WI: Earlier Barbarossa

I don't usually get into WWII discussions because I'm not nearly as well-read on them as some of the people here, so forgive any blatant oversimplifications I might make here.

Crux of my question is, what if Hitler budgets the Wehrmacht more time for Barbarossa and the operation launches in May or early June rather than June 22nd? Late June gives you about 3 months until the weather starts turning bad in September, during which time you have to take and hold a sizable chunk of Soviet land (and ideally Moscow) and smash the Soviets before they come into form in the winter. A tall order, even for the Wehrmacht. If you launch the operation at the first thaw in early May though, you (possibly) get better fighting conditions for a mechanized offensive in addition to more time to finish the job. Just a thought, any input?
 

Kongzilla

Banned
They'd run into far more resistance near the border, because a lot of the Red Army was there OTL because that is when Stalin thought Hitler would Invade anyway.
 
The start of Barbarossa was driven by the preparedness of first wave divisions, some of which didn't get their allocation of motor transport until 1st of June. If you can get these divisions their transport then they can go early.
 
Wouldn't the weather be against them if they moved earlier? I'm sure I heard somewhere about heavy rains in may forcing them to wait.
 
Wouldn't the weather be against them if they moved earlier? I'm sure I heard somewhere about heavy rains in may forcing them to wait.

The Yugoslavian campaign forced them to wait. Hitler delayed the invasion to deal with them and Greece.
 
off course a Barbarossa operation launches in May (if Italian were better in conquer east Europe)
the Wehrmacht had reach Moscow in late september.
but i have my doubt's they had occupy it.

Stalin trow everything he got to defend Moscow.
he even use the Orthodox church to mobilized the masses for volunteering
even flow a icon of a Russian saint in a Bomber, several times around Moscow (no joke)
that help to to attack the now dispenses Wehrmacht forces who reached the outskirts of Moscow.
the red army trow one division after another on the germans, until they got order of Hitler to move south direction Baku oilfields...
 
David Glantz's books on the Eastern Front

I remember reading in one of David Glantz's books ,on the Eastern Front, that due to mud and other weather conditions an invasion of the USSR earlier than June was impossible.

On another note the Polish invaded Russia during the 1600's and they were semi successful. They started the campaign on June 24th 1610 and reached Moscow by August 1610, but they had a much shorter distance to travel than Germany only from Smolensk, which they were besieging at the time.

this might also be helpful
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Clz27nghIg
 
I remember reading in one of David Glantz's books ,on the Eastern Front, that due to mud and other weather conditions an invasion of the USSR earlier than June was impossible.

OTOH what hindered Germans isn't something that can't be realistically PODed away.

The problem is that in april Stalin secretly mobilised 800.000 men, something Germans had no clue about until they ran into them. This was so called second row of armies deployed around Smolensk.

Earlier Barbarossa doesn't remove this but will severly disrupt their obilisation and/or deployment. If we assume same troubles and taking into account Soviets were able to stop Germans only with their final "this is it folks, there's nothing left" row at the gates of Moscow removing one could spell disaster for SU.

Of course if Germans speed up their preparations same people will notice it and send same warnings and Stalin might react similarly so both sides do same things similar way only 2 months earlier.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by 1.36
The Yugoslavian campaign forced them to wait. Hitler delayed the invasion to deal with them and Greece.

I though that used different forces.

That one has been debated multiple times & it is clear there was negligable delay on that account.

I remember reading in one of David Glantz's books ,on the Eastern Front, that due to mud and other weather conditions an invasion of the USSR earlier than June was impossible.

Not impossible, but difficult. Aside from the unpaved roads of the region being mud several rivers were still in flood until after 15 June. Early to mid June were still fairly overcast and consistenly good weather for military air ops could not be predicted until late June. Not catching the Red Air force by suprise on the ground would be a serious disadvantage.

The start of Barbarossa was driven by the preparedness of first wave divisions, some of which didn't get their allocation of motor transport until 1st of June. If you can get these divisions their transport then they can go early.

There was a complete reoganization of division transport. Seigfried Knappe, a member of the 84th Inf Div wrote about that Div being stripped of its automotive transport for the new mechanized divisions being formed the previous winter & spring. As I understand it by June all the infantry divisions had little of the automotive transport that had been common in the first & second wave divisions for the 1940 campaigns.

Aside from the expanded mechanized forces the seperate transport units were expanded to help with the expected shortage of railroad transport in the east.

In any case the weather was the show stopper in May & June. Inconsistant flying weather alone made sucessfull operations problematic during June. After that we all know what the mud can do.
 
The problem is that in april Stalin secretly mobilised 800.000 men, something Germans had no clue about until they ran into them. This was so called second row of armies deployed around Smolensk.

Just part of the expansion that had been underway.

Since 1939 the conscription classes each year had been larger with more recruits called up each time.

The Reservists mobilized for the Finnish war, & the Polish, Baltic, and Moldavia occupations had not been entirely released. A portion of those had been retained in active service.

The conscrition classes that completed their two years training in the autum of 1940 & spring of 1941 were not released. The bilk of those men wer retained on active service.

...and a call up of individual reservists and reserve formations spun back up in latter 1940, steadily increasing to that 800,000 mark by June 1941.

Generally speaking the size of the 'active' Red Army about doubled between 1939 & mid 1941. The size of the reservist pool also was grossly increased from 1938 as well.
 
Just part of the expansion that had been underway.

Since 1939 the conscription classes each year had been larger with more recruits called up each time.

The Reservists mobilized for the Finnish war, & the Polish, Baltic, and Moldavia occupations had not been entirely released. A portion of those had been retained in active service.

The conscrition classes that completed their two years training in the autum of 1940 & spring of 1941 were not released. The bilk of those men wer retained on active service.

...and a call up of individual reservists and reserve formations spun back up in latter 1940, steadily increasing to that 800,000 mark by June 1941.

Generally speaking the size of the 'active' Red Army about doubled between 1939 & mid 1941. The size of the reservist pool also was grossly increased from 1938 as well.

The thing is that those best trained were deployed forward and wiped out in first massive encirclement. Germans had pretty good idea about these. The 800.000 mentioned was a response to warnings sent by intelligence and deployed further east, beyond where Germans expected them, and first indication of their existance was when Germans ran into them.

This is also the explanation of "It's safe to say war has been won" and "we counted on 100 divisions but so far encountered 320 of them" quotes. As I said, Germans had no clue about their existance and defeated what they believed was bulk of RA in few short weeks (which was also the best part of RA) but were surprised when they ran into new armies. These extra rows of armies were not so well trained and equiped and became increasingly less so as new formations were created, but in a desert thirsty man takes what help he can get.

To return to OP, this secret and invisible mobilisation slowed and attrited Germans just enough so they lacked that extra punch to come on top in the end. If germans start earlier it may not be there. Or it might be as Stalin would respons earlier but in same way to earlier but same German moves.
 
Martin Van Creveld analysied the idea that the Greek campaign delayed Barbarossa by counting the divisions invloved in both. All first wave divisions involved in both were in place for Barbarossa in time, something like 10 rear echelon divisions were not, but when the force is 160 divisions a mere handful of rear echelon divisions isn't a show-stopper.
 
The Germans waited for sound tactical reason's, even if the overall ideas bhind Barbarossa were insane.

Attacking in spring negates German advantages, meaning thy'd likely be stalled far further west than OTL.
 
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