WI: Different Strategic Bombing Targets

kernals12

Banned
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#fdftoa

This report by the Secretary of War completed in September 1945 documents the effects of allied strategic bombing on Nazi Germany.

There are some interesting takeaways
1. The 1943 attacks on the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt resulted in large losses of US forces but
"there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."
2. The attacks on Germany's fuel supply was far more successful "These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September." and even the Nazis privately admitted the disaster this caused, on June 30, Albert Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The effects of this were made clear:
"Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation."
3. The decision not to attack Germany's electricity supply was a big missed opportunity
"The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results."

So what if the allies had chosen to go after Germany's fuel supplies at an earlier date and attacked the electricity grid instead of ball bearing factories?
 
I have always felt that POL (petrol [gasoline], oil, lubricants) should have been the key target, following by wrecking the rail system as much as possible...
 

Deleted member 1487

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#fdftoa

This report by the Secretary of War completed in September 1945 documents the effects of allied strategic bombing on Nazi Germany.

There are some interesting takeaways
1. The 1943 attacks on the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt resulted in large losses of US forces but
"there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production."
2. The attacks on Germany's fuel supply was far more successful "These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September." and even the Nazis privately admitted the disaster this caused, on June 30, Albert Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The effects of this were made clear:
"Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation."
3. The decision not to attack Germany's electricity supply was a big missed opportunity
"The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results."

So what if the allies had chosen to go after Germany's fuel supplies at an earlier date and attacked the electricity grid instead of ball bearing factories?

If they connect the war ends much sooner.
 

kernals12

Banned
The claims about attacks on electric plants are vindicated by the most famous of the few raids on German power plants, the dambuster raids on the Mohne and Edersee dams which did have a notable, if only temporary, impact on German arms production. And impact that could've lasted longer if the British had followed up with attacks while the dams were being rebuilt.
 

Deleted member 1487

The claims about attacks on electric plants are vindicated by the most famous of the few raids on German power plants, the dambuster raids on the Mohne and Edersee dams which did have a notable, if only temporary, impact on German arms production. And impact that could've lasted longer if the British had followed up with attacks while the dams were being rebuilt.
I certainly agree that it was about as pancea a target as you could get and like the USSBS think that they should have focused on that.
 
I certainly agree that it was about as pancea a target as you could get and like the USSBS think that they should have focused on that.
Yep.. I'm inclined to agree. I'd also focus on fuel production as well. (If the Germans realize the allies are systematically going after the power grid they may try and shift resources to distributed power generation, maybe a portion of of the resources used for UBoat engines and dynamos get allocated to powering critical industrial sites. A lack of fuel would complicate that.)

Edit to add. The Germans might also try to build small coal fired generating plants. So the historical campaign against the transport network would also need to happen IMHO (to prevent coal from being distributed.)

Even if the Germans manage to somehow shift to distributed generation I would expect there to be a massive impact on their war economy.
 
POL targets all the way.
Though, the US daylight bombing will not cut it until the introduction of proper escort.
 
POL targets all the way.
Though, the US daylight bombing will not cut it until the introduction of proper escort.
Even if the allies shut down allmost all German POL production, I suspect a Germany that could still mine and transport coal, make steel, chemicals, explosives etc and products derived from those materials would still be a tough opponent to defeat. Presumably once the Germans realized they were about to loose most of their POL production there would be a shift to producing and stockpiling lubricants and other similar products while they still could. I would also expect the Germans to shift to small scale synthetic fuel production which presumably would require an ongoing effort on the allied air forces to suppress and I doubt the allies could be completely successful at this. I suspect between stock piles and some on going low rate production the Germans would still manage to find fuel for tanks for an occasional counter offensive and similar uses.

