There are two possible options for an Allied invasion of France, in the summers of 1942 and 1943. I will cover 1942 with this thread. I believe the Allied options were quite broad until June of 1942. GEN Erwin Rommel’s defeat of British Eighth Army at Gazala and Tobruk that month forced the Allies to focus only on relieving pressure on the British position in Egypt. This meant landings in French North Africa, which materialized as Operation Torch.
There is a time lag between a firm decision and the actual execution of an operation, usually four to six months in which it can be aborted; but not shifted to a new objective without starting planning all over again. Invasion prerequisites must ensure adequate bases, logistics, military, naval and air forces are in place. There are two options for an amphibious landing, the English Channel or French Mediterranean coast. The former has established bases in Great Britain, the latter does not. However, the French Riviera does have the advantage of invading forces not encountering German troops until they are firmly ashore. Obtaining a necessary base for landings in Southern France requires an occupation of Sardinia first.
The strategic rationale for invading Sardinia and then Southern France is that it is a viable alternative to Operations Bolero (build-up of U.S. Army in Great Britain) and Sledgehammer (1942 emergency invasion of Northern France). British were dead-set against Sledgehammer because the U.S. commitment was only three divisions, the remainder of the force was British and Canadian. If Sledgehammer did succeed in saving Russia from an imminent collapse by drawing off enough German forces, then a Dunkirk-style evacuation on a scale even larger than 1940 would be required.
Therefore, I conclude that any assault on Sardinia must have a decision date no later than January 1942, and be executed prior to June 1942. Any simultaneous assault on Corsica would increase the risks of the entry of Vichy France into the war on the Axis side, or a German occupation of the remainder of France before the Allies are ashore. Control of the sea-lanes between Gibraltar and Sardinia would be lost as the Allies simply lack sufficient combat power to simultaneously occupy Sardinia, Corsica, Vichy France and French North Africa all at once.
On the other hand, once captured, Sardinia would not be evacuated, and any Axis forces withdrawn from Russia could be spread from Norway to Bordeaux and from Genoa to Crete to defend against the next amphibious assault. Capture of Sardinia would eliminate the safest convoy route from Italy to Libya by opening the one passing west of Sicily and east of Tunisia to Allied air and surface attack. It would also reduce the window for uncontested air attacks on Malta convoys from three days to one. An invasion of Sardinia (Operation Brimstone) would make strategic sense whether the Soviets were in imminent danger of collapse or not.
The first British interest in invading Sardinia that I am aware of was in February 1941, when Churchill suggested that troops from Egypt could execute it once Tripoli were captured. This interest evaporated when Greece invited British troops later that month leading to disaster in the Balkans by April-May 1941. The Italians became aware of this interest through their espionage network in Cairo, and sent the 44th Cremona Infantry Division to Sardinia in April 1941 to reinforce the locally recruited 30th Saubauda and 31st Calabria Infantry Divisions. Later, in December 1941, the 204th and 205th Coastal Divisions were formed to help protect Sardinia from invasion. It would not be difficult to revive British interest at the Arcadia Conference in Washington D.C. during December 1941-January 1942.
Only the 44th Cremona Infantry Division can be considered combat ready. Due to heavy Italian shipping losses, Sardinia is required to be self-sufficient in food, and at any given time 10-15% of the troops of two remaining divisions are furloughed to engage in agricultural labor. The two coastal divisions have personnel assigned, but are partially equipped due to losses in artillery, mortars, heavy machine guns, vehicles and other equipment in North Africa and Russia the previous winter. Consequently, training has lagged. Coastal divisions are also low on the priority list, and their presence may not even be known to the Allies.
If a solid decision were made in January 1942, the following operations must be cancelled to provide troops, naval and air support, and shipping: Bolero, Sledgehammer, The Doolittle Raid, Ironclad (Invasion of Madagascar May 1942) as well as convoys to Russia departing after mid-March 1942. Additional risk in the Indian Ocean is also accepted after the capture of Singapore to ensure success in the Mediterranean. No additional USN ships are transferred to the Pacific after 31 January 1942. Ironically, cancelling the Doolittle Raid frees VA William Halsey, USS Enterprise and escorts to participate in the Battle of Coral Sea – an interesting thread outside the scope of this one.
