An easy victory in Korean war might change the dynamics in Indo-China. The first Indo-China war was still raging on during the Korean War. The French position in Indochina might be stronger. They might be even saved from their death trap in Dien Bien Phu. The reason the French didn't receive direct support from its allies during that battle. The Brit refused to support Operation Vulture and that basically ended any Anglo-American aid to the doomed garrison. Brits might be more confident about the whole situation. America might inherit a different Southeast Asia.
 
Interesting way to view it. Could you elaborate?
If south korean won the war, Kim Il-Sung's puppet government would be established in Jilin Province. This results in china-backed insurgency hopping across yalu rivers. Furthermore, korean war was fought when they both didn't have their government fully structured. Furthermore, considering Syngman Rhee did postwar, i expect third world authoritarian unified korea.
 
Truman would run for re-election, and against Taft he would win. I believe Eisenhower would decline to run against the sitting president. At best, he would run ON HIS TICKET.
 
If south korean won the war, Kim Il-Sung's puppet government would be established in Jilin Province. This results in china-backed insurgency hopping across yalu rivers. Furthermore, korean war was fought when they both didn't have their government fully structured. Furthermore, considering Syngman Rhee did postwar, i expect third world authoritarian unified korea.

Why the assumption Kim's puppet government would even happen anywhere?
 
On social consequence may be an even stronger Evangelical Protestant influence nationally and internationally. Remember that Pyongyang was once considered the Jerusalem of East Asia, and a lot of stuff we associate with megachurches today started in OTL South Korea. That has broad social effects, for good and for ill.
 
Mr. Bubbles wrote:
Something I've been curious for a long time is if the South Korean-UN coalition was able to win the Korean War. I understand that something like this would be very unlikely, but if the whole "let's nuke Manchuria" situation never came to pass and they were able to defeat the North Koreans and Chinese through conventional methods by 1951, what effects would this have on the world?

The terrain in the north favors the defender, (if the North Korean Army wasn't in a route and could have fallen back on prepared defensive positions and supplies the allied advance would have been significantly slowed) and anyone who's attacking from the north once they are past the Yalu and into the hills. Mao was in debt to the North Korean communists for active support of men and materials during the Chinese Civil War and had no intention of allowing the Western military access to the defensible terrain on the Korean side of the border. As MacArthur was a supposed 'expert' on Asia, (he wasn't) and felt that the Chinese army was both ill-equipped and ill-lead, (reports by people who'd seen them in action near the end of the Civil War were ignored) and that any attack would be met with superior Allied air suppression, (ignores the terrain again) Mac announced the plan to push past the 38th parallel because he didn't 'trust' the ROK troops to do the job even with Allied air and fire support on call. (Note that China had passed on warnings that entry by any troops OTHER than the ROK would force intervention this was also ignored)

Not that tactical air and fire support were all that great in the first place mind you and strategic bombing was more constrained by ROE than Vietnam would be. (For similar reasons as there was a very real fear of the war expanding)

Coupled with Mac's rhetoric about pursuing the North Koreans to total destruction, hinting at going into China after them, throwing out comments on nuking Manchuria and along the Yalu all in all there wasn't a lot of doubt that if the UN forces crossed the 38th they might not stop short of the Soviet border if then so Mao and Stalin were agreed to intervene.

Conventionally you'd need someone other than Mac in charge in Asia. Someone who's actually concerned with his whole theater of operations and what's going on rather than just Japan. There was a lot of warnings that the North was building up militarily but Mac wanted all the forces in Japan directly rather than forward posted so along with some diplomatic faux-pa's the impression was South Korea was on its own. While North Korea was getting Russian hardware very little was flowing to South Korea and they were 'making-do' with ex-Japanese equipment for the most part with some left over American hardware. America was more focused on Europe as a stage than Asia.

Of course without Mac and any more focus on Korea than OTL and it's likely that Kim does not get the go-ahead to attack since his chances are very much smaller. Of course if he still does attack, (some subterfuge on a larger scale than OTL say to massage the egos of Mao and Stalin) and then ends up getting pushed back it is still very likely that Russia and China intervene because the basic circumstances, (can't let an ally fall to the west and have the Allies right on the Chinese border) remain the same. It's possible without Mac that the warnings from China are taken more seriously in which case, (assuming the ROK can handle it with allied air and fire support) the UN might hold at the 38th parallel while feeding supplies and support to the ROK offensive.

