WI Daimler Benz Panther?

I realize that I am in the minority here, but I just do not buy the argument about needing to have technical superiority. What made the Panzer divisions so formidable was not their equipment but their tactics and training, plus the specific decision to equip all tanks with radios. As I said earlier, remember all those times during Barbarossa and Typhoon when obsolete Panzer Is and IIs repeatedly defeated far better Soviet tanks long after the surprise wore off.
I agree that tactics and training were far more important, though I´d also caution that later on the advantage in that regard against the Soviets was smaller than during Barbarossa and Typhoon. And I made in an earlier thread the rough calculation that by foregoing production of both Tiger and Panther they could at most field in their place twice their number in T34 copies instead. And that was the high number which made some rather optimistic assumptions about resources, industrial organisation and manpower available. Now by concentrating on the Pz IV, an established model the chances to achieve that rise, but they would still face 4:1 odds just against the T34s produced alone. If they were able to concentrate all these tanks on the Eastern Fronts that is. And not mentioning other tank models used there. Pretty harsh demands on a tank that is about equal to its main opponents.
To your specific points, I don't know if you read through this whole thread, but in the scenario that we worked out the Germans are willing to wait until 1944 to introduce this tank, meaning that they do have time to do the completely new turret.
If they already wait until 44, then why should they introduce at that point a tank which clearly is maxed out in its armament, instead of an improved version of the larger MAN tank, where otl it is proven that it would have had growth potential. It would have been possible to upgrade that one with an 88mm gun in the future. Meanwhile while the Pz IV with Kwk42 failed ultimately due to weight issues, it also had some other issues, namely crew space in the turret, which would not have been better in the DB modell, since it had the same turret ring diameter. And the diameter can´t be increased without changing the hull.
Regarding water bodies, that's unfortunate, but even if true its still better than a vehicle that spontaneously breaks down three-fourths of the time like the early model Panthers did.
With a longer design stage the reliability issues in the MAN would probably have been adressed before fielding it. It is of course possible that the DB would have addressed its water problem as well, so with a delayed introduction neither does matter all that much. But at the point the decision was made otl it is imo understandable to want a tank that could ford a river.
As for the less stable platform, you admit that this would be outweighed by better reliability.
In your delayed introduction reliability both can only be solved fully by changing the suspension, but it is unlikely in the middle of a war. OTL the Panthers reliability did improve, even with the same suspension. The stability disadvantage of the leaf suspension is inherent in the design though.
As for being only a moderate improvement over the Panzer IV, this tank would have the exact same optics and same gun as OTL Panther, meaning that it would be able to penetrate a T-34-85 from 2000m, while the reverse would be the case from several hundred meters. That is a big margin of superiority, far bigger than that of the Panzer IV/48.
I made the comparison from the point the decision was made otl, at which moment the advantage to the PzIV was far smaller. And while the further development could have changed that, a longer development would also have helped the MAN design and that from a better starting point.

You also did not address the issue of the operational range. The petrol engine was necessary for good reasons and with it the DB design had a range not all that much better than the Tiger, which is damn pitiful for a medium tank. Barring a breakthrough in engine technology that did not happen otl there is no choice but expanding the hull for larger fuel tanks to address that problem.

To sum it up the main drawbacks of the DB version can only be solved by enlarging the hull (though they could limit the need to enlarge it by accepting that the tank can´t be upgunned further), which would increase the weight, just like the new turret with the larger gun never tested otl. Now who is to say what 5-10 tons more will do to the better power to weight ratio and the reliability which were the main advantages to the MAN? While MAN will have solved some of their issues and still have plenty room for upgrades.
 
Actually Tatra during war from V910 developed diesel engine V955 with 18 cylinders and 300 HP.

However, wouldn't have Germans problem to supply diesel fuel. I read that while gas they could manufacture synthetically with diesel fuel there was not such possibility.

No, Nine Fischer-Tropsch process plants made heavier fuels like lube oil, Diesel and Kerosene, over 3 million tons, while the 12 larger lignite coal
hydrogenation plants made the high grade gasoline, 18 million tons.

Germany was more concerned with higher octane gasoline production, but was able to make more Diesel



 
The MAN Panther never became particularly reliable compared to the DB even in 1944 and after. I hope you don't mind, but I am going to copy-and-paste some of the quotes I re-posted earlier in this thread. They are rather long. The last one is particularly revealing:

From "A FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE PANTHER TANK," a very interesting post at WOT: "Mid- to late-war US and British tanks, such as the Sherman, Cromwell and Comet, were expected to cover long distances under their own power as and when needed. The Panther could not be counted upon to do this... The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km...Half of the abandoned Panthers found in Normandy in 1944 showed evidence of breaks in the final drive."