The invasion date is set for 3 May 1942, the earliest opportunity to allow USN ships to resume transfers to the Pacific, but after a resupply convoy to Malta in April. Naval Forces for Operation Brimstone are overwhelming, and entails the risk that KMS Tirpitz may break out on a raiding cruise without opposition. This risk was accepted earlier during major resupply efforts for Malta, beginning with Operation Halberd in September 1941.
USN (VA Kent Hewitt) in three elements: Task Force 34.1 consists of aircraft carriers USS Hornet, Wasp, Ranger; battleships USS Washington, North Carolina; heavy cruisers USS Wichita, Tuscaloosa, Vincennes, Augusta; light cruisers USS Atlanta, Juneau, San Diego, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Savannah, Nashville, destroyers USS Warrington, Benson, Mayo, Gleaves, Niblack, Madison, Lansdale, Hillary P Jones, Charles F Hughes, Plunkett, Meredith, Grayson, Monssen, Gwin, Wilson, Sterett, and Lang (Total 18). USN Close Escort (Task Force 34.2) for the 102 amphibious and cargo ships contains battleships USS New Mexico, Texas, New York; light cruisers USS Milwaukee, Memphis; destroyers USS Davis, Eberle, Livermore, Kearny, Ericsson, Forrest, Fitch, Corry, Hobson, Mayrant, Rhind, Rowan, Stack, Wainwright, Buck, Roe, Bainbridge, Greer and Tarbell (Total 19). Destroyers USS Wolsey, Ludlow, Dallas, Simpson and Broome escort a supply group (Task Force 34.3) including escort carrier USS Charger plus oilers USS Salamonie, Cimarron and Chemung. (Ships based on Operation Torch with adjustments for historical presence in the Atlantic, refit schedules, etc.) Most naval bombardment by USN ships were diversionary in nature, since the targets needed to be seized intact, not destroyed.
The USN brings 105 fighter, 116 bomber and 23 torpedo aircraft aboard its three carriers, in four types: Grumman F4F Wildcat, Douglas SBD Dauntless, Vought SB2U Vindicator and Douglas TBD Devastator. They are distributed in 14 squadrons aboard USS Hornet: VF-8 (19 F4F-3, 2 F4F-4); VS-8 (21 SBD-3), VB-8 (21 SBD-3), VT-8 (16 TBD-1); USS Wasp: VF-71 (18 F4F-3, 3 F4F-4); VF-72 (17 F4F-3, 4 F4F-4); VS-71 (7 SB2U-1, 10 SB2U-2, 3 TBD-1); VS 72 (20 SB2U-2); VT-7 (4 TBD-1); USS Ranger: VF-5 (18 F4F-3, 3 F4F-4); VF-41 (17 F4F-3, 4 F4F-4); VS-41 (14 SB2U-1, 2 SB2U-2); VS-42 (12 SB2U-1, 6 SB2U-2); VT-4 (3 TBD-1). USS Charger carries 66 USAAF Curtiss P-40E Kittyhawk fighters with modified undercarriages for a catapult launch. [These Kittyhawks were historically flown from USS Ranger to Takoradi Airfield (Gold Coast) en-route to China during May 1942]
A RN Strike Force from Home waters combined with Gibraltar-based Force H; with aircraft carriers HMS Illustrious (No 810, 829, 881, 882 Sqn), Formidable (No 807, 820, 824, 888 Sqn), Victorious (No 801, 809, 812, 832 Sqn) battleships HMS King George V, Duke of York; battlecruiser HMS Renown; heavy cruisers HMS Norfolk, London, Devonshire; light cruisers HMS Kenya, Mauritius, Gambia, Charybdis, Manchester, Liverpool, Delhi; destroyers HMS Quentin, Partridge, Pathfinder, Penn, Onslow, Offa, Oribi, Laforey, Lookout, Lightning, Ashanti, Somali, Punjabi, Intrepid, Icarus, Faulknor, Forester, Fury, Escapade, Echo, Achates, Active, and Volunteer (Total 23). No 881, 882, 888 Sqn are equipped with 12 Martlet; No 807, 809 – 12 Fulmar; No 801 – 8 Sea Hurricane; No 810, 824, 829 – 12 Swordfish; No 820, 812, 832- 12 Albacore. A total of 140 aircraft.