China could still intervene once the ROK gets close to the border as this would be a perfect opportunity to smash the bulk of their forces even if they don't advance all the way to the 38th parallel. That risks even more isolation as the Chinese would be going against their own 'agreement' though they could argue they never said they wouldn't attack the ROK forces, just that they WOULD attack if anyone else but the ROK crossed the 38th. (As they were being systematically isolated and frozen out of foreign relations anyway so it might be a wash. Or they could cross the Yalu and set up a perimeter to 'protect' the border of China that just happens to shelter the remnants of the North's government and troops but that's not going to help export/sell the communist revolution in Asia which is Mao's main goal so again unless Stalin holds him back he might go for it anyway.

Probably your best option is an earlier death of Stalin leading to an earlier Sino-Soviet split. Mao would still back Kim's attempt to take over the peninsular but without overt Soviet backing and approval he's likely to fail and that same lack of support would affect China's ability to intervene.

To you points:
*What effect would this have on the world:

Communism would be seen as less 'successful' when exporting itself by force. Both the original North Korea attack and follow up Chinese attack seemed to show an ability to meet and match Western military power at least temporarily in a conventional war. On the converse side both Russia and China would now be very worried about the West pushing its 'advantage' with both atomic and conventional forces. If there is an ideological split this worry could help smooth things over. There would also be less support from Moscow for exporting revolution and communism because of the difficulty of supporting such activities in the face of Western counters. Castro might find more sympathy in Beijing than Moscow but Mao won't be able to give the level of actual physical support that the Soviets might.

*Would America get involved in Vietnam much earlier? What about other conflicts?

Laos probably rather than Vietnam directly as it was a close call OTL. Laos was originally seen as the lynchpin of that area and Vietnam a secondary. You also have the problem of support from China and Russia which in this case might push for a more 'defensive' conflict due to the failure in Korea. Vietnam was seen as being 'similar' to Korea but became much more complicated when America became directly involved. Support and the push for forced reunification came BECAUSE of the outcome of the Korean war was a stalemate where as a loss could push the conflict priority either way.

My thought is Mao would be stinging and push more support and 'advisors' towards Vietnam but on the other hand Ho Chi Mine and his government were split about 50/50 over accepting Chinese help due to past relations with China and possible future plans of both Russia and China. (OTL this was the reason the Soviets got basing rights and China later invaded and was repulsed)

*Would this shift the international view on communism?

It might appear a bit weaker than OTL due to the loss of Korea

*How long would Syngman Rhee remain in power?

Depends on how hog-wild he goes in 'pacifying' the north as the West in general and Americans in specifica will be less inclined to allow their 'victory' to be soiled by atrocity. He was far from the only candidate for power and the US can make a choice to support someone else.

*If MacArthur were never fired, would he have continued to serve until he died or would he have retired?

Mac not getting fired would require a President he at least tolerated if not respected which wasn't Truman, might not have been Dewey and certainly wasn't Taft who's isolationist polices he considered folly. (Here he and Eisenhower were in agreement)

Despite a very personal dislike Truman gave MacArthur the benefit of the doubt on policy in Asia and it came back to bite him in the butt every single time. MacArthur throwing around higher level policy decisions he could not legally make in rhetoric and ignoring directives and orders to meet with Truman and/or his representatives was the final nail in the coffin. (Telling your boss he has to come to you because you're to 'busy' fighting a war you have almost lost TWICE now is not a sound career move but Mac believed his own press that he was too important to lose. "Firing" to retirement and 'fading' away was his only option when it was clearly pointed out his 'hero' status could be pretty easily reversed with enough effort. It's not like the information wasn't available it was that Mac's "staff" was generally just that good at spin control and that could be easily countered with a moderate amount of high level effort) It's likely her retires soon after the war anyway as he had his eyes on politics but it's questionable if he'd be able to ride his status into the White House given the forces against him.

*The 1952 elections. With an early victory, would Eisenhower still have been elected?

