WI - East Asian Anti-Communist Triple Alliance

While other threads have mentioned Japan on its own faring poorly against the Soviets in the event the former attempts to invade the Russian Far East.

What-if via a butterfly netted scenario as part of an ATL East Asian Anti-Soviet/Anti-Communist Triple Alliance Japan was not only joined by a stable post-Qing China (as a constitutional monarchy under the Duke of Yansheng aka Later Yin Dynasty), but also a Korean Empire (that experienced a successful Munjo Reformation instituted by King Munjo later Emperor Munjo, the latter essentially being the Korean equivalent of Japan's Meiji Restoration)?

Since the ATL Empire of Japan is not in much of a position to annex Korea let alone threaten China in this scenario (beyond Taiwan) nor able to capitalize on the weakness of both as in OTL, how would it along with ATL China and Korea deal with the Soviets and the potential threat of Communism? Would they remain neutral like OTL Sweden or like OTL Finland opt to join the Axis in an ATL WW2 (leading to ATL Sino-German cooperation, Anti-Comintern Pact, pre-war German-Japanese industrial co-operation, etc for all three nations).

How would the Soviets respond, are they completely screwed in this scenario if this East Asian Triple Alliance opts to invade? How would the WAllies respond to such a development?

An interesting thing to consider would be this ATL China's potential to play a more belligerent Anti-Western role in this scenario (in seeking to avenge the "decades of humiliation"), on top of OTL Anti-Western sentiment in Japan.

Does some form of ATL Pacific war still happen in this scenario? China would probably be seeking to retake colonial possessions in its territory as well as Outer Manchuria, while Japan would be focused on gaining Northern Sakhalin, Kuril Islands as well as potentially other areas of Southeast Asia with Korea possibly joining in this "decolonisation" effort.

Also beyond the Soviet Union, am curious to know what role the Communists in both China and Korea are likely to play in this ATL scenario beyond evolving into similar post-war analogues of the German Red Army Faction, Italian Red Brigades and Japanese Red Army terrorist groups.

Or is it possible that such a scenario drifts into an entirely different direction, with Japan for example joining the Allies instead due to the potential belligerency of an ATL Axis China/Korea and being in a similar position to the UK in OTL during WW2 as an island nation?
 
Back around 1934, there was a lot of contemporary expectation that Japan and the Soviets would fight a regional war, to be started by strikes on Vladivostok. Concurrent to this, the Chinese and the Japanese nearly came to an agreement on the status of Manchuria as Japanese while Japan was also seeking restored amicable relations with the Anglo-Americans. To quote an old SHWI post by @David T:

In 1934 it seemed that a Chinese-Japanese rapprochement (based on Chinese
*de facto* recognition of Manchukuo and Japanese promises not to move any
further south) was a possibility. In Japan the key figure supporting such
a policy was Hirota Koki, who either as Foreign Minister (as in 1934) or
as Prime Minister was the most important civilian politician in Japan in
the mid-1930s: "cooperation among Japan, Manchukuo and China" was his
slogan. Hirota appreciated Chiang Kai-shek's efforts to destroy the
Chinese communists. Hirota also wanted reconciliation with America and
Britain--provided of course that they would recognize the new realities in
East Asia. (After all, shouldn't the US realize that Japan was seeking no
more in East Asia than the US enjoyed in Latin America with the Monroe
Doctrine?) According to Akira Iriye, "Japanese aggression and China's
international position, 1931-1949" in the *The Cambridge History of China,
Volume 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2* (edited by John K.
Fairbank and Albert Feuerweker (Cambridge UP 1986), pp. 510-511 (all
references in this post are to this book, unless otherwise indicated):

"Hirota was not without success in 1934. At least outwardly, the Japanese
military endorsed the strategy of using peaceful and political means to
consolidate Chinese-Japanese ties and promote Japanese interests in China.
There were, to be sure, those in the Kwantung Army and the Boxer Protocol
Force in Tientsin (the so-called Tientsin Army) who were already plotting
to penetrate North China. The South Manchurian Railway, anxious to keep
its monopoly in the economic development of Manchuria but coming, for that
reason, under increasing attacks from non-business Japanese expansionists,
was also interested in extending its operations south of the Great Wall.
At this time, however, these moves were not crystallizing into a
formidable scheme for Japanese control over North China. Certainly in
Tokyo the government and military leaders were content with the
achievements of 1931-3.