Force K from the Mediterranean Fleet will launch air attacks and conduct night bombardments in Cyrenaica as a diversion. It contains aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable (No 880 Sqn -12 Sea Hurricane; No 800 – 12 Fulmar; No 806 – 4 Fulmar; No 827, 831 – each 12 Albacore); battleship HMS Warspite; heavy cruisers HMS Dorsetshire, Cornwall; light cruisers HMS Hermione, Euryalus, Cleopatra, Dido, Newcastle; destroyers HMAS Napier, Nestor, Norman, HMS Lively, Lance, Kipling, Jervis, Jackal, Janus, Hotspur, Hasty, HMNethS Van Galen and Isaac Sweers (Total 13).
The RN Close Escort Force (Force A) consists of battleships HMS Nelson, Malaya; heavy cruisers Kent, Berwick; light cruisers Nigeria, Trinidad, Edinburgh, Ajax, Cairo, Curacoa; destroyers HMS Matchless, Marne, Martin, Ithuriel, Inglefield, Eclipse, Duncan, Brilliant, Antelope, Wishart, Westcott, Wrestler; escort destroyers HMS Wilton, Tetcott, Ledbury, Lamerton, Blankney and French La Combattante (Total 18). On 30 April 1942, just north of Gibraltar, HMS Edinburgh was torpedoed by KMS U-462, but made port successfully.
The RN Support Group (Force V) boasted three small aircraft carriers, HMS Eagle, Hermes and Argus; escorted by light cruiser HMS Arethusa; destroyers HMS Vidette and French Leopard; and escort destroyers HMS Aldenham, Blackmore, Badsworth, Grove, Middleton, and Polish Kujawiak (Total 8). One oiler, RFA Brown Ranger was attached to refuel the small escort destroyers. HMS Eagle, Hermes and Argus each had three Fairey Swordfish from No 813 Sqn for antisubmarine patrols; and respectively 23, 20 and 24 Supermarine Spitfire VC fighters (the historical number delivered to Malta by USS Wasp in May 1942).
The Italian Navy is hard pressed to match the Allied armada. Battleships RItS Littorio, Caio Dulio and Guilio Cesare are operational; but RItS Vittorio Veneto is still working up after repairs to torpedo damage and RItS Andrea Doria is undergoing engine repairs. Heavy cruisers RItS Bolzano, and Gorizia are in service, but RItS Trento and Trieste are under refit. Light cruisers Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto Duca D’Aosta, Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli and Muzio Attendolo are available for a total of only seven cruisers. Destroyers number 17: RItS Mitragliere, Legionario, Alpino, Ascari, Aviere, Bersagliere, Camicia Nera, Fuciliere, Granatiere, Alfredo Oriani, Grecale, Folgore, Freccia, Saetta, Ugilino Vivaldi, Lancerotto Malocello and Premuda.
RItS Eugenio di Savoia, Raimondo Montecuccoli, Ascari, Alfredo Oriani, Ugilino Vivaldi, Lancerotto Malocello and Premuda were stationed at Cagliari, on Sardinia, the remainder at Taranto. Italian Naval Intelligence became aware of the size of Force H reinforcements from the Spanish port of Algeciras beginning on 1 May; observing a massive pre-dawn explosion of HMS Punjabi’s depth charges when accidentally rammed by HMS King George V while departing harbor. By 2 May with the refueling of Task Force 34, the scale of the Allied Force was clear, but not the destination. The Italians could not know if it was an invasion force or a massive reinforcement of Egypt by the most direct route. Nor could a second air strike replicating the November 1940 attack on Taranto be ruled out. Outnumbered, the Italian fleet responds cautiously; the squadron at Cagliari withdrawing to Palermo.
Once the landings were made, Allied warships protecting the invasion beaches made predictable and somewhat restrictive movements to remain close to their charges. USN Chief of Naval Operations ADM Ernest J King is a bitter Anglophobe and opponent of USN deployments to Europe. Once success of the landings is assured, USS Hornet, North Carolina, Vincennes, Atlanta, Juneau, Nashville, Meredith, Gwin, Grayson, Monssen, Sterett, Lang, Wilson, Stack and Cimarron depart on 7 May 1942 for Pearl Harbor via Gibraltar, Guantanamo Bay, Panama and San Diego, arriving 19 days later. USS Wasp, Washington, Quincy, Juneau, San Diego depart the Mediterranean on 18 May 1942 with an escort of destroyers for refits on the East Coast before transferring to the Pacific. The remaining USN vessels departed as merchant ships were unloaded, the last leaving on 28 May 1942.
