WI: Delayed D Day and Earlier A Bomb

I'm just skimming the posts here, but one point I'm surprised hasn't been raised: Any targeting plans regarding Germany would have been considerably shaped by the more robust aerial defenses the Reich still possessed at the end of 1944 - defenses much more robust than those of Japan in August 1945 (which were negligible at best, with the remaining planes, fuel and pilots being hoarded for use against OLYMPIC and CORONET).

In fact, there wasn't much planning at all with regards to targets in Germany. In part this was because of the prospect that the Bomb would not be ready in time anyway, but also because of concerns over the dangers that a bomber would be shot down, and the risk the Germans might recover it intact. The first targeting discussion, in early 1943 (involving a group composed of Gen. Groves, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Admiral William Purnell, and Major General Wilhelm Styer) actually proposed Truk Lagoon, which at that point was the main base for the IJN Combined Fleet:

The point of use of the first bomb was discussed and the general view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokio but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.

More directly interesting is a postwar interview with Leslie Groves, where he digs into the dangers of German aerial defenses:

REPORTER: General Groves, could we go back for a minute. You mentioned in your book [Now it Can Be Told] that just before the Yalta Conference that President Roosevelt said if we had bombs before the European war was over he would like to drop them on Germany.3 Would you discuss this?

GROVES: At the conference that Secretary Stimson and myself had with President Roosevelt shortly before his departure, I believe it was December 30th or 31st of 1944, President Roosevelt was quite disturbed over the Battle of the Bulge and he asked me at that time whether I could bomb Germany as well as Japan. The plan had always been to bomb Japan because we thought the war in Germany was pretty apt to be over in the first place and in the second place the Japanese building construction was much more easily damaged by a bomb of this character than that in Germany. I urged President Roosevelt that it would be very difficult for various reasons.

The main one was that the Germans had quite strong aerial defense. They made a practice, as every nation does, that when a new plane came into the combat area, that they would run any risk that they could to bring such a plane down so that they could examine it and see what new ideas had come in so that they could make improvements and also would know the characteristics of the plane so that they could prepare a better defense against it. We had no B-29’s in Europe. If we had sent over a small squadron or group as we did against Japan of this type, everyone of them would have been brought down on the first trip to Germany. If they hadn’t been, it would have been through no lack of effort on the part of the Germans.

The alternative would be to bring a large number of B-29’s over to to England and that would have been a major logistical task and the other possibility would have been to have used a British plane which would not have been a bit pleasing to General Arnold and also would have created a great many difficulties for our general operation because then it would be an Allied operation with the United States furnishing the bombs and everything connected with it but using a British plane and a British crew to actually drop the bomb and it would have raised a tremendous number of difficulties.

And difficulties like that — while you say you should be able to handle that — you can but in a project of this character there are so many little things, each one of them key, that you can’t afford to throw any more sand into the wheels that you can help.

The bombing of Germany with atomic bombs was, I would say, never seriously considered to the extent of making definite plans but on this occasion I told the President, Mr. Roosevelt, why it would be very unfortunate from my standpoint, I added that of course if the President — if the war demanded it and the President so desired, we would bomb Germany and I was so certain personally that the war in Europe would be over before we would be ready that you might say I didn’t give it too much consideration.

Working from this discussion, I think that if Groves had been ordered to bomb Germany at the end of 1944, what you would need to do would be this:

1) Proceed to deploy a sizable number of squadrons equipped with B-29s to England in 1944 as soon as they became available (which would of course impinge on deployments to Guam), and work them into bombing raids over a variety of German targets during daylight;

2) Efforts would be escalated to wear down Luftwaffe fighter defenses and radar sites in western Germany;

3) The target would be a a) city still substantially intact (in order to assess effectiveness of the bomb, and also to gain maximum value from it), b) within fighter escort range, and c) no deeper into German aerial defenses than necessary.

