WI: different commander of U-waffe

Was Dönitz bad for U-waffe?

For all the (justifiable) grief Göring gets, I don't see Donitz taking nearly as much of a beating for his mistakes. His insistence on regular U-boat reports opened them up to detection & attack, as well as aiding in breaking KM Enigma. His resistance to the Type XXI delayed it easily a year.

So, can Dönitz have been replaced by someone else? If so, when? 1939? Earlier? If he is replaced, how much better can the U-waffe do? I don't expect a 1000-boat fleet in '40,:rolleyes: but *Type XXIs in '41 seem reasonable. (I'm not sure the Walther boats are ever reasonable.:eek:) Does this also improve the torpedoes sooner? Does it force a reduction in shipping to India, & a resulting greater Indian sympathy for Japan?

And, just to be fair to the WAllies, does this drive British changes in approach? Does it, frex, lead to Hampdens over Biscay, or out of Iceland & Newfoundland, in '40?:cool::cool: Does it delay (or butterfly away) ASV for Bomber Command? (Even Hampdens with ASV wouldn't be a bad call...) Does it force a change to Bomber Command's strategy of attacking cities, in favor of rail &/or river attack? Does it force Winston to abandon his dream of an Italian invasion?

No, I don't expect it can win the war for Germany.:rolleyes: I do wonder what the different outcome looks like--& if it doesn't, counterintuitively, lead to an earlier Allied victory...
 
Was Dönitz bad for U-waffe?

For all the (justifiable) grief Göring gets, I don't see Donitz taking nearly as much of a beating for his mistakes. His insistence on regular U-boat reports opened them up to detection & attack, as well as aiding in breaking KM Enigma. His resistance to the Type XXI delayed it easily a year.

So, can Dönitz have been replaced by someone else? If so, when? 1939? Earlier? If he is replaced, how much better can the U-waffe do? I don't expect a 1000-boat fleet in '40,:rolleyes: but *Type XXIs in '41 seem reasonable. (I'm not sure the Walther boats are ever reasonable.:eek:) Does this also improve the torpedoes sooner? Does it force a reduction in shipping to India, & a resulting greater Indian sympathy for Japan?

And, just to be fair to the WAllies, does this drive British changes in approach? Does it, frex, lead to Hampdens over Biscay, or out of Iceland & Newfoundland, in '40?:cool::cool: Does it delay (or butterfly away) ASV for Bomber Command? (Even Hampdens with ASV wouldn't be a bad call...) Does it force a change to Bomber Command's strategy of attacking cities, in favor of rail &/or river attack? Does it force Winston to abandon his dream of an Italian invasion?

No, I don't expect it can win the war for Germany.:rolleyes: I do wonder what the different outcome looks like--& if it doesn't, counterintuitively, lead to an earlier Allied victory...

I really cant see the type XXI being available in 1941. You're shaving 4 years of wartime development, what are the drivers?

Also, oddly, type XXI's in 1941 would sink LESS shipping, as they are far less suitable for the surface wolf-pack tactics that were so deadly.

Whatever they do, any big change in U-boar production isn't politically possible until 1938, when the Anglo-German naval treaty was abrogated, and in any case the first 18 months production is still highly restricted by available resources.
 
Who by? Look to his flotilla commanders as the most likely to inherit the mantle, and see if any names pop out. http://www.uboat.net/flotillas/ seems a reasonable place to start.

Flot.1 "Weddigen" in the period of interest was commanded by Hanz-Gunter Looff, Hans Eckermann and Hans Cohausz, not names that ring any great recognition.

Flot.2 "Salzwedel" at Lorient was commanded by Werner Hartmann, who was in charge at the first attempt to command a wolf pack from a sea going boat, has the experience and time in rank. A possible.

Flot.3 "Lohs" at La Rochelle had Hans Rudolf Rosing, liaison with the Italians and at one point Doenitz' administrative deputy for the Atlantic boats, a successful commander on a very successful boat, and more likely.

Flot.6 was led by Georg-Wilhelm Schulz, a peacetime merchant seaman, a noted trainer of effective men, and who did go on to staff time. Not likely much of a nazi, though.

I'm skipping flotillas because there are many cases of commanders simply being rotated from one to the other- by this point Eckermann has turned up four times and Rosing three.