About 130 Italian aircraft are stationed on Sardinia, with a good rate of serviceability. Another 45 German aircraft are slated to arrive from Crete on 4 May 1942 after reconnaissance confirmed the approaching Allied Fleets. On D-Day, 3 May, Italian fighters are in the air on dawn patrol, but soon swamped in northern sector by VF-5, VF-8 and VF-72; while VB-8, VS-42, VS-71, VT-4 and VT-7 engaged in bombing shore targets. These included SM-79 level and torpedo bombers armed and spotted for launch once the location of the Allied fleets was reported. The remaining USN aircraft were held back for combat and anti-submarine patrols and in case the Italian Fleet was located at sea. Similar losses were suffered in the southern sector where No 881, 882, 888 Sqn covered for strikes by No 810, 812, 820 and 824 Sqn. In the early afternoon, reserve squadrons launched attacks on invasion beaches and airfields in central Sardinia. By the end of the day, Italian air power was crippled, and German aircraft remain on Sicily.
The overall Army Commander for Operation Brimstone is LTG Harold Alexander, who upon his selection is not sent to Burma. This is because the British are supplying the majority of troops. His Deputy is MG Dwight D Eisenhower who already has the full confidence of GEN George Marshall. Under Alexander are First British Army commanded by LTG Bernard Montgomery and I US Armored Corps under MG George S Patton. Marshall, Eisenhower and Patton all have in common a mentor in retired MG Fox Conner, Chief of Staff to GEN John J Pershing during World War I, and the latter two have Marshall’s confidence as planners. Montgomery, for all of his arrogance enjoys a similarly high (and well-deserved) reputation in the British Army.
British First Army contains under its direct command Force 110, containing 1 Guards and 36 Infantry Brigade Groups; 5 Division (13, 15 and 17 Brigades), 29 Independent Brigade [containing four infantry battalions, an armoured regiment of mixed Valentine and Tetrarch tanks (Special Service Regiment), and a field regiment of 25pdr howitzers]; and 5 Commando. All units of Force 110 have undergone significant amphibious training except 15 Brigade, and are commanded by Royal Marine MG Robert Sturges. V British Corps under MG Charles Allfrey is allocated as a follow-on force with 1 and 4 Divisions and (25 Army) Tank Brigade with nearly 200 Churchill/Valentine infantry tanks.
Montgomery is assigned beaches around Cagliari, the largest port of Sardinia on its southern coast. The 6-inch coastal defense batteries are engaged by HMS Nelson, Kent and Ajax covering a direct assault by 5 Commando. Once neutralized, other landings proceed. 5 Division is assigned landing beaches to the east of the port including Monserrato Airfield four miles inland; 29 Independent Brigade (which has the only three LSTs in the RN assigned) is to assault just west of the port and advance rapidly inland to seize the key Cagliari-Elmas Airfield (most capable in Sardinia) located there. Force 110 envelops the smaller port of Quartu about eight miles east of Cagliari. The landings begin on 4 May, and although pockets of resistance are stiff from 30th Saubauda Division, both ports and both airfields are secured on D-Day.
After a day of consolidation to allow British Army stevedore and logistical personnel to disembark, 5 Division began advancing slowly northwest of Cagliari, and 1 Guards Brigade up the east coast of Sardinia from Quartu. 29 Independent Brigade and 36 Brigade remained in general reserve. Spitfire VC fighters became operational from Cagliari-Elmas Airfield on 7 May and Monserrato Airfield the next day. Forc V returned to Gibraltar, where Hurricane IIC and IV aircraft trained in ground support operations were embarked and flew off for Sardinia on 13 May.