From Tanks Encyclopedia: "Daimler-Benz’s design sported a well-sloped low hull, permitted by a well-proven, although “old school” solution, with leaf spring suspensions combined with large doubled roadwheels and no return rollers. This gave the tank a low silhouette and narrow hull, and thus kept the weight under the allocated limit."

From Wikipedia: "DB's proposal used an external leaf spring suspension, in contrast to the MAN proposal of twin torsion bars. Wa Pruef 6's opinion was that the leaf spring suspension was a disadvantage and that using torsion bars would allow greater internal hull width. It also opposed the rear drive because of the potential for track fouling. Daimler Benz, however, still preferred the leaf springs over a torsion bar suspension as it resulted in a silhouette about 200 mm (7.9 in) shorter and rendered complex shock absorbers unnecessary. The employment of a rear drive provided additional crew space and also allowed for a better slope on the front hull, which was considered important in preventing the penetration by armour piercing shells.[8] On 5 March 1942, Albert Speer reported that Hitler considered the Daimler-Benz design to be superior to MAN's design."

From Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 by Robert Forczyk, Pages 11-12: "After Todt's death in February 1942, Albert Speer became head of the Reich's Armaments Ministry and his principal deputy was Karl-Otto Saur, an ambitious and sycophantic Nazi engineer. Saur's main goal was to gain favor with Hitler by "achieving the impossible," and he saw the new medium tank program as a means to that end. While Speer also preferred the Daimler-Benz design, Saur realized that it would take time to develop a diesel engine, and that did not fit his personal agenda. Saur was able to convince Speer that the new tank had to enter production by December 1942, although this goal was not based on strategic considerations... Although the Daimler-Benz VK 30.02 may not have "looked German," its rear wheel drive and diesel engine would have provided the German Panzerwaffe with a more mechanically reliable tank." The "also" is a reference to Todt, who preferred the DB as well.

In conclusion, the MAN Panther's unrelenting reliability problems meant that its effective range, as opposed to its range on paper, was almost certainly lower than the DB would have been.

Regarding whether the Germans could have sustained the loss ratio from concentrating on the Panzer IV/48 and wiking's improved Marder until 1944, the answer is yes. The losses at Kursk were 760 tanks and assault guns for the Germans and 6,064 for the Soviets, a ratio of roughly 9-1. Keep in mind that at that battle they were attacking into the teeth of lavishly prepared defenses that had been built over the course of months. In normal circumstances it will be even more unbalanced.
 
The MAN Panther never became particularly reliable compared to the DB even in 1944 and after. I hope you don't mind, but I am going to copy-and-paste some of the quotes I re-posted earlier in this thread. They are rather long. The last one is particularly revealing:

From "A FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE PANTHER TANK," a very interesting post at WOT: "Mid- to late-war US and British tanks, such as the Sherman, Cromwell and Comet, were expected to cover long distances under their own power as and when needed. The Panther could not be counted upon to do this... The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km...Half of the abandoned Panthers found in Normandy in 1944 showed evidence of breaks in the final drive."

From Tanks Encyclopedia: "Daimler-Benz’s design sported a well-sloped low hull, permitted by a well-proven, although “old school” solution, with leaf spring suspensions combined with large doubled roadwheels and no return rollers. This gave the tank a low silhouette and narrow hull, and thus kept the weight under the allocated limit."

From Wikipedia: "DB's proposal used an external leaf spring suspension, in contrast to the MAN proposal of twin torsion bars. Wa Pruef 6's opinion was that the leaf spring suspension was a disadvantage and that using torsion bars would allow greater internal hull width. It also opposed the rear drive because of the potential for track fouling. Daimler Benz, however, still preferred the leaf springs over a torsion bar suspension as it resulted in a silhouette about 200 mm (7.9 in) shorter and rendered complex shock absorbers unnecessary. The employment of a rear drive provided additional crew space and also allowed for a better slope on the front hull, which was considered important in preventing the penetration by armour piercing shells.[8] On 5 March 1942, Albert Speer reported that Hitler considered the Daimler-Benz design to be superior to MAN's design."

From Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 by Robert Forczyk, Pages 11-12: "After Todt's death in February 1942, Albert Speer became head of the Reich's Armaments Ministry and his principal deputy was Karl-Otto Saur, an ambitious and sycophantic Nazi engineer. Saur's main goal was to gain favor with Hitler by "achieving the impossible," and he saw the new medium tank program as a means to that end. While Speer also preferred the Daimler-Benz design, Saur realized that it would take time to develop a diesel engine, and that did not fit his personal agenda. Saur was able to convince Speer that the new tank had to enter production by December 1942, although this goal was not based on strategic considerations... Although the Daimler-Benz VK 30.02 may not have "looked German," its rear wheel drive and diesel engine would have provided the German Panzerwaffe with a more mechanically reliable tank." The "also" is a reference to Todt, who preferred the DB as well.

In conclusion, the MAN Panther's unrelenting reliability problems meant that its effective range, as opposed to its range on paper, was almost certainly lower than the DB would have been.

Regarding whether the Germans could have sustained the loss ratio from concentrating on the Panzer IV/48 and wiking's improved Marder until 1944, the answer is yes. The losses at Kursk were 760 tanks and assault guns for the Germans and 6,064 for the Soviets, a ratio of roughly 9-1. Keep in mind that at that battle they were attacking into the teeth of lavishly prepared defenses that had been built over the course of months. In normal circumstances it will be even more unbalanced.

Those losses you quote are for both Soviet offensives not just the German one.

It again reflects the way in which the Russians use their armor - in a far more cavilier fashion than the Germans did - as I mentioned on the other thread - this a result of the then lesser average skill at arms relative to the average German and having far greater numbers as well as the ability to replace such losses.

Remember that while the Russians 'lost'* more tanks than the Germans they did gain an advantage on the eastern front from those losses which they subsequantly never lost.

I agree with both of you a simpler more reliable tank in 1943 than the Panther built in larger numbers would probably = a greater chance of a given German Infantry units having armor support and therefore suffereing fewer losses as a result in the attack/ counter attack.

It would have made more sense - although with improved allied tanks coming online in late 1944 in large numbers such a design might be found wanting.

However having more tanks and using them in action means more tanks being 'exposed to danger' - so while there would be fewer losses by % to mechanical issues (assuming such a tank is more reliable than the OTL Panther) over all the actual number of tank losses to Mines, infantry attacks, artillery and AT guns would rise.

I dont think such a tank would result in a stale mate on the Eastern Front - that would require a major change in stategy - ie the acceptance that a more mobile battle needed to be fought and that requires no Hitler at this stage -as well as some how addressing the mismatch in numbers - but having more 'good enough' tanks would potentially slow down Red army sucesses and again result in fewer overall losses in men at the cost of greater AFV losses.

*Note that many of those 6000 'lost' tanks were subsequantly recovered and put back into service
 
Those losses you quote are for both Soviet offensives not just the German one.

It again reflects the way in which the Russians use their armor - in a far more cavilier fashion than the Germans did - as I mentioned on the other thread - this a result of the then lesser average skill at arms relative to the average German and having far greater numbers as well as the ability to replace such losses.

Remember that while the Russians 'lost'* more tanks than the Germans they did gain an advantage on the eastern front from those losses which they subsequantly never lost.

I agree with both of you a simpler more reliable tank in 1943 than the Panther built in larger numbers would probably = a greater chance of a given German Infantry units having armor support and therefore suffereing fewer losses as a result in the attack/ counter attack.

It would have made more sense - although with improved allied tanks coming online in late 1944 in large numbers such a design might be found wanting.

However having more tanks and using them in action means more tanks being 'exposed to danger' - so while there would be fewer losses by % to mechanical issues (assuming such a tank is more reliable than the OTL Panther) over all the actual number of tank losses to Mines, infantry attacks, artillery and AT guns would rise.

I dont think such a tank would result in a stale mate on the Eastern Front - that would require a major change in stategy - ie the acceptance that a more mobile battle needed to be fought and that requires no Hitler at this stage -as well as some how addressing the mismatch in numbers - but having more 'good enough' tanks would potentially slow down Red army sucesses and again result in fewer overall losses in men at the cost of greater AFV losses.

*Note that many of those 6000 'lost' tanks were subsequantly recovered and put back into service

Its a fair point about the losses-the numbers for the German offensive alone are 323 for the Germans versus 1614 minimum for the Soviets, a manageable 1-5 ratio.

Regarding German AFV loss rates going up the more they have, it just depends on how they're used. If they are wasted frivolously and dispersed over the front, then they will lose more due to the causes you suggest. However, if they are held back in concentrated reserves and deployed specifically against Soviet armored formations at the point of breakthrough, then the overwhelming bulk of the fighting will be against other AFVs, in which case the Germans will enjoy all the advantages that wiking and I have brought up.
 
Top