Next possible candidate is Jurgen Osten, who commanded the ninth flotilla at Brest for a while, service in the surface fleet followed by combat followed by flotilla command and staff time followed by back to sea again and some of the longest patrols and most demanding seamanship of the war, but not an obvious star.

Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock, in the eleventh at Bergen, was the chap the skipper in "Das Boot" is based on. Not a likely candidate for high command, then.


So basically it's likely to be Rosing or Hartmann, very much Donitz's men and unlikely to do much differently- but there is an outside possibility needing an interesting butterfly.

There was one officer who was recalled to active duty, after service in the first world war- the all time ace of aces, Lothar von Arnauld.

He was killed in a plane crash on his way to take up an appointment as Donitz' deputy for western France, the job Rosing later got.

If he fails to die, then things get interesting, because he was not likely to be in personal sympathy at all with the Nazi regime, had in fact retired in 1932 and moved to Turkey, and had to be fetched back.

The overwhelming majority of his sinkings were made in accordance with prewar prize rules, surface and inspect, let the crew abandon and then fire scuttling charges; not what Donitz was preaching at the time. His methods would have been very different.
 
The trouble is that Doenitz was very popular guy with his men. Many of the mistakes made were actually not his. I think he suspected Enigma, but was repeatedly assured it was unbreakable. Torpedoes were also not his mistake. He wanted to have 300 boats, but simply could not get to the resources needed to build them. By the time it was obvious that the U-waffe was the answer to German naval problems, it was too late.
 
According to his memoirs, he did, but according to his memoirs he wasn't a committed Nazi, so take them with an approximately dehydrated-Atlantic sized grain of salt.

It was largely on his initiative that the switch to four rotors was made, most of the sources agree, but for how many of them is he the primary?
 

Tovarich

Banned
Was Dönitz bad for U-waffe?.......His insistence on regular U-boat reports opened them up to detection & attack, as well as aiding in breaking KM Enigma......
I confess upfront to knowing damnall about naval war strategy; but how could he maintain any kind of strategy without knowing where his boats were and what they'd done recently?

I suppose the 'strategy' may have been initially "go out like you're individual pirates", but surely that needed to change to something co-ordinated once escorted convoys came into use?
 
Astrodragon said:
I really cant see the type XXI being available in 1941. You're shaving 4 years of wartime development, what are the drivers?
I won't say "likely", only "possible"--& it was Dönitz who was the leading cause of it taking so long.

Drivers? I'd say increased air patrols over Biscay, for a start.

Thing is, it isn't exactly the OTL *Type XXI I'm (necessarily) suggesting, only an analog, with better udw speed & endurance.
Astrodragon said:
type XXI's in 1941 would sink LESS shipping, as they are far less suitable for the surface wolf-pack tactics that were so deadly.
I find that pretty hard to believe. Even allowing they aren't the same as OTL, higher udw speed & endurance, against OTL corvettes, would seem to lead to higher sinkings. (Against singletons, maybe not, tho I'd suspect those sinkings would be a lot higher--& it was singletons, not convoys, that were the bulk of sinkings for the duration.)
Astrodragon said:
Whatever they do, any big change in U-boar production isn't politically possible until 1938, when the Anglo-German naval treaty was abrogated, and in any case the first 18 months production is still highly restricted by available resources.
I'll accept that, & take as given no change (or no big change) in numbers until after WW2 starts. I'm more interested in the in-war impact.
CarribeanViking said:
Yes, that's the question.:p (I really don't have a candidate in mind.)
CarribeanViking said:
Hans Rudolf Rosing
I like this one...:cool:
CarribeanViking said:
very much Donitz's men and unlikely to do much differently
As noted, IMO it doesn't take too much to have a big impact on U-waffe's effectiveness, especially later in the war. Earlier adoption of technological improvements, like snorkels or more battery capacity, or bigger boats, would help; Dönitz was slow on both. Better dispositions would be good, such as fewer (no?) boats in the Med, or more off Texas & Louisiana; Dönitz essentially bungled both. (I know, Hitler wanted Med boats, & Norway ones, too; was it possible to resist more strongly? Or was that too much at risk of being shot?:eek:)
CarribeanViking said:
Lothar von Arnauld
That makes things very interesting.:cool: I'd tend to oppose him, because the situation has changed a lot since WW1 (not least Britain's response to U-boats {i.e., report on sighting, making all merchantmen de facto naval auxiliaries, not protected by the prize rules}, plus the widespread use of A/S a/c), but...
 
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