WI - Doolittle Raid using catapults?

It is my understanding that the Doolittle raid brought about the Midway operation

If there was no Doolittle raid at all were the Japanese planning on attacking either Midway or the Aleutians anyway in June 1942? If not then could a Midway battle be delayed to late June or July? A delayed battle means that Saratoga is back in Pearl Harbor and Hornet's VT-8 gets it's Avengers.
Or
If Yamamoto coming balls to the walls to Midway then the Tokyo raid gets cancelled. If Doolittle's planes are still on Hornet then they are flown off at Midway to become part of the Island's air group.
 
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If there was no Doolittle raid at all were the Japanese planning on attacking either Midway or the Aleutians anyway in June 1942? If not then could a Midway battle be delayed to late June or July? A delayed battle means that Saratoga is back in Pearl Harbor and Hornet's VT-8 gets it's Avengers.
Or
If Yamamoto coming balls to the walls to Midway then the Tokyo raid gets cancelled. If Doolittle's planes are still on Hornet then they are flown off at Midway to become part of the Island's air group.

WASP and NORTH CAROLINA also departed Norfolk for the Pacific in early June 1942.
 
It is my understanding that the Doolittle raid brought about the Midway operation.

Yes and no. There had been a debate that spring over strategy. One school argued the FS operation, to seize Fiji & Samoa areas in the hope this would cause Australia & New Zealand to drop out & secure the south front. The other led by Yamamoto argued for striking closer to Japans main bases (Truk & the Home Islands) as more likely to defeat the remnant of the USN. There is the idea the April raid settled this in favor of the Midway operation, but I've not seen conclusive proof of this.

In any case the raid indirectly produced enough intel in May to see the Midway operation coming. Exactly how long it would have taken the USN sigint to break back into the JN25 is difficult to say. Until late April progress had been slow & the key not recovered. Other sigint methods were not productive in this case as the Japanese preparation in the Home Waters & Truk were much the same as preparations for departing for the S Pacific & a FS op. Had the FS operation been selected then a increase in sigint. shifting to the S Pac. would have been seen, as well as air & sub recon observing a increase in cargo and warships. Since the earliest a FS operation could have kicked off would have been July the JN25 might have been penetrated again by then, or maybe not.

As far as raids go, the Tokyo raid was just one in a series. The USN had been raiding Japanese Pacific bases and operations since january, December if you count the aborted raids of December. While the IJN had concealed some of these the March raid on the Japanese Army convoy to New Guinea could not be overlooked. In operational terms it was catastrophic as the dispersal of the convoy & weeks/months delay of cargo delivery set back New Guinea ops for a couple months. That raid has been near forgotten, but it was a major loss of face for the IJN. The USN had no intent of stopping there. Raids were a large component of the early stage of War Plan Orange. Had the orders for the B25 raid not come down the carriers would have been striking elsewhere, & pushing the IJN into attempting another decisive battle.
 
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