Would Eisenhower have run? Eisenhower originally had stated clearly that he didn't think a General should pursue political office BECAUSE he knew how ambitious Mac was and that he had his eye on doing so. Had the Republican's had anyone but Taft to put up against Truman Ike probably would not have run but Taft was a fallback to pre-war isolationism and wanted to withdraw US support and military which Ike would not support. Had Taft been open to moderating any of those policies when Ike had a personal interview with him Ike would not have run but under the circumstances he didn't think he had a choice and most of the Republican leadership agreed. It was him or Taft. Mac actually ran in the 1952 primaries but lost out early on and endorsed Taft even though he'd been critical of him his entire campaign. (Which tells you how he felt about Eisenhower) Part of the reasoning given historically for his poor showing was in fact his 'hero' luster was fading quickly and he quickly lost support inside the party. Even if he 'wins' the Korean war his past is still there and out of service he doesn't have as deep a PR team as he did when in.

*How would this affect the USSR and China? Would this lead to an earlier Sino-Soviet split?

If Stalin is still alive? No split and possibly closer relations though Stalin is still going to be hesitant over Mao's pushing to 'export' communist revolution worldwide. If Stalin's not around then the split probably happens earlier and is more public and open as Mao didn't like any of the possible successors to Stalin nor anything less than autocratic 'communist' rule. What's interesting is what happens if something happens to Mao directly after the loss. The struggle between Mao-aligned and Soviet aligned factions happens sooner than OTL and without Mao as a influence the outcome is a lot less clear. Mao has only the semi-legendary status of the Long March and winning the civil war but does not have the notch for Korea, (it's a loss and he didn't intervene or win which loses him great face) so the question becomes is his legacy more marginalized earlier on in this case? For that matter since he's either been defeated or did not intervene in Korea might he fall from power?

*What impact would this have on pop culture worldwide?

No MASH, and America has a much more positive outlook for longer on military intervention and deterrence since it 'worked' in Korea. America retains the concept of 'total victory' in any conflict for a while longer, which will make it harder to justify or accept anything short of total commitment to a conflict. We would be less willing to pull out punches in places like Laos and Vietnam if we're involved which might not be a bad thing overall but it will also foster the idea that "might makes right" for longer as well. This will probably lead to more focus on a military capable of prosecuting and winning both limited and unlimited war which will have knock on effects down the line. In media there will be more focus on war movies with American "good guys" and accented bad guys who always lose. In politics the idea of a 'cheap' defense based on total war under any situation, (Ike's "New Look" policy for example) will get less traction because Korea proved we can fight and win a war without atomic weapons so Ike's budget cuts will need to come from somewhere else. "Westerns" will probably focus less on sheriffs/marshal's and the 'frontier' and more on military conflict. A lot of the late 50s 'anti-communist' movies and shows will be less over the top and more we can defeat them any time they raise their heads which will have a knock on effect of less traction for McCarthy as we'll have won a quick and decisive victory. Similarly the "Communist Scare" will be shorter lived and harder to sustain.

*What would be the international relationships of this United Korea?

Internationally Korea will be a 'front-line' with Communism and with the Industry and resources in the north probably more intact AND available for international investment, (and more importantly NOT available to Russia and China) you may see about as much investment and interest earlier on as was given Japan in the period putting those two nations at odds with the US playing arbiter and judge.

Bhlee0019 wrote:
If South Korea won the war, Kim Il-Sung's puppet government would be established in Jilin Province. This results in china-backed insurgency hopping across Yalu rivers. Furthermore, Korean war was fought when they both didn't have their government fully structured. Furthermore, considering Syngman Rhee did postwar, i expect third world authoritarian unified Korea.

They'd try at least but the terrain and barriers favor the defender. As long as Mao is around he'd be more focused on Korea than Vietnam though long-term he wants to push "Western" militaries as far away from the border as possible. At the time however Kim was more aligned with Russia than China though Korean communists had fought alongside the Chinese communists during the civil war and Mao was very keen to 'support' a communist Korea.