"The powers, on their part, were generally acquiescent in the Japanese
position in Manchuria. They even showed some interest in investing money
in economic development there. With Japan stressing cooperation anew, the
confrontation between Japan and the Anglo-American powers was
disappearing. There were irritants, to be sure, such as the Amo [Amau]
statement of 17 April 1934, in which the Foreign Ministry spokesman
strongly rejected other countries' military aid to China as well as such
economic and technical assistance as had political implications. The
statement was ambiguous, and when Washington and London sought
clarification, the Foreign Ministry immediately backed down, reiterating
its adherence to international cooperation. No amount of rhetoric, of
course, could hide the fact that Japan perceived itself as the major East
Asian power. However, it was ready to re-establish the framework of
international cooperation on that basis..."

As for Nanking, some personnel changes suggested that it too was ready to
deal:

"T. V. Soong, the outspoken denouncer of Japanese aggression, when he
returned from London in late 1933, had been replaced by H. H. Kung. Wang
Ching-wei [Wang Jingwei] stayed on as foreign minister, and T'ang Yu-jen,
a Japanese educated bureaucrat, was appointed vice foreign minister. Kao
Tsung-wu, another graduate of a Japanese university, was recruited to
become acting chief of the Foreign Ministry's Asian bureau. Underneath
these officials, there were many more who had been trained and educated in
Japan. Unlike more famous diplomats such as Alfred Sze and Wellington
Koo, who were almost totally Western-oriented, these officials had
personal ties with Japanese diplomats, intellectuals, and journalists.
Matsumoto Shigeharu's memoirs, the best source for informal Chinese-
Japanese relations during 1933-7, lists not only Wang, T'ang, and Kao, but
scores of businessmen, military officers, intellectuals, and others with
whom he had contact at this point, most of whom, he reports, expressed a
serious desire for accommodation with Japan." (p. 512)

Those who felt this way had various motives. Some thought that the
Communists, both Chinese and Russian, were a more serious threat to China
than Japan was. Others wanted Japanese help in the industrialization of
China; they looked to the Western powers as well for capital and
technology, but they believed that such enterprises could not succeed if
Japan was excluded. Finally, of course, they all wanted to stop further
Japanese aggression, and felt that only by recognizing what Japan had
already achieved and co-operating with the relative moderates in the
Japanese government could the expansionist extremists in Japan be checked.

"This was the background of the talks Minister Ariyoshi Akira held in 1934
with Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Wang Ching-wei. The
atmosphere was so cordial that Wang issued only a perfunctory protest when
the Amo statement was published. A series of negotiations was
successfully consummated, covering such items as mail and railway
connections between Manchuria and China proper, tariff revision, and debt
settlement. Toward the end of the year Japan expressed its readiness to
raise its legation in China to the status of embassy, symbolizing Japan's
recognition of China's newly gained position as a major nation...[A
rapprochement] would entail at least tacit recognition of the status quo,
China accepting the existence of Manchukuo as a separate entity and Japan
pledging not to undertake further territorial acquisitions southward.
China would also promise to suppress anti-Japanese movements by students,
journalists, politicians and warlords, in return for which Japan would
assist its economic development." (pp. 512-13)

One thing that caused Chinese officials to favor rapprochement with Japan
was that the Chinese were disappointed with how other nations were acting.
The international ostracism of Japan which the Chinese had hoped for had
not come about. The US under the Silver Purchase Act was buying up silver
at a price above world market rates. [1] "The immediate result was a huge
drainage of silver from other countries, notably China, causing severe
shortages and monetary crises. Banks closed and shops went out of
business. Resentment of the United States mounted, matched by a belief
that China might have to live with Japan. Britain stood ready to help put
China's finances back in order, but it was unlikely to undertake large-
scale projects without Japan's endorsement..." (p. 513)

In 1935, the Nationalist government did crack down on anti-Japanese
boycotts and demonstrations, and Japan did raise its legation to an
embassy, an elaborate ceremony being held in Nanking on June 15. However,
that same year saw the beginning of the end of the reconciliation.
According to Iriye, General Doihora Kenji, head of the Kwantung Army's
special affairs division, was the man most to blame for undermining the
incipient accommodation. Doihara argued that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang
Ching-wei should not be trusted; they were not true friends of Japan but
were simply acting as such because China was so weak. The only correct
policy was for Japan to consolidate its power in northern China by bold
moves. He aimed to remove Kuomintang power in northern China, establish
separatist "autonomous" puppet regimes there, and integrate the area
economically with Manchukuo.

