WI: Different Russian opening moves WW I?

"However, there were several major caveats to the arrangement that persisted until 1912: [...] and reserved the right to in any case to retain a free hand in sending the bulk of its forces against either Germany or Austria-Hungary. St. Petersburg had contended with Vienna for Balkan advantage, and the Romanovs had scores to settle with the Habsburgs that dated to the Crimean War. Whatever, the interpretation of alliance obligations, Russian planners always remained uncertain whether Germany might turn east or west at the onset of a European war. For Russia, the difference was significant. It was plus or minus roughly thirteen German corps, or perhaps as many as six field armies."

From: HAMILTON R.F. and HERWIG H.H. eds., War Planning 1914, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 82-83.

So let's say Russia stuck with the pre-1912 arrangement and then witnesses how the Germans in 1914 deploy the bulk of their forces westward. Rather than upholding alliance commitments to attack Germany, the Romanovs get overjoyed at a chance to crush the Habsburgs. So Russia stays on the defensive against the Germans and focuses all its forces on Austria-Hungary to relieve Serbia. The Tenth Army stays as a defending forces while the First and Second Armies, earmarked for operations in East Prussia IOTL, go to Galicia. What happens? Would the Russians break out beyond Galicia with these additional forces before Germany can come to Austria-Hungary's aid? How is the Western Front affected?
 
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raharris1973

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Here's a first guess -

the First and Second Armies gain ground in Galicia in 1914 that the Russians will manage to hold, however, grinding down the Austrians and reducing their fortresses to the point that the Russians can pass the Carpathians is just not likely at all within the fall of 1914 (the Austrians did not lose Premsyzl or all of Galicia during 1914, and did do a counterattack).

Despite greater injury to Austria-Hungary, Germany will have time to send forces to backstop them before they are all gone.

The lack of an invasion of East Prussia may convince the Germans to keep 2 additional corps in the west. This won't enable victory on the Marne or the taking of Paris in the early months of the war, but could allow Germany to do better in the race to the sea, possibly severely weakening British and Belgian forces' long-term position.

That leaves early 1915 an interesting time, with France and Austria-Hungary more vulnerable. Long-term German prospects depend on them being able to thrash the Russians enough on Austrian territory by early spring to prevent Italy and Romania from vulturing against A-H with catastrophic effects. And these countries will be on the "edge of their seats" ready to intervene earlier.

If Italy and or Romania vulture in during 1914, the threat to Austria could be enough to make Germany shift forces so that it cannot improve its western front position at all over OTL, but I think the Germans can shift enough to prop up Austria without needing to cede any ground east of the 1917 Hindenburg line. Longer term, this probably shortens the Central Powers' effective lifespan, but it could go back to converge with OTL's equilibrium after the German troop transfers.
 
Here's a first guess -

the First and Second Armies gain ground in Galicia in 1914 that the Russians will manage to hold, however, grinding down the Austrians and reducing their fortresses to the point that the Russians can pass the Carpathians is just not likely at all within the fall of 1914 (the Austrians did not lose Premsyzl or all of Galicia during 1914, and did do a counterattack).

But we do have seven Russian field armies rather than five opposite four Austro-Hungarian field armies. That's a numerical advantage of nearly 2:1. Austria-Hungary did badly (not just in Galicia, but in Serbia too) and I figured they couldn't do much worse short of the Russians breaking the Carpathian shield. I'm interested in hearing why you think A-H would hold.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
I'm not sure exactly which plan your following (the Russians have plenty of them) but I'm guessing this is one of the varients of Alxseyev which are interesting.

Basically his concept was to ignore East Prussia with just a screen to check any possible advance out of there. The main Russian thrust would descend upon the Austrians. Given the closeness of the fight there, its pretty obvious that the Russians would be able to close the trap and encircle the Austrians. They might get some troops out in a breakthrough but that's about it.