Stalin's "ok" on the war was what Kim was really seeking but he wanted Mao on-board as a direct back up since Russia could not supply actual direct support if things went pear-shaped. Mao as noted was aware of and planned on honoring the 'debt' he owed the Korean communists. It is arguable that no matter what assurances or guarantees the UN gave China they were going to counter-attack when the North Koreans looked to be on the ropes. About the only thing that would have stopped them was the direct threat of the use of atomic weapons on any such counter attack which was what MacArthur was suggesting. On the other hand Truman had a point as well that it was highly provocative AND above Mac's paygrade for that decision and SHOULD have been discussed in Washington not off-handed remarked to the press. And Mac's suggestion of recruiting Nationalist China to participate was way over the top.

Part of the problem was that Mac's comment and rhetoric seemed to indicate he'd use atomic bombs, (and that he had them in-theatre and under his direct control) on China preemptively and/or he would chase the "North Korean's" into China if he had to and he fully ignored any signs of Chinese mobilization of threats of not allowing the UN forces on the border of China. Had he been 'right' about intervention from China he'd have enhanced his "hero" status and probably would have retired to seek political office shortly thereafter. As it is I see him still being wrong and China intervening but only going as far as to "secure" the south side of the Yalu and allow the North Korean's to retreat into China. The only way Mac could dislodge them is massive strategic bombing which Truman won't approve or nukes which Truman will also not approve so you probably still have Mac fired over arguing with the CinC over policy and Mac headed home to dive into politics.

Mr. Bubbles wrote:
So who would be the most likely to lead North Vietnam?

Ho Chi Mihn still as there's no reason to think he wouldn't be in charge. He'd be less agreeable to Mao's suggestions of using force to conquer the South though as it clearly didn't work for Korea and probably fall back on significant support for popular revolution. Thing is with the reduction of Mao's influence, (any appearance of 'loss' in Korea will have that effect) it's quite possible that once the French are gone Minh will be able to tone down the Communist rhetoric and seek a compromise with the South. Of course having 'won' Korea should the US turn its attention to Vietnam, (as I noted the focus was originally on Laos) it will not be in the manner of OTL but a more direct confrontation. The US will tend to have less of a care about possible intervention by China due to the lack of such in Korea where the Chinese had a better and deeper connection. (Noted on the past 'history' between Vietnam and China above) On the other hand China now has much more to lose by NOT directly intervening but are much more likely to transfer the conflict (and any direct action) to Laos and that's going to get ugly quite rapidly. At which point the US, (and the West in general) will have to make a choice of going all in or trying to limit involvement. At which point the "Korean" lesson will be a big factor on why we should go "all-in" from the start but conversely America in general will be tired of wars that don't directly involve US interests so politically we may have to settle for less than full commitment with all that entails.

AshiusX wrote:
An easy victory in Korean war might change the dynamics in Indo-China. The first Indo-China war was still raging on during the Korean War. The French position in Indochina might be stronger. They might be even saved from their death trap in Dien Bien Phu. The reason the French didn't receive direct support from its allies during that battle. The Brit refused to support Operation Vulture and that basically ended any Anglo-American aid to the doomed garrison. Brits might be more confident about the whole situation. America might inherit a different Southeast Asia.

Aid was tepid from the start because this was the seen as supporting the "French" Empire which wasn't something America was publicly interested in doing. It was far different from Korea where the US was supporting an independent nation against Communist aggression. In Indo-China the locals were fighting for their freedom from the French oppressing and exploitation and the average American supported the Vietnamese more than the French who had been busy pissing off their former allies since 1946. What is possible is that, (as noted above) Minh makes an effort to tone down the Communist rhetoric and reach a compromise with the Southern forces and the UN solution ends up NOT dividing the country. I think that both the USSR and China, (who has no say but goes through the USSR) still push for a divided and definitely Communist North but Minh was initially a bit more willing to compromise and play the long game. Lack of US dialog was the main issue with the initial discussions as even talking to an avowed "Communist" leader post Korea was a deal killer. Here a clear Western win in Korea shows that we are strong enough to be magnanimous and unafraid to listen especially to someone who's ideals are closer to Jefferson than Marx.

Magnum wrote:
Truman would run for re-election, and against Taft he would win. I believe Eisenhower would decline to run against the sitting president. At best, he would run ON HIS TICKET.