On 8 May, 5 Division encountered prepared positions of the 44th Cremona Infantry Division short of Decimommanu Airfield 15 miles from Cagliari; and its advance was halted. The same day, 29 Independent Brigade was released to sweep the southwestern corner of Sardinia. The Humber armoured cars of 5/Reconnaissance Corps had not yet arrived from disembarkation at Cagliari, and the Italian positions were uncertain for 25 hours. On 10 May, 40/Royal Tank Regiment of (25 Army) Tank Brigade; 1/Reconnaissance Corps, 38 (Irish) Infantry Bde and a field regiment of 1 Division reinforced 5 Division and Montgomery personally planned a deliberate attack on 44th Cremona Infantry Division. Begun on 12 May, in two days the Italian defenses were broken. By this time, Sardinian recruits were discarding uniforms and returning home.
I US Armored Corps landings are on the northern coast of Sardinia, with the three US units most experienced in amphibious operations. 3rd US Infantry Division (3rd US ID) pioneered US amphibious doctrine in two sets of maneuvers in Puget Sound in 1940, and again the following summer in Monterrey Bay near Ft Ord. The 1st Marine Raider Battalion attached; embarked in the six destroyer transports (APDs) they had trained with for the previous year. Acting as shock troops, they spearhead landings just south and north of the port of Alghero under cover of darkness. 7th and 30th U.S. Infantry Regiments (IR) follow them ashore, and 31st Calabria Infantry Division is too spread out at likely invasion sites to concentrate rapidly enough to prevent the capture of this port.
As soon as Alghero is captured, 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division, minus 3rd U.S. Cavalry Brigade (retained in the United States to cadre the 9th U.S. Armored Division) begins disembarkation. As with most of I Armored Corps, 4th Cavalry Brigade consisted of veteran Regular Army troops, the 9th and 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiments (Colored). Supported by the 3rd and 16th Field Artillery Battalions (75mm guns), the mission assigned these horse mounded troops is to act as dragoons in the rugged mountainous terrain of Northern Sardinia where roads were few and unimproved. Establishing blocking positions in the few places where an effective counterattack can be mounted, they protect the other movements of the Corps from disruption. Fodder is plentiful in the spring, which allows the limited supply of gasoline landed to be prioritized to other units. (Historical note: Patton requested 2nd U.S. Cavalry Division for Operation Torch to screen the mountainous terrain on the border with Spanish Morocco, but the unit had already been disbanded in July 1942.)
15th U.S. IR lands directly on the seaplane ramps of Fertilia Airfield (equal in size to Cagliari-Elmas, but fewer hangers and facilities) north of Alghero and on nearby beaches. Again, elements of 31st Calabria Infantry Division are too thin to avoid being flanked and overrun. The airfield is secured after six hours, and becomes the first operational airfield when P-40s from USS Charger arrive. Beginning 8 May, Combat Command A of 1st US Armored Division (CCA/1 AD) begins offloading its tanks and half-tracks pier side.
7th U.S. ID (minus 17th IR) lands at Porto Torres, some 21 miles north of Fertilla across the base of a shallow peninsula. It is seized without opposition, and the small port is taxed just to supply daily rations. In 36 hours, the division has advanced inland to capture the city of Sassari, and the next day linked up with 15th U.S. IR. 17th U.S. IR assaulted the island port of La Maddalena, and saw some of the fiercest fighting of the campaign, as much of the 205th Coastal Division was concentrated there. The port was not secured until 6 May and the island the following day, which allowed TF 34.1 and 1st USMC Raider Bn to be released. La Maddalena allowed the Americans early warning of air attacks coming from the Italian mainland.
Each combat element of I U.S. Armored Corps was assigned a platoon or company from the 107th U.S. IR. This regiment activated on 10 February 1942 from Italian-speaking troops serving in National Guard Divisions. Acting as a civil-military affairs detachments, the 107th U.S. IR is effective in securing the cooperation of captured Italian officials, and using telephone exchanges, persuading others not to sabotage infrastructure, communications, roads and rail facilities. Valuable intelligence was obtained from anti-Fascists contacted by chance.
On 11 May, Patton had stockpiled enough transport and fuel to send CCA/1 AD and 30th U.S. IR down the main highway from Alghero to Oristano – some 65 miles in three days. The lightning thrust captured three more airfields, Milis, an auxiliary bomber field north of the city, Oristano Airfield similar in capability to Fertilla, and Casa Zeppara four miles to the southwest of the city that was the primary base for torpedo bombers on Sardinia. As ground crews and P-40s arrived, they were replaced at Fertilla Airfield by the 1st Fighter Group, which flew its P-38E aircraft from Gibraltar; and 12th Bombardment Group with B-25s on 20-21 May.