This would open up two alternatives to the Russians- a drive towards Silesia or a drive to Vienna. The Russians would have a huge army for this- not only the Southern Armies used, the two northern armies that were beaten in East Prussia but also the 7th Army that was guarding the Romanian border (the Romanians aren't joining with the Austrian army in a Russian Pow camp)

There's really nothing left of the Austrian army for the Germans to save and they are going to have to defend Silesia. They probably will abandon East Prussia and pull back to the Vistula or the Oder to form a solid line. The Germans simply couldn't move enough forces into East Prussia to mount an attack on their own

Really don't think any of this is going to matter on the Western Front except that after the Russians force the withdrawal of enough forces that France and Britain are secure.

Really think that Italy and Romania will be pouncing on the Austrians to get a share of the booty while the gettings good. The War will probably end with a Russian victory by December

This is basically the plan the Russians adopt in World War II
 
I see several problems with this approach.
First, would the French still finance to the OTL levels and what would be the changes? Because I think that the French would probably not like the Russian focus on the Austro-Hungarians, when the Germans come marching in...

Second, the standart question, where would the troops be and how are they supplied. More troops are not always a good thing. Because if the Russians have a glut of troops they have to feed, what of the ammo...

Thierd, what would the Austro-Hungarian reaction to an even more unfavorable troop ratio be? Simply saying that all will be like OTL is Imo not that realisticaly.

Fourth, while the Conrad question is there, I do not belive he will simply hold on to the changes. Yes he was a less then stellar commander, but he should have enough experiance to do something if the Russians change their strategic disposition, or not.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
I see several problems with this approach.
First, would the French still finance to the OTL levels and what would be the changes? Because I think that the French would probably not like the Russian focus on the Austro-Hungarians, when the Germans come marching in...

Second, the standart question, where would the troops be and how are they supplied. More troops are not always a good thing. Because if the Russians have a glut of troops they have to feed, what of the ammo...

Thierd, what would the Austro-Hungarian reaction to an even more unfavorable troop ratio be? Simply saying that all will be like OTL is Imo not that realisticaly.

Fourth, while the Conrad question is there, I do not belive he will simply hold on to the changes. Yes he was a less then stellar commander, but he should have enough experiance to do something if the Russians change their strategic disposition, or not.


Perhaps the Russians keep it a secret and don't tell the French. On a different note, Joffre was actually sympathetic to the Silesia option but wanted the Russians to ignore the Austrians as well- a really bad idea but Joffre had lots of bad ideas

You certainly don't need to send both 1st and 2nd armies to the south- and in fact your probably right that supply problems would emerge soon enough

However, the Russians are initially thrown back by Conrad's attack and recover by sending the 9th army from Warsaw south as a reinforcement. Essentially, this plan is using the 2nd Army as the 9th is in OTL but sending it there earlier

Is it enough to change Conrad's decisions? Perhaps but perhaps not. One of Conrad's greatest failings is that he was an overly aggressive commander- the type that will walk into traps
 
How close were the French and Russian military in terms of cooperation? Did they have officers in each others country as observers?
I ask because I think the disposition of one or two armys would create a footprint. At least they would have to adjust stockpiles, infrastructure and staffwork. So the French probably will notice something.
But would that be enough? I rightly do not know.

The thing about Conrad and his failings is understood. But the initial stages of Galicia seemed to work. So what if the A-H leaders notice the Russian additional Army and simply hunker down? Could that happen and what would be the results?
It hardly could be that much worse, as even in OTL the Russians had to stopp for some time to reorganize.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
How close were the French and Russian military in terms of cooperation? Did they have officers in each others country as observers?
I ask because I think the disposition of one or two armys would create a footprint. At least they would have to adjust stockpiles, infrastructure and staffwork. So the French probably will notice something.
But would that be enough? I rightly do not know.