If Hirota was serious about reconciliation, he had to suppress Doihara's
separatist moves in North China. These moves coincided with the coming to
East Asia of the British economic mission led by Frederick Leith-Ross,
aiming at Anglo-Japanese cooperation for the development of China:

"By rejecting the British offer to cooperate, the Japanese government
showed a complete lack of flexibility and imagination. Now more than ever
before such cooperation should have been welcomed, but this was the very
thing the army expansionists were determined to oppose. International
arrangements to rehabilitate China not only would restrict Japan's freedom
of action, but also would strengthen the central government at Nanking.
These very reasons might have convinced Foreign Minister Hirota to take a
gamble and work with Leith-Ross, but he utterly failed to grasp the
significance of the mission and did nothing to encourage it. Nor did he
do much to oppose separatist moves by the army in China..." (p. 515)

China's leaders could not remain conciliatory while the Japanese army was
stripping China of its northern provinces. Chiang might have preferred to
postpone a showdown with the Japanese until he had destroyed the
Communists (the former to Chiang were a "disease of the skin" whereas the
latter were a "disease of the heart"); but however authoritarian Chiang's
government was, it could not ignore public opinion. Students held massive
demonstrations in defiance of government bans. The Chinese Communists
began to agitate for a new United Front. Pro-Japanese officials like Wang
Ching-wei lost influence; Wang was the target of an assassination attempt
in late 1935. Meanwhile, the Japanese, having alienated both China and
the "Anglo-Saxon" powers, turned to Germany and joined the "anti-Comintern
pact"--but all this did was to encourage the USSR to strengthen China's
defenses and press harder for a KMT-Communist united front. This
culminated in the Sian (Xi'an) Incident, which left China united as it had
not been for decades. At the same time, the hope for a self-sufficient
Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc proved illusory: In 1936 Asia
accounted for only 38.2 percent of Japan's total imports and 50.9 percent
of its exports. There was a heavy balance of payments deficit with the US
(which provided more than 30 percent of Japan's imports and took more than
20 percent of its exports) and the UK.

The interesting thing is that by the spring of 1937 the Japanese
government actually realized that its policy was not working. The key
documents in its self-appraisal were "Implementation of policy toward
China" and "Directives for a North China policy," both adopted on April
16, 1937 by the four ministers' conference (the foreign, finance, war, and
navy ministries. As Iriye summarizes them (p. 517) "The documents
stressed 'cultural and economic' means to bring about 'coexistence and
coprosperity' between the two countries, and the need to 'view
sympathetically' the Nanking government's effort to unify China. It was
decided not to seek North China's autonomy or to promote separatist
movements...The economic development of North China...should, according to
the new directive, be carried out through the infusion of Japan's private
capital as well as Chinese funds. Third powers' rights would be
respected, and cooperation with Britain and the United States would be
promoted." It was a remarkable reversal of policy, but made too late:
Nobody in China trusted Japan any more, and Chiang Kai-shek's authority
depended on taking a strong anti-Japanese stand. The Western powers too
were less inclined to appease Japan than they had been a few years
earlier. Any chance for reconciliation was destroyed by the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident--which, incidentally, might plausibly have been avoided;
unlike many of the "incidents" of the prior years, it seems to have been
an accident, not something premeditated by the Japanese Army--and
subsequent Sino-Japanese War.