To me, the most obvious fits would be one of the German coastal cities on the North Sea or Kiel canal. Of course, most were pretty well bombed conventionally by that point. RAF and USAAF commanders might be ordered to ease up on the primary city in the months before the attack, perhaps.

4) On the raid itself, maximize protection of the bomber with heavy fighter attacks to tie up Luftwaffe assets; heavy bombing raids on other cities; and accompany the bomber itself with a sizable force of other B-29's and fighter escort.

Of course, employing a large escort means you put other planes and crews at risk for damage from the blast. There is just no getting around the fact that dropping a bomb on Germany would have been a more difficult task than doing it over Japan.
 
One other consideration: Once you use it on Germany, the Japanese will know you have it, too.

Which means they will likely alter their aerial defensive planning accordingly, for starters. They'll know they're next.
 
The allies would have not used the a bomb on Germany because of its weak state. And the Soviet probably would have liberated most of Germany
 
I'm just skimming the posts here, but one point I'm surprised hasn't been raised: Any targeting plans regarding Germany would have been considerably shaped by the more robust aerial defenses the Reich still possessed at the end of 1944 - defenses much more robust than those of Japan in August 1945 (which were negligible at best, with the remaining planes, fuel and pilots being hoarded for use against OLYMPIC and CORONET).

In fact, there wasn't much planning at all with regards to targets in Germany. In part this was because of the prospect that the Bomb would not be ready in time anyway, but also because of concerns over the dangers that a bomber would be shot down, and the risk the Germans might recover it intact. The first targeting discussion, in early 1943 (involving a group composed of Gen. Groves, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, Admiral William Purnell, and Major General Wilhelm Styer) actually proposed Truk Lagoon, which at that point was the main base for the IJN Combined Fleet:



More directly interesting is a postwar interview with Leslie Groves, where he digs into the dangers of German aerial defenses:



Working from this discussion, I think that if Groves had been ordered to bomb Germany at the end of 1944, what you would need to do would be this:

1) Proceed to deploy a sizable number of squadrons equipped with B-29s to England in 1944 as soon as they became available (which would of course impinge on deployments to Guam), and work them into bombing raids over a variety of German targets during daylight;

2) Efforts would be escalated to wear down Luftwaffe fighter defenses and radar sites in western Germany;

3) The target would be a a) city still substantially intact (in order to assess effectiveness of the bomb, and also to gain maximum value from it), b) within fighter escort range, and c) no deeper into German aerial defenses than necessary.

To me, the most obvious fits would be one of the German coastal cities on the North Sea or Kiel canal. Of course, most were pretty well bombed conventionally by that point. RAF and USAAF commanders might be ordered to ease up on the primary city in the months before the attack, perhaps.

4) On the raid itself, maximize protection of the bomber with heavy fighter attacks to tie up Luftwaffe assets; heavy bombing raids on other cities; and accompany the bomber itself with a sizable force of other B-29's and fighter escort.

Of course, employing a large escort means you put other planes and crews at risk for damage from the blast. There is just no getting around the fact that dropping a bomb on Germany would have been a more difficult task than doing it over Japan.
Basically a mission to drop an atomic bomb on a German City would require a buildup and air campaign similar to Operation Overlord. You have to build the airfields, deploy B-29 GROUPS and be prepared to support them.

As for the actual bombing mission I can only think of two cities that OTL were not heavily bombed until 1945: Dresden and Chemintz.

I could see a series of diversionary raids as part this timeline's mission to draw off German fighters. But at the end TTL's version of "Enola Gay" would have to make the actual bomb run alone. The fighter escorts could sit in a holding area until the B-29s clear the target area.
 
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There is another option:

Germany is still off the target list for now. If a bomb is tested and ready in January 1945 then:

1. Cancel Iwo Jima/Okinawa invasions. Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Feb.1945
 
One other consideration: Once you use it on Germany, the Japanese will know you have it, too.