If Taft runs then Eisenhower will run against him as per OTL because Taft's isolationist and non-alliance defense platforms were seen as a potential disaster if he were President. Ike met privately with Taft to ascertain if he would modify his positions and Taft flatly refused to consider the idea so ike officially entered the race. Truman wasn't going to get 'credit' for winning Korea no matter what he did and his popularity was at an all-time low so if its him or Taft the chances were VERY high that he'd lose to Taft which is why Eisenhower ran. Eisenhower had no reason to go independent and every reason to go Republican, (he also needed to confront MacArthur which was another reason to run Republican) and he initially didn't WANT to run but was being drafted by both sides. He had specifically stated he did not thing that it was 'proper' for a General to run for political office in the hopes that it would preclude MacArthur from running but Mac had no shame and saw nothing wrong with using his "hero" status to gain political office. Once it became clear that Taft was going to run, would handily defeat Mac, and not change or compromise his position Ike didn't see that he had a choice in running. Truman, even with a 'win' in Korea is going to still be unpopular by 1952 with neither domestic or foreign policy going well for him so it is still likely that whoever runs against him will win and Eisenhower could not afford the possibility that it was either MacArthur or Taft so...

Another down-side here is even if Truman wins he would simply take it as a mandate to continue his current planning and prioritize domestic over military/defense spending which had 'won' in Korea despite his previous cuts. (His budget literally paid all domestic spending and then doled whatever was 'left-over' to the military with the priority being the Air Force. This changed somewhat due to Korea but every indication was he'd have gone back to it once the war was over)

Zireael wrote:
Why the assumption Kim's puppet government would even happen anywhere?

Bhlee0019 wrote:
Kim Il Sung planned to flee to china and establish a puppet government in case the Korean war ends in total southern victory.

In addition Mao owed Kim and the Korean Communists for their support during the Chinese Civil War including about a battalion of Koreans fighting directly for the Chinese Communists. It's partially why some form of intervention was inevitable and at worst the Chinese will ensure the escape of the remnants of the North Korean army and government. On top of that the one thing Chine did not want/need was a US presence squatting on their border so they would have at least secured a large 'buffer' zone along that border and as I've noted the terrain favors the defender once you get into the mountains south of the Yalu. The only way this doesn't happen is if the ROK and/or UN forces get there first which would probably be ASB if not require a miracle given the logistics and transportation constraints of the area and Allied forces. It is possible another amphibious assault could have been made to try and cut of the area, or maybe an airborne operation but doubtful it could be done before the Chinese could move to blocking positions. Short of authorization to expand the war, (strategic bombing of China and/or atomic weapons) China will plan and execute intervention on North Korea's side the moment UN forces cross the 38th. They would do so more clandestinely if facing only ROK forces but they would make every attempt to keep as much of the North as possible. Barring that outcome they would at least keep a significant 'buffer' of territory south of the Yalu in well defensible terrain to block Western forces.

Some other butterflies of a "short, victorious" Korean war:

-No jet-v-jet combat so the F-86 comes into production as a straight-wing strictly subsonic and mediocre aircraft

-Few if any overflights of the Soviet Union and/or China under cover of being 'co-belligerents' in the war so less information on what is actually going on in those nations. Lack of that information may hurt Truman even more in 1952 as there is no proof one way or another on the 'bomber-gap' question. (Not that having such information was helpful in OTL but at least he could point to ongoing efforts to obtain that information even if he couldn't announce the results)

-A quick war means a faster return to smaller military budgets as we 'won' with what we had quite obviously so less money for missile and advanced aircraft or other military equipment. The Redstone let alone Navaho or Snark programs are all not going to get the OTL boost they did and may not get significantly started until much later

-Like in Vietnam later the US learned a good bit, (that the promptly forgot as "we're not going to do this again") on tactical and strategic air power projection and updated ground combat tactics and operations. Short war means a lot of those lessons aren't learned

-The US will retain much longer a bias on the ability of any other military of any size to resist them which as noted above means we'll be confident we can easily do 'more' with 'less' with all that implies for European confrontations. Though at the same time we will be MORE willing to commit forces than OTL due to that being the key to winning the Korean war.

Randy
 
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