So the question is: Can we imagine either a Hirota willing to stand up to
the Kwantung Army back when doing so might have made a difference (1935)
or alternatively a Kwantung Army led by someone less rabidly anti-Chiang
than Doihora? With regard to the former possibility, Japanese civilian
politicians who defied military pressure in the 1930s risked their lives,
so perhaps the latter hypothesis is more worth exploring. I don't think
it inconceivable that an alternate leadership of the Kwantung Army might
have concluded that at least a temporary reconciliation with Chiang was
desirable so as not to distract Japan from a possible future war with the
Soviet Union. Surely in the event of such a war it would help to have at
least a neutral (if not actually favorable) China, US, and UK; and
certainly the last thing that a Japan concerned about the Soviet Union
should want would be to get bogged down in fighting in China. (A problem
of course is that even in 1937 the Japanese did not believe they ever
*could* get bogged down in China; after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,
they expected at most a short, victorious war, limited to North China...)

One other thought: If Sun Yat-sen had lived, what would be his attitude?
(Of course if he had lived, all sorts of other things might have changed--
for example, it is possible that the Kuomintang-Communist break might
never have occurred, but I will deal with that question in another post
some day...) Sun seems to have had a sentimental attachment to Japan and
the idea of pan-Asianism throughout his life, even when he had to concede
that Japan was behaving worse than the "white" powers. Even as late as
1924, when Sun had decided on an "anti-imperialist" alliance with the
Soviet Union and a United Front with the Chinese Communist Party, he still
appealed to Japan for help--perhaps hoping to reduce his one-sided
dependence on the Soviet Union. (As one might expect, the appeal fell on
deaf ears; Japan, like the western powers at that time, preferred to deal
with the warlords of Beijing.) Wang Ching-wei and other advocates of
reconciliation with Japan loved to refer to all the pro-Japanese
statements Sun had made throughout his life. In fact, when Wang later
became head of the Japanese puppet government in China, he had an
anthology of Sun's pro-Japan and pro-pan-Asian writings and speeches
published under the title *China and Japan: Natural Friends, Unnatural
Enemies.* (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941). It is indeed possible
that Sun would have acquiesced reluctantly in the loss of Manchuria.
According to Marie-Claire Bergere, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford University
Press 1998), pp. 265-6, "In January 1914, Sun Yat-sen gave his blessing to
Chen Qimei's expedition to Manchuria. Not much is known of this
expedition, but the plan probably involved having the revolutionaries make
contact with Prince Su's monarchists and help establish the separatist
kingdom of Manchuria that some Japanese leaders already had in mind. It
is known that unlike Song Jiaoren and a number of the other revolutionary
leaders, Sun had never evinced any passionate nationalism with regard to
these regions of the northeast. Perhaps this was because they had
formerly been the territory of barbarian tribes, only annexed to China at
the beginning of the twentieth century. Sun considered that these
territories were 'not all of China,' if they were lost, 'the true China,'
the China of the Han, would still remain." Also, in 1915, worried about
the negotiations between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese, Sun wrote a
letter to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs "in which he offered
the Tokyo government even greater concessions than those claimed in the
Twenty-one Demands." Bergere, p. 264. Wang has often been criticized for
his opportunism, but perhaps in this respect he was being more faithful to
Dr. Sun's memory than is usually believed...

Thoughts?


[1] The extent to which the Silver Purchase Act actually hurt China has
been debated. "Brandt and Sargent (1989) and Rawski (1993) challenge
[Milton] Friedman's (1992) view that the Chinese economy suffered from the
US silver purchase program and the ongoing rise in silver prices and
China's exchange rate, however. Given that there is no argument that China
endured severe deflation between 1932 and 1934,2 these revisionist views
imply that not only was a silver-based country not hurt by a rising world
silver price but also that the real economy remained robust to double-
digit deflation. But, after large-scale silver purchases got underway, US
exports to the rest of the world rose between September 1934 and September
1935 rose while exports to China fell by 38% (Westerfield, 1936, p. 112).
Longer-run time series analysis by Bailey and Bhaopichitr (2004) suggests
that the world silver price appears to have had a significant effect on
China�s own exports over the 1866-1928 period. Meanwhile, a plethora of
accounts by both Chinese and western contemporaries and observers echo the
view that China was significantly hurt by the rising silver price in the
1930s and that the accelerating deflation had severe effects on the real
economy." http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/econ/papers/2005-07.pdf
Regardless of the extent of damage to China, US silver policy was of
course indefensible. The only mitigating factor that could be cited in
FDR's favor is that after all it was the Founders, not FDR, who provided
that each state, large or small, would have two senators--with the result
that "a minor industry, employing in 1939 less than five thousand persons,
the silver industry, in effect, held the government to ransom" through its
control of fourteen Senate seats in sparsely populated Western states.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Coming of the New Deal,* p. 252.
http://books.google.com/books?id=mj3VmJ38tHIC&pg=PA252

