facilities, cutting communication lines, spreading disinformation, and activating "sleeper" agents.[28]

In early August 1942, a Brandenburg unit of 62 Baltic and Sudeten Germans led by Adrian von Fölkersam penetrated farther into enemy territory than any other German unit. They had been ordered to seize and secure the vital Maikop oilfields. Disguised as NKVD men, and driving Soviet trucks, Fölkersam's unit passed through the Soviet front lines and moved deep into hostile territory. The Brandenburgers ran into a large group of Red Army soldiers fleeing from the front. Fölkersam saw an opportunity to use them to the unit's advantage. By persuading them to return to the Soviet cause, he was able to join with them and move almost at will through the Soviet lines.[31]
No nation successfully infiltrated commandoes into an enemy's country and committed major sabotage like this during WW2. The Germans tried IOTL to use Brandenburgers in October 1941 to blow up a damn near Moscow and were caught by the NKVD and executed.
 
I'm wondering what effect of a supply cutoff from Stalin after a failed February 1941 sabotage attempt would have on the German war economy.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm wondering what effect of a supply cutoff from Stalin after a failed February 1941 sabotage attempt would have on the German war economy.
Depends, how much supplies were shipped between February 1941-June 22nd? It certainly would be felt by the end of the year.
 
No nation successfully infiltrated commandoes into an enemy's country and committed major sabotage like this during WW2. The Germans tried IOTL to use Brandenburgers in October 1941 to blow up a damn near Moscow and were caught by the NKVD and executed.

Good point about the dam attempt. Once the Germans invaded the Soviet Union it would become harder for Brandenburgers to infiltrate behind Soviet front lines and sabotage high-value targets like power plants, especially when the target was in the path of the German advance on Moscow in October 1941.

In pre-war 1940 and early 1941 it would be easier for Brandenburgers to move about clandestinely in the Soviet Union and place timed explosives at power plants. Their proven ability to masquerade as NKVD units might enable them to move about freely and gain entry to power plants under the guise of power plant security assessments and subversion investigations.
 

Deleted member 1487

Good point about the dam attempt. Once the Germans invaded the Soviet Union it would become harder for Brandenburgers to infiltrate behind Soviet front lines and sabotage high-value targets like power plants, especially when the target was in the path of the German advance on Moscow in October 1941.

In pre-war 1940 and early 1941 it would be easier for Brandenburgers to move about clandestinely in the Soviet Union and place timed explosives at power plants. Their proven ability to masquerade as NKVD units might enable them to move about freely and gain entry to power plants under the guise of power plant security assessments and subversion investigations.
Every German attempt to infiltrate the USSR at a high level was an abysmal failure (for all other spy agencies in the world too, into the 1970s AFAIK) due to the NKVD and SMERSH being so fucking brutal and mass executing anyone remotely suspected of spying. Stalin and Beria did not err on the side of human rights, they even Gulaged their own liberated POWs in 1945 for being traitors to the nation for having surrendered. They weren't to kind to people that even escaped during the war and came back from encirclements or PoW camps. Even partisans fighting for the USSR ended up in many cases facing repression and deportation lest they put their guerrilla skills to use against Stalin's regime post-war. The longest lasting threat was the Baltic and Ukranian partisans that had collaborated with the Germans, but they too were crushed brutally.

There was NEVER a time pre-war that it was easy to move around the USSR; everyone was heavily monitored due to Stalin's paranoia and the Great Purge prevented anyone with upper level power from working with foreign agencies; if they wanted to the regime would just make up that you were a spy and torture you and your family before executing or Gulaging you. Foreign agents wouldn't get anywhere in the USSR at any time. It was only after the 1970s when the Soviets relaxed a bit and Soviet citizens got really fed up with the regime that the US had success recruiting agents within the USSR, but frequently they would end up caught and executed with some exceptions who managed to defect successfully. Remember the USSR was a police state that Nazi Germany never could hope to be.
 
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