WI: De Gaulle's Tripartite NATO agreed

[RLBH]

In 1959, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed a tripartite directorship of NATO, under which the USA, UK and France would jointly direct strategy, control nuclear weapons, and exercise command of NATO forces. Of course, this was mostly aimed at giving France a seat at the 'top table' of the Western alliance. US President Eisenhower flatly rejected the proposal, effectively confirming de Gaulle's belief that NATO undermined French autonomy and institutionalised French inferiority to the United States and United Kingdom. That led France down the path of leaving NATO's joint command structure in 1966.

What if de Gaulle's proposal had been adopted, and France had been given equal footing with the USA and UK in the leadership of NATO?

 

[B-29_Bomber]

The problem is that in 1959 the 5th French Republic was inferior to the United States(indeed, so was Britain).

De Gaulle was living in Nostalgia-Land and had been since July 1940.

 

[RLBH]

The problem is that in 1959 the 5th French Republic was inferior to the United States(indeed, so was Britain).

True enough - but France and the United Kingdom weren't miles apart, both were (and are) permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. One can see how the UK getting a seat at the (admittedly American-dominated) top table whilst France didn't was taken as a direct snub.

 

[B-29_Bomber]

True enough - but France and the United Kingdom weren't miles apart, both were (and are) permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. One can see how the UK getting a seat at the (admittedly American-dominated) top table whilst France didn't was taken as a direct snub.

Yeah, but the UNSC was, for Britain, mostly because they were, at the time, still a major world power, with the biggest world spanning empire. By the time the Empire fell apart the UNSC was already set in stone and in the USA's favor(it got its friend on the Council).

Whereas France? We were throwing them a bone, likewise with the occupation zone in West Germany.

 

[Matteo]

In 1959, French President Charles de Gaulle proposed a tripartite directorship of NATO, under which the USA, UK and France would jointly direct strategy, control nuclear weapons, and exercise command of NATO forces. Of course, this was mostly aimed at giving France a seat at the 'top table' of the Western alliance. US President Eisenhower flatly rejected the proposal, effectively confirming de Gaulle's belief that NATO undermined French autonomy and institutionalised French inferiority to the United States and United Kingdom. That led France down the path of leaving NATO's joint command structure in 1966.

What if de Gaulle's proposal had been adopted, and France had been given equal footing with the USA and UK in the leadership of NATO?

This was nothing more than a token proposal.

It was just not acceptable in a world of realpolitics when you have such a superpower as the US by 1959 and France or the UK. One makes such a kind of proposal in order to have it rejected, so that one can say : "they did not accept my proposal so I quit".

It is quite the same as asking by 1959 the US to accept to have the dollar run by the IMF since it was then the world reserve currency. You know the answer that any country in the same situation as the US would have made : nothing else but the same answer "the dollar is our money but it is your problem."

It's quite the same as asking : what if you asked Bill Gates to give to you half his belongings because you'd like to be in the top 10 of the Fortune-100 richest and BG accepted ?

 

[Alcsentre Calanice]

Yeah, but the UNSC was, for Britain, mostly because they were, at the time, still a major world power, with the biggest world spanning empire. By the time the Empire fell apart the UNSC was already set in stone and in the USA's favor(it got its friend on the Council).

Whereas France? We were throwing them a bone, likewise with the occupation zone in West Germany.

Since France's Empire had quite the size of Britain's one in 1950, I don't see the point.

 

[Ryan]

Since France's Empire had quite the size of Britain's one in 1950, I don't see the point.

I think the point is more that at the time the UK was considered a superpower (along with USA and USSR) and more of an equal with the US (though obviously not an equal) than France, which was probably seen as a weak country that should do what the US tells it to.

 

[Simon]

... effectively confirming de Gaulle's belief that NATO undermined French autonomy and institutionalised French inferiority to the United States and United Kingdom.

Did it? I don't know about enough about early-period NATO but did the UK really have all that much, if any, sort of preferential position within it compared to France? The only thing I can think of is the UK being the other thermonuclear power in the alliance whilst France was still about a year away from testing their first nuclear device and roughly nine years from testing a thermonuclear one. That's bound to require more coordination but would it really disadvantage France that much? Sure de Gaulle could be touchy with his need for national grandeur but as Matteo said it does seem to suggest a demand made as much for the expected refusal as acceptance.

I think the point is more that at the time the UK was considered a superpower (along with USA and USSR)...

I doubt they were really considered a superpower so much as a great power on the next rung down the ladder. Their main advantage was being one of the Big Three, their Empire, and not having to live down/recover from being militarily defeated and then four years of occupation and collaboration.

 

[Strategos' Risk]

I think there's also the matter of French suspicion that NATO leadership was seen as a cousin's alliance between the Anglo powers.

 

[TinyTartar]

I think the point is more that at the time the UK was considered a superpower (along with USA and USSR) and more of an equal with the US (though obviously not an equal) than France, which was probably seen as a weak country that should do what the US tells it to.

There is something to this. The British Empire may have died after the Suez Crisis, but it was still seen (wrongly, in my view) as an elite superpower by many countries in the world, and had enormous amounts of cultural capital even if at home it was slowly heading down the path to be the sick man of Europe.

France, on the other hand, had been occupied by the Nazis in the most humiliating fashion, had lost or was losing two colonial wars, and was reliant on the US to keep those wars going. It had a political system in constant turmoil, and was being economically lapped by West Germany. De Gaulle may have been the only French leader of the early Cold War to command respect, but he was also kind of delusional.

There is no reason to shift NATO's structure over hurt French feelings. Now, could it have been done? Yes. After all, France's occupation zone and security council presence gave them international prestige to justify such an action, but they would be an unequal partner.

 

[Strategos' Risk]

What if the U.S. agreed it, in exchange for France decolonizing Vietnam and Algeria in a way that would make the locals happy.

 

[Simon]

What if the U.S. agreed it, in exchange for France decolonizing Vietnam and Algeria in a way that would make the locals happy?

Why would the US care about Vietnam or Algeria to cede that kind of influence to the French?

 

[celt]

Since France's Empire had quite the size of Britain's one in 1950, I don't see the point.

In the early 50s, bear in mind, the UK was still roughly producing half of Western Europe's industrial output, of course that changed rapidly with a West German growth rate of 9% and France and Italy on about 5-6%. why the UK got stuck on 2-3%. The Suez crisis and the coming of the Common Market ended any pretensions of Britain being a third force in world affairs. de Gaulle's request was, I believe, just a token gesture, however, the French were probably pissed that the US, UK and Canadians liked to meet up separately to talk about defence issues.