At the same time this was occurring in 1934, the Chinese were fighting a major border war against the Soviets in Xinjiang and later on in 1936 nearly launched an Anti-CCP campaign. All of this together means the Japanese and Chinese could plausibly forge an Anti-Soviet alliance while the restored relations with the West on the part of Japan would lead to an end of the "Strike South" faction in favor of gearing up towards a "Pan-Asian" Anti-Communist war.
 
Back around 1934, there was a lot of contemporary expectation that Japan and the Soviets would fight a regional war, to be started by strikes on Vladivostok. Concurrent to this, the Chinese and the Japanese nearly came to an agreement on the status of Manchuria as Japanese while Japan was also seeking restored amicable relations with the Anglo-Americans. To quote an old SHWI post by @David T:



At the same time this was occurring in 1934, the Chinese were fighting a major border war against the Soviets in Xinjiang and later on in 1936 nearly launched an Anti-CCP campaign. All of this together means the Japanese and Chinese could plausibly forge an Anti-Soviet alliance while the restored relations with the West on the part of Japan would lead to an end of the "Strike South" faction in favor of gearing up towards a "Pan-Asian" Anti-Communist war.

Would the best approach have been for this East Asian Triple Alliance to join the Axis or bide their time until the end of the alternate WW2 before striking the Soviets post-war to initiate an Anti-Communist conflict before the Soviets get a chance to become a nuclear power in 1949 as in OTL? Does this have any impact on how the iron Curtain forms in this ATL in the case of the latter?
 
Would the best approach have been for this East Asian Triple Alliance to join the Axis or bide their time until the end of the alternate WW2 before striking the Soviets post-war to initiate an Anti-Communist conflict before the Soviets get a chance to become a nuclear power in 1949 as in OTL? Does this have any impact on how the iron Curtain forms in this ATL in the case of the latter?

50% of Lend Lease comes through Pacific ports. If the Japanese were to cut it during WWII the Soviet Union will collapse.
 
50% of Lend Lease comes through Pacific ports. If the Japanese were to cut it during WWII the Soviet Union will collapse.

Would it have been in ATL Japan's or the East Asian Triple Alliance's (e.g. Japan/China/Korea) interest to do so, given the Allied support for the Soviets as opposed to maintaining a strict neutrality towards each other for the duration of the conflict (as was the case in OTL between Japan and the Soviets) and only striking once Germany was all but defeated?

Would the former have prompted an East Asian War as an ATL Pacific War and embargo of Japan / East Asian Triple Alliance with the Soviets allowing the Allies to uses it airbases out of desperation, with the Pacific cargo fleet being redirected to ports serving the Persian and Murmansk routes as was apparently the case in OTL when the Pacific route was cut for two months in 1941 and a significant portion of 1942 (with full volume not returning to the route until 1943)?
 
Would it have been in ATL Japan's or the East Asian Triple Alliance's (e.g. Japan/China/Korea) interest to do so, given the Allied support for the Soviets as opposed to maintaining a strict neutrality towards each other for the duration of the conflict (as was the case in OTL between Japan and the Soviets) and only striking once Germany was all but defeated?

Would the former have prompted an East Asian War as an ATL Pacific War and embargo of Japan / East Asian Triple Alliance with the Soviets allowing the Allies to uses it airbases out of desperation, with the Pacific cargo fleet being redirected to ports serving the Persian and Murmansk routes as was apparently the case in OTL when the Pacific route was cut for two months in 1941 and a significant portion of 1942 (with full volume not returning to the route until 1943)?

Unquestionably it would've been better when the Germans and Soviets were at each other's throats.
 

trurle

Banned
50% of Lend Lease comes through Pacific ports. If the Japanese were to cut it during WWII the Soviet Union will collapse.
Partially incorrect. Initially (in 1941-1942), the rail infrastructure of Soviet Union on Far East was grossly inadequate, and large fraction of early lend-lease was actually rail vehicles and other rail-related stuff to prevent stockpiling in ports. If Far East Soviet ports are closed, US still have the adequate Iranian route which was opened in September 1941 IOTL.