The thing about Conrad and his failings is understood. But the initial stages of Galicia seemed to work. So what if the A-H leaders notice the Russian additional Army and simply hunker down? Could that happen and what would be the results?
It hardly could be that much worse, as even in OTL the Russians had to stopp for some time to reorganize.


Cooperation is decent but not great between the two. The Russians keep a lot from the French and the British. French-Russian communications were largely between Zhilinsky (northern commander and the real architect of disaster) and Joffre. The Southern Armies kept to themselves

That the Russians were able to move the 9th army would argue that the logistics wouldn't be a problem and the French were clueless. The Russians are using the fortresses as supply depots so stockpiles are there
 
As I understand it, the 9th Army was forming up there (in August). But that was what Conrad wanted to deter. So in moving the 1st or 2nd Army there you change the whole balance Imo (as they formed from July on).

That these formations are more formed up then the 9th is a pro. For the Russians at least. But that will not be ignored by the CP.

Also what is Hindenburgs (of his predecessors) reaction in this? He would have better chances against the single Army. And then he could fall into the Russian back... at least if the Austrians manage to hold somewhat and bind the Russian attention. A long shot yes, but it could happen.
 
Interesting, opinions vary strongly. I think this sounds like a reasonable compromise:

- Russia goes into Galicia full bore and the Austro-Hungarian army does worse than IOTL, such as an earlier fall of Przemysl and Russia threatening to break through the Carpathians.
- Austria-Hungary goes on the defensive in Serbia to bolster the Galician front
- Romania and Italy see A-H struggling and decide to dogpile the Habsburgs, who collapse by late 1914 or early 1915 despite German reinforcements.
- With a much shorter front, the ability to receive supplies through A-H and more troops available to it the Russian Army does better against Germany. Germany therefore has to send more troops east.
- War is over by 1916.

Thoughts?
 
IDK about Italy, but Romania is unlikely to enter the war in 1914.

King Carol I (who was a Hohenzollern after all) wanted to join Germany!! OTL in 1914, but found the political class opposed to such an undertaking. Had he wanted it, he could theoretically have forced his will upon the main parties, but declined to do so, claiming he was 'a constitutional monarch'. That said, the main political parties weren't all in favor of joining in immediately - they feared the CPs might still win, or that they might be too strong to take on in the short term, or that, even absent those, the whole sacrifice might be in vain absent a clear commitment by the Entente regarding Romania's territorial ambitions.

Therefor, to get a Romanian entry, you would IMO have to tick all of the conditions below:

1. have Carol I die
2. have Ferdinand I feel secure enough on the throne
3. have appropriate weather for an attack across the Carpathians
4. have the CPs seem on the verge of collapse
5. obtain clear commitments by the Entente regarding at least Transilvania


1 - happened in October 1914
2 - will probably take AT LEAST a few months, if not more
3 - given 1&2, the earliest date would be March-April 1915
4 - with the situation in the west still in flux, nothing is certain; by the time things clearly stabilized, winter was already well on its way
5 - unlikely at this early stage, especially if it looks like they're winning
 
If I remember correctly, Conrad deployed his forces away from the frontier, then marched them to and beyond the frontier to attack, after all the marching were already worn out before actually any fighting would occur.

If the Austrians notice the extra deployments they could just remain on the defense from the get go, so could perform better than OTL.

The Germans could just take two corps from the 8th army and deploy in Silesia and support the Austrian flank.

As noted above the 2 German corps would remain in the west as the Russian attack wouldn't develop fast enough to make the German nervous (and its Austrian territory anyway).
 
IDK about Italy, but Romania is unlikely to enter the war in 1914.

King Carol I (who was a Hohenzollern after all) wanted to join Germany!! OTL in 1914, but found the political class opposed to such an undertaking. Had he wanted it, he could theoretically have forced his will upon the main parties, but declined to do so, claiming he was 'a constitutional monarch'. That said, the main political parties weren't all in favor of joining in immediately - they feared the CPs might still win, or that they might be too strong to take on in the short term, or that, even absent those, the whole sacrifice might be in vain absent a clear commitment by the Entente regarding Romania's territorial ambitions.