CCA/1 AD also overran the Blackshirt Legion of the 44th Cremona Infantry Division which was utterly ill-equipped to face M-3 Lee and M-3 Stuart tanks, nor fight infantry from half-tracks. This defeat on 15 May convinced Italian commanders that further resistance was futile. In the north, 7 U.S. ID had cleared Ozieri and its small airfield and was advancing towards Olbia. The final element of I Armored Corps, 5 U.S. ID (minus its 10th U.S. IR and artillery sent to Iceland in October 1941) began to arrive on 15 May, too late to see any combat. There was no organized evacuation, 5 Division captured Villacidro Airfield on 19 May, and 159th U.S. IR took Venefiorita Airfield, 6 miles north of Olbia the next day and all airfields were in Allied hands 17 days after the landings. The last Italian troops “went into the bag” on 23 May.
In a postscript to Operation Brimstone, on 20 May 1942 the 38th U.S. Engineer Regiment (General Service) arrived on Sardinia with the mission of expanding existing port capacity. Four days later, the 45th U.S. Engineer Regiment (General Service) (Colored) arrived with the mission of building massive numbers of Quonset huts and ammunition bunkers to support further operations. The achievements of these engineers would be essential to the opening of a second front in Europe.
On 1 June, 78 Division HQ was formed on Sardinia, and 1 Guards, 29 and 36 Brigades, and Special Service Regiment are assigned. Two weeks later, the island of Pantelleria and its vital airfield were taken with few casualties. Pantelleria has no water sources, and once cisterns were drained relied on water tankers resupplying it from the mainland. With the capture of Sardinia, such resupply was unlikely, and the Italian commander capitulated to the British rather than later to thirst.
The RN did suffer one loss off Sardinia, HMS Trinidad managed to torpedo herself during a confused night engagement with Italian destroyers on 15 May. Force K lost destroyers HMS Lively, Kipling and Jackal to the German dive-bombers operating from Sicily on 11 May while engaged in an ill-advised diversionary operation. However, the next month Operation Harpoon successfully resupplied Malta with the loss of destroyer HMS Hasty only.
The Italian response to the loss of Sardinia was both military and political. Within days of the Sardinian landings, the 131st Centauro Armored, 16th Pistoia Motorized and 185th Folgore Parachute Divisions would not be sent to North Africa; but to Sicily instead as that island was viewed as the next Allied target. Two weeks later, the Germans were informed the Italian Eighth Army would not deploy to Russia. Its Alpine troops would remain on the French Border, Semi-motorized and Infantry Divisions used to guard the area around Rome against possible amphibious assault. On 1 June, the Italians sheepishly requested the return of the five divisions sent to Russia in August 1941 as part of the Italian Expeditionary Force.
On 15 July 1942, the Fascist Council met for the first time in over a decade and deposed Benito Mussolini. He is replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio. While the new government pledges loyalty to the Axis, internally a spirited debate begins over whether to seek an armistice with the Allies, and under what terms.
The German response is just as significant. Adolf Hitler viewed Russia, not the Mediterranean as the decisive front in the Second World War. Hitler sees no need whatsoever to amend Directive 41, issued on 5 April 1942 establishing Case Blue – the general offensive to capture the oil of the Caucasus and Stalingrad to secure its exposed flank. Hitler is forced to replace the nine Italian divisions intended for Case Blue, and there are few places they may be obtained from. Troops in Northern Finland, thus far unsuccessful in capturing Murmansk were selected; XXXVI German Mountain Corps with 163rd and 169th Infantry Divisions and 6th SS Division Nord were transferred in May 1942. XIX German Mountain Corps HQ was organized and together with 2nd, 6th and 7th Mountain Divisions and Panzer Battalion 211, transferred in June. Only 3rd and 5th Mountain Divisions remained to support the Finns north of the Arctic Circle. Both Corps became part of the newly formed Twenty-Third German Army. The 22nd Air Landing Division was assigned after the successful capture of Sevastopol in July instead of being sent to Crete on garrison duty. Because some divisions had three regiments, seven German divisions were able to replace nine Italian.