The actual bottleneck for Soviet Union in war with Asian block scenario would be likely diversion of manpower, not the lack of war supplies. Anyway, lend-lease supplied a total of ~20% of Soviet wartime-produced equipment/supplies - significant but not essential.
 
Partially incorrect. Initially (in 1941-1942), the rail infrastructure of Soviet Union on Far East was grossly inadequate, and large fraction of early lend-lease was actually rail vehicles and other rail-related stuff to prevent stockpiling in ports. If Far East Soviet ports are closed, US still have the adequate Iranian route which was opened in September 1941 IOTL.

The actual bottleneck for Soviet Union in war with Asian block scenario would be likely diversion of manpower, not the lack of war supplies. Anyway, lend-lease supplied a total of ~20% of Soviet wartime-produced equipment/supplies - significant but not essential.

Not sure where you're getting those stats, especially concerning the Persian corridor:

1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.

As for the value of Lend Lease of itself, it was unquestionably essential and the only thing that kept the Soviets from collapse during the war. The loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas had engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector had fallen by 40%. In addition, the USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources; Lend Lease was sufficient to meet all of these demands except for aluminum and nickel. Antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking.

If the material situation in of itself wasn't damning enough, the food situation is. From Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union During World War II -
3j4GfGz4_o.png

MTrRlP8L_o.png
 

trurle

Banned
Not sure where you're getting those stats, especially concerning the Persian corridor:

1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.
The sources you provide feels like unreliable/propaganda. Most suspiciously, it deliberately omits the base number. Soviet Union baseline military production in 1942 was 20,000 tons per day. (7 million tons per year) - and territorial losses did not affected productivity, because bottleneck was tooling (which was mostly evacuated), not raw materials (elaborated in your source). Regarding most bulk-volume alloying materials, these can be substituted with minor drop of performance. Except for may be manganese. Finally, caloric calculation you cite is misleading if not outright fraudulent with statements like "it would be safe to assume that the Red Army could not have fed its soldiers adequately without it" or "760 calories a day, or 19% "..

I remember the following joke heard during my army service:
The Russian and American officer are exchanging opinions at military conference.
American one:
- Our soldiers consume 4,000 kcal per day.
Russian one:
- Liar! Human stomach capacity is insufficient to digest that much beets!

The joke hints on following:
1) 4000 kcal/day is upper limit for worst possible situation (winter and offensive warfare). Actual infantryman food supply can be easily rationed down to 2500 kcal/day with typical heating/clothing arrangements or by accepting reduced mobility.
2) Food substitutes (emergency food) do exist.
 
The sources you provide feels like unreliable/propaganda. Most suspiciously, it deliberately omits the base number. Soviet Union baseline military production in 1942 was 20,000 tons per day. (7 million tons per year) - and territorial losses did not affected productivity, because bottleneck was tooling (which was mostly evacuated), not raw materials (elaborated in your source). Regarding most bulk-volume alloying materials, these can be substituted with minor drop of performance. Except for may be manganese. Finally, caloric calculation you cite is misleading if not outright fraudulent with statements like "it would be safe to assume that the Red Army could not have fed its soldiers adequately without it" or "760 calories a day, or 19% "..

I remember the following joke heard during my army service:
The Russian and American officer are exchanging opinions at military conference.
American one:
- Our soldiers consume 4,000 kcal per day.
Russian one:
- Liar! Human stomach capacity is insufficient to digest that much beets!

The joke hints on following:
1) 4000 kcal/day is upper limit for worst possible situation (winter and offensive warfare). Actual infantryman food supply can be easily rationed down to 2500 kcal/day with typical heating/clothing arrangements or by accepting reduced mobility.
2) Food substitutes (emergency food) do exist.

Baseline military production in tons does not account for the value of the Lend Lease; you can make 1,000,000 million tons of tanks but that is irrelevant if you don't, for example, have the explosives or fuels to match for it. Nor can you even make tanks or especially planes in the first place without the necessary inputs to create them, which Lend Lease allowed for given the Soviet deficiencies in aluminum production for one example. If you control for high quality aluminum in particular, needed for air frames, you find it's all pretty much Lend Lease origin.