Which means they will likely alter their aerial defensive planning accordingly, for starters. They'll know they're next.

The only plan is to stop every B-29 overflight.

They can't do that.
 
I'm just skimming the posts here, but one point I'm surprised hasn't been raised:

Except it was raised, by me...

Also the prior useage of the B-29 against Germany in the conventional role for reasons spelled out by LeMay when chatted with Roosevelt about it...



So we'd probably see B-29s start getting used against Germany in the summer of ITTLs 1944.

One other consideration: Once you use it on Germany, the Japanese will know you have it, too.

Which means they will likely alter their aerial defensive planning accordingly, for starters. They'll know they're next.

Like what? By mid-'45, the Home Islands Air Force was completely in tatters and the survivors were being being preserved with the last drops of aviation fuel for kamikaze missions against the American invasion fleet. If they actually attempt to intercept atomic bombers, then they'll have to try and intercept every heavy bomber in the skies over Japan and their going to run out of fuel long before they can manage that.
 
Basically a mission to drop an atomic bomb on a German City would require a buildup and air campaign similar to Operation Overlord. You have to build the airfields, deploy B-29 GROUPS and be prepared to support them.
B-29s were not B-36, that did require new tarmac where they were based.

Upthread, I posted a pic of a YB-29 landed in England in 1944.
They didn't have to redo much when they based B-29s from 1950-1958 as the B.1 Washington
0747306.jpg
 
Basically a mission to drop an atomic bomb on a German City would require a buildup and air campaign similar to Operation Overlord. You have to build the airfields, deploy B-29 GROUPS and be prepared to support them.

As for the actual bombing mission I can only think of two cities that OTL were not heavily bombed until 1945: Dresden and Chemintz.

I could see a series of diversionary raids as part this timeline's mission to draw off German fighters. But at the end TTL's version of "Enola Gay" would have to make the actual bomb run alone. The fighter escorts could sit in a holding area until the B-29s clear the target area.

Well, the obvious objection to Dresden and Chemnitz is that they're very, very deep in Germany. A lot of layers of German air defenses to get through. Mustangs could reach that far with drop tanks, but it would be at the outer limits of their combat radius. I'm not saying it's impossible that they would end up the prime targets, but I think those factors would weigh against them. And there would be another factor, too: they'd be closer to Soviet lines than Allied lines in December 1944, leaving a greater chance that a captured bomb might fall into their hands, too.

There are some other mid-sized cities that hadn't been hit hard yet: Regensburg, Bamberg, Luneburg, Marburg....none of them had very high strategic value, though, and most are deep inside Germany, too.

It's hard to say, We have so little to go on. Allied planners never went very far down that road. I think they'd be reluctant to go very deep into Germany, based on what Groves said; but it's hard to say. I think they'd be risk averse. It would have been a more difficult decision than we faced with Japan.

One question is, were the Battle of the Bulge (or an operation similar to it) to unfold around the same time, how that would affect the decision. If you hit a key transport hub around the Ruhr, that could really damage logistics for the German offensive; but at the same time, the bulk of Luftwaffe assets are going to be concentrated around there, too. If only the Allies had had a ballistic missile to use...
 
Except it was raised, by me...

Ooops. Sorry. Like I said, I skimmed.

Like what? By mid-'45, the Home Islands Air Force was completely in tatters and the survivors were being being preserved with the last drops of aviation fuel for kamikaze missions against the American invasion fleet. If they actually attempt to intercept atomic bombers, then they'll have to try and intercept every heavy bomber in the skies over Japan and their going to run out of fuel long before they can manage that.

It's an interesting question, and that's why I didn't try to spell out an answer. It's true that the Japanese have pretty limited options, but that doesn't mean they have *no* options...

Let's posit that the U.S. nukes some German port city in December 1944.