Therefor, to get a Romanian entry, you would IMO have to tick all of the conditions below:

1. have Carol I die
2. have Ferdinand I feel secure enough on the throne
3. have appropriate weather for an attack across the Carpathians
4. have the CPs seem on the verge of collapse
5. obtain clear commitments by the Entente regarding at least Transilvania


1 - happened in October 1914
2 - will probably take AT LEAST a few months, if not more
3 - given 1&2, the earliest date would be March-April 1915
4 - with the situation in the west still in flux, nothing is certain; by the time things clearly stabilized, winter was already well on its way
5 - unlikely at this early stage, especially if it looks like they're winning

Still, if Italy enters in September-October and Romania enters in March-April 1915, that's eight and seventeen months early respectively, which is compounded by a less weakened Serbia. I'd expect Austria-Hungary to collapse sooner.

If I remember correctly, Conrad deployed his forces away from the frontier, then marched them to and beyond the frontier to attack, after all the marching were already worn out before actually any fighting would occur.

If the Austrians notice the extra deployments they could just remain on the defense from the get go, so could perform better than OTL.

The Germans could just take two corps from the 8th army and deploy in Silesia and support the Austrian flank.

As noted above the 2 German corps would remain in the west as the Russian attack wouldn't develop fast enough to make the German nervous (and its Austrian territory anyway).

Dunno, I don't think highly of Conrad's generalship. He's such an offensive commander that he's liable to let himself be lured into a trap. OTOH, not all of Russia's generals were the brightest of bulbs either :rolleyes:.
 
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I don't see Italy entering the war until at least after the death of Foreign Minister San Giuliano on October 16th, 1914, regardless of the situation on the Eastern Front, as he strongly favoured the policy of neutrality, and it was only after his death & replacement by Sonnino. Even then, Italy would not have entered the war without detailed assurances from the Entente of territorial gains after the war, the negotiations for which would have taken time. Unless something crazy like the Russians in Budapest happens, I have a hard time seeing Italy entering the war before January at the earliest.

More generally, I don't think a Russian concentration on Austria-Hungary is necessarily decisive, for a variety of reasons:

1. A basic lesson of the war was that an increase in attack strength did not automatically mean improved results. One would need to figure out where exactly two additional armies would be deployed, including the logistics of assembling and transporting them - the Russians were notoriously incapable of using their railways efficiently, and trying to deploy two more armies along the Galician frontier could easily lead to chaos.

2. The Russians did not take full advantage of the opportunities that did exist in Galicia in the opening weeks - Ruszki of 3rd Army in particular was notorious for moving very slowly, regardless of how often Ivanov ordered him to advance faster. Adding additional Russian forces does nothing to solve the leadership problems in the Russian army.

3. Rain and poor roads also impeded the Russian advance after the initial victories in August and early September, and by late September these were the only factors limiting the pace of the Russian advance - the defeated Austro-Hungarians were retreating faster than the Russians could pursue. Adding two more Russian armies does nothing to solve these problems.

4. I just don't see the Russians taking Przemysl by a coup-de-main in 1914. The biggest factor prolonging the siege of the fortress was that the mud around it greatly slowed the deployment of heavy artillery, again something that greater forces does not solve. The Russians only managed to capture Przemsyl by starving the Austro-Hungarians into surrender, something that takes time.

Beyond this, there is the issue of the German response. If Hindenburg/Ludendorff end up commanding 8th Army, I would expect an aggressive offensive by the beginning of September, and the idea of a Russian 'screening' force (even if it is a full army) containing 8th Army for any length of time is highly improbable. By late September an advance of 8th Army towards Warsaw would almost certainly necessitate the redeployment of Russian forces in Galicia back north - you could end up with the Russian equivalent of the experience of Austria-Hungary's B Staffel, shuttling back and forth between two fronts without decisively impacting either.