Original source, by the way, is Hyperwar.

As for the Soviet food situation, no emergency foods exist and mass starvation was breaking out in the civilian populace. As for the Red Army, rations were already at around 3,000. This means the loss of Lend Lease food would've ensured starvation among its ranks for every year of the conflict.
 
As historians cannot come to a consensus on how far the Soviets were to collapse, and therefore how significant lend lease was, I hardly think you two will hash it out here.

As much as such an alliance would be beneficial, one wonders how long it can last. Eventually China will industrialise and Japan will see themselves being overshadowed. At that point if Chinese expansionists start to wonder why Japan has Taiwan or Manchuria then what can Japan do?

Of course Canada and the USA managed to be allies for a long time so its certainly not impossible.
 

trurle

Banned
Baseline military production in tons does not account for the value of the Lend Lease; you can make 1,000,000 million tons of tanks but that is irrelevant if you don't, for example, have the explosives or fuels to match for it. Nor can you even make tanks or especially planes in the first place without the necessary inputs to create them, which Lend Lease allowed for given the Soviet deficiencies in aluminum production for one example. If you control for high quality aluminum in particular, needed for air frames, you find it's all pretty much Lend Lease origin.

Original source, by the way, is Hyperwar.

As for the Soviet food situation, no emergency foods exist and mass starvation was breaking out in the civilian populace. As for the Red Army, rations were already at around 3,000. This means the loss of Lend Lease food would've ensured starvation among its ranks for every year of the conflict.
For reference: i have cleaned up the soviet lend-lease source from
http://www.jrbooksonline.com/fdr-scandal-page/lend.html
Hope it will help to make more meaningful discussion.
 

Attachments

  • lendLeaseSovietMachineReadable2.zip
    26 KB · Views: 48
Unquestionably it would've been better when the Germans and Soviets were at each other's throats.

But doing so would make enemies out of the US and UK, and they’d likely still depend on American oil.

Agree with both.

Ideally Japan, China and Korea need to strike at the precise moment when the Germans are finished just as tensions are beginning to mount between the West and the Soviets a few years before the start of the Cold War, perhaps leading to the ATL Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany to be pushed back further eastwards compared to OTL.

Even than this East Asian Triple Alliance has a limited window before the Soviets become a nuclear power in 1949 and likely uses it out of desperation if they are really on the back foot as opposed to it being a limited conflict.

It would be interesting to see where the Triple Alliance strikes given all roughly border the Soviets as well as what minimal gains they are likely to accept compared to the losses the Soviets are willing to tolerate in the Far East up to potentially West Siberia (or up to roughly in the area between Kazakhstan and Mongolia).

What would significantly help the East Asian Triple Alliance in this scenario would be the Allies supplying minimal to no Lend Lease to the Soviets (and depending on the accounts of some anti-communists like George Racey Jordan, etc also no nuclear secrets which allowed the Soviets to quickly become a nuclear power not long after the US), with the Soviets still managing to push the Germans back at great cost.

One potential side effect with Japan not being part of the Axis in ATL would be which German / Axis cities are visited by Enola Gay and Little Boy in this scenario, however it is possible the East Asian Triple Alliance becomes the 2nd victims of nuclear weapons if they are unable to defeat the Soviets before the latter becomes a nuclear power.
 
As much as such an alliance would be beneficial, one wonders how long it can last. Eventually China will industrialise and Japan will see themselves being overshadowed. At that point if Chinese expansionists start to wonder why Japan has Taiwan or Manchuria then what can Japan do?

Japan would not have Manchuria in this scenario, though do see tensions arising between China and Japan over Taiwan (notwithstanding the fact China historically viewed the territory as troublesome to deal with and a bit of a white elephant like Russia with Sakhalin in OTL before the discovery of oil) as well as possibly Japanese ruled Sakhalin. ATL China could potentially become very expansionist / irredentist later on.

It is possible that ATL China seeks to either be the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement or creates a more right-leaning Anti-Communist equivalent, with Japan titling towards the West. Korea is a bit of an unknown, perhaps it feels more comfortable in China's orbit or tilts towards the West like Japan due to concerns about the ATL Chinese (since Korea would not be occupied by the Japanese in this scenario).
 
Top