I don't see the Germans being able to launch offensives without a large scale POL supply, but I could see them waging a long drawn out defensive campaign.
 

kernals12

Banned
Even if the allies shut down allmost all German POL production, I suspect a Germany that could still mine and transport coal, make steel, chemicals, explosives etc and products derived from those materials would still be a tough opponent to defeat. Presumably once the Germans realized they were about to loose most of their POL production there would be a shift to producing and stockpiling lubricants and other similar products while they still could. I would also expect the Germans to shift to small scale synthetic fuel production which presumably would require an ongoing effort on the allied air forces to suppress and I doubt the allies could be completely successful at this. I suspect between stock piles and some on going low rate production the Germans would still manage to find fuel for tanks for an occasional counter offensive and similar uses.

I don't see the Germans being able to launch offensives without a large scale POL supply, but I could see them waging a long drawn out defensive campaign.
Stockpiles of fuel and lubricants need lots of storage space and make good targets for RAF attack.

Also, trains won't last long without lubricants.
 
Stockpiles of fuel and lubricants need lots of storage space and make good targets for RAF attack.
I don't recall all the details but I do recall that the Germans had a certain amount of protected bulk under ground POL storage.

Granted stockpiling and protecting significant ammounts of fuels probably would likely have been a challenge but I could see the protected bulk storage of lubricants being much more feasible. Add what ever POL they get from dispersed small scale synthetic production to stockpiled lubricants and I suspect the Germans would have been able to keep at least some tanks and aircraft operational for urgent tasks.
 

kernals12

Banned
I don't recall all the details but I do recall that the Germans had a certain amount of protected bulk under ground POL storage.

Granted stockpiling and protecting significant ammounts of fuels probably would likely have been a challenge but I could see the protected bulk storage of lubricants being much more feasible. Add what ever POL they get from dispersed small scale synthetic production to stockpiled lubricants and I suspect the Germans would have been able to keep at least some tanks and aircraft operational for urgent tasks.
Synthetic fuel production can't be efficiently dispersed.
 
Stockpiles of fuel and lubricants need lots of storage space and make good targets for RAF attack.

Also, trains won't last long without lubricants.
Re the lubricants.. Yes I agree the Germans would need those and they would need to decide to start empahsising lubricant production and stockpiling at a suitable time.
 
Synthetic fuel production can't be efficiently dispersed.
Why not ? Presumably lab scale and pilot scale production could been scaled up and replicated if there was no alternative ?

Presumably there would be underground factory space made avalaible for this as well ?

Edit to add I can probably accept that there may have been critical bottle necks in high octane aviation gasoline but I'm thinking other fuel production would have been easier.
 
Even if the allies shut down allmost all German POL production, I suspect a Germany that could still mine and transport coal, make steel, chemicals, explosives etc and products derived from those materials would still be a tough opponent to defeat. Presumably once the Germans realized they were about to loose most of their POL production there would be a shift to producing and stockpiling lubricants and other similar products while they still could. I would also expect the Germans to shift to small scale synthetic fuel production which presumably would require an ongoing effort on the allied air forces to suppress and I doubt the allies could be completely successful at this. I suspect between stock piles and some on going low rate production the Germans would still manage to find fuel for tanks for an occasional counter offensive and similar uses.

I don't see the Germans being able to launch offensives without a large scale POL supply, but I could see them waging a long drawn out defensive campaign.

Having even smaller quantities of fuel vs. what was historically so means even less training for pilots, that means they get killed easier, while not being able to dent Allied war effort. Less fuel also means LW flies less combat sorties. Not good prospects when one is out-numbered already by 1942. The sudden drop in LW capability = Allied AFs can make ever more damage to the targets of their choosing (chemical factories, marshalling yards, you name it), thus the vicious circle expands. Less losses to the bombers means the Allied bomber force grows quicker than historically, another vicious cycle for Germany. Germany with Luftwaffe removed from equation is kinda the can that is opened at the top.
As for the stockpiles - once can stockiple what it has as a surplus, the POL was not on that list for Germany.
We can also recall that trucks, tanks and other AFVs are useless without fuel. An army without means of at least counter-attack (if not outright offensive) presents themsleves on a silver plate to the enemy that can concentrate at will and choose the area of attack.
 
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