Hitler is also quite disillusioned with the inability of the Italians to defend their home territory, and believes that Sicily must be ‘stiffened” with German troops or it too will fall. Consequently, a replacement battalion of 40 PzKw IVF2 tanks – the most powerful in the German Army and infantry, artillery, engineer and other replacement troops were diverted to Sicily on 10 May 1942. A major factor in this decision is the high loss rate of personnel and material crossing the Mediterranean to Libya. With the loss of one of two convoy routes these losses are expected to increase. One week later, MG Gustav von Vaerst, commander of 15th Panzer Division was ordered with his key staff and logistical personnel to Sicily where his division would be rebuilt by diverting all further reinforcements there. Troops in North Africa were reallocated to 21st Panzer and 90th Light Divisions. To provide an infantry support, the 164th Light Division and 2nd Parachute Regiment were assigned on 21 May, and LTG Walther Nehring was detached from Afrika Korps to command this fledgling Sizilien Korps.
GEN Erwin Rommel flew to both Rome and Berlin to protest the neutering of his offensive plans, but was denied an audience with Hitler. Without German and Italian reinforcements there was little Rommel could do except wait at Gazala for British Eighth Army to complete its counteroffensive preparations. A number of spoiling attacks were launched, and while they inflicted greater Commonwealth casualties than Axis, they did not disrupt Auchinleck’s positioning of troops, logistics, and airpower to support the coming attack.
On 28 May 1942, the Soviets launched a 16-day offensive aimed at Kharkov that ended in total defeat and nearly 200,000 casualties. Exactly one month later, Fourth German Panzer, Second German, Twenty-Third German and Second Hungarian Armies begin the Case Blue Offensive from vicinity of Kursk and Orel. Two days later, Sixth German Army begins its drive on Stalingrad. It is joined on its southern flank by First German Panzer Army on 3 July. It is followed by Seventeenth German Army on 8 July to provide its southern flank with protection. The next day Sevastopol surrendered and over the next three weeks Eleventh German Army began crossing the Kerch Strait to join the attack. Fourth Romanian Army would follow. On 23 July 1942, Rostov is captured and Hitler personally writes Directive 45 to replace Fourth German Panzer Army with Third Romanian Army and directing the panzers to assume a position between Sixth and First German Panzer Armies. There is nothing in the Western Mediterranean to cause Hitler to alter the plans for Case Blue.
I realize that the greatest counterargument to any Alternative History scenario is that it did not happen that way. There is also a danger of applying 20-20 hindsight. I believe I have avoided that by thoroughly analyzing three possibilities that would enable Operation Brimstone to proceed as I have outlined. The first is the strong emotional attachment that PM Churchill felt towards the inhabitants of Malta and the desire to expeditiously lift its siege. Much of the RN force noted above was committed to the relief convoys Operations Harpoon and Pedestal in June and August 1942 respectively. The second possibility is that GEN Marshall could persuade his superiors that Russia just might fall without a second front, rendering a victorious outcome of the war difficult to envision.
The third possibility is British recognition that U.S. divisions not employed in combat in Europe in 1942 would be sent by Marshall to the Pacific instead. This last point is worth emphasizing. Marshall released the 1st U.S. Cavalry and 6th, 7th, 31st, 33rd, 38th 40th and 43rd U.S. Infantry Divisions to the Pacific after the postponement of landings in Europe. All of these divisions had trained for combat in Europe, and retraining for the Pacific Theater meant six of these eight divisions did not see combat until 1944.
The success of Operation Brimstone confirms the quality of U.S. commanders in a combat debut, their ability to properly plan and execute a complex operation, and U.S logistical capabilities. Air supremacy over a significant sector was quickly seized and maintained; and U.S. airmen proved capable. All of these issues were greatly doubted by the British at the Arcadia Conference. Secondly, the concept of a single supreme commander was tested and proven. Although the Italian defenders on Sardinia proved second-rate (a factor unknown to the Allies in May 1942), Allied confidence receives a considerable boost when it is needed the most.
In my next post I will cover an invasion of Unoccupied France in 1942. As always, comments, dissenting views, etc. are always welcome.