Alternatively, if there is less of a risk to East Prussia in September, Falkenhayn would likely keep at least one or more corps on the Western Front in October instead of sending them east. This might have provided the vital margin at 1st Ypres - twice the Germans broke through the British lines, only for the attack to fail due to a lack of reserves to follow up the lead forces. If the Germans achieve a more sustained breakthrough, not only might the strategic situation worsen for the Entente (the fall of Ypres would have unhinged the Franco-Belgian along the canal to the north), but the BEF could suffer even greater losses to the point that it is rendered combat ineffective, to say nothing of killing more of the long-service personnel essential to the later expansion of the BEF.
 
I don't see Italy entering the war until at least after the death of Foreign Minister San Giuliano on October 16th, 1914, regardless of the situation on the Eastern Front, as he strongly favoured the policy of neutrality, and it was only after his death & replacement by Sonnino. Even then, Italy would not have entered the war without detailed assurances from the Entente of territorial gains after the war, the negotiations for which would have taken time. Unless something crazy like the Russians in Budapest happens, I have a hard time seeing Italy entering the war before January at the earliest.

More generally, I don't think a Russian concentration on Austria-Hungary is necessarily decisive, for a variety of reasons:

1. A basic lesson of the war was that an increase in attack strength did not automatically mean improved results. One would need to figure out where exactly two additional armies would be deployed, including the logistics of assembling and transporting them - the Russians were notoriously incapable of using their railways efficiently, and trying to deploy two more armies along the Galician frontier could easily lead to chaos.

2. The Russians did not take full advantage of the opportunities that did exist in Galicia in the opening weeks - Ruszki of 3rd Army in particular was notorious for moving very slowly, regardless of how often Ivanov ordered him to advance faster. Adding additional Russian forces does nothing to solve the leadership problems in the Russian army.

3. Rain and poor roads also impeded the Russian advance after the initial victories in August and early September, and by late September these were the only factors limiting the pace of the Russian advance - the defeated Austro-Hungarians were retreating faster than the Russians could pursue. Adding two more Russian armies does nothing to solve these problems.

4. I just don't see the Russians taking Przemysl by a coup-de-main in 1914. The biggest factor prolonging the siege of the fortress was that the mud around it greatly slowed the deployment of heavy artillery, again something that greater forces does not solve. The Russians only managed to capture Przemsyl by starving the Austro-Hungarians into surrender, something that takes time.

Beyond this, there is the issue of the German response. If Hindenburg/Ludendorff end up commanding 8th Army, I would expect an aggressive offensive by the beginning of September, and the idea of a Russian 'screening' force (even if it is a full army) containing 8th Army for any length of time is highly improbable. By late September an advance of 8th Army towards Warsaw would almost certainly necessitate the redeployment of Russian forces in Galicia back north - you could end up with the Russian equivalent of the experience of Austria-Hungary's B Staffel, shuttling back and forth between two fronts without decisively impacting either.

Alternatively, if there is less of a risk to East Prussia in September, Falkenhayn would likely keep at least one or more corps on the Western Front in October instead of sending them east. This might have provided the vital margin at 1st Ypres - twice the Germans broke through the British lines, only for the attack to fail due to a lack of reserves to follow up the lead forces. If the Germans achieve a more sustained breakthrough, not only might the strategic situation worsen for the Entente (the fall of Ypres would have unhinged the Franco-Belgian along the canal to the north), but the BEF could suffer even greater losses to the point that it is rendered combat ineffective, to say nothing of killing more of the long-service personnel essential to the later expansion of the BEF.

As far as San Giuliano goes, can't they just sack him? As for the rest: so you're saying a Russian concentration on Austria-Hungary would't be decisive? Question: by how much, exactly, could the Russians do better with two additional armies?
 
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