At this point, the Philippines are past salvaging; the IJN is toast, Luzon is about to get invaded, and the IJA Air Force isn't in much better shape. They know Formosa and Okinawa are probably next. The U.S. has already begun aerial bombing of Japan (though I assume on a reduced basis, because of the B-29 deployments to England), so they know that any B-29 over their islands could be carrying a city buster now.

How do they react to that? I'm not sure, honestly. Does it drive them to seek a peace deal sooner?

One possibility is that they might pull back more air assets to Japan and devote more resources to air defenses. It might not make much difference, but they might figure they could get lucky. They could probably figure out that lone B-29's, or groups of 2 or 3 might be more likely to be atomic missions, and they might go after those more vigorously. Also: It might encourage a more serious Japanese attack on US airbases in the Marianas, since that is where any nuclear attack would come from. Long odds for that, but they might get lucky and do enough damage to cause some significant delays in air operations there.

The other question is how the U.S. would change its own plans. It no longer has that element of surprise, and we would have to speculate about how that might change their own tactics for the atomic bombings.

Here's another question: There's pretty good odds a nuke doesn't force Hitler to surrender, right? And a coup is nearly impossible, after the reaction to the July 20 attempt.Germany fighting on for another four months or so might encourage the hardline elements to argue that suffering a couple atomic bombings isn't fatal per se; the Germans lost because they had land frontiers to defend.
 
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There is another option:

Germany is still off the target list for now. If a bomb is tested and ready in January 1945 then:

1. Cancel Iwo Jima/Okinawa invasions. Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Feb.1945

I think there'd be tremendous pressure to go forward with Okinawa. It was seen as essential for almost any strategy to defeat Japan, be that invasion, or bomb-blockade.

Perhaps they drop the a-bombs first, and see how Japan responds. If there's no surrender, Okinawa goes forward.

(Here's a question: When fighting bogs down in southern Okinawa, would the U.S. be tempted to drop a bomb in the heart of the main Japanese defense network?)
 
I think there'd be tremendous pressure to go forward with Okinawa. It was seen as essential for almost any strategy to defeat Japan, be that invasion, or bomb-blockade.

Perhaps they drop the a-bombs first, and see how Japan responds. If there's no surrender, Okinawa goes forward.

(Here's a question: When fighting bogs down in southern Okinawa, would the U.S. be tempted to drop a bomb in the heart of the main Japanese defense network?)

Invading Okinawa if the bomb fails to get the Japanese to surrender is an option.

Iwo Jima was supposed to be a short but bloody campaign when it was planned. What if the Iwo Jima assault still goes in February maybe at the beginning of the month? The reason being that it is considered too much of a threat to the upcoming atomic bomb mission and the belief that the island can be secured in a week? Once Iwo Jima is secured then the Japanese are nuked in March? Perhaps Iwo Jima is deemed crucial enough that the Marines get as much pre-invasion bombardment that they want?

Would the US wait till after Iwo Jima is secured or at least secured enough that aircraft can use it's airfields?
 
Would the Americans considering dropping one on Iwo Jima if the campaign goes sideways as per OTL? Frying an entire Japanese army division in one shot would potentially be a very effective demonstration.
 
Would the Americans considering dropping one on Iwo Jima if the campaign goes sideways as per OTL? Frying an entire Japanese army division in one shot would potentially be a very effective demonstration.

Iwo Jima is just too small - less than 3km in diameter - impossible to assure the safety of US troops on the island.

Okinawa, however, is a lot bigger - IJA 32nd Army held about the bottom 10 miles or so of the island.

I doubt Buckner and the US ground commanders would support using the Bomb there - not just because of pride or service interests, but because the risk to US troops would still be too high - and the ultimate outcome not in doubt.
 
I would assume that in event of dropping an atomic bomb in Iwo Jima, the Americans would evacuate the island before dropping the bomb.
 
If the United States nukes Japan (and they surrender) first what is Stalin's reaction?
Would he say the west sacrificed Russian lives or would he simply push his Generals to grab as much of